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forum

THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

It has been five and a half years since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Soviet forces have now been engaged in that country longer than they were involved in the Great Patriotic War, and there is presently no end in sight. As resistance to the Soviet occupation has stiffened, Soviet tactics have become increasingly brutal and indiscriminate, including the deliberate destruction of villages, the systematic killing of noncombatants, and the forced transfer of thousands of Afghan youths to the Soviet Union for education and political indoctrination. The current "ORBIS Forum" examines Soviet efforts to pacify Afghanistan, and the state of the resistance. The contributors are **Milan Hauner,** *a historian and currently the 1984-85 Thornton D. Hooper Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute;* **Alex R. Alexiev,** *member of the professional staff of the Rand Corporation;* **Anthony Arnold,** *Visiting Scholar at the Hoover Institution; and* **Robert L. Canfield,** *Professor of Anthropology at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri.*

SEIZING THE THIRD PARALLEL: GEOPOLITICS AND THE SOVIET ADVANCE INTO CENTRAL ASIA*

by MILAN HAUNER

In July 1868, a senior British army officer and well-known orientalist, Sir Henry Rawlinson, submitted to the India Office in London a memorandum on the "Central Asian Question," for which he would today have been called a "hawk." If true, he was then most appreciative of Russia's skill in pursuing her Central Asian expansion with utmost caution and temper: "Although steadfastly making progress year by year — whether from accident or design is immaterial — she has never placed her foot beyond

* The present contribution is part of my work in progress, under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, on the "Geostrategic Implications of the Soviet Move into Central Asia." Research in the London archives has been supported by a grant from the American Philosophical Society.

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that point from which she could, if required, conveniently, withdraw it." In a brilliant summary, particularly relevant today, Rawlinson then portrays Russia's approach to India like an army investing a fortress: She had already laid the first parallel ("a mere line of observation") along the Orenburg-Irtysh line, ready to take up the next one ("line of demonstration") from Krasnovodsk along the Oxus River to the Pamir plateau, and thinking of seizing the third parallel, running from Herat to Kabul and Kandahar. "Established upon such a line, her position would indeed be formidable. . . and all forces of Asia would be inadequate to expel her."[1]

In light of the confirmed seizure of the "Third Parallel," I shall reflect herein upon past Russian advances into Central Asia and offer a few thoughts about present and future Soviet predicaments in that area.

The emphasis on the historical dimension for understanding the present Soviet position on the Southern Tier is important for two reasons. It is my belief that through its two powerful manifestations, ideological and geopolitical, the historical dimension strongly influences present Soviet strategic thinking. Second, in view of the inaccessibility of Soviet decision-making processes, there is no other starting platform for formulating opinions and hypotheses than the recorded and reassessed historical evidence. Besides, Soviet leaders are known to pay greater attention to the lessons of the past than do their Western counterparts.

My central argument is not that the present masters of the Kremlin have been following some outdated tsarist master plan about breaking out from the limitations of the Eurasian heartland in the direction of the warm waters of the Persian Gulf, but rather that a combination of factors, on a global as well as local scale, stimulated greatly by accidental opportunities created along the Southern Tier of the Soviet land fortress, might do the trick. And yet, the amazing similarity between old blueprints and present actions is often so striking that the question of continuity is legitimate and must be addressed.

War in Afghanistan

The recent fifth anniversary of the Soviet military takeover of Afghanistan in December 1979 offered more than a melancholy opportunity for routine stock-taking. In Special Report No. 118 the U.S. Department of State characterized the outlook for the immediate future of Afghanistan as grim, and concluded "that the fighting will continue for the foreseeable future."[2] As the conduct of Soviet operations grows more

[1] IOR (India Office Records) L/P&S/18/C 3. See also *England and Russia in the East* (London: 1875) by the same author.

[2] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Special Report No. 118, December 1984: *Afghan Resistance and Soviet Occupation. A 5-Year Summary.*

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ferocious, the *mujahidin* resistance will not cease, despite the heavy price these simple but courageous Muslim fighters are paying for their determination to resist a foreign godless power that imposed an alien government upon them. For all their awesome disunity, generated by their ceaseless tribal feuds, they will continue to fight their lonely *Jihad,* without much hope of strong foreign assistance, let alone intervention. At the same time, however, regardless of ineffective international efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement,[3] the Soviets will press on with their long-term strategy, aiming not only at wearing down the guerrillas, but at the permanent sovietization of the entire country. There should be no mistake about their determination, for they are prepared to sit it out, even if it is going to take them years like the eradication of the *basmachi* resistance in Turkestan during the 1920s.

In military terms, the Soviets and whatever remains of the loyal Afghan forces have resorted to a policy of escalation and diversification. The former has been practiced through systematic scorched-earth tactics against all active resistance groups and their areas of activity, as exemplified in the resumption of the combined operations consisting of armored thrusts and airborne commandos in the Panjshir Valley last year (from which we have had outstanding reports by journalists like Edward Girardet and Anthony Davis).[4] This has further swollen the number of refugees from Afghanistan in the neighboring countries of Pakistan and Iran to an estimated total of just under 3.5 million (Afghans).

The diversification of Soviet military tactics is caused by several factors. Like the Americans in Vietnam, the Soviet military had still to learn the bitter lesson of fighting an antiguerrilla war for which they had no experience. Since 1979, however, they have not only improved their tactics, and gained valuable combat experience in testing new weapons, but they have improved their ground-air cooperation within the command-control structure of smaller units. Although they modestly increased their contingent inside Afghanistan to some 115,000 troops,[5] supported by about 35,000 troops from the Turkestan Military District (MD) across the border, their air command remains total and overwhelming. In addition to about 1,000 fixed-wing aircraft employed in Afghanistan itself or in the neighboring Turkestan MD, some 400 helicopters, including the

[3] Most persistently advocated by Selig S. Harrison, e.g.: "A Breakthrough in Afghanistan?" *Washington Post,* December 27, 1983; "Afghanistan Stalemate," *Parameters* (Winter 1984); "L'Afghanistan: Une Solution Politique Est-elle Possible?" *Politique Etrangère,* 3/1984.

[4] Writing for *Christian Science Monitor* and *Washington Post* respectively.

[5] This is the official estimate by the U.S. Department of State (see note 2 above). Some analysts have put the figure as high as 150,000, e.g., David C. Isby, "Afghanistan 1982: The War Continues," *International Defense Review,* 11/1982, pp. 1523-1528; Bernard Dupaigne, "L'armée soviétique en Afghanistan," *L'Alternative* (Paris) 31/1985, pp. 4-11.

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dreaded Mi-24 gunships, are available to the Soviets.[6] According to recent reports counterinsurgency operations, masterminded by the KGB and KHAD (its Afghan equivalent), have been successfully used behind the lines to eliminate some of the guerrilla leaders.[7] The bulk of the Soviet troops inside Afghanistan, however, is never engaged in directly fighting the *mujahidin* resistance. Rather, the Soviets sustain the large strategic infrastructure —guarding the main communications, maintaining pipelines, protecting garrisons etc. — which happens to be constantly under guerrilla attack. The estimated 20,000 to 25,000 Soviet war casualties over the five-year period, of whom about one-third are dead, are regarded as perfectly manageable from the Soviet point of view, in the absence of a critical public opinion and independent media inside the USSR.[8]

In a somewhat isolated position remains the unconfirmed allegation that six of the seven motorized rifle divisions currently stationed in Afghanistan are deployed in the southwestern corner of the country, as if poised for an attack across the Iranian and Pakistani border on Baluchistan in order to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean.[9] In view of the arid terrain and absence of water, and, more importantly, the lack of the necessary infrastructure supported by a modern railway or efficient road system, it does not seem feasible at present to deploy such a large Soviet force between Herat and Kandahar, despite the undoubted historical attraction of this particular line of advance, which must have been on Russian and British minds since the heyday of the famed Great Game. One cannot resist recalling how skillfully for instance the future Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, presented the "Seistan Question" to the British public in the 1890s, portraying the double-threat behind the potential Russian advance toward a maritime outlet in the south, either via Meshed through Persian Khorasan, or via Herat through western Afghanistan, because "the forward frontier of Russia would be brought over 300 miles nearer to the advanced frontier of India. . ." and created "unlimited opportunities from this base of intriguing with trans-frontier tribes, and of nibbling at Baluchistan."[10]

Although the geographic and climatic obstacles do not now allow the Soviets to concentrate mechanized troops in inhospitable Seis-

[6] Isby, "The War Continues"; and James B. Curren and Phillip A. Karber, "Afghanistan's Ordeal Puts a Region at Risk," *International Armed Forces Journal* (March 1985), pp. 78-105.

[7] Edward Girardet, "Migratory Genocide: The Soviets Declare Afghanistan a Free-Fire Zone," *The New Republic,* March 4, 1985, pp. 13-16; *BBC World News,* report by Gordon Adam, March 4, 1985.

[8] U.S. Department of State "A 5-Year Summary." Other estimates are much higher: Dupaigne and Girardet put the figures close to 20,000 Soviets killed in Afghanistan (above, nn. 5 and 7).

[9] Cf. Yossef Bodansky, "The Bear on the Chessboard: Soviet Military Gains in Afghanistan," *World Affairs,* (Winter 1982/3), pp. 273-298.

[10] G. N. Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question* (London: 1892), vol. 1, ch. 9, p. 236.

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tan, this does not alter the basic geostrategic fact that the southernmost forward line of the Soviet defense perimeter has been moved forward since December 1979 from their railhead at Kushka by about 500 km closer to the shores of the Indian Ocean. From their upgraded airbases at Shindad and Farah, the distance as the crow flies to Chah Bahar on the Makran coast of Persian Baluchistan is 900 or 800 km respectively, within the reach of their tactical ground attack aircraft, and sufficient enough to carry out reconnaissance flights far into the Indian Ocean.[11]

Estimates have been made that the Soviets could launch an operation from Seistan to reach Chah Bahar within twenty days, advancing at a conservative rate of 30 km a day across rugged terrain and poor tracks.[12] But the advance could be even faster if airborne troops were used in support, together with the so-called SPETSNAZ units (*spetsialnoye nazvanie*).[13] After five years in Afghanistan, during which they may have totaled more than half a million men in combat conditions, the Soviets should have at their disposal enough experienced personnel for forming several such groups, specially trained in mountain and desert warfare.[14] A Soviet reporter permitted us a few blurred glimpses about the exploits of such a unit in that very area: "In two weeks, destroying the remnants of counter-revolutionary bands, they drove about 1,300 km [i.e., over 90 km a day!] over the stony deserts and shifting sands of Seistan in a 50°C heat, in order that children, the whole Afghan nation, could live in peace, and that the dreams about the lofty future could be fulfilled."[15]

This typical conclusion in a Soviet-style report from the war zone in Afghanistan only partially reflects the schizophrenic nature of the indoctrinated mind trying to prove that a military invasion of a foreign country is justified by the ultimate Communist utopia. There is more to it. It also demonstrates the pervasiveness of ideology in the Soviet way of thinking. It is one important element in the "correlation of forces" (*sootnoshenie sil*), which guides the Soviet mind whenever it is confronted with the question of taking risky choices and assessing both domestic and

[11] According to *Soviet Military Power* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense 1984), p. 55, most of the Soviet tactical aircraft operating from Afghan air bases, MiG-23, MiG-27, Su-17, Su-24, have a sufficient radius of action to operate in the Gulf of Oman.

[12] I am grateful to Professor Michael McGwire for showing me his unpublished chapter, "Soviet Military Objectives—VI: The Southern Theater" (June 1984), p. 17.

[13] On SPETSNAZ: F. N. Smith, "On Soviet Unconventional Warfare," *Defense & Foreign Affairs,* (June 1983), pp. 7-8; *Jane's Defence Weekly,* November 10, 1984, pp. 840-1; Isby, "The War Continues."

[14] Joseph Collins has noticed a conspicuous increase of articles on mountain and desert warfare in specialized Soviet military journals since 1979 (id., "Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan: A Preliminary Assessment," *Comparative Strategy,* 2/1983, p. 162).

[15] I. Shchedrov, "Budni dalekoi provintsii" (Everyday Life in a Far-off Province), *Pravda,* October 4, 1981. Yossef Bodansky, "Soviet Military Gains," p. 295, who quotes from this article, implies that this special unit "carried out a two-week sweep into Iranian Seistan," which Shchedrov's article of course does not mention at all.

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foreign reaction.[16] Whatever the temptations, and however conducive to the Soviets launching a surprise airborne operation with the aim of seizing, let's say, Chah Bahar, lying only 600 km further south, the masters of the Kremlin will always carefully scrutinize the pros and cons in the sociopolitical complex of this highly volatile and unstable region. "Russia has always had her reserves in readiness, and has not only secured her communications with her base," wrote Sir Henry Rawlinson some 120 years ago, "but has also looked to her lateral supports, so as to combine the whole forward movement in one harmonious operation."[17]

While "intriguing . . . and nibbling at Baluchistan," they would definitely prefer to wait and see, until more favorable situations in neighboring Iran and Pakistan emerge, to secure the area as an act of *fait accompli*.[18] Naturally, an invitation from a future "People's Socialist Republic of Baluchistan," but preferably without the prospect of protracted guerrilla warfare like the Afghan case, would be the smartest solution of this kind. And no amount of U.S. nuclear deterrence is going to prevent it, especially if the "invitation" were to receive the backing, however reluctant, of the nonaligned countries led by India, with NATO-Europe as passive onlookers pursuing détente with the Soviet Union.

Attention should, therefore, be paid to the progress of sovietization inside Afghanistan itself, which has been advancing relentlessly. There is evidence enough to show how the Afghan army, now consisting, because of desertions, of less than half its original strength of 90,000 men in 1979, has been streamlined into an obedient Soviet tool. The same goes for other governmental institutions and universities which are run by Soviet advisers and experts, especially Tajiks as interpreters, often drawn from the Central Asian republics because of cultural and linguistic affinities. Thousands of teenagers are being sent from Afghanistan into the Soviet Union for education and training; the figure now could be as many as 50,000. The first waves of young Afghans, conditioned by the social-engineering process, are already returning. This is a problem of extraordinary consequence. Some of the more far-sighted Afghan refugees in Peshawar, the unofficial headquarters of the *mujahidin,* have already

[16] For the concept of "correlation of forces" see Vernon Aspaturian, "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces," *Problems of Communism* (May-June 1980), pp. 1-18. On the military dimension see John Erickson, "The Soviet View of Deterrence: A General Survey," *Survival* (November-December 1982), pp. 242-49.

[17] See note 1 above.

[18] For the moment, the *baluch* rebels do not seem to be desperately anxious to play the Russian card. See Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow. Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1981).

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MAP A: AFGHANISTAN TODAY



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expressed their anxiety in demanding the urgent establishment of a free Afghan university-in-exile.[19]

While part of the country south of the Hindu Kush, with the exception of the capital Kabul and several garrison towns, is left for further devastation as a giant firing range for Soviet troops, there is a discernible policy to link up the infrastructure of the economically more valuable northern provinces with that of the Soviet Central Asian republics. Natural gas, the country's major export item, is being pumped directly across the border, with no distribution pipelines to Afghan cities. In the spring of 1982, the Russians completed a new bridge across the Amu Darya between Termez and Heyratan, and thus succeeded, after almost a century of vain attempts, to put a railway line on Afghan territory. Another railway line reportedly is being built between the old Russian border fortress of Kushka and Herat.[20] It remains to be seen how far and in which direction the future rail network in Afghanistan is going to be stretched, and whether Lord Curzon's warning about Russia using her railways as by far the most potent weapon in her subjugation of Asia, marking "a complete and bloodless absorption," is going to be confirmed.[21]

The war in Afghanistan is, of course, only one of several crises in the region, although the one in which the Soviets are most directly involved at present. The Revolution in Iran, the Gulf War and the threat to the oil traffic from the same region, together with the responses of the great powers involved, are further catalysts in the chain of crises which has been ongoing since 1978 in Central Asia, after a long period of apparent calm. Perhaps this is the reason for the continuing disunity among Western interpreters of the Soviet military takeover in Afghanistan. There are those who look upon the invasion as a face-saving measure on Moscow's part, designed to salvage the impatient Afghan revolutionaries from allowing themselves to be engulfed in a self-defeating counter-insurgent warfare against growing fundamentalist tribal resistance. This interpretation is contradicted by those who, more aware of the geopolitical dicta and historical parallels, perceive the invasion as a long-overdue Soviet

[19] Anthony Hyman, *Afghan Resistance: Danger from Disunity*, Conflict Studies No. 161 (London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1984); id., "Victim of a Wicked Stepmother," *The Times Higher Educational Supplement*, November 2, 1984; Alexandre Bennigsen, "Mullahs, Mujahidin & Soviet Muslims," *Problems of Communism* (November-December 1984), p. 35; Richard Bernstein, "Remaking Afghanistan in the Soviet Image," *New York Times Magazine*, March 24, 1985; Jeri Laber and Barnett Rubin, "The War in the City: The Gulag Reaches Kabul," *The New Republic*, March 4, 1985, pp. 16-18; and Girardet, ibid., p. 15.

[20] See map B. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Background Brief*, "The Afghan Economy," September 1984, p. 5.

[21] Curzon, *Persia* I, pp. 72-79.

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attempt to take possession, under whatever pretext, of the Afghan base and use it as a stepping stone for a whole range of further advances:[22]

(1) Descending either via western Iran or Baluchistan to the warm waters of the Gulf to control the oil traffic.

(2) As a long-overdue countermeasure to the potential U.S. nuclear deployment in the Indian Ocean and to check the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).

(3) As the first step toward a long-term objective of exploiting the Indo-Pakistani feud in order to establish an overriding control within the whole subcontinent.

(4) Finally, and perhaps most important from the geopolitical perspective, as a significant move to complete the encirclement of China — Moscow's ultimate foe.

What should by now become sufficiently clear is that the traditional distinction between "defensive" and "offensive" actions is not very helpful when analyzing the actions of a superpower. This has been obvious to historians dealing with the phenomenon of the Great Game, that lofty common denominator for the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia, who recognized that terms like "aggressive" and "defensive" were not mutually exclusive in the given context.[23] In any case, continuing the offensive-defensive dispute five years into the war in Afghanistan would be entirely irrelevant. It may well be — and I am personally inclined to believe this — that the military takeover of December 1979 was forced upon the Soviet leaders by circumstances and must be seen, even in Moscow, as a setback in that it disrupted the original scenario for the

[22] Since too many authors have tried to interpret the motivations behind the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in December 1979, I have made a selection of the more pronounced views under three categories: (1) Pro-defensive: Most emphatic is Fred Halliday, "Revolution in Afghanistan," *New Left Review,* 112/1978, pp. 3-41; id., "War and Revolution in Afghanistan," ibid., 119/1980, pp. 20-41; id., *The Threat from the East? Soviet Policy from Afghanistan and Iran to the Horn of Africa* (London: Penguin, 1982). More balanced is George F Kennan in *U.S. News & World Report,* March 10, 1980. The alleged Chinese involvement in Afghanistan is blown up out of all proportion by Dev Murarka, "The Russian Intervention: A Moscow Analysis," *The Round Table* (April 1981), pp. 122-39. But he may be right on the subconscious fear of the "Yellow Peril" on the part of the Russians. (2) Pro-offensive views differ widely according to the emphasis they follow: Sir Olaf Caroe, "The Strategic After-Effects of India's Partition," *The Round Table,* (April 1980), pp. 129-37. Richard Pipes, "How Real is the Soviet Threat?" *U.S. News & World Report,* March 10, 1980. George Lenczowski, "The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf: An Encirclement Strategy," *International Journal,* 2/1982, pp. 307-27. Thomas T. Hammond, "Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf," *Survey* (Spring 1982), pp. 83-101. William E. Griffith, "Super-power Relations after Afghanistan," *Survival* (July-August 1980), pp. 146-51. (3) On the inter-changeability of offensive and defensive predicates: Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Moscow's Afghan Gamble," *The New Leader,* January 28, 1980, pp. 7-13. Edward N. Luttwak, "After Afghanistan, What?" *Commentary* (April 1980), pp. 40-49. Jiri Valenta, "From Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion," *International Security* (Fall 1980), pp. 114-41. A fascinating and historically more gradational analysis is John Erickson's memorandum presented to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, March 19, 1980, "The Soviet Invasion and its Consequences for British Policy" (HMSO London, 1980).

[23] e.g., David Gillar, *The Struggle for Asia, 1828-1914. A Study in British and Russian Imperialism,* (London: Methuen, 1977), pp. 181-82.

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continuation of the slow but systematic penetration of Afghanistan, which had started immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution during King Amanullah's reign (1919-29), and was accelerated, despite dormant periods, in the last thirty years.[24] What must not be forgotten is the fact that when Soviet troops occupied Kabul in December 1979, they had already controlled the strategic infrastructure of Afghanistan for several years: depots, airfields, major roads leading from the Soviet border, including the most important Salang Pass Highway across the Hindu Kush, completed under their plans and assistance in 1964. One day we may learn more details about the Soviet decision-making process during 1979 with regard to Afghanistan. Meanwhile, in the absence of reliable evidence, let us ponder the geopolitical dimension of the war in Afghanistan.

The Geopolitical Dimension I: The Historical Context

Apart from sharing the nuclear deterrence monopoly with the United States — of a relatively recent date — the status of Russia as a Great Power has rested for the last hundred years on two factors: the control of the largest landmass on our planet and the sheer size of her military might. This Eurasian landfortress, whose circumferential border comes close to 70,000 km, notwithstanding the great imbalance of internal distribution, is richly endowed with human, mineral, and energy resources that make the present Soviet superpower virtually self-sufficient. Ruled by a single power and ideology, with an unbroken tradition of autocracy and totalitarianism, this enormous Eurasian landmass can be truly regarded as one of only two geostrategic realms in the world; the other being the trade-dependent Atlantic Region.[25]

All this gives the Soviet superpower enormous strength, the advantage of inner communications, particularly in the European sector; at the same time, however, it is the source of its considerable weakness and vulnerability. The weakness is twofold: Excessive preoccupation with internal security because of continuous social and national upheavals inside Russia proper and in her surrounding buffer and client states. The second element of internal weakness is of a geostrategic nature: It is the empire's vulnerability to the two-front war contingencies located at the extremities of its 13,000 km-long west-east axis. There sit the two main theatres of future military operations (TVD = *teatr voiennykh deistvyi*),

[24] Milan Hauner, "The Significance of Afghanistan: Lessons from the Past," *The Round Table*, 279/1980, pp. 140-44; and "The Soviet Threat to Afghanistan and India, 1938-1940," *Modern Asian Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, vol. 15, ii, 1981), pp. 287-309.

[25] Saul B. Cohen, *Geography and Politics in a World Divided* (Oxford University Press, 1973); reassessed more recently by the same author: "Asymmetrical States and Global Geopolitical Equilibrium," *SAIS Review* (Summer-Fall 1984), pp. 193-212.

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the European one against NATO, and the Far Eastern one against China. This fundamental geostrategic dilemma is complicated by the severe geophysical limitations of Soviet sea power, which is divided into five isolated fleets and separate zones of operations.

Russia's predicament vis-à-vis the west-east axis dates from the last quarter of the nineteenth century when the decision was made to incorporate the Far East as an integral segment of the Russian Empire. Tsar Nicholas I epitomized the Russian determination to secure and fortify the Pacific coast when he rejected the request of his own foreign minister to abandon the recently founded fort at the mouth of the Amur river, bearing the tsar's own name, Nikolaevsk. "No," replied Nicholas, "where once the Russian flag has been raised it must never be lowered." [26] It was only symptomatic that the future capital of the Russian Far East, and its major naval base on the Pacific, was to be called Vladivostok, i.e., "Ruler of the East." The fictional determination to hold the Far East, come what may, became a reality with the decision to build the great Trans-Siberian Railway (1891-1904). It was a point of no return. Vladivostok has not changed its name during the entire Soviet era, though there are probably very few cities left in former colonial territories still bearing such a provocative imperialistic name. And there is little reason to expect that the present Soviet rulers of the Far East would hold their red flag in any less esteem than the tsarist conquerors held theirs.

The Far Eastern Front was fully tested for the first time during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), just as the great Trans-Siberian Railway had almost reached its completion. Russia lost the war, not because of a military threat in the West — there was none — but because of revolution inside the country and inadequate communications. Because the section round Lake Baikal was not completed, the Trans-Siberian could ferry only three military trains from west to east every twenty-four hours. It took forty days to send a train from Warsaw to Mukden where an army of more than one million men had to be supplied by land since the Japanese controlled the access from the ocean. A Russian fleet sent from the Baltic to penetrate the blockade was annihilated.

It is the central argument of this article that the security of this fragile west-east nexus, along which substantial stretches in inner and eastern Asia become synonymous with the safeguarding of the Trans-Siberian Railway, is of fundamental importance for understanding the Russian/Soviet strategic dilemma in geopolitical terms. In addition, it is also important for understanding the development of the legendary Russian "drive to the warm sea port."

[26] Violet Conolly, *Beyond the Urals. Economic Developments in Soviet Asia* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 11-12.

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To establish the sequence of Russia's historic urge to secure warm water outlets, say from Peter the Great onward, one must start with the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits leading into the Mediterranean, which accounted for most of Russia's military endeavors during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is often forgotten that almost simultaneously with the drive to the Black Sea (Azov campaign 1695-1696), Peter tried to gain access to the "Indo-Persian Corridor"[27] by sending his troops down across the Caspian Sea (occupation of Gilan and Mazandaran 1722/4-1732). The great geographic divide between the two warm seas was of course the Caucasus, which formed its own TVD, directed not only against the weaker flank of the Ottoman Empire, but against Persia as well. Once the Russians penetrated the Caucasus and subdued the mountain tribes of Daghestan led by the legendary Imam Shamil, a large army of almost 200,000 men was ready for a new venture.[28] Two ambitious targets for further military expansion were considered, Central Asia and the Far East, of which the latter could not be saturated with adequate troops because of the enormous distance involved and the lack of proper communications. Even as late as 1895 when Japan attacked China, Russia had no more than 15,000 troops in the Far East.[29] The most strategically sound idea, therefore, was to ship the bulk of the Army of the Caucasus across the Caspian Sea into Central Asia.

However, Russia's ambition to assert her military might on the Pacific coast as well as in Central Asia must be seen as two parallel endeavors. She could not advance in both directions at the same speed, nor could she allocate the same resources to both places. As the conquest of the Far East gained priority — notwithstanding the predominance of the European *platsdarm* where the bulk of Russian population and industrial activity is still to be found — the Southern Tier assumed an important dual function: to buttress the vulnerable lifeline connecting Europe with the Far East, soon to materialize into the Trans-Siberian railway, and to divert British attention from other fronts by threatening to attack India via Persia and Afghanistan.

For a while St. Petersburg debated which of the two advances would be most advantageous. New opportunities presented themselves along the Southern Tier to adventurous proconsuls, who tried to exploit their fortunes by steadily pushing the undefined frontiers ahead, often

[27] The term "Indo-Persian Corridor," which I suggest be used for Russian/Soviet attempts to advance from the Southern Tier in the direction of the Persian Gulf and India, seems to be the most adequate in view of historical continuity.

[28] See Rawlinson (n. 1 above); Louis Mallet, "Russian Advances in Asia, 1873," IOR: L/P&S/18/C 9; Colonel M. J. Venyukov, "The Progress of Russia in Central Asia, 1877", ibid., document C 17.

[29] A. L. Narochnitskiy, *Kolonial'naya politika kapitalisticheskikh derzhav na Dalnem Vostoke 1866-1895* (Moscow, 1956), pp. 696-99.

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regardless of instructions received from a government. This then created the classic environment for the pursuit of the Great Game whose operational range included China. Like the British advancing from their Indian stronghold in the northwest direction, the Russians became entangled in the same dilemma, as Prince Gorchakov succinctly put it, "of knowing where to stop."[30]

The construction of military railways provided the necessary logistic infrastructure for the successful completion of Russia's conquest of Central Asia and seemed to offer her a major advantage over the British in the Great Game. The first was the Trans-Caspian (1880-88), with its important Merv-Kushka extension (1897-1900), whereby for the first time a railhead was established on the Afghan border within 80 km of Herat; the second link was the Orenburg-Tashkent line (1897-1904), with the extension to the second railhead on the Afghan border at Termez (1914-16). Finally, the third important line was to be the "Turksib," the eastward connection between Turkestan and the Trans-Siberian, completed by the Soviets in 1931.[31] The British, fully aware of their inadequate transportation during the second Afghan War (1878-80), responded to the Russian challenge by speeding up their own railway constructions on the North-West Frontier and in Baluchistan. After overcoming the treacherous Bolan Pass they reached Quetta in 1887, and three years later completed the 4 km-long Khojak Tunnel, which brought the line to Chaman on the Afghan border, about 100 km south of Kandahar. Their second railhead in the Khyber Pass was not completed until 1925. In between, the British constructed a network of narrow-gauge military railways and roads in the nonadministered districts of what, since 1901, became the North-West Frontier Province and in Baluchistan. Finally, in order to undercut the anticipated Russian descent to the Indian Ocean via Seistan, a 700 km-long Quetta-Nushki Extension Railway was completed during World War I along the entire latitude of Baluchistan.[32]

The "Age of Railway Imperialism" reached its zenith in the competing designs for the never-materialized Trans-Persian Railway (see map B). While between 1874 and 1914 the Russians came up with several projects to cross Persia by rail along their north-south axis of expansion, the British exerted all possible diplomatic pressure to block such advances.

[30] W. Kerr Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan. A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 319-23.

[31] Compiled from George N. Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question* (London: Longmans & Green, 1889) Chapters 1-8; *id., Persia I,* pp. 72-79, 613-39; Georg Cleinow, *Roter Imperialismus. Eine Studie über Verkehrsprobleme der Sowjetunion* (Berlin: Jul. Springer, 1931), chapters 12-13; George Dobson, *Russia's Railway Advance into Central Asia* (London-Calcutta: 1890); A. M. Solov'eva, *Zheleznodorozhnyi transport Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX. veka* (Moscow: Nauka, 1975).

[32] Compiled from IOR: L/P&S/10/54 and 1188; L/P&S/C 152; L/P&S/20/A 96.

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MAP B: RAILWAY IMPERIALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA BEFORE 1918



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From their point of view the most dangerous Russian variant was the scheme connecting Ashkhabad with Meshed, and proceeding via Khorasan and Seistan, to terminate at Bandar Abbas overlooking the Strait of Hormuz. Such prospects greatly worried the British whose empire rested on sea supremacy, now directly challenged by the development of transcontinental railways. They felt that Russia's control of Seistan was a point of vital importance: ". . . we cannot allow her to descend on to the Persian Gulf and establish there a second Port Arthur!"[33]

The twentieth century saw the picture of the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia become complicated by the growing German menace, translated into the *Bagdadbahn* project, which was to terminate at the head of the Persian Gulf. Since the Russians felt equally uncomfortable about the German penetration of the Balkans and Asia Minor, they agreed to make temporary concessions to the British with regard to Afghanistan and to delineate spheres of influence in Persia. The outcome was the first important international agreement about "Greater Central Asia," i.e., stretching from Persia to Tibet, the St. Petersburg Convention of August 1907, which laid the foundation of the short-lived Anglo-Russian Entente.[34] The basic geopolitical realities for the two rivals facing each other in Central Asia remained, however, unaltered. Although Russia temporarily recognized Afghanistan as lying within the exclusive sphere of British influence, and abstained from further "nibbling at Baluchistan," the Committee of Imperial Defence retained the casus belli clause, stipulating that in the event of a Russian invasion of Afghanistan, Great Britain would declare war on Russia.[35] As for other areas along her Eurasian rimlands, Russia succeeded quietly in converting northern Persia and Outer Mongolia, during the very years of the Anglo-Russian Entente, into virtual protectorates, and intensified her infiltration of Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang).

During both World Wars, in terms of actual battle, Central Asia hardly seemed to have played a conspicuous role. And yet, its geopolitical weight was significant in the ensuing power struggle. In the course of the two global conflicts, it was Germany against whom the two old rivals, Britain and Russia, turned, while preserving a status quo along

[33] Quoted from H. R. Sykes, "Our Recent Progress in Southern Persia and Its Possibilities," *Proceedings of the Central Asian Society,* March 1, 1905. As late as 1916, the Russians were still pressing the British to obtain their consent for the construction of the "missing link," which existed between Termez and Peshawar, of the Indo-European Railway Connection. The 650 km-long link would have included a twenty-one km-long tunnel under the Hindu Kush (IOR: L/P&S/18/D 229).

[34] J. C. Hurewitz, ed., *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics. A Documentary Record,* vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 538-41.

[35] N. H. Gibbs, *Grand Strategy,* vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1976), p. 825; Beryl J. Williams, "The Strategic Background to the Anglo-Russian Entente of August 1907, *The Historical Journal,* ix, 3(1966), pp. 360-73.

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their mutual zones of friction. However, in the course of both world conflicts, there were brief stages during which Germany seemed to have worked in collusion with Russia in Central Asia against Great Britain: during 1918, following the implementations of the Brest-Litevsk Peace Treaty, and again between 1939 and 1941, during the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.

Following the two Russian revolutions of 1917, Turkestan seemed to be drifting in the same irresistible direction of separatism and disintegration as the other borderlands of the tsarist empire. While Bolshevik power rested solely on the maintenance of the only rail connection between the Russian heartland and Central Asia via Orenburg — largely cut off during the first two years of the Civil War — it remained confined to Tashkent, the only large russified city in Turkestan. Early on, however, the Bolsheviks, possessed two major advantages. Not only could they maintain and repair the railway network, but they seized the only professional force of military value available in Turkestan at that time. These were the prisoners-of-war, estimated to number over 30,000, mostly Austro-Hungarians, who, to escape malnutrition and boredom, had joined the Red Guards in Turkestan as *internatsionalisty*. Seen from the British angle, it became feasible to imagine a Turco-German sweep across Trans-Caspia, with the additional gloomy prospect of watching "these potential recruits of an army of world revolution" getting loose in the direction of India.[36]

The events of great upheaval in Central Asia from 1917-22 created a set of multiple political options which could have shaped the future of Turkestan far differently. This state of continuous flux created an unpredictable series of challenges and responses for all participants and victims in the division of spoils:

(1) German designs were directed at weakening British control over India, by exploiting the Turkish connection. They aimed at rousing the Muslim population of India through a mass tribal uprising on the North-West Frontier of India via Afghanistan. As a propaganda vehicle for Turkestan, the Germans earlier considered exploiting the Pan-Turanian movement (Enver Pasha). Although these schemes had been hatched in Berlin since 1915 (The Hentig-Niedermayer Expedition), preparations intensified after Brest-Litevsk during the short period between March and November 1918.[37]

[36] Compiled from the *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, vol. 6 (1919), pp. 3-11, 119-36; vol. 7 (1920), pp. 42-58; vol. 8 (1921), pp. 49-69; vol. 9 (1922), pp. 96-110.

[37] Ibid. See also Ulrich Gehrke, *Persien in der deutschen Orientpolitik während des Ersten Weltkrieges*, 2 vols., (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960).

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(2) British interventionists occupied Baku between the summer of 1918 and March 1919, to prevent the oil wells from falling into German hands, and moved into Trans-Caspia, to deny control of Russia's south-east passage to the Turco-German forces.[38]

(3) Intermittent centrifugal movements were created with German encouragement, such as the "Cossack South-Eastern Union," stretching from the Don region, Orenburg, to Semirechie, which might have influenced events in Turkestan, depending on the control of the Orenburg-Tashkent Railway.[39]

(4) The prospect of "Balkanization" of Central Asia might have given another temporary extension of life to the ex-Russian protectorates of Bukhara and Khiva.

(5) Or, alternatively, the replacement of the conservative Khanates by the forces of modern Islamic revival *(Jadids),* as epitomized by the short-lived existence of the "Provisional Government of Autonomous Turkestan" under Mustafa Chokaiev in Kokand, claimed authority over Russian Central Asia in competition with the all-European Tashkent Government. The Kokand experiment was savagely smashed by the Red Guards dispatched from Tashkent in February 1918.[40]

(6) An attempt to create a larger Islamic federation was led by the ambitious Amir Amanullah. Apart from Afghanistan, it was to consist of Bukhara and Khiva, and parts of Iran. In the event of British power collapsing in India, Amanullah undoubtedly would have extended claims to historic Afghan holdings across the Durand Line to the Indus River and stretching probably as far down as Sind and the Indian Ocean coast (cf. Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 and the origins of "Pashtunistan").[41]

(7) A Pan-Turanist federation in Central Asia — a lifelong dream of Enver Pasha, who finally reached Turkestan via Moscow in November 1921. Despite all his superb credentials (son-in-law of the *Khalif,* the last Turkish Sultan; ex-Minister of War, etc.,), the anti-Bolshevik guerrillas *(basmachi),* whom Enver immediately joined, refused to acknowledge his claim to overall leadership. After Enver's death in August 1922 amidst fighting, the incoherent *basmachi* resistance would linger on

[38] As in note 36 above. See also L. C. Dunsterville, *The Adventures of Dunsterforce* (London, 1920); F. M. Bailey, *Mission to Tashkent* (London: J. Cape, 1946).

[39] Anonymous, "Russia, Germany and Asia," *The Round Table,* vol. 8 (December 1917 to September 1918), pp. 526-64.

[40] Mustafa Chokaiev, "Turkestan and the Soviet Regime," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society,* vol. 18 (1931), pp. 403-20.

[41] Ikbal Ali Shah, "The Federation of the Central Asian States under the Kabul Government," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society,* vol. 7 (1920), pp. 29-49; Ludwig W. Adamec, *Afghanistan 1900-1923. A Diplomatic History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 108-68.

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into the 1930s, incapable, however, of offering any constructive solution for a viable political alternative in Central Asia.[42]

(8) A "Socialist Pan-Turan," was envisaged by the "red" Tatar, Sultan Galiev, Stalin's confident in the Commissariate of Nationalities. This option was temporarily exploited by the Bolsheviks during the Civil War, especially among the Tatars and Bashkirs. It was also useful as a propaganda vehicle for carrying out anti-imperialist slogans to rally non-European revolutionaries.[43]

(9) Finally, the option that materialized when all else had failed: the old status quo ante bellum, i.e., reconquest of Turkestan by the Bolsheviks, who emerged as winners from the Civil War, "to strengthen the links between the toiling masses of the Russian and Turkestan peoples . . . and to fulfill the Leninist policy on nationalities."[44]

Despite the suppression of the *basmachis,* the Bolsheviks could not postpone their anti-imperialist strategy and the promotion of world revolution from the Turkestan *platsdarm*. The failure of Communist takeovers in western Europe gave the advocates of anticolonial revolutions their chance to prevail with their own schemes through which they could couple the Civil War in Russia with cross-border subversions in order to disentangle their countries from British bondage — despite the late Soviet diplomatic recognition of Afghanistan of February 1921, or Enver Pasha, still pursuing the grand Pan-Turanian dream. From the Second Komintern Congress and the Congress of the Eastern Peoples in Baku (July and September 1920 respectively), the Bolshevik revolutionary strategy seemed to have radically switched to the pursuit of anticolonial subversions and uprisings in the East.

Scores of Indian revolutionaries and Muslim *muhajirs* were to be trained and provided with weapons on Soviet territory. At a propitious moment they were to be launched via friendly Afghanistan to infiltrate the Indian border. The prominent Indian Marxist, M. N. Roy, set up a military and propaganda center at Tashkent *(Indiiskiy dom);* Maulavi Barakatullah, V. N. Chattopadhyaya, and Raja Mahendra Pratap, who had worked during the war for the German emperor, were now keen to transfer their allegiance to Lenin.[45] India acquired a new dimension as the major

[42] Sir Olaf Caroe, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967); Essad Bey, *Die Verschwörung gegen die Welt* (Berlin, 1932); Azade-Ayse Rorlich, "Fellow Travellers: Enver Pasha and the Bolshevik Government 1918-1920," *Asian Affairs* (October 1982), pp. 288-96.

[43] Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union. A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1979).

[44] Quoted from Yu S. Akhtyamov, ed., *Istoriya Bukharskoi Narodnoi Sovetskoi Respubliki 1920-1924 gg. Sbornik dokumentov.* (Tashkent, 1976), p. 467.

[45] A. C. Bose, *Indian Revolutionaries Abroad* (Patna, 1971); M. N. Roy, *Memoirs* (Bombay 1964); C. S. Samra, *India and Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1947* (Bombay 1959); R. A. Ul'yanovsky, ed., *Komintern i Vostok* (Moscow, 1969 and 1978).

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external target in the Bolshevik strategy to enhance world revolution by striking at the most vulnerable spot in the edifice of British colonialism. "If we propound the solution of the right of self-determination for the colonies, the Hottentots, the Negroes, the Indians, etc., we lose nothing by it," Bukharin had already announced in March 1919, ". . . it is only water for our mill, since it contributes to the destruction of English imperialism."[46] Five months later, writing to the Central Committee, Trotsky exploited the idea in terms of military strategy:

> The sort of army, which at the moment can be of no significance in the European scales, can upset the unstable balance of Asian relationships, of colonial dependence, give a direct push to an uprising on the part of the oppressed masses and assure the triumph of such a rising in Asia . . .
> One authoritative military official already some months ago put up a plan for creating a cavalry corps (30,000-40,000 riders) with the idea of launching it against India.
> It stands to reason that a plan of this sort requires careful preparation, both material and political. We have up to now devoted too little attention to agitation in Asia. However, the international situation is evidently shaping in such a way that the road to Paris and London lies via the towns of Afghanistan, the Punjab and Bengal . . .[47]

This "authoritative military official" could easily have been the ex-tsarist General A. E. Snesarev (1865-1937), who headed the Academy of the General Staff in Moscow between 1919 and 1921. He was a very able military geographer, spoke fourteen languages, and spent many years in various parts of Central Asia. Convinced of Russia's historic mission to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, he did not think that the Bolshevik Revolution could have changed the fundamentals of Russia's geopolitical stand in this region, as he already had laid out in his principal work, *India as the Main Factor in the Central Asian Question* (1906). For a Russian military geographer of Snesarev's range and experience, it was only natural that India, as seen through Russian eyes from the Southern Tier, was to be contemplated as an inseparable part of Central Asia, including also eastern Persia, Afghanistan and Baluchistan, Russian Turkestan, the Pamirs, and Kashgaria.[48]

In the course of his lectures on the military geography of Central Asia, which Snesarev resumed in the autumn of 1919, he would exhort the future Soviet generals and diplomats: "if you want to destroy the capitalist tyranny over the world — beat the British in India!"[49] The

[46] E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923,* vol. 3 (London: Penguin, 1966) pp. 238.
[47] Jan H. Meijer, ed., *The Trotsky Papers, 1917-1919,* vol. 1 (London, Paris, 1964), pp. 623-25.
[48] See also A. E. Snesarev, *Afganistan* (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1921), intr., pp. 3-19. (This is a stenographic record of Snesarev's course, given between Fall 1919 and Spring 1920, at the Eastern Section of the General Staff Academy in Moscow.)
[49] Ibid., p. 243.

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distance between Turkestan and India was to be covered across Afghanistan in a series of quick marches along three avenues of attack: the Western Route via Kushka, Herat, Kandahar, Quetta; the Central Route via Amu Darya, Hindu Kush, Kabul, Peshawar; and the Eastern Route via Pamir, Chitral, Gilgit, Peshawar. Even the longest route, from Kushka to Quetta via Kandahar, was not supposed to take more than forty-three legs, not counting days of rest. Snesarev calculated his daily rates for marching infantry, supported by cavalry and horse-drawn artillery, whose columns would be actually moving slower than the swift horsemen from the far-off days of Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Timur or Babur, who all once tried to conquer India along Snesarev's Central Route.[50]

Notwithstanding the geophysical obstacles with which the Bolshevik-sponsored invasion of India would have had to cope, at least five preconditions would have to be fulfilled in order to bring about the demise of the British Raj over India: (1) the elimination of British naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean; (2) an outbreak of civil rebellion inside India; (3) a mutiny of the Indian Army; (4) an external challenge in the form of a tribal uprising on the frontier supported by Afghanistan; and (5) collusion with an overland advance against India by a major power. Between 1918 and 1920, however, only two of these preconditions appeared to be fulfilled (2 and 4), but they did not occur simultaneously, and the Soviets were either incapable, because of the distances and logistics involved, or late in exploiting them.[51]

During the entire interwar period the British administration in India nevertheless regarded Communist infiltration as the main external threat to the continuity of British rule,[52] and the Indian General Staff definitely viewed Soviet Russia as the number one enemy in terms of a military threat to the Indian defense perimeter.[53]

With regard to the second instance of Russo-German collusion that occurred during the early stages of World War II, sufficient evidence and detailed analysis, covering the earliest phase in Nazi-Soviet scheming against the British in Central Asia, the so-called Amanullah Plan, has recently been published elsewhere.[54] Surprisingly, much more superficial attention has usually been paid to the abortive visit of Molotov to Berlin in November 1940, following Ribbentrop's invitation to join the Axis

[50] Ibid., chapter 8. See also Alexandre Bramine, *One Who Survived. The Life Story of a Russian Under the Soviets,* (New York: Putnam, 1945), pp. 85-87.

[51] For a detailed account see Milan Hauner, *India in Axis Strategy. Germany, Japan, and Indian Nationalists in the Second World War* (London & Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Verlag, 1981).

[52] Sir Cecil Kaye, David Patrie, Sir Horace Williamson, *Communism in India,* 3 vols. (Calcutta 1971-76). Unpublished documents from the National Archives of India, 1919-1933.

[53] Bisheshwar Prasad, *Defence of India. Policy and Plans* (New Delhi, 1963), pp. 1-90.

[54] Milan Hauner, "The Soviet Threat to Afghanistan and India 1938-1940," *Modern Asian Studies,* 15/2 (1981), pp. 287-309; see also Hauner, *India in Axis Strategy,* pp. 139-73.

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under the condition that the Soviet Union would divert her expansion from the Baltic, the Balkans, and the Turkish Straits, toward the Persian Gulf, in order to threaten the British position in India. To set the record straight, it was the Germans who invited the Russians to resume their historic drive to the Gulf and in the direction of India. This, from the Soviet point of view, was not a concession at all, and Molotov kept returning to Russia's aspirations in the Dardanelles, Bulgaria, and Finland. Finally, Hitler lost patience, and on December 18, 1940, released the "Barbarossa" directive for a surprise attack against the Soviet Union in early 1941.[55] It is not altogether clear whether the Molotov-Ribbentrop meeting had influenced the drafting of the Soviet contingency plan for the occupation of Iran, whose 1941 version was later captured by the Germans. The evidence, on the basis of the available text, points rather in the direction of an edited earlier draft since the main thrust of the pre-emptive Soviet operation was to be directed against the Iranian troops and against the British Indian Army, which was expected to enter Iran from Baluchistan and Iraq. This contingency plan had limited objectives and did not envisage the seizure of any "warm water port" on the Indian Ocean coast.[56] However, in August 1941, Soviet troops, very probably guided by the instructions of the above-mentioned plan, entered Iran in close cooperation with the British Indian Army, this time not acting as an enemy but as an ally. And allies they were, together with the Americans, who were soon called into the British zone and through the "Persian Corridor" helped to ship over four million tons of vital supplies to Russia. Without the existing Trans-Iranian Railway, however, completed under Reza Shah in 1937, this massive "Aid to Russia" could never have materialized.[57]

The Geopolitical Dimension II: Ideas Here and There

A critical assessment of the Soviet geostrategic position today cannot be complete without mentioning the impact of geopolitical theories that influenced contemporary strategic thinking. In the absence of other evidence, such retrospective evaluation might contribute to a better understanding of the present Soviet position on the Southern Tier. In addition, with the implications resulting from the recent occupation of Afghanistan and the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism, such evaluation could help

[55] Hauner, *India in Axis Strategy*, pp. 183-86.

[56] *Soviet Command Study of Iran (Moscow 1941).* Draft *Foundation and Brief Analysis*, by Gerold Guensberg, (Arlington, VA: SRI International, January 1980).

[57] T. H. Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, U.S. Army in World War II*, vol. 7, pt. 1 (Washington, 1952).

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to recognize fundamental internal changes and trends affecting Soviet Eurasia as a whole.

It all began in 1904 with the publication of a seminal article, "The Geographical Pivot of History," by a British geographer, Halford Mackinder (1861-1947), which heralded the advent of a new geopolitical polarization in the competition between imperialist powers. Characteristically, its appearance coincided with the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War and the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Against the then fashionable doctrine of navalism, whose main advocate was the equally brilliant A. T. Mahan, Mackinder predicted the ascendancy of the new Central Asian Pivot Area. Later dubbed the Heartland, it was conceived as invulnerable to the direct application of sea power, and therefore destined to become the basis of a future world dominion, either under exclusive Russian control, or Russo-German combination, or even usurped by the "Yellow Peril" if China and Japan joined their forces. Since it was British sea power which encircled the Eurasian landmass along the circumferential maritime highway, thereby blocking Russia's attempts to break out in order to reach warm seas, Mackinder argued that British naval monopoly could soon be checked by the rising naval might of Germany and Japan at the two extremities of the "inner and outer marginal crescents" of Eurasia, or by a further penetration of the Russian land power to coastal rimlands to gain an open sea frontage. Thus, as early as 1904, Mackinder already visualized the Russian superpower of today, exercising in essence the same pressure on the rimlands of Eurasia as did the nomadic people of the past.

Mackinder's second argument for selecting his original Pivot Area of 1904 was based on the geography of Eurasia, as primarily determined by its Arctic and interior drainage, making it inaccessible to sea navigation and thus invulnerable to attacks by naval powers. This obvious geographical disadvantage, however, was to be offset, in his view, by the phenomenal development of transcontinental railways in Central Asia, which was to transform the steppe from an area of low economic yield into one of highest geostrategic potentialities "in population, wheat, cotton, fuel, and metals."[58]

This optimism was not shared by Russian geographers who, on the other hand, were reluctant to enter into a public controversy with Mackinder's Heartland theory.[59] The economist-geographer P. N. Savit-

[58] Harold J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *The Geographical Journal,* vol. 23, 4 (1904), pp. 421-44. Recent comprehensive reappraisal of Mackinder and his theory is W. H. Parker, *Mackinder. Geography as an Aid to Statecraft* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982).

[59] Some discussion on Mackinder's 1904 lecture was apparently conducted in *Morskoi Sbornik,* a Russian naval monthly (cf. H. J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality,* reprint [New York: Norton, 1962], intr. by A. J. Pearce, p. xxii).

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sky, however, was familiar with the geopolitical literature, especially in German, which he studied under Peter Struve in St. Petersburg during World War I. In the early 1920s he became one of the co-founders of the remarkable Eurasianist Movement *(Evraziitsy),* actually the most important and original ideology which emerged amongst Russian intellectuals in exile, who were seeking under the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution to redefine the uniqueness of Russian civilization as a product of distinctly Eurasian geopolitical and ethno-cultural influence.[60] Like Mackinder, whom he does not cite, Savitsky was equally conscious of the fundamental importance that transportation always had played and will play for the development of the Heartland, but he could not see how movements of goods by land over long distances could rival shipments by sea. With most of the Siberian rivers running into the ice-bound Arctic Sea, he could not envisage for Russian Central Asia a bright economic future within a free world market. He saw, however, a way out in developing an integrated Eurasia continental market independent of the world oceanic trade, which could be diversified to satisfy regional needs. But, Savitsky insisted, Russia still needed a new port on the Persian Gulf.[61]

Today, with the enormous benefit of hindsight, we can easily criticize Mackinder for underestimating the potential of air power, and for overstating the ultimate invulnerability of the Eurasian land fortress in controlling its interior lines of communication far from the open sea frontage. Twice, in 1919 and 1943, in the course of great international upheavals, Mackinder decided to modify the boundaries of his Pivot Area by shifting the frontiers further west in order to include Eastern Europe as a whole, and in agreement with his often-quoted dictum: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island (i.e., Eurasia plus Africa); who rules the World-Island commands the World."[62] Mackinder's prophecy came very near to its ominous fulfillment in 1941-42, when Nazi Germany ruled East Europe to the Volga. Hitler, however, refused to follow a joint strategy with his Japanese ally for the command of the Heartland, either across Eurasia or the Indian Ocean.[63] The clarity of Mackinder's vision, especially as outlined in his original 1904 draft, has survived countless attacks. On the other hand, his optimism that the Pivot Area was endowed with huge

[60] Otto Böss, *Die Lehre der Eurasier* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1961); Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, "The Emergence of Eurasians," *California Slavic Studies,* vol. 4 (1967), pp. 39-72.

[61] *Iskhod k Vostoku. Predchuvstviya i sversheniya. Utverzhdenie Evraziitsev* (Sofia 1921), with articles by P. N. Savitsky, Prince N. S. Trubetskoy, P. P. Savchinsky, G. V. Florovsky. Here Savitsky's article "Kontinent-Okean. Rossiya i mirovoi rynok" quoted.

[62] Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality,* p. 150. Contradicted by Nicholas J. Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944), p. 43.

[63] See Hauner, *India in Axis Strategy,* passim.

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primary resources in minerals and energy, seems to be confirmed by the spectacular economic rise of western Siberia over the last few years.[64]

Mackinder's Heartland theory is often contrasted with Mahan's teaching, which favors sea power and access to maritime communications. It is more profitable to contemplate both theories as complementing each other. If Mackinder's theory about the invulnerability of the Pivot Area from sea powers has been vindicated by events, Mahan expressed similar views even earlier about "the vast, uninterrupted mass of the Russian Empire, stretching without a break," so that "the Russian center cannot be broken." Mahan, however, went further than Mackinder in noting that geography had made Russia much weaker on her flanks, because of the extended lines of supply and weak communications. In his opinion, her progress toward the Persian Gulf through the wedge inserted between Afghanistan and Persia, was a "strictly analogous movement" with the penetration through Manchuria to Port Arthur.[65] Mahan was among the first strategic thinkers who emphasized the fundamental strategic dilemma of the great Eurasian power: the difficulty of waging war on two fronts. He believed, that it was less risky from Britain's point of view to allow Russia to expand in the Pacific, where she would meet permanent opposition by Japan, the United States, and probably Germany, in addition to British hostility. By contrast, to let Russia break out in the direction of the Persian Gulf, where Britain would be left to cope with the task alone, would be more difficult because of the additional heavy task of guarding the line of communication with India. Mahan was basically suggesting that Britain should wrest the initiative for diversive challenge from Russia and pay her back in her own coin: ". . . to allow Russia to engage herself so deeply in Manchuria that she would have neither time nor money to spend on Constantinople or the Persian Gulf."[66]

The term *geopolitics* has been often summarily disqualified — not only in Russia but in the West also — because of the unfortunate misappropriation of Mackinder's Heartland theory by the advocates of German *Geopolitik* during the interwar years, especially Karl Haushofer, who embraced the Heartland thesis in a rather determinative way. Although Haushofer indisputably allowed himself to be heavily prostituted by the Nazis, his conception was not that of Hitler's racially perverse *Lebensraum*. Haushofer in fact believed in something different: the idea

[64] Summed up recently in Stuart Kirby, *Siberia and the Soviet Far East. Resources for the Future.* The Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report No. 177 (London, October 1984).

[65] Alfred T. Mahan, *The Problem of Asia* (Boston: Little & Brown, 1900), pp. 24-27, 43, 118-19.

[66] Robert Seager and Doris D. Maguire, eds., *Letters and Papers of Alfred T. Mahan* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975), vol. 3, p. 226.

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of a "Transcontinental Bloc" between Germany, Russia, and Japan, against the Anglo-Saxon maritime world; i.e., Russia as an equal partner was to be the indispensable bridge between Germany and Japan, and not a subjugated *Lebensraum* for exploitation by the Germanic supermen as figured in Hitler's racist mind.[67] Hans Weigert, writing in 1942 from his American exile, was correct in unequivocally stating that the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939 must have been Haushofer's greatest triumph, and that "one only needs to read the famous chapter XIV of *Mein Kampf* to see that Hitler's and Haushofer's ideas of Soviet Russia and of Germany's eastern policy were worlds apart."[68]

Given Haushofer's advocacy of the Heartland theory and the Transcontinental Block before the Nazi takeover, it might have been quite possible that his ideas found a positive reception in Moscow, though to describe him as "one-time adviser to Stalin," because he had allegedly supplied the master of the Kremlin with geopolitical analyses, might be difficult to verify.[69] On the other hand, a possible link here could have been one of Haushofer's professional colleagues, Oskar von Niedermayer, another military geographer of great practical experience, since he was one of the two Germans who led the extraordinary expedition to Afghanistan in 1915, and became, in the early 1920s, under the alias "Major Neumann," the unofficial Reichswehr representative in Moscow. It was Niedermayer who stood at the origins of the clandestine joint ventures between the German and Soviet general staffs and served as a liaison between General von Seeckt and the Komintern agent for Germany, Karl Radek. Niedermayer wrote to Haushofer that the latter's book on Japan, *Dai Nihon,* had found enthusiastic reception in Moscow and that the Red Army's General Staff was ready to supply him with whatever Japanese publications he required in exchange for written commentaries.[70]

Gradually, however, as the succeeding editions of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* (1929, 1952, 1971) testify, the officially sanctioned Soviet view on *Geopolitika* had become bitterly hostile: "Geopolicy . . . is a bourgeois, reactionary conception . . . that employs misinterpreted

[67] Especially, inter alia, Karl Haushofer, *Dai Nihon: Betrachtungen über Gross Japans Wehrkraft, Weltstellung, und Zukunft* (Berlin: Mittler, 1913); *Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen* (Berlin: Zenthal, 1931); *Geopolitik des pazifischen Ozeans* (Berlin: Vowinckel, 1924 and 1938); *Japan baut sein Reich* (Berlin, 1941). The best compilation of Haushofer's work in English, including his important articles from *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik,* which he edited, remains Derwent Whittlesey, ed., *German Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1942).

[68] Hans W. Weigert, *Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), pp. 149, 155. See also Robert Strausz-Hupé, *Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power* (New York: Putnam, 1942), pp. 79, 169. For the standard Marxist-Leninist view about the Haushofer-Hess-Hitler chain, see Günter Heyden, *Kritik der deutschen Geopolitik* (Berlin: Dietz, 1958), pp. 110-23, 163-64. There is also a Russian edition of Heyden's book, published in Moscow in 1960.

[69] See note 59 above, introduction by A. J. Pearce, pp. ix, xxii.

[70] Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ed., *Karl Haushofer-Leben und Werk* (Boppard: Harald Boldt, 1979), vol. 2, pp. 4-5, 93-94.

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data of physical and economic geography, to substantiate and carry out through propaganda the aggressive policies of imperialist states"; that it is founded on the idea that geophysical conditions play the decisive role in human society; that it supports the inequality of races, thereby linking it up with social Darwinism and Malthusianism. The criticism reaches its crescendo in claiming that geopolicy became the official doctrine of German Fascism under Karl Haushofer, who, through Rudolf Hess, had decisively influenced Adolf Hitler. After World War II, the entry continues, geopolicy was revived in West Germany where it became an instrument of militarism and revanchism, assisted by U.S. imperialism, and directed against socialist countries and national liberation movements.[71]

A more comprehensive entry on "Geopolitical Theories of War" appeared in the 1976 edition of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia.* The writer of the entry appears to have made at least a modest attempt to read Mackinder. He is familiar with the Heartland *(serdtse zemli),* but without revealing that Mackinder had located it within the boundaries of the Russian Empire. As for the scientific validity of geopolitical theories, the author regards all of them as absolutely unfounded. He cannot deny the influence of environment upon the life of society and the character of military operations, but declares that "the internal and external policies of the bourgeois state, the question of war and peace, are determined not by the geographic environment, but by the deep-rooted class interests of state-monopoly capitalism. The source of war in our epoch was, and remains, imperialism."[72]

Lenin himself, through his friend, the geographer N. N. Baransky, was interested in using geographical knowledge for the economic and social transformation of Russia, but had no interest in geopolitics. He opposed environmental determinism because he believed in relentless technological progress.[73] The fact that he said nothing about geopolitics in his voluminous utterances, collected in fifty-five volumes, must have created an enormous handicap for any Soviet geographer or political scientist trying to arouse an interest in the subject in the Soviet Union today. If the Soviets are nevertheless acting according to some unknown "Heartland" concept in the pursuit of world dominion, Mackinder's theory would not seem to be the right recipe, though they are probably reading him with profit. Furthermore, if modern geopolitics, as one author rightly put it, is to be seen as consisting of the interrelationships between geographic factors (population, space, resources, geophysical features and

[71] Entry *"Geopolitika"* in *Bol'shaya Sovietskaya Entsiklopediya,* 1971.
[72] *Sovietskaya Voiennaya Entsiklopediya* (Moscow, 1976), vol. 2, pp. 521-22.
[73] Preston E. James, *All Possible Worlds. A History of Geographical Ideas* (New York: Odyssey, 1972), pp. 292-95.

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climate, etc.), technological factors, and the policies of the major powers, then the Soviets do practice geopolitics, even if they do not consciously use the word, except as a term of abuse.[74] *Correlation of forces* is the term preferred in Moscow, and were Mackinder alive today, he would probably understand why. He would feel that his predictions of 1904 were vindicated by the recent phenomenal development of the extractive industries in western Siberia. On the other hand, he would have also become more apprehensive about the new spatial dichotomy developing inside the Eurasian land fortress along the north-south axis, which must be causing great uneasiness to Soviet strategists. This schism threatens to disrupt the century-old west-east axis that still constitutes the main geostrategic nexus of the Soviet superpower.

The major geostrategic dilemma of the present and future Soviet leaders during the 1980s and 1990s seems to lie exactly here — in the attempt to coordinate the strategic dicta of military security with their new landward thrust that directs Soviet power deeper into the Siberian wilderness, where its major mineral and energy resources are to be found. The strategic problem consists basically of the century-old two-front-war scenario, which directs the Soviet leaders to deploy their military forces at the two opposite extremities of the Eurasian landmass. And as the other pressures (detailed above) intensify, it might become a herculean task to contain them all without a fundamental reorganization of the Soviet Eurasian empire which, after all, is an anachronistic survivor of the age of imperial expansion and colonization.

SOVIET STRATEGY AND THE MUJAHIDIN*

by ALEX R. ALEXIEV

As it nears the midpoint of the sixth year since its invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has continued and intensified its efforts to defeat the resistance and consolidate its control of the country. It is pursuing this objective through an assertive and comprehensive strategy in the military, political, and economic realms that is often not well understood in the West. In each of these separate dimensions, the Soviet strategy has ex-

[74] Peter Vigor, "The Soviet View of Geopolitics," C. E. Zoppo and C. Zorgbibe, eds., *On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear* (Dordrecht: M. N. Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 131-38.

* This article is based in part on a testimony given by the author to a hearing on Afghanistan by the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan chaired by Senator Gordon Humphrey, March 11, 1985, Washington, D.C.

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hibited some novel, and at times increasingly sophisticated, approaches that present a growing challenge to the Afghan freedom fighters and pose a threat to the long-term viability of the resistance.

The Military Dimension

The most striking and, at first glance, paradoxical feature of the Soviet military effort at present is the increasing evidence that it may not be designed to secure a purely military solution through a decisive defeat of the resistance forces. This is very likely due to the realization that such a military solution is not obtainable short of a dramatic intensification of the Soviet effort entailing massive and perhaps intolerable personnel loss and economic and political costs. Instead, militarily the Soviets have pursued a strategy of consolidating their control of the urban areas and the major transportation and logistics networks of the country, while denying any significant or lasting gains to the *mujahidin.* They have been fairly successful in this objective without a marked increase in either military assets or losses and at a relatively low manpower commitment that does not exceed 2½ percent of overall Soviet force strength and 1 to 2 percent of their defense expenditures.

Perhaps the most significant development in the area of Soviet operations has been a dramatically intensified effort to disrupt resistance logistic and supply operations, and interdict the flow of weapons and supplies across the Durand line. For this purpose, the Soviets have built new bases and considerably expanded their military presence near the Pakistani border. Beginning with the onset of winter in 1984, they have conducted the most massive interdiction campaign of the war to date, involving some ten thousand troops and extensive use of air assault forces.[1] While the campaign has been much less than a total success and sealing off the border completely is almost impossible, the Soviet interdiction strategy coupled with normal difficulties experienced in winter operations has resulted in serious problems for the *mujahidin.*

The second major objective of Soviet military operations, such as the much publicized spring and summer offensives of 1984, has been essentially political in nature. These operations have aimed not so much to defeat resistance forces as to intimidate and terrorize the population into withdrawing support for the *mujahidin* or abandoning areas of intense resistance. Both the tactics and weapons used in such operations, i.e., high-altitude carpet bombing, deliberate destruction of villages, napalm, fragmentation bombs, antipersonnel mines, etc., testify to such intent. In

[1] For a more detailed account of this campaign, see Husain Haqqani, "Deadly Winter Games," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* February 14, 1984.

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this campaign the Soviets have not hesitated to use some of the most odious Nazi terror tactics as, for instance, the use of booby-trapped toys and the execution of civilian hostages. It is not clear to what extent these tactics will be effective in the long term but they appear to be successful in the short run. Thus the Panjshir, Shomali, and Loghar valleys which until recently harbored large resistance concentrations have reportedly been abandoned by most of the civilian population following recent brutal assaults. Given such tactics, it is not surprising that Soviet operations exact a heavy toll among the noncombatant population. According to French doctors operating small clinics in resistance-controlled areas, over 80 percent of the casualties inflicted by the Soviets are civilian.

The Economic Dimension

A concerted effort at economic warfare as part of the Soviet strategy has acquired critical importance in the past two years and may well be the greatest threat to the continuing viability of the resistance in the near future. Essentially, the Soviet approach has consisted of a large-scale attempt to curtail food production and destroy the economic base of support in general for the *mujahidin* in areas known to be resistance strongholds. To achieve this goal the Soviets have used a stick-and-carrot approach involving four specific tactics:

- Outright destruction of crops by napalm and discouraging agricultural activities by planting antipersonnel mines in the fields;
- Destruction of the irrigation system;
- Buying off surplus food from peasants at prices much higher than market prices;
- Supplying peasants living in government-controlled areas with seed, fertilizers, and implements on extremely favorable terms.

These Soviet tactics combined with the practice of establishing scorched-earth, heavily mined perimeters around most towns and along key highways have resulted in the destruction of a large part of the most productive land. Agricultural production has fallen to 20 to 25 percent of pre-1979 levels; prices of most commodities have risen six- to tenfold and severe food shortages with near famine conditions are prevalent in many areas.[2]

[2] For a recent scholarly report documenting these conditions see Frances D'Souza, *The Threat of Famine in Afghanistan,* London, May 1984. It should be noted that economic warfare and famine are a time-tested weapon in the Soviet arsenal. For instance, the universal opposition to collectivization in the Ukraine was finally subdued through a manmade famine which claimed some six million victims. In another example, the large-scale anti-Soviet resistance in the Baltics following World War II was successfully suppressed by the Soviets after five years of bitter fighting through the destruction of the freedom fighters' economic base (collectivization and the deportation of some 600,000 Balts to Siberia). The same strategy was used successfully to subdue the West Ukrainian resistance movement (1944-1952).

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Alongside these tactics, the Soviets have pursued the long-term objective of consolidating the regime's grip over the peasantry by gradually introducing the Soviet model of collectivized agriculture in the Afghan countryside. Some one thousand Soviet-style collective farms, fifty state farms and a number of machine and tractor stations are reported to have already been established by late 1983.[3]

The unavailability of food at the local level is likely to have serious consequences for resistance operations since the alternative is to bring supplies from Pakistan at much greater risk and cost. In addition, to forestall further exodus of the local population, the *mujahidin* may even have to feed them, which evidently is already happening in some areas.

The Political Dimension

The Soviet political warfare effort has both an internal and an external dimension. Internally the strategy has aimed at winning over some elements of the diverse Afghan society, exacerbating the traditional ethnic and tribal tensions, promoting separatism, and preventing the emergence of Afghan nationalism. This objective has been sought through a sustained effort to create a new loyal technological and administrative elite educated and indoctrinated in the Soviet Union, and through the activities of a newly formed Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities and the Afghan secret service (KHAD).

According to an Afghan diplomat who served in Moscow as chargé d'affaires until April 1984, ten thousand Afghan military and security officers and intelligence specialists had been trained in the Soviet Union by that time.[4] Thousands of students are being trained and indoctrinated in the Soviet Union, particularly in Central Asia, and lately increasing numbers of children are being sent across the Amu Darya for long-term periods of education and preparation as future pro-Soviet Afghan elites.[5]

The ministry, which has been set up on the model of the Soviet Ministry of Nationalities under Stalin in the 1920s, has pursued a dual approach. In the north of the country, populated primarily by Afghan nationalities (Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen) that have co-nationals across the border in the Soviet Union, it has stressed their separate identity and close historical and cultural links with their Soviet brethren. Since the

[3] Radio Moscow, December 22, 1983.

[4] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* December 24, 1984.

[5] Two thousand Afghan university students were reported to be studying in Uzbekistan alone in 1984 (*Pravda Vostoka,* April 17, 1984). In late 1984, Radio Kabul announced the departure of 870 children between the ages of seven and nine for a ten-year course of study in the Soviet Union, and a much larger group was said to follow (cited in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* December 24, 1984).

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latter generally enjoy a higher level of modernization and standard of living, the message conveyed is that the Afghans' own future will be brighter under socialism and Soviet rule. It is also not inconceivable that this may be the beginning of a campaign preparing these ethnic areas north of the Hindu Kush for eventual annexation to the Soviet Union. A different approach has been pursued in the southern, predominantly Pashtun areas where the emphasis has been on bribing and coopting tribal and religious elites into withholding support from the resistance. Thus, tribal chieftains, Moslem dignitaries, and military officers have recently been exempted from limits on land ownership imposed by land reforms, while defecting *mujahidin* are paid salaries several times higher than they would expect to command based on their skills. Here again the purpose is to create a stratum of people in the countryside who have a vested political and economic stake in the system and are likely to defend it.

The more immediate goal of such cooptation is the establishment of tribal militias, armed and supplied by the regime. These militias are not only the recipients of large sums of money, but are also guaranteed wide-ranging autonomy and nearly complete freedom from government interference in their affairs, in return for denying the resistance access to their territories and occasional participation in the fighting on the side of the regime. By skillful manipulation of traditional tribal rivalries, the Soviets have been able to score some conspicuous successes in this area. Pro-regime tribal militias have been organized in some of the strategic eastern border areas among elements of the Ahmadzai, Waziri, and Shinwari tribes as well as in the western and southern regions of the country. There is considerable room for doubt in the long-term loyalty of such units to the regime, and indeed, in one recent case the showcase of the militia program in Kabul province defected en masse to the *mujahidin,* but the trend is nonetheless disturbing.

The external political effort has pursued the removal to the extent possible of the Afghanistan issue from the international political agenda and more important, has pursued an intensified effort to intimidate Pakistan into curtailing support for the resistance and eventually denying it the sanctuaries on Pakistani territory, which are vital for its operations. The increasingly brutal pressure exerted by the Soviets has been accompanied by frequent air incursions and bombings of border areas and acts of internal subversion.

The State of the Resistance

Indeed, with this formidable strategy the Afghan *mujahidin* have continued their valiant struggle with fierce determination, though in increasingly difficult circumstances. Militarily, the *mujahidin* have held

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their own despite setbacks, and continue to operate throughout most of the country. They are much better organized and more effective than before, and there is an observable tendency toward greater professionalization of the resistance fighters, many of whom have now accumulated years of experience in the field. Military effectiveness is also enhanced by better supplies of heavy weapons such as heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, mortars, and an occasional SAM-7 antiair missile, particularly in the eastern regions close to the Pakistan border. The resistance has also improved its operational skills, and the traditional and ineffective levée en masse tactics typical of the early period are seldom observed at present.

Nonetheless, while the *mujahidin* have without question improved their military capabilities, they are far from realizing their full potential. The most glaring resistance deficiency continues to be its inability to combat effectively Soviet helicopter gunships and jet aircraft due to the lack of modern antiaircraft weapons. As a result, the Soviets are able to operate with virtual impunity in the air, precluding any lasting mujahidin gains. Resistance operations are also hampered by ammunition shortages particularly serious in the west and the north, inadequate training, and nearly complete lack of any medical care in the field. Perhaps the most serious short-term problem is the growing shortage of food in resistance strongholds.

Politically, the resistance continues to be characterized by lack of unity among the leadership of the different resistance organizations in Pakistan, which in turn is reflected, albeit to a lesser degree, in the field. This lack of unity has a negative impact on the resistance also because the Peshawar factions are the conduit of most arms and supplies inside the country, a fact that creates conditions conducive to rivalries and clientelism. The political divisiveness characterizing the resistance is further compounded by the tendency of some foreign aid donors to favor specific groups for reasons that often have little to do with their military effectiveness and contribution to the struggle.

Partly because of the political disunity of the Afghans but also because of the rather apathetic attitudes of the West, the Afghan resistance has still not been able to acquire anywhere near the international legitimacy and visibility that organizations like the PLO, for example, enjoy.

Overall, the Afghan resistance has done very well in the field and is not in any immediate danger of being defeated. Nonetheless, the resistance faces some very serious challenges particularly in the economic and political areas, which make its long-term prospects not very encouraging unless these trends are reversed.

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Implications of a Soviet Victory in Afghanistan

Before discussing the ways to reverse these trends and a role for Western aid, it is useful to address the question of the implications of a Soviet victory in Afghanistan.

There is no clear evidence that Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan was a part of a Soviet "blueprint" of expansionism in Southwest Asia as has been argued by some. It is much more likely that the overriding objective was to prevent the overthrow of the Communist regime in Kabul. Nonetheless, it is clear that the consolidation of Soviet control in Afghanistan will improve the Soviet strategic position in Southwest Asia and open a number of tempting opportunities for expanding Soviet influence in this key strategic region.

Pakistan, historically beset by regional and separatist strife, would be most directly threatened. The Soviet Union already has a considerable record of subversive involvement in Pakistani separatist movements, particularly in Baluchistan, but also in Pushtunistan, and is not likely to resist the temptation to destabilize a key Western ally. With a hostile Afghan regime, the Soviet army on its borders, and four million "palestinized" Afghan refugees, Pakistan would find itself in a most serious security predicament if and when the Soviets strengthen their grip on Afghanistan.

The incorporation of Afghanistan in the Soviet Bloc would also present Moscow with opportunities in Iran which is certain to experience serious political upheavals in the next few years. It should be recalled, for instance, that Baluch territory extends through much of Southeastern Iran all the way to the Strait of Hormuz. Already the Soviets are reported to be training and preparing Baluch separatists, Iranian Tudeh members, and Pakistani left-wing oppositionists in Herat and Kabul for future contingencies.

Apart from these political opportunities, there are a number of military power projection advantages that accrue to the Soviets in Afghanistan. Soviet interdiction capabilities in the Persian Gulf are dramatically enhanced by their ability to operate out of Afghanistan. For instance, the distance from the southwestern corner of Afghanistan to the Strait of Hormuz is only 300 miles, giving Soviet aircraft easier and more effective access to the Strait. In the Indian Ocean, Backfire bombers using airfields in southern Afghanistan could reach the important U.S. base at Diego Garcia and other points in Eastern Africa without refueling, which they cannot do from Soviet territory. Further, Soviet control of the Wakhan Corridor brings them within interdiction range of the strategic Karakorum highway — China's only outlet to the Indian Ocean. A sovietized Af-

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ghanistan, in short, could be, and very likely would be, transformed from a historical buffer zone to a stepping stone for destabilization and continued Soviet expansion in a region vital to Western security interests.

The Afghan Resistance and the Imperative of Western Aid

Although the trends observed in the struggle for Afghanistan are not encouraging for the resistance at present, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that the Soviets will be victorious. One of the main reasons for the difficulties experienced by the *mujahidin* is the fact that the aid effort mounted by the West to date does not appear to be very effective. Five years after the Soviet invasion, the resistance has still not been provided with adequate quantities of effective weapons, there has been no systematic effort to provide economic assistance inside the country, and the political dimension of the Afghans' struggle has been sadly neglected.

There are a number of reasons that may help explain this failure. Perhaps most important, though not most obvious, is the seeming lack of clear objectives to be achieved through the provision of Western aid. Despite considerable rhetoric decrying Soviet behavior, the prevailing attitude much too often seems to be one of resigned belief in the inevitable defeat of the resistance, and implicit unwillingness to test the validity of this proposition by providing the *mujahidin* with the means to raise dramatically the cost of the war to the Soviets. Such unwillingness is usually justified by arguments that a more effective aid program "may trigger an escalation of Soviet military operations in Afghanistan" or endanger Pakistan.[6]

Both of these concerns are based on flawed premises. There is no reason to believe that the Soviets are willing or even able to escalate their involvement in Afghanistan to the point where they can expect a quick military solution. Given the Afghan terrain and the high resistance morale, even half a million men cannot guarantee Moscow the desired military and political stability. Were it possible, they would not have hesitated deploying such numbers as they did in Czechoslovakia in 1968. On the other hand, for the Afghan people of whom close to a million have been killed and more than four million forced to flee the country, escalation is hardly a meaningful concept. Short of open genocide, it cannot get much worse. As far as Pakistan is concerned, as long as the Afghan struggle continues, the Soviet Union is not in a position to mount a serious military threat. Thus, in a very real sense, the Afghan resistance

[6] These and similar arguments were attributed to administration and intelligence officials in a *Washington Post* article of January 13, 1985.

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acts as Pakistan's forward defense, and if it becomes stronger it can only enhance Islamabad's security.

There are, therefore, some very good reasons for a concerted Western effort led by the United States to provide the Afghans with the means needed not only to fight and die, but to give them a chance to advance their cause. The resistance has a tremendous unrealized potential and the motivation necessary to mount a real challenge to the Soviets. We do not know if the Soviets will ever be willing to reach an accommodation and leave the country, but the point is that we will never find out unless we make it possible for the *mujahidin* to make Moscow pay a very steep price for its aggression.

Above and beyond the moral imperative of helping a small people subject to aggression by a great power, there is a very important strategic imperative to do so. For the Afghan struggle is also the West's struggle.

To begin with, a good case could be made that by tying down the Soviets in a military conflict, no matter how limited, the Afghans have placed some restraints on Soviet behavior elsewhere. The relative Soviet retrenchment in the Third World, noticeable in the past four or five years, is at least in part due to Afghanistan, since Moscow has been historically reluctant to become engaged in several conflicts at the same time. Western ability to assist the *mujahidin* in putting up a stiffer and more effective resistance, even if ultimately unsuccessful, would have served the purpose of demonstrating a determination to stand up to Soviet expansionism, and is very likely to be taken into serious consideration in future Soviet decisions on intervention in other places. Conversely, failure to do so could only encourage Soviet perceptions that the West is reluctant and incapable of resisting even the most blatant encroachments. Western unwillingness to provide the Afghans with modern antiair weapons, under the pretext of "plausible deniability," for example, is in all probability interpreted by Soviet generals not as a sensible policy of avoiding confrontation, but as a sign of weakness. It should be noted here that efficient Western aid could also be extremely cost effective. The principles of guerrilla war dictate that every dollar of effective aid to the guerrilla could cost the opposing side up to ten dollars to counteract. That is ten dollars that may otherwise be spent on weapons threatening the West.

Finally, a successful resistance and Soviet failure to pacify Afghanistan by military means, may force the Soviet leadership to start questioning the traditional Soviet belief in the unlimited political utility of military power — a belief that is both a cornerstone of their political value system and a key determinant of Soviet international behavior.

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Should the Soviets be made to realize that they cannot achieve the sovietization of Afghanistan, except at an extraordinary cost, it is not at all inconceivable that they may settle for much less than outright domination of Afghanistan. When asked why the Soviet Union failed to sovietize Finland after the Winter War of 1939/1940, Stalin reportedly replied, "A hedgehog could be swallowed, but it is an extremely uncomfortable process." It is not only our moral obligation, but also in the best interests of the United States and the West to do everything possible to make Moscow's attempt to swallow Afghanistan also as uncomfortable as possible.

THE STONY PATH TO AFGHAN SOCIALISM: PROBLEMS OF SOVIETIZATION IN AN ALPINE MUSLIM SOCIETY

by ANTHONY ARNOLD

The sovietization of Afghanistan has not gone as planned. In this paper we will look briefly at the basic problems confronting the sovietizers, the past history of their efforts, their instrumentalities, their changing approaches, and what the future may hold.

Two factors particularly affect the Afghan peoples' cultural immunity to outside influence: the Islamic faith they practice (examined elsewhere in this issue) and the mountains they inhabit. Afghans possess traits found in many other mountain peoples; individualism, community independence and self-sufficiency, close-knit families, resistance to change, occasional arrogance, excellent marksmanship, and strong traditions of feuding. These prickly human characteristics combined with difficult terrain usually afford even small alpine countries a measure of protection from physical and cultural invasion by much larger neighbors.[1]

In Afghanistan, more so than in many societies, the family is the strongest social unit. Traditionally, immediate family bonds are very close, as required in a society where feuds can endure for centuries. Paradoxically, intra-family animosities are also common, but in the face of any threat from without, families set aside their internal rivalries. The

[1] The Swiss are perhaps the most familiar example. In 1914, threatened with invasion by two million Germans against the million he could mobilize and asked what his army would do, the chief of the Swiss General Staff is supposed to have replied tersely, "Shoot twice." In the ensuing war, as in World War II, Swiss neutrality remained sacrosanct.

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same is true of communities, of tribes, and, in the largest sense, of the country as a whole.[2]

Establishing external control over Afghans is even more challenging because families usually live in the same community; generally it is only those strays who desert the family circle who can be converted to alien values. Family units are internally self-supporting and tend to close ranks automatically against real or perceived threats from without.[3]

If the family is the basic social unit, the basic political unit is the village. Some 25,000 villages, with roughly ten to thirty-five families in each, are home to about 85 percent of the Afghan population. Reflecting native values, these "village-states" are semi-autonomous, largely self-sufficient, often at odds with their neighbors, and deeply suspicious of outsiders. Central authority emanating from Kabul has rarely amounted to real control except for short periods when punitive forces have been dispatched to subdue particularly rebellious districts. Local authority is usually vested in the *malik* or village chief, but important issues are usually submitted to the rough democracy of the *jirgah,* an open assembly of all adult males in the community. Those who would subvert a village by buying off the malik soon find that they have succeeded in acquiring only a short-term rental at best. Although most local chiefs willingly accept bribes from any quarter, in the long run they can only deliver if their constituents agree.

Tribal unity, more diffuse than either that of the family or village, gains strength when inter-tribe rivalries lead to open hostilities. This presents the authorities — Soviet or Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) — with a seemingly exploitable wedge: the capability of setting tribe against tribe in order to take their minds off fighting central authority. Nevertheless, as the British found in Afghanistan in the nineteenth century, and as both tsarist and Soviet Russians learned in the Caucasus and Central Asia, one can only gain allies among the tribesmen by supplying arms, and those arms eventually and invariably are turned against the supplier.[4]

[2] These somewhat contradictory traits are summed up best in two aphorisms: "The Afghan is never so at peace as when at war," and the ultimate in personal animosity, "I hate him like a cousin!"

[3] There is also a vexing technical problem for would-be sovietizers. Afghan surnames only rarely carry over from generation to generation, and it is usually impossible to determine family relationships by the members' names, which often have no common denominator. Just constructing a family tree in order to identify points of authority can be a daunting task.

[4] One of the more cold-blooded tsarist invaders of the Caucasus, General Velyaminov, was quite bitter about it all. After listing the various tribes that he had inflamed against each other, he added that this had "not given rise to the slightest enmity among them. All were ready to join against Russia the moment they saw a chance to overthrow her rule. What hatred did result from this policy was directed not against any tribe or nation but against individual leaders in the service of Russia. . . ." (John Baddeley, *The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus* [London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1908], p. 121). The Soviets had precisely the same experience in Central Asia in the 1920s and are relearning the lesson today in Afghanistan.

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In addition, the various ethnic groups that inhabit Afghanistan have little or no cohesion. As we shall see, Soviet strategy now promotes ethnic unity as part of a divide-and-rule policy.

Finally, the isolated, independent mountain communities that make up most of Afghanistan are not fertile ground for the formation of pan-Afghan organizations. Efforts to bridge the communities through trade unions and various front groups are very recent. Neither are there national or regional registers to help the authorities keep track of individuals. Communications are primitive. Collectively, all of these factors make imposition of any type of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan extremely difficult.

Pre-Invasion Sovietization Efforts

In part because of Afghan values, the country had no Communist movement until well into the second half of this century. Whereas all other countries bordering the USSR had parties that either predated the October Revolution or were born within the next six years, the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was not founded until January 1, 1965, over four decades later. Moreover, the PDPA was extraordinarily coy about admitting its Marxist-Leninist foundations. The party platform, published in 1965 within weeks after the first (and so far only) party congress, showed some signs of Marxist leanings; but the reforms it demanded were more consistent with West European and North American values than with those espoused in the USSR or Eastern Europe. Simultaneously, however, the PDPA founders drafted a secret constitution that forthrightly declared the party's dedication to Marxism-Leninism. In form and content, the constitution duplicated the governing statutes found in virtually all pro-Soviet parties.[5]

The PDPA proved a weak political reed during the first years of its existence. The founding "congress" consisted of twenty-seven intellectuals whose only real links were to the minuscule Afghan intelligentsia. Agitators like the current leader Babrak Karmal were successful in calling students into the streets of Kabul and disrupting efforts by the royal family to form a constitutional monarchy, but their role was limited to spoiling. In the new parliament, the PDPA won four seats (out of 300), but the winners did not dare label themselves PDPA delegates, if only because political parties had not been legalized.

Understanding that the legal road to power was impassable in the foreseeable future, the PDPA sought different avenues. In Mohammed Daoud, a member of the royal family whose political ambitions

[5] See Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983) pp. 137-59 for the full text of both these documents.

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had been frustrated by his first cousin, the king, they thought they had found the perfect figurehead. Thanks largely to the aid of the Parcham branch of the PDPA, Daoud succeeded in overthrowing the monarchy in 1973.

Daoud soon proved himself unsatisfactory as a figurehead. Young Parchami enthusiasts who demanded he institute socialist reforms were packed off to villages to do it themselves — and ran into a "mud curtain" of resistance. Those who returned to complain were fired or even jailed for dereliction of duty. Meanwhile, Daoud quietly and methodically fired or transferred the civilian Parchami ministers who had ridden to power with him, picking them off one by one for ostensibly nonpolitical reasons. Those in the military who objected to his slow pace of reform were transferred from combat units to menial jobs where they could pose no threat. When in 1977 Daoud promulgated a new constitution that might have given Afghanistan eventual democracy, the PDPA (with Soviet backing if not at Soviet instigation) patched up its internal feuds and began plotting the coup that unseated him in April 1978, the "Great Saur Revolution."

Even after that coup succeeded, the PDPA made a deliberate and concerted effort to deny its pro-Soviet orientation. For a few days, the country was supposed to be in the hands of a "Military Revolutionary Council," a junta of army and air force officers with no avowed ideological goals, led by General Abdul Gader. The new regime's foreign policy was supposed to be based on "strict nonalignment, peaceful coexistence, and the tenets of Islam." Only after the coup was a guaranteed success did the PDPA leader and founder Nur Mohammed Taraki step forward to take charge openly, but even then the denials continued. Taraki emphasized to Western correspondents that there was no party called "Communist" in Afghanistan, and he branded all reports that the PDPA was under Soviet influence or control as "seditious fabrications." He called the neighboring Islamic states of Pakistan and Iran "brothers," acknowledging no such fraternal bonds with the USSR.

The PDPA's ideological diffidence was rooted in the shakiness of its hold on power. Still numbering only a few thousand in a population of perhaps seventeen million devout and chronically rebellious Muslims, the party could not hope to survive any mass spontaneous resistance. Like the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) itself in the first years after the October Revolution, the PDPA had to overcome with any means possible — and especially with political deception — what it lacked in numbers and popular support. Moreover, unlike the CPSU in its formative years and unlike parties further removed geographically from the USSR, the PDPA had to contend with the Afghans' intimate familiarity

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with the actual practice of Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet takeover of the Central Asian khanates in the 1920s and the unpopularity of Moscow's rule there in succeeding decades (especially during the drive for collectivization) produced waves of eyewitness refugees who settled among their ethnic kin in Afghanistan, bringing anti-Soviet prejudices with them. Until it felt secure, the PDPA wanted to avoid uniting its scattered opposition by admitting its allegiance to the USSR.

The PDPA was further weakened by internal factionalism, which was only papered over in the months preceding the coup. Almost before the gunsmoke had dissipated, the major rivals Parcham and Khalq were again at each other's throats, as they had been almost since the founding congress — and perhaps even before that.[6] Outnumbered, outmaneuvered, and (most important) outgunned by their rivals, the Parchami leaders were soon packed off into external exile while their followers in Afghanistan were persecuted relentlessly. Of the two factions, the Parchamis traditionally had been more concerned with concealing their ideology. Once free of the moderating Parchami influence, the victorious Khalqis rashly threw off their "democratic Islamic" cloaks and undertook to sovietize the country forthwith. To build a base of popular support, they acknowledged, might take thirty years, and that was too long. Instead, they would ram through reforms that might be unpopular in the short run, but ultimately would be acceptable as the Afghan people recognized their benefits.

Eight decrees of progressively more revolutionary and socialist content, striking at such roots of Afghan culture and tradition as land tenure, bridal dowries, and the complex system of rural debts and mortgages, were promulgated during the first six months of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan's (DRA) existence. Official propaganda mirrored in tone, vocabulary, and content what the people were accustomed to hearing out of Radio Tashkent. Official statements were no longer preceded by Islamic invocations, and the Afghan flag became blood red, virtually indistinguishable from its Soviet model. Relations with Iran and Pakistan swiftly deteriorated, and the DRA declared itself to be a socialist state.

These moves provoked a ground swell of opposition from the people, and resistance — disorganized, ill-equipped, but almost universal — began to spread across the land. Subsequently, the USSR was to disavow the DRA's 1978 policies and especially its claim to socialism, but at the time it offered no criticism; in early 1979 Soviet authorities

[6] Recent articles commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the party's founding indicate that prerequisite unity was achieved only with some difficulty, implying that the two factions had fallen out before the party was launched (*Kabul New Times,* November 5, 1984).

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confirmed Afghanistan's socialist label on several occasions.[7] By July of 1979, however, the spreading resistance had put an abrupt end to that practice, even though the PDPA continued to trumpet its socialism, going so far as to call the Saur Revolution a "logical continuation" (by implication, almost a higher stage) of the Russian October Revolution. Such declarations could not have amused the Kremlin, especially as the PDPA's ability to run the country in late 1979 was visibly crumbling in the face of popular opposition.

In straight geopolitical terms, the Kremlin's course was clear. Nothing but a massive military intervention could save the progressively more expensive economic and political investments that it had made in Afghanistan over the previous decades. The independent-minded Khalqi, Hafizullah Amin, had to be removed and replaced by the more pliant and completely beholden Parchami exile, Babrak Karmal. In ideological terms, however, there was a delicious paradox: orthodox socialism is what had brought the USSR's newest client state to the brink of political collapse; yet, to save that state for Moscow, it was necessary to use the new puppet rulers and the Soviet army to root out socialism.

Or at least to pretend to. There is no question that the ultimate Soviet goal is to turn Afghanistan into a docile Marxist-Leninist satellite, and meantime to control all aspects of its administration. Nevertheless, the USSR's vain attempts to stem the tide of resistance by such measures as restoring the traditional black, green, and red colors to the Afghan flag, reinstituting the practice of introducing official statements with an Islamic blessing, and espousing private ownership of land are significant. Since the invasion, Soviet and DRA spokesmen have taken pains to avoid suggesting to Afghan audiences that socialism is even an eventual Afghan goal, much less (as Amin had claimed) a current reality. R. Ulyanovsky, a Soviet ideologist writing for Afghan audiences, was indignant about unnamed Afghan leaders who in 1978 had promoted "rash slogans which frightened away the Revolution's allies[,] among them . . . the thesis that the government's aim was to establish a socialist society in the country."[8]

This retreat from socialism, if only tactical, carries important implications. It indicates that the process of sovietization, originally seen as a relatively swift and painless process, is now understood to be something that will take many decades, if indeed it is practical at all. Until prospects for success improve, the USSR clearly does not want to take full ideological responsibility for its Afghan comrades.

[7] See Henry F. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983), pp. 96-97, for authoritative Soviet statements in 1979 referring to Afghanistan's socialist standing. Bradsher is mistaken, however, in implying that the USSR has continued to call Afghanistan socialist.

[8] *Kabul New Times*, November 27, 1984.

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Instrumentalities

The PDPA, claiming a membership in late 1984 of "more than 120,000," remains the basic tool of sovietization. Although the party unquestionably has gained numerical strength thanks to intensive recruitment drives in recent years, that figure — which includes candidate members — is almost certainly inflated. The PDPA's image as an executor of Soviet policy holds little charm for most Afghans. Even opportunists, witnessing the growing successes of the resistance in both town and city, are discouraged from joining.

A lower estimate of party membership can be derived from combining two auxiliary claims: (1) that 60 percent of the members allegedly belong to one of the three services on which the regime depends for the vestiges of native self-rule — the army, the secret police (Sarandoy), and the intelligence service (KHAD); and (2) about 60 percent of the combined strength of all three — variously estimated at 50,000-90,000, with 10,000-20,000 each in Sarandoy and KHAD and 30,000-40,000 in the military — were supposed to be party members. This would give a total party strength of 50,000-90,000, well under 1 percent of the population and not a very impressive showing after seven years' intensive recruitment efforts, including rich rewards for those who sign up.[9] Even this figure is thought high by many (including this writer), who are keenly skeptical about both Afghan and Communist — and especially about Afghan Communist — statistics.

Judging by Babrak Karmal's complaints, recruitment in the army has not been as successful as desired, and deserters have confirmed that party membership among officers remains low.[10] This implies that most candidate and standing members belong to Sarandoy and KHAD, two services whose brutality in the maintenance of state security provides the strongest of incentives to join — their mutual need for self-protection.

Sarandoy and KHAD, however, exemplify the PDPA's worst problem, its factionalism. Sarandoy is a stronghold of Khalqi sentiment, whereas KHAD is Parcham-dominated. Such serious conflicts have arisen, that in April 1984 Babrak Karmal warned both services publicly that the arms furnished them were not to be used against each other.[11] There is little sign that his scolding had any effect; a reported rash of murders of Afghan officials in Kabul during the rest of 1984 was ascribed as much

[9] One emigré publication claims that party membership automatically boosts an official's pay by a factor of four; if the job is with the military the salary is doubled or trebled again (*Afghanistan Information Centre Monthly Bulletin* [Peshawar], 44-45, November-December 1984, p. 7).

[10] *Kabul New Times*, May 5, 1984; *1984 Yearbook on International Communist Activities* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. 187.

[11] *Kabul New Times*, April 14, 1984.

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to factional disputes as to resistance operations, and factional clashes were supposed to have reached "huge proportions" since the start of the year.[12]

Since the Parchamis were returned to power by the invading Soviet forces at the end of 1979, the Khalqis — who have constituted a majority of the PDPA for over a decade — have been losing relative strength. Parchami control over most levers of power enables them to attract more new members than the Khalqis, whose numerical advantage in the party is now estimated at roughly 60/40.[13] Nevertheless, Khalqi strength in the military (its primary area of recruitment during the Daoud years) and its monopoly of Sarandoy help preserve the faction's integrity. Although the USSR would cheerfully dispense with the ideologically rowdy and undisciplined Khalqis, they cannot excommunicate the faction without critically weakening the already demoralized armed forces and police, and the PDPA as a whole.

Aside from the factional problem, the overall quality of the PDPA membership has declined. The twenty-seven intellectuals who founded the party in 1965 have been superseded by a motley assemblage, many of them bureaucrats, mostly employees of one of the two civilian intelligence services. By 1982, at a gathering of 841 middle- and upper-level functionaries in Kabul (including, presumably, all surviving founding members), there were only forty "teachers, scholars, doctors, and [members of] the creative intelligentsia" present, whereas twenty-seven persons with no schooling at all also attended. It seems only fair that the workers and peasants, in whose name all the violence in Afghan politics since 1978 has occurred, be given more voice in the party than at the founding congress, where their representation was zero. They have, however, shown relatively little enthusiasm for joining. In spite of regular exhortations and incentives to sign up, as of 1984 only 50 percent of the membership claimed worker, peasant, or artisan background. There is a greening of the party, as indicated by the claim that 48 percent of the new members in 1984 had come from the ranks of the Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan (DYOA), accentuating a trend that set in immediately after the 1978 coup.[14]

Geographically, the party huddles in population centers where some measure of protection is afforded by garrisons of DRA or Soviet

[12] BBC (London), June 26 (FBIS, June 27, 1984); Radio Karachi, October 7 (FBIS October 10, 1984); Voice of the Islamic Revolution (clandestine radio in Afghanistan), October 20, (FBIS, October 24, 1984).

[13] U.S. Department of State, *Afghanistan: Five Years of Occupation,* Special Report No. 120, December 1984, p. 5.

[14] Arnold, *Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism,* p. 124; *Pravda,* July 8, 1984; Bakhtar News Agency, September 27, 1984 (*Afghanistan Forum,* January 1985, p. 33).

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troops. Jauzjan Province, for example, otherwise considered a model of successful party work, was criticized in 1984 because 82 percent of its PDPA members were concentrated in Shebargan, the capital.[15] More telling, after five years of occupation the party has no committees in nearly a third of the country's cities and large administrative districts.[16]

The second major tool of sovietization has been the National Fatherland Front (NFF), the coordinating body for all other fronts set up by the DRA. Since its establishment in 1981, the NFF has been guided by one of the shrewder Khalqi founders of the PDPA, Saleh Mohammed Zeary, whom fellow students nicknamed "Quicksilver" at an early age, in recognition of his skill in avoiding confining loyalties. Thanks in part to this talent — and perhaps because of Soviet intercession on his behalf — Zeary was able to retain his PDPA politburo seat after the Parchamis returned to power, and to win a secretariat position as well.[17]

In spite of his abilities and influence, however, Zeary has not been able to turn the NFF into an effective asset. Designed to act as a bridge between the PDPA and the population, it appears to have failed at both abutments. The NFF has claimed membership of 700,000, but a probably more accurate figure of 55,000 apparently slipped past the censors/propagandists in 1984.[18] As in the party, there has been a concentrated drive for new members, but even though there is not quite the same stigma in belonging, relatively few Afghans have heeded the call. At least part of the reason for the front's unpopularity is its present principal duty: enforcing military conscription. The loss of twenty-seven members to assassinations in the first month of the NFF's existence and the resistance's continuing active disapproval of participation have reinforced popular unwillingness to associate with the organization.[19]

Unpopular with the masses, the NFF appears to have fared even worse with the PDPA. Official criticism of the front in late 1984 was scathing. Its listed shortcomings included: aimlessness; slow growth

[15] *Kabul New Times,* October 2, 1984.

[16] This figure was derived by comparing the total number of cities and large administrative districts (eighty-nine, according to Radio Kabul, February 12 [FBIS, February 17], 1984) with the number of party committees claimed for such units (sixty-one, according to the *Kabul New Times* of May 5, 1984). Interestingly, the number of such party committees had fallen from the seventy claimed in 1983 (ibid. April 24, 1983), probably indicating a further deterioration of the security situation in the country at large due to resistance activities. The same sources permit one to conclude that party committees existed in only 40 percent of the medium-sized district and subdistrict (i.e., rural) units in 1983. They also, however, show a huge jump in such committees in 1984 — from 114 to 207 — but it is a question how many of these exist only on paper, given the inability of the DRA to exert its authority in the countryside.

[17] Arnold, *Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism,* pp. 186, 196; Nancy Peabody Newell and Richard Newell, *The Struggle for Afghanistan* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Press, 1981), p. 120.

[18] *Kabul New Times,* April 25, 1984. The figure gains even more credence because the same article gave an exact membership (19,287) for the Democratic Organization of Afghan Women that was also far below the claim of "more than 50,000" made in previous years.

[19] *New York Times,* July 17, 1981; Radio Kabul, December 18, (FBIS, December 21), 1984.

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of existing chapters and failure to found new ones; lack of internal coordination; disinclination to cooperate with PDPA and DRA authorities; inability to formulate "great plans"; weakness in training, recruitment, and "sociopolitical work"; failure to fill vacant leadership positions; unsatisfactory pro-Soviet, pro-PDPA, pro-DRA, pro-army, and anti-enemy propaganda [the order is interesting]; lack of adherence to meeting schedules; inability to control and implement resolutions; administrative defects; and general disorganization. In spite of these blasts, there was no indication that Zeary personally was in trouble, and by late December he had succeeded in getting a much more positive press, even without enough time to have mended all those wayward NFF traits.[20]

More than fifteen sub-fronts ("social organizations [that participate] in all revolutionary transformations") make up the NFF; most are copies of counterparts found in the USSR and among its allies. In order of their latest membership claims, these sub-fronts include the Central Council of Trade Unions (200,000 — includes unions of writers, artists, and journalists as well as proletarians); the Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan (DYOA) (120,000); Pioneers (rough equivalent of the Boy and Girl Scouts) (85,000); Democratic Women's Organization of Afghanistan (DWOA) (25,000); and a number of others. Some of the latter, for which membership figures are not available, are unique to Afghanistan: the Council of Religious Scholars and Clergy; the Council of Tribal Elders; *jirgah* representatives; the Economic Advisory Council; peasants' cooperatives; and paramilitary auxiliaries under various names (e.g., "Groups for the Defense of the Revolution"). Some seem far removed from politics: the Olympics Committee, the Afghan Red Crescent Society, and even the Center for Social Activities at Kabul University. Unlike the NFF, the subgroups have not been stung by criticism, perhaps because they are not perceived as a direct transmission belt for party directives. Like the NFF and PDPA, however, they all recruit intensively; apparently, in the case of the DYOA, using "force and imposition" to achieve their goals.[21] The relatively low level of participation in the various fronts in spite of such methods reflects the low esteem in which DRA-sponsored organizations are held.

Organs of the DRA, especially Sarandoy, KHAD, and the army, also are instruments of sovietization. In the case of the army, however, low morale and widespread infiltration by the resistance into its ranks make it a most unreliable and double-edged tool. When a new military service law extending the standard tour of duty from three to four years

[20] *Kabul New Times,* October 18, 1984; Radio Kabul, December 18 (FBIS, December 21), 1984.
[21] *Kabul New Times,* November 20, 1984; Radio Kabul, September 19 (FBIS, September 20), 1984; Radio Kabul, December 19 (FBIS, December 19), 1984.

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was announced in March 1984, desertions promptly soared and mutiny erupted in the Eighth Division, stationed in Kabul. Sarandoy, because of its Khalqi orientation, is also prone to disaffection. Even KHAD, despite its association with the ruling Parchamis, has suffered defections of ranking officers.[22] As with the party, the intelligence organs find it difficult or impossible to infiltrate the self-contained village units, where every citizen is personally acquainted with every other. In spite of close KGB coaching and even participation in KHAD operations, it is characteristic that neither the DRA nor the Soviet military command, when preparing a massive offensive against the Panjshir Valley in the spring of 1984, seemed to know anything about the disposition or plans of their opponents.[23] Until the DRA can set up an efficient nationwide secret police apparatus, it is difficult to picture how sovietization can succeed.

A measure of the authorities' impotence in rural areas can be deduced from their protracted wrestling with a "Law on the Local Organs of State Power," a piece of legislation that has been cited alternately as in effect and pending since its introduction in 1981. At face value, the law appears to grant local autonomy to communities, whereas in fact it is designed to establish centralized control over them. A key article ensures PDPA command by providing that the NFF or one of its constituent organizations make all nominations for public office. The failure to implement the law is probably due to the inability of the DRA to influence rural communities well enough to win acceptance by local *jirgahs.*

To establish a rural presence, the DRA in 1983 tried to set up "consensus headquarters," ad hoc bodies consisting of local representatives of the PDPA, NFF, KHAD, Sarandoy, the army, local elders, and virtually anybody else willing to cooperate with the authorities. Endowed with unspecified "special powers" to implement government policies (presumably including application of the law on local organs), the consensus headquarters, proving no more able in this regard than their individual members, met heavy official criticism.[24]

Changing Approaches

The tactical retreat from sovietization by the Babrak government in 1980 was the carrot half of a policy designed to defuse the resistance. The stick half, of course, was the Soviet invasion force that was expected to make short work of those still skeptical of the invaders' charitable intentions. The enormity of the Soviet invasion in the eyes of

[22] *Economist,* January 8, 1983, p. 36.
[23] *Christian Science Monitor,* October 2, 1984.
[24] Radio Kabul, September 21 (FBIS, September 24), 1984.

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the Afghans, however, competely eclipsed the palliatives, and resistance swiftly became all but total. Nevertheless, the regime has persisted in some de-sovietization policies, has been ambivalent on others, and has reversed still others.

One of the most important — and least successful — efforts has been to remove the stigma of socialist atheism from the DRA. From his first public reappearance in Afghanistan, on January 1, 1980, Babrak has tried to portray himself as a good Muslim and the DRA as an Islamic republic. Neither effort has been convincing, due to such gaffes as the leader's failure to remove his footwear when ostensibly praying in a mosque. The front group whose very existence is supposed to support the theme, the Council of Religious Scholars and Clergy, though occasionally mentioned in the press, is remarkably reticent about its membership and activities. The suspicion is that it is made up mostly of persons studying Islam from the outside, the better to subvert it. The depth of the regime's problem in selling its religious tolerance was illustrated by a series of articles in the *Kabul New Times* in mid-1983. From May through June, various DRA and PDPA leaders were reported meeting with mullahs who supported the regime. Only readers with good memories could be expected to recognize that the holy men's names were all variations on Sayed Bahawoddin Jan Aqa, sometimes shortened, sometimes combined or split up to look like different names, but indubitably the same renegade cleric being served up again and again.[25]

The widely hailed land reform of the first PDPA government in 1978 proved a fiasco becasuse it destroyed the complex economic structure of Afghan agriculture without offering adequate substitutes. When the initial reform was followed in 1979 by the first steps towards collectivization, rural resistance increased sharply. On returning to power, Babrak at first left this issue alone. In 1981, however, after rural opposition had intensified, he tried to undo the damage by grandly offering property ownership to army officers on active duty, as well as to mullahs and tribal chiefs who would swear allegiance to the DRA. This somewhat startling reversion to feudalism is still in effect, but in 1984 it was augmented by renewed pledges for land and water reform. Oddly, the boasts of achievements at the end of the year (679,567 hectares of land distributed to 308,210 peasant families) were scarcely more than what had been claimed before the end of 1978.[26]

Meanwhile there is a parallel drive to establish peasants' "cooperatives." The cooperative is an undefined type of organization that

[25] *Kabul New Times*, May 31 through June 23, 1983.

[26] Radio Kabul, November 29 (FBIS, December 3), 1984; Radio Moscow, October 5 (FBIS, October 19), 1984.

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seems remarkably unpopular despite the many benefits that accrue to members: tax exemption for four years; 50 percent tax cuts for six more years; exemption from registration fees, transport taxes, and transport charges; exemption from or 50 percent reduction in both import and export duties on agricultural materials; 25 percent discount on consumer goods import duties; and easy loan terms from the state bank. Peasant reluctance to join the cooperatives is evident from the periodic enjoinders in the press against the use of force to make them sign up. If not in name, the cooperatives appear to be collective farms in their political function, that of imposing state control on the farmer. The establishment in late 1984 of four state farms and Soviet-style machine tractor stations in five provinces provides further evidence of intended rural sovietization.[27]

At least for the time being the rural transformation remains mostly theoretical. Little land lies within Kabul's power to confiscate, restore to original owners, redistribute, or collectivize. The resistance controls rural Afghanistan and leaves agriculture in private hands.

Regarding other parts of the economy, signals in 1984 were mixed. There seemed to be a trend developing toward ever greater state involvement, with the eventual goal of setting up a state-run "unified economic system." As part of a drive to regulate trade and pricing, a state-run retail organization, KART, was expanded and seemed to be encroaching on the traditional private enterprise of the bazaar. Bazaar merchants, feeling this squeeze — and also under increased pressure by both the resistance and the regime to abandon their fence-sitting posture between the two — began to close shop in Kabul in the second half of the year. This appears to have caused some second thoughts among some DRA leaders, and there were official protestations of concern for the merchants and small producers.[28]

Utilization of an old Soviet speedup method — unpaid Saturday labor by "volunteer" workers called *subotniks* (in Afghanistan performed on the traditional free Friday) — has been adopted with enthusiasm by a financially hard-pressed DRA. If the same enthusiasm is less noticeable among the *subotniks* themselves, it is not for want of regime propaganda in favor of the device. Similarly, "work emulation" drives and "worker competitions" suspiciously resemble the Soviet Stak-

[27] *Kabul New Times,* July 14 and November 6, 1984; Radio Kabul, December 10 (FBIS, December 11), 1984. The claim that "by now a majority of peasants are organized in . . . cooperatives" (*Kabul New Times,* March 21, 1984) is most unlikely.

[28] *Kabul New Times,* March 21, 1984; *Times* (London), October 9, 1984; see also "Great Importance Attached to Private Sector," *Kabul New Times,* October 29, 1984, giving extensive statistics on government help to private enterprise. Official statistics indicate that 28 percent of trade is now handled by state and cooperative organs (Radio Kabul, September 29, 1984 [FBIS, October 4], 1984).

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hanovite movement and its modern counterpart of "socialist competition."[29]

Sovietization of the economy on the international scale is also proceeding without hesitation. Afghanistan maintains observer status in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), but its economy is being integrated ever more closely into that of the USSR. A permanent Afghan-Soviet Commission on Economic and Planning Cooperation sits in Kabul, and it is scarcely accidental that the DRA's Five-Year Plans coincide on the calendar with those of the USSR. Still, this does not yet represent any overall economic gain for Moscow. Although 95 percent of Afghanistan's natural gas flows into the Central Asian pipeline network without cash reimbursement, and 70 percent of the country's trade is with Comecon countries, the ongoing war and the DRA need for outright Soviet grants more than equal any profits. The proceeds from gas sales, for example, are applied against Afghan debts to the USSR. In addition to regular loan repayments, these include an undisclosed portion of the occupation costs and all of the military hardware issued to the DRA forces. In 1983, the total Afghan debt to the USSR, estimated at $3 billion, was rising far faster than the $300 million in annual credits received from gas sales.[30]

Among the more ominous signs of integration is the growing volume of transborder trade with the Central Asian republics that is not handled through either Kabul or Moscow but is negotiated directly, just as would be done were Afghanistan a Soviet republic.[31]

None of these trends is irreversible, however, and as the Afghan economy deteriorates under wartime stresses the significance of economic sovietization, like that of rural transformation, remains largely theoretical.

Education, with its potential for indoctrinating students in Soviet values, is another field where principles appear more threatening than realities. Since 1978, a widely trumpeted effort to increase literacy in the country has served as an excuse to introduce Soviet texts and to get rid of teachers who do not support the regime. By the end of 1983, the DRA said it was educating over a million students in primary and 200,000 in secondary schools. Some 900 government employees were taking night courses conducted by forty Afghan and sixty foreign teachers from "friendly countries." Russian has been introduced as the first foreign language, and courses in such Marxist classics as dialectical and historical materialism are now mandatory at the university level. Native Afghan

[29] *Kabul New Times,* March 22 and July 8, 1984.
[30] *Afghanistan Forum Newsletter* 11, No. 2 (March 1983): 12
[31] *Kabul New Times,* April 4, 1984.

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teachers have been replaced by Soviets, some 150 of whom (nearly three-fourths the whole staff) are supposed to be on duty at the Polytechnic Institute in Kabul alone. Scholarships for study in the USSR and Eastern Europe are made available on a large scale, and in early 1984 some 7,500 Afghans were supposed to be studying in the USSR.[32]

But over the past twenty years some 70,000 Afghans have received training in the USSR, without the program having made the host country appreciably more popular. Moreover, in the academic year 1982-83, only 200 of the 1,500 scholarships offered to Afghan scholars by the USSR were accepted. Afghan students in the Soviet Union have suffered racial discrimination at the hands of their hosts, and many refuse to return after vacationing at home. Meanwhile, resistance control over most of Afghanistan ensures a high casualty rate among pro-regime rural teachers, and even in Kabul student attendance has fallen drastically. According to one report, Kabul University's faculty of engineering has shut down completely for want of students. In areas controlled by the resistance, new school systems are being set up with non-communist curriculums.[33] The DRA is a long way from establishing a monopoly over education.

These drawbacks have not gone unnoticed in Moscow, where interest in inculcating more friendly attitudes in Afghans intensifies with each new Soviet casualty on the battlefield. As years have passed and armed opposition shows no signs of abating, Soviet authorities have resorted to ever long-range programs. Starting in 1980, several hundred Afghan children in the ten- to thirteen-year-old range have been sent off each year for a few weeks of summer camp in the USSR. In 1984 alone, 1,400 children took such vacations. Presumably the desire is to isolate them from parental and peer influences, giving Soviet camp counselors a free rein to mold more accommodating attitudes.[34]

In 1983, orphanages for still younger children whose parents had been victims of the war were established. These institutions are called *Watan* (Homeland) and are presided over by Babrak's wife, Mahbuba. Patterned after establishments set up by Felix Dzerzhinsky — the first Soviet secret police chief — to control the "unsupervised" *(bezprizornye)* waifs cast adrift by the Civil War, the orphanages' avowed goal is to turn out dedicated servants of the party and state. In late 1984, the USSR took a direct hand in Afghan children's upbringing when it imported 870 seven-

[32] Ibid., May 22, June 6, and December 15, 1983; Radio Karachi, March 1 (FBIS, March 2), 1984. According to Radio Karachi, school children as young as ten years old were being sent away to Soviet schools.

[33] Edward Girardet, "Russia's War in Afghanistan," *Central Asian Survey* 2:1, July 1983, p. 95; *Afghan Studies Association Newsletter* 11 No. 3, Fall 1983; Radio Tehran, December 19 (FBIS, December 20), 1984.

[34] *Kabul New Times,* September 13, 1984.

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to nine-year-olds from Kabul for ten years' education in Soviet boarding schools. The children were accompanied by thirty-five Afghan teachers, and it was anticipated that an equal number would be sent away in the near future. Although official propaganda surrounding the exodus claimed that all of these children were orphans, unofficial reports insisted that most of the children were being spirited off against the wishes of living parents.[35]

It will be decades before the ultimate effect of this mass resettlement and indoctrination effort (is kidnapping too strong a term?) becomes known, but the fact that the Soviets felt compelled to embark on it indicates the time frames they are considering in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the emotional impact on Afghans of all political persuasions on seeing such young children shipped off into Soviet exile is considerable. Whether future movements will be allowed to proceed unchallenged by the resistance is an open question.

Sovietization further extends the effort to turn tribe against tribe on the battlefield. Under the enticing slogan "national and cultural rights to be ensured," the USSR is pursuing a classic divide-and-rule strategy designed to prevent the various Afghan ethnic groups from cooperating against the common Soviet enemy. The technique is to emphasize each minority group's language and culture, as has been done in parts of the Soviet Union, in order to isolate each from the rest and to leave Russian as the only common language. Newspapers and radio broadcasts in some minority languages are already being produced, with more to follow.[36] Like the educational program, this is one whose effects will be very slow in making themselves known.

Outlook

Sovietization is impossible in Afghanistan as long as the resistance holds out as it has for the past five years. In fact the Soviet position in 1985 is, if anything, weaker than five years ago, immediately after the invasion. Today, sovietization is *not* succeeding, and assertions that it is are not only premature, but an active disservice to the resistance.

That view appears to be shared in Moscow, which has carefully limited its real commitments to the PDPA and DRA while simultaneously doing all it can to convince the world it is winning. As noted, Afghanistan is no longer termed socialist in either its own or other Communist media. This means that the ideological imperative of the Brezhnev Doctrine, requiring Soviet armed defense of socialism "wherever in the world it is

[35] Ibid., November 18-20, 1984.
[36] Radio Kabul, April 12 (FBIS, April 13), 1984.

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threatened," does not apply in Afghanistan. Theoretically Soviet troops could be withdrawn tomorrow without undercutting Soviet commitments to allies unfortunate enough to have earned the socialist label.

State commitments are scarcely stronger. Afghanistan has not been made a member of the Warsaw Pact, which would impose much wider obligations on the USSR. Instead, Moscow bases its military presence only on an alleged invitation that in turn rests on the 1978 Afghan-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation. Withdrawal under the terms of this specific agreement would not be difficult, nor would it set a formal precedent applicable in Eastern Europe. Moreover, Afghanistan's limited status as an "observer" in Comecon seems similarly significant. In short, the USSR has been careful to maintain enough distance between itself and the Kabul regime that disengagement remains an option.

This is not to say that the USSR has yet written off the sovietization of Afghanistan. Quite the contrary — that remains its firm intention, and it might yet succeed. If today's terror tactics against the civilian population eventually destroy the support structure on which the resistance depends, if Western public interest and material support are allowed to die, then sovietization is a possibility — but only with the application of still more terror and with no foreseeable end to Afghan hatred of the invaders. Even if ultimately successful, the Soviet occupation forces will have incurred blood debts that must inevitably be paid by their children and grandchildren.[37] Soviet efforts to deceive the world — and indeed themselves — by depicting their aggression as something greeted with equanimity if not enthusiasm by the Afghans could prove a costly lie for them in the long run.

The widely held belief that sovietization will succeed, however, is still only a supposition. Certainly there are precedents that make that a logical conclusion, but Afghanistan has a way of turning logic on its head. Several factors combine to assure that the Afghan struggle will endure for as long as Soviet troops remain in the country, and to provide hope that the invaders finally will depart without achieving their goals:

- The ideological resistance and fighting spirit of an Islamic people confronted with atheist invaders.
- The absence of historical precedent (in Afghan eyes) for conquest by aliens.
- The continuing availability of safe haven in Pakistan for the resistance fighters and their dependents.
- The political bankruptcy of the PDPA and DRA.

[37] Well over a century after the formal completion of the Russian conquest of the Caucasus, very similar to Afghanistan in terrain and local culture, murder of Moscow-appointed officials by local rebels is still not uncommon (*Arabia-The Islamic World Review*, December 1982, p. 15).

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- The failure of the USSR to make Afghanistan "un-news" or to convince the world that they really are winning, despite intensive efforts to these ends.
- The growing awareness of, respect for, and support to the Afghan resistance being shown in the West.
- The growing internal contradictions of the Soviet empire that threaten its long-term stability.
- The eternal mountains and the infinite patience they have instilled in their hardy people.

In the end, *inshallah* (if God wills), these factors will prevail. I think it will happen in my lifetime.

ISLAMIC SOURCES OF RESISTANCE*

by ROBERT L. CANFIELD

The Islamic resistance fighters in Afghanistan, the *mujahidin,* have two advantages. One is the rugged, convoluted terrain of the Hindu Kush, which forces traffic through vulnerable choke points, obliges invaders to be strung out along the floors of narrow valleys easily attacked from above, and provides native populations with innumerable places of refuge. The *mujahidin*'s other advantage is their Islamic faith. Examinations of the Afghan peoples' Islam have been rare, even though over a half-century ago a prominent Afghan suggested that it deserved special attention as a "politic-religious culture . . . [that is] essentially Sunni and Islamic."[1] It is the conjunction of political and religious qualities in Afghan Islam that provides the *mujahidin* with certain advantages for their resistance against the Afghan Marxist-Soviet regime.[2]

Islam is as much a social, political, and economic system as a religion. The rituals, customs, and institutionalized relationships of the Afghan peoples are overlaid with meanings considered Islamic because they are believed to derive from the teachings, personal beliefs, and habits of Muhammad. Islamic concepts of authority, responsibility, and status

* I wish to thank Anthony Arnold, Lois Beck, David Edwards, Nake M. Kamrani, and Nazif Shahrani for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

[1] Iqbal Ali Shah, *Afghanistan of the Afghans* (London: Diamond, 1928), p. 22.

[2] Alexandre Bennigsen, "Mullahs, Mujahidin, and Soviet Muslims," in *Problems of Communism* (November-December 1984), pp. 28-44. The *mujahidin* resistance appears to have encouraged Muslims in Soviet Central Asia to take a greater interest in Islam as an idiom of local recalcitrance, a point made by Bennigsen in several works.

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are implicit in notions of kinship and tribe, household and community, leader and follower.[3] As a result, any attempt to assess the importance of Islam in the life of the Afghan peoples must go beyond their understandings of virtue, permanence, and the supernatural: such an attempt must also consider how Islam informs Afghan life as a whole, affects its social contracts and alignments, and shapes its public affairs.

Although Islam is tractable — certain features of faith and practice being shaped and reshaped by experience — it is not infinitely so. It derives from, or purports to derive from, revelations of God, and claims, therefore, to be at certain points nonnegotiable; it resists some kinds of change even as it allows others. The less negotiable aspects of Islam impose on succeeding generations of Muslims certain similarities in thought, custom, and behavior. For generations, Islam has profoundly influenced Afghan understandings about life, experience, and social relationships. Moreover, Afghans have maintained certain social ties in deference to Islamic values. This paper describes the Islamic social alignments and moral understandings extant in the early 1970s, and their effect on the resistance groups that formed in response to the Marxist coup of 1978 and the Soviet occupation after 1979. In certain respects those alignments and understandings resemble those of generations past, but we may presume that under the conditions of war there will be some changes in the faith and practice of Afghanistan Muslims, although probably within limits already imposed by the structure in place. We therefore will devote most of our attention to that structure.

Islam in Afghanistan before the 1970s

Before the disruptive events of the 1970s, Islam as a system of social relations and a related set of moral understandings had two cultural styles, each associated with major class divisions in the society. There was a "traditional Islam" that was practiced by the great majority of the population, about 90 percent of whom were rural agriculturalists or migratory pastoralists; and there was a "progressive Islam" that took form among certain people influenced by the West.

Being the style of belief and practice of the great majority, traditional Islam has had a huge impact on Afghan history and social affairs. Nevertheless, it has been poorly understood in the West, and — as the behavior of the Khalqis revealed after the 1978 coup — little better understood by some of the Westernized Afghans who have set policy in

[3] Nazif Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield, *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1984); especially the articles by Anderson, Katz, Barfield, Canfield, Shahrani ("Introduction"), Richard Tapper, and Tavakolian.

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the country. Our emphasis on the traditional style of Islam reflects its importance in the nation as a whole. It is described, on one hand, as a related set of Islamic categories and concepts, and, on the other, as a system of social alignments deriving from those concepts.

The categories of Islamic thought described here are imbued with specific significance for the traditional Muslims of Afghanistan because of historical events and circumstances distinctive to the area.

A basic distinction in Islam generally, and in the traditional Islam of Afghanistan in particular, is between believers and unbelievers, the latter being called *kafirs,* "infidels." In the popular moral imagination, kafirs are suspected of idol worship and eating pork, which is considered repulsive and filthy; they have even been suspected of immoral practices.[4]

Such is the concept of kafir in the abstract. In actual history the peoples of Afghanistan came into contact with real non-Muslims only rarely, and unlike many Muslims elsewhere, were never subjected to kafir rule. They did, however, come into touch with kafir nations in the nineteenth century, doing battle in particular with the Russians who intruded from the north and west, and with the British who pressed on the south and east. The impingements of the non-Muslim nations on their territories hardened the Afghan people's distrust of foreigners and, for some of the people at least, of Western technology and the ideas that came with it. In the nineteenth century, the British were the most resented and feared of the kafir nations. But in the 1920s, in their treatment of the *basmachi* resistance to Soviet control in Central Asia, the Soviets exceeded the infamy of the British. Many Central Asian Muslims fled to Afghanistan, bringing accounts of Soviet ruthlessness. In the 1960s, the Soviets were said by some rural peoples not only to be carousers but to be devoid of sexual scruples. In the world of the traditional Afghan people, the Soviets embodied the Islamic concept of the kafir.[5]

It has been said of Afghan society that Islam provides a basis of unity, as it bridges the diverse ethnic and racial backgrounds of its peoples. But the peoples themselves — especially those belonging to the minority groups — are well aware that their Islamic heritage is a cultural unity only, not social or political. Islam, however, is really several religious traditions, and quarrels between the different dogmatic groups have at

[4] Robert L. Canfield, "What They Do When the Lights Are Out," paper presented at the ACLS/SSRC Joint Committee on the Near and Middle East Conference on Symbols of Social Differentiation, May 25-28, 1978, Baltimore, Md.; cf. Louis Dupree, *Saint Cults in Afghanistan,* American University's Field Staff Reports, South Asia Series Vol. 20, No. 1, 1976.

[5] Audrey C. Shalinsky, "Islam and Ethnicity: The Northern Afghanistan Perspective," *Central Asian Survey,* 1(2/3): 71-85, 1982; Canfield, "What They Do When the Lights Are Out." The Soviet reputation for cruelty and debauchery may have been stronger in the northern part of Afghanistan where the *basmachi* refugees settled, and this may account for the early uprisings against the Afghan Marxist regime and the current tenacity of the resistance there.

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times disrupted social relations. Sectarian distinctions have on occasion been the overriding bases for social differentiation and political alignment.

There are three main sects in Afghanistan: Sunnis, who predominate by far; Imami Shi'ites, who comprise about 20 percent of the population; and Isma'ili Shi'ites who number perhaps only 30,000.[6] Open conflicts between these sects have taken place in the past. Most recent and the bloodiest was the war in the 1880s between the Hazaras, who are Shi'ites, and the government, supported by and comprised of Sunni Pushtuns ("Afghans") and Tajiks.[7] Though no wars on such a scale have occurred since, many implicitly sectarian conflicts have occurred between Shi'ites and Sunnis, mostly in the rural areas. The limits of trust and alliance continue to be the boundary of the sect. To this day traditional Muslims belonging to different sects do not intermarry, the only exceptions being the rare event when a Sunni man takes a Shi'ite wife, a kind of sectarian hypergamy, in which case their children are considered Sunni.

Islamic Social Networks

The maximal social unit of potentially supportive and intermarrying people is the sect, although the range of actual interaction and functional cooperation for an individual is limited to a small segment of the sect. And within the sects, certain persons are venerated for their superior moral qualities, defined somewhat differently according to the sect. All of the sects esteem the knowledge of canon law and theology, noble descent from Ali or a companion of Muhammad, and spiritual inspiration associated with ritual attempts to purify the soul. Sunnis emphasize two of these qualities, knowledge of canon law and theology, and spiritual power attained through pious exercises (i.e., as in Sufism). Specialists in law and theology are known as *mullahs,* the most eminent as *mawlawis;* the leaders of groups using rituals to purify the soul, Sufis, are called *pirs, ruhanis* or "Saints."[8] The Sunnis actually do also respect noble descent — indeed, their most eminent authorities combine all three qualities: knowledge of jurisprudence and theology, spiritual power attained through apprenticeship in a Sufi order, and descent from a noble ancestor.[9] The most eminent Shi'ite authorities likewise combine all three

[6] The Isma'ills reckoned their number to be 20,000 in 1968.

[7] Hasan Kakar, *Afghanistan: A Study in Internal Political Developments, 1880-1896* (Kabul: privately published, 1971).

[8] The word *saint* is unsatisfactory because it has different connotations in English. In deference to custom and in the absence of a better word, I use it here, but its proper meaning should be inferred from the description.

[9] Oliver Roy, "Sufism in the Afghan Resistance," *Central Asian Survey* 2(4): 68, 1983, attributes the influence of the Mujaddidi family to their eminence as Pirs of a Sufi order, their reputation as learned scholars, and their marital connections with the royal family. He omits the importance of their putative descent from one of the companions of the Prophet.

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qualities, but it is characteristic of Shi'ites to emphasize their authorities' noble descent. Shi'ites venerate Sayyeds, the reputed descendants of Muhammad through Ali his cousin (and his daughter, Ali's wife), but the most eminent of the Sayyeds are also noted for their personal piety and knowledge. The eminent Islamic authorities of the three sects will here be called "Great Saints." It happens that these saints have exerted, normally through informal means, a strong influence on Afghan affairs.

Islamic concepts of authority and virtue have affected how the Afghan peoples aligned into groups. Social ties imbued with Islamic concepts of right and obligation have ramified in wide networks that have, under extraordinary conditions and only for limited periods, formed the backbone of political movements. The relationships among the members of an Islamic network were defined in Islamic terms — that is, they were based on, or at least legitimated by, Islamic values. But the ties were not solely moral. Some that seemed to be non-Islamic, notably the ties of community and kinship, were in fact deeply imbued with virtual significance defined by Islamic ideals. This permeation of social alignments has given an Islamic cast to the whole system of social relations in Afghanistan. Virtually all traditional social ties have been at least partially bonded by concepts of virtue and obligation defined in Islamic terms. The two main elements of these Islamic networks were the Great Saints, who were the nodes of these social networks, and the common people, who were their clients.[10]

Great Saints had large personal networks of clients and friends, based on their clients' veneration. Clients sought them out for counsel, arbitration and charms, which were believed to be especially effective. Moreover, many people believed the Saints' good will was a source of blessing and pressed gifts upon them, which were transformed into material holdings controlled by members of the Great Saints' families. Some Great Saints owned land, livestock, apartment buildings, automobile dealerships, even export-import companies. The material wealth of Great Saints thus became an additional basis for their influence and prosperity. They were sought out by other prominent and influential people who wanted their friendship. Sometimes people tried to arrange permanent ties by offering their daughters in marriage to the Saints or their relatives. The result was that the families of the Great Saints had numerous relatives, friends and contacts.

Although the Great Saints constituted the nodes of the Islamic networks, many preferred to give their attention to pious activities and

[10] For further explanation of the structure and function of Islamic networks see Robert L. Canfield, "Islamic Coalitions in Bamyan: A Problem in Translating Afghan Political Culture," in Shahrani and Canfield, *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan.*

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the needs of their clients. Often their relatives assumed the more mundane duties, including the responsibility for social and political affairs. But even the most pious Great Saints have been known to take an interest in public affairs if conditions were serious enough; and some Great Saints, notably those belonging to the Naqshbandi order, regarded public service as a ritual duty.[11]

Two patterns of relationship bound the common people to the Great Saints. One was the loose set of dyadic ties between the Saints and their individual clients already implied. The other was a tighter, more formal relationship in which Sufi adepts trained under the guidance of their Saints. In this case, a Saint served as the teacher and leader of ritual exercises formalized according to the stipulations of a Sufi order. Among the Shi'ites there were no formal Sufi orders — formal Sufism is a sub-tradition of Sunnism — but the relationship of Shi'ite students to their masters was equally close.[12]

Most people, however, maintained a less formal relationship to their Saint, visiting him occasionally, giving him gifts, and sometimes soliciting his help in resolving their problems. In addition to their dyadic tie with the Saint, they were also integrated among themselves by kinship and community ties with Islamic implications.

Community bonds are affected by the prescription that Muslims should "enjoin the good and forbid the reprehensible," the good and reprehensible being defined in Islamic terms, of course. Practice varied with respect to circumstances. Rural communities usually were bound by strong common interests and were closely integrated through descent and intermarriage, but urban neighborhoods had few practical reasons for cooperation, as the residents were more transient. In any case, social unity in both was regularly expressed by public Islamic ritual.

Bonds of kinship overlapped those of community or neighborhood, stretching webs of relation to other communities and regions. The members of a community were usually related through multiple kinship connections, but kinship ties also ramified widely because some community members married outsiders. As marriages typically were consummated by co-sectarians, they seldom crossed sect boundaries. Kinship

[11] Hamid Algar, "The Naqshbandi Order," *Studia Islamica*, 42: 123-52, 1976. The Mujaddidi family are Naqshbandis.

[12] Oliver Roy, "Sufism in the Afghan Resistance"; and id., "Islam in the Afghan Resistance," *Religion in Communist Lands* 12(1): 55-68, 1984. Roy (1983, 1984) distinguishes between "spiritualist" (or *tariqat*) Sufism and "maraboutic" Sufism. Sufism as such is an overtly Sunni tradition, although it has always been intrinsic to Shi'ism. My description applies as much to Imami Shi'ites and Isma'ili Shi'ites as to Sunnis. Also, I regard the "spiritualist" and "maraboutic" systems as two kinds of relations to a Saint rather than two distinct systems. This is consistent, however, with Roy's description of the situation, as he notes that the Mujaddidis and Gailanis were venerated by some people according to the "maraboutic" pattern and by others according to the "spiritualist" *(tariqat)* pattern.

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ties, like communal ties, had Islamic implications that were expressed and reinforced by rituals at times of status transition: birth, circumcision, marriage, and death. In this sense tribal ties, which are putatively based on kinship relations, have had Islamic implications; tribes in Afghanistan are never mere secular institutions.[13]

The Progressive Variant of Islam

Such was the structure of the traditional style of Islamic belief and practice in Afghanistan as recently as the 1970s. It was based on shared understandings about virtue and obligation that influenced the shape of social alignments. In contrast, the progressive style of Islam took form among a relatively small cadre of elite and urban middle class families, joined eventually by some less prosperous individuals educated in the nation's public schools. This style constituted a set of orientations toward Islam whose differences from traditional style can be attributed to Western influences, although not always in the same way.[14]

Western imperial power menaced Afghanistan in the nineteenth century and persisted until 1919: when the British allowed Afghanistan control of her own international affairs and the Russian czarists fell to the Bolsheviks. But Western cultural elements did intrude into Afghanistan, mainly as technology and development ideals. Imported technologies and national evolutionary ideals became more important as the Afghan government, especially after the 1890s, strengthened its hold on its territories and its diverse peoples. Technology and development ideals spurred development of a bureaucracy that would serve the interests of the rulership. Early in the twentieth century, an educational system, modeled after European systems, was established to provide personnel trained in the skills and outlook required by an expanding bureaucracy. The leaders of this bureaucracy and the most successful products of this national educational system would form a new sociocultural entity, a nation-oriented middle class, that would become the governing element of the country. This group had some attitudes about life and society that conflicted with traditional values, and the contrast was notable in their attitudes toward Islam. Alongside a respect for Islamic law, Islamic heroic

[13] John W. Anderson, "How Afghans Define Themselves in Relation to Islam," in Shahrani and Canfield, *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan*. Indeed, the Pushtun tribes regard themselves as a kind of Islamic lineage, claiming descent from Qays, a loyal companion of Muhammad. Cf. Oliver Roy, "Intellectuels *et Ulema* dans la Résistance Afghane," *Peoples Méditerranéens* 21 (October-December 1982), pp. 129-157; id., "Sufism in the Afghan Resistance"; and id. "Islam in the Afghan Resistance."

[14] The classic general works on Afghanistan's political development are Hasan Kakar, *Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan* (Austin: University of Texas, 1979); Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, second edition (Princeton: Princeton University, 1980); and Richard S. Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1972).

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images, and Islamic ideals, they gave place to secular law, secular heroic images, and nationalistic ideals. For many people in the emerging bureaucratic middle class, Islam ceased to permeate all aspects of life. They placed Islamic ritual and social responsibilities into a distinct cultural category, a "religion," that could be distinguished from other elements of Afghan culture, such as politics and economics. They gave prominence to the Afghan nation, a less legitimate social entity to the traditional Muslim mind, and they regarded the magical techniques of the traditional populations as superstition, although in fact they retained strong ties with traditional relatives and friends. Many progressive Muslims would nevertheless lose a clear sense of the problems of the traditional populations and the reasons for Islam's importance to them, but they assumed an underlying commitment to Islam, especially where it represented national interests. For some people, however, Islam lost its importance: there emerged in the 1950s a small radical element, mostly Marxists, who renounced all religion and thus stood to the left of the most radical progressive Muslims.

Progressive Islamic ideas were being discussed by the literate elite in the early decades of this century, influenced by — in fact, transplanted from — other Muslim nations more directly confronted with the West.[15] Reaction to Western influences took a range of forms similar to reactions elsewhere in the Muslim world. For everyone the pivotal issue was how Islam related to Western culture. "Radical" progressives regarded Islam, as practiced among the common people, as an impediment to progress; they differed from the Marxists in refusing to reject Islam in principle. "Moderate" progressives regarded Islam, as theory dictated its practice, as no impediment whatever; in fact, they argued, the true intent and spirit of Islam was conducive to progress. A small group that could be called "conservative" regarded development of the Western sort as undesirable, even pernicious, and contrary to the true character of Islam. Conservatives were progressive in their desire for national progress, but believed that development had to take a distinctly Islamic form.

These versions of progressive Islam — radical, moderate, conservative — tended to be favored by people with different educational and experiential backgrounds. Radicals and moderates typically had studied abroad, mainly in the West but also at the American University in Beirut, a particularly fertile enclave of Western culture. Some of the moderates, in addition to having had some contact with Western culture, had studied at Islamic centers in the Middle East or South Asia; some

[15] See May Schinasi, *Afghanistan at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century: Nationalism and Journalism in Afghanistan: A Study of Seraj ul-Akhbar (1911-1918)* (Naples: Instituto Universitario Orientale, Seminario di Studi Asiatici, 1979).

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were members of prominent religious families. Unlike the radicals and moderates, who normally knew at least one Western language well, many conservatives were less familiar with Western languages; but some had studied in Islamic nations, and most had been in contact with ideas generated among Muslims elsewhere.

These were the main distinctions among progressives as of the 1960s. But in that period an important new element emerged. This was "Islamic revolutionism," [16] advanced first by some young progressives associated with the university.[17] In many ways their orientation resembled that of the conservatives, but it was more self-conscious, more internationally aware, and more strident, as it coalesced against the secularism of the government and the Communist elements that were becoming more prominent. It was destined to have a major place in the *mujahidin* resistance.

Patterns of Islamic Devotion

Such were the patterns of social alignment and cultural orientation informed by Islamic concepts in Afghanistan in the early 1970s. There were two styles, traditional and progressive. The traditional style was essentially similar to the faith and practice of Muslim peoples in this region for several centuries. It was a set of ideals about virtue, sublimity, and permanence that had been given shape and color in earlier times and had more recently come to regard with suspicion the Soviets and other foreigners, who appeared in many ways to embody the Islamic notion of wicked and gross kafirs. In contrast, the progressive style of Islam was, to varying degrees, shaped by Western ideals and concepts; but in one of its versions it was aggressively Islamic and reformist.

As the outlook of Afghan Muslims would enter importantly into the reactions to the Marxist coup of 1978, the nature of their commitment to Islam is critical. This is especially important to avoid imputing to the *mujahidin* stereotyped and superficial motives — such as those implied, for instance, in phrases about "primitive fundamentalist Moslem tribesmen," or "medieval barbarians . . . who are criminally exploiting Islam." [18]

[16] The term is Shahrani's in Nazif Shahrani, "Introduction: Marxist 'Revolution' and Islamic Resistance in Afghanistan," in Shahrani and Canfield, *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan.* Roy, "Islam in the Afghan Resistance," calls them Islamists.

[17] This viewpoint has been called "fundamentalism," a less than ideal word. In the West it has implications peculiar to a certain twentieth-century movement in American Christianity and can be used for an Islamic orientation only by distorting both viewpoints. Also, the Islamic groups so designated are often diverse, sharing only certain qualities that the Western observer considers diagnostic, and in any case, the distinction of such a group from other kinds of Islamic orientation masks certain reactionary ("fundamentalistic"?) qualities in other groups excluded from the category.

[18] Unflattering terms of this sort are critiqued in Canfield, "Islamic Coalitions in Bamyan."

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The devotion of traditional Afghan Muslims to Islam must be appreciated in terms of the moral appeal of Islam, the use of Islamic forms as means of efficacy, and its use as a medium of social interaction.

From the point of view of the sincere Muslim, the pre-eminent importance of Islam is its appeal to morality and truth. Islamic faith entails the belief in moral entities that have direct and pervasive implications for social life and human well-being. Islamic behavior in the proper sense is motivated by an acknowledged deference to ultimate values, enduring principles intrinsic in the cosmos. Ideally, for traditional Muslims the pre-eminent reality is God, who is holy and worthy of deference and worship. The truth and morality intrinsic to his character are, in an abstract sense, more important than life. Implicit in traditional Islam has been the unquestioned belief that deference to God and the acknowledgment of virtue is the expected behavior of any good and honorable person.

How that is performed in real life has of course been an enduring problem. But a prevailing assumption among Muslims, especially traditional ones, has been the belief that there are times when a good person will be impelled by moral considerations to go against self-interest. Moral behavior in the purest sense is free of self-interest. In the late 1970s, when Marxist repression and the Soviet invasion were to test the moral commitment of the Afghan peoples, the idea was already firm among them that some situations could demand extreme measures, even the loss of life: overt holy war on behalf of purely moral causes was an implicit possibility.

Moreover, for traditional Muslims Islam has been more than a system of values, ideals, and images of hope: it has been a means for coping with personal distress. That is, it has been a means of efficacy. Efficacy — the ability to deal with the problems of life — is a matter of importance in any society, and a large share of human energy and resources are expended for it. The people of Afghanistan have experienced much illness, injury, and conflict, and traditional Afghan Muslims find Islam a vital means of coping. Afghan Islam is a system of explanations for misfortune, natural and supernatural, and, by implication, a set of means for coping with it or avoiding it. Rituals such as the prayer rite and fasting are believed to win God's favor, with practical implications for well-being, in this life as well as the one to come. Also, the Saints, and after their deaths their shrines, are believed able to mediate on behalf of ordinary mortals and so to gain them blessing, healing, deliverance, or protection. Furthermore, amulets on which quotations from the *Qur'an* or other secret or esoteric symbols are written, are believed to be efficacious. Thus, the practice of Islamic rituals and adherence to Islamic

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ideals has, for traditional Afghan Muslims, offered practical benefits in dealing with the problems of life.

In addition to its moral appeal and its practical use as a means of efficacy, Islam is a social order that obliges an appearance of devotion. Pervading all social life, Islam exerts a certain coercive influence on people's behavior. Anyone wanting to get along in this society has to show at least overt deference to Islamic ideals and rituals. People can observe Islamic prescriptions as a means of expressing solidarity with relatives, friends, and colleagues, even if they are doubtful about its supernatural claims and its practical efficacy. Beyond this sort of informal influence, Islam has been supported by government policy. The Afghan government has long ruled according to the Hanifa tradition of jurisprudence, a specific tradition within Sunnism. The courts have adjudicated according to Hanifa Sunnism; the government has subsidized mullahs who were Sunni and who preached according to Sunni doctrine; mosques were built for the practice of rituals as defined in Hanifa Sunnism. Also, as a kind of identity mechanism, the non-Sunni peoples in the country have emphasized their distinctive brands of Islamic faith and practice. Non-Sunni — i.e., Shi'ite — teachings and rituals have expressed local and familial solidarity against the Sunnism of the dominant society. The rituals of the Imami Shi'ites and Isma'ili Shi'ites have in their respective communities exemplified their willingness to cooperate and share, and, as situations required, to stand together in contrast to the Sunnis. Imamism and Isma'ilism have been idioms of recalcitrance in a society long dominated by Sunnism.[19]

The motives for the Islamic commitment among traditionalists are, thus, three: that Islam is true and morally compelling; that it is an important means of well-being and efficacy; and that it is a means of expressing social solidarity. Progressives have similar, but somewhat modulated, motives for their Islamic faith, according to their interest in Western ideas and their nationalist objectives. On the whole, they regard Islam in some ultimate sense as true and binding. But for them Islam has had a different place in their lives. It has not been a means — or at least the sole means — of efficacy. That progressive Afghans belong to the middle class and have been closely associated with, if not the essential element in, the national bureaucracy, has meant that they have been based mostly in the cities — essentially in Kabul — and have therefore had better access to modern technological resources than the rural and urban poor. They

[19] Robert L. Canfield, "The Ecology of Rural Ethnic Groups and Spatial Dimensions of Power," *American Anthropologist* 75: 1511-1528, 1973; and Robert L. Canfield, "Faction and Coercion in a Plural Society: Religious Alignments in the Hindu Kush," Anthropological Paper No. 50, Ann Arbor: Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, 1973.

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have had a better knowledge of modern hygiene and closer access to modern medicine, so that they could be less dependent on traditional means of cure. Even though many progressives, mostly men, have regarded the magical techniques used by traditionalists as superstition, the traditional means of efficacy have continued to be used by some progressives, mostly in times of stress when modern techniques have proved inadequate.

But modern technology has been only one element of the condition that skewed the attitude of urban middle class Afghans. Actually, the whole Western system of social and political ideals has had a major impact, largely making these people conscious of the discreteness and importance of the Afghan nation. Progressives have differed from the traditionalists, for whom tribal, communal and sectarian loyalties have remained compelling, in their concern for national progress. If the moral imperative of the typical traditional Muslim was loyalty to the Islamic community — with familial, tribal, and sectarian components — then the moral imperative of the typical progressive Muslim was loyalty to the Afghanistan nation-state, with territorial, nationalistic, and economic components. This is why progressives have taken Islamic ritual forms — essentially according to the Sunni rite — as symbols of national unity, even as they worked to encapsulate Islam into a religion with a limited sphere of influence.

Such was the structure of Islamic styles in the early 1970s. They both had conceptual and organizational dimensions. The traditional style categorically distinguished kafirs, sects, and Muslim authorities, notably Saints, and it encouraged social ties that united people in vast networks of Islamic affiliation. The progressive style gave prominence to national ideals and objectives and considered Islamic ritual forms expressions of national solidarity. These two styles of Islamic thought and social arrangement would profoundly shape the response of the Afghan peoples to the cataclysmic events of the 1970s.

Responses of Afghan Muslims to the Khalq-Parcham-Soviet Administrations

Although there was some opposition to the government earlier, the important resistance activities began after the Marxist coup of 1978.[20]

[20] On the early responses of people to the Khalq regime see Shahrani and Canfield, *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan.* For the behavior of the Marxist elements of the population, see also Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan's Two Party Communism* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1983); and Thomas T. Hammond, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984).

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What was at first an uncertainty about the new regime became anger and frustration as unrealistic, insensitive, and oppressive policies were introduced. When the Soviets invaded, these feelings turned into widespread outrage, among traditionalists and progressives alike.

The "parties" and "fronts" that formed in opposition to the Marxist government and its Soviet sponsors took form around alignments — communal, tribal, Islamic — that were already in place. That meant that established social and cultural distinctions were carried forward into the new alignments. There is, for instance, an important distinction within the parties between the kinds of persons who take leadership roles and those who do not: those who lead are more educated and have already had an interest in wider social and cultural issues; that is, they are progressives. The rank-and-file fighters in the field are more traditional.[21] Besides the differences within the parties there are crosscutting differences among them that tend to divide the parties in several ways. There are Sunni parties, Imami Shi'ite parties and (although they are not well advertised) Isma'ili fighting groups; there are tribal Pushtun groups and non-tribal Pushtun groups, and non-Pushtun (often anti-Pushtun) groups. Also, there are different groups in respect to their objectives. All agree in wanting to overthrow the Marxist regime and drive out the Soviets, but they differ on the kind of government that should be established afterwards. There are basically two points of view, "establishment" and "Islamic revolutionary." The establishment groups[22] are sympathetic to the fallen regimes dominated by the Afghan royal family and have no particular designs for change in the restored country. The Islamic revolutionary parties seek to establish a new kind of nation altogether, one based on Islamic principles applied more broadly to public affairs. The result of these differences is that there is a hodgepodge of parties and fronts. They can be classified as follows:

Sunni Parties

"Establishment" Parties

"Moderate"

Mehaz-e Melli-ye Islami (leader: Sayyed Ahmad Gailani)

[21] The outlook and motives of followings have never been necessarily concordant with those of their leaders. People regarded as "saints" have been known to persecute their followers. (Said Amir Arjomand, "Religious Extremism [Ghuluww], Sufism and Sunnism in Safavid Iran: 1501-1722, *Journal of Asian History* 15: 1-35, 1981.)

[22] Shahrani, "Marxist 'Revolution' and Islamic Resistance in Afghanistan"; and Roy, "La Résistance Afghan"; id., "Sufism in the Afghan Resistance"; and id., "Islam in the Afghan Resistance" have called the "establishment" groups "traditionalists." Their terminology would confuse the reader here, as I have used the word "traditional" for an element of society which they assumed but did not name.

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Jebhad-e Melli-ye Nejat (leader: Sibghatullah Mujaddedi)[23]
"Conservative"
Harakat-e Enqelab-e Islami (leader: Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi)
Islamic Revolutionary Parties
Jamiat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (leader: Burhanuddin Rabbani)
Hizb-e Islami (leader: Mowlawi M. Yunus Khalis)
Itihad-e Islami Baray Azadi-ye Afghanistan (leader: Abdur Rabbur Rasul Sayyaf)
Hizb-e Islami[24] (leader: Gulbudin Hikmatyar)

Shi'ite Parties

Imami Shi'ite Parties
"Establishment"
Shura-ye Enqelabi-ye Ettifagh-e Afghanistan (leaders: various Hazara Sayyeds)
Islamic Revolutionary
Harakat-e Islami (leader: Sheikh Asef Mohseni)
Nasr (leadership: various Iran-supported individuals)[25]
Isma'ili Groups (probably with "establishment" objectives; located in the Central Hindu Kush)[26]
(Name unknown) (leadership: Sayyed Manucher ["Sayyed-e Kayan"])
(Name unknown) (leadership: Sayyed Mansur, a rival of "Sayyed-e Kayan")

Islam's Role in the Mujahidin Resistance

Islam has thus affected the resistance in two ways, by providing established lines of trust and alignment and by giving the *mujahidin* legitimacy and courage. Islamic concepts of authority and obligation had fostered well-established, familiar avenues of trust and obligation through which new appeals to cooperation could be made. Islamic concepts of

[23] These two party leaders come from prominent Sunni "Saint" families. Both were formerly associated with conservative interests in the past but these two men are now often described as "moderates." Their followings nevertheless include many traditionalists who venerate them as "saints," even though Mujaddedi is said not to be a "saint" and Gailani's personal inclinations are described as "secular." Because much of Gailani's and Mujaddedi's support comes from tribal peoples, Roy, "Sufism in the Afghan Resistance," has described their parties as "secular," a somewhat misleading term, as the bases for the support for the families of these men have long been traditional Islamic, even though much of that support has come from tribal peoples. Tribal structures are not without Islamic implications.

[24] This party is aggressively anti-Sufi and anti-"superstition." David Edwards (in a personal communication) indicates that this party, although well supplied with funds and weapons, has only weak support at the grass roots. It is composed of non-tribal Pushtuns and is distrusted by tribal Pushtuns as well as non-Pushtuns.

[25] According to Lee Coldren (in a personal communication) this party has recently overpowered many of the other Hazara Shi'ite groups.

[26] The Isma'ilis in Badakhshan once supported the Marxists but were trounced into quiescence by their Sunni neighbors.

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authority had established relationships that helped organizational activities. The ties of relation fostered by Islam were somewhat ambiguous, so that the pre-eminent authorities, the Great Saints, could assign responsibility to relatives or trusted friends. Islam also legitimized the resistance and strengthened its impulse by the call to holy war and martyrdom. Under the present conditions, when the severity of the threat is evident, the call to holy war has defined a way to respond to it and lent to that response a moral significance. The ritual of Holy War has helped generate a sustained resistance movement among both types of Afghan Muslims, progressives who think in terms of an Islamic state, and traditionalists who think in terms of an Islamic community. And beyond all this, Islam has provided the perfect stereotype for an enemy, the kafir, to which the Soviets have obligingly conformed, their atheism having been avowed and their reputation for debauchery having been well established. Islam, then, has been for the *mujahidin* both a useful system of interpersonal relations around which to form their new structures and a legitimating idiom for their cause.

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THE CUBAN AND SOVIET CHALLENGE IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN*

by Edward Gonzalez

Cuba continues to be an intrusive player in the Caribbean Basin, actively challenging the U.S. presence and the security of many states in the region. In contrast to the 1960s, however, today's Cuba has become a world class actor not only in the Caribbean, and Central and South America, but also in more distant African and Middle Eastern theaters. Unlike two decades ago, Havana no longer is a solitary and besieged socialist state in the Caribbean Basin. On the contrary, Cuba's activist foreign policy is now backed by the Soviet Union, while the Castro regime has gained allied Marxist-Leninist states in Nicaragua and, until October 1983, in Grenada as well.

As in the past, Cuba's capacity for power projection stems partly from factors internal to the Cuban polity itself. Among these are the regime's ability to mobilize the population behind its ambitious foreign policy goals, the growth in size and capability of the armed forces, and the well-honed foreign policy skills of Fidel Castro himself. Cuba's influence is further enhanced by its network with radical states and movements in the Third World, by the continued attraction it possesses for left-wing radical circles in Latin America and other regions, and by the guerrilla training and support it provides insurgent movements in Central America and elsewhere. These and other internal factors have enabled Cuba to exploit the Basin's revolutionary situations, first in Nicaragua and Grenada, and then in El Salvador.

In the final analysis, however, Cuba's power projection capabilities derive ultimately from its status as a privileged client-state of the Soviet Union. As evidenced by Cuba's large-scale military incursions

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into Africa beginning in 1975, the Soviet relationship enables Castro to augment greatly his power resources:

> Cuba is a small country with a big country's foreign policy. No other developing nation maintains more diplomatic missions, intelligence operatives, and military advisers and troops abroad than does Cuba, not even the oil-producing states that can afford it. The gap between its internal resources and its external capabilities is filled by the Soviet Union, not because of altruism, but because the Soviets are assured that what the Cubans do abroad will serve their purposes.[1]

Such a symbiotic relationship necessarily rests on a congruence of interests between Havana and Moscow in their foreign policy agendas. This study will argue that such Cuban-Soviet congruence has in fact existed with respect to the Caribbean Basin in recent years. But it will also contend that this very congruence could present Castro with serious policy dilemmas in the years ahead if Cuban-Soviet behavior continues to imperil U.S. security interests in the region. Specifically, five main propositions shall be advanced:

- Cuban and Soviet interests in the Caribbean Basin became congruent after 1979 because of the expansionist surge in Soviet global policy and the emergence of new targets of opportunity in the Basin itself, the active exploitation of which furthered the goals of both countries.
- The growth in Cuban and Soviet capabilities for power projection in the Basin, and thus their capacity to influence the outcome of events, has also contributed to this coincidence of interests between Havana and Moscow.
- Nevertheless, because Cuban and Soviet interests in the Basin differ in their respective motivations, priorities, and intensities, the degree of Cuban and Soviet commitment to Basin allies could sharply diverge in the future, particularly if faced with a U.S. military challenge as occurred with Grenada.
- Although Grenada revealed the limits of Cuban and Soviet power in the Basin, Castro most probably will be compelled by his imperial ambitions, and by his need to preserve his status as a favored Soviet client, to continue his expansionist policy in the region.
- Such a policy is likely to heighten the risks of direct confrontation with the United States as the 1980s progress, and could strain the Cuban-Soviet relationship.

After identifying and comparing the respective interests and objectives of Havana and Moscow in the Caribbean Basin, this article assesses each actor's ability to project power to advance its goals. The study then examines how events in Grenada in October 1983 sharpened the divergences between Havana and Moscow, and focuses on Grenada's future policy implications for Castro.

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[1] Robert Pastor, "Cuba and the Soviet Union: Does Cuba Act Alone?" in Barry B. Levine, ed., *The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), p. 207.

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Castro's Foreign Policy Agenda

In Pursuit of Maximalist Ambitions

Since coming to power in 1959, Castro's foreign policy has been characterized by a set of minimum defensive interests. In order of priority, Castro's minimum interests have been to (1) enhance his political power base in Cuba; (2) assure his regime's security vis-à-vis the United States; (3) increase Cuba's international autonomy as a dependent client-state; and (4) obtain sufficient levels of economic assistance to promote the island's development. These core interests have been essentially satisfied through Cuba's ties with the USSR since 1960. Although Cuba remains outside the Warsaw Pact, the understanding reached by Kennedy and Khrushchev in resolving the 1962 missile crisis virtually guaranteed Cuban security as long as Soviet strategic weapons were not placed there again. Although its international autonomy has become severely circumscribed by its Soviet ties since 1970, the Castro regime has benefited greatly by Soviet economic largess, particularly over the past decade.

In addition to his minimum interests, Castro's foreign policy agenda has always included a set of *maximum* goals, imparting an offensive aspect to Cuba's international behavior. Based on Cuban statements and behavior during the past decade, Castro's maximalist strategy can be seen to entail four major objectives:

- To promote, if not to lead, the Third World struggle against "imperialism" in order to erode the global power and presence of the United States.
- To extend Cuba's influence and presence in Africa, the Caribbean, and Central America, through an active diplomatic, political, technical, and military-security presence in these areas.
- To promote the rise of radical-left or Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Caribbean Basin through armed struggle, coups, or other revolutionary means in order to form a core of radical states closely aligned with Cuba.
- To increase Cuba's power potential as a second-order power, politically and militarily, through the infusion of ever higher levels of Soviet military and economic assistance.

Castro's maximum goals thus place Cuba on a collision course with the United States: they can only be realized through active collaboration with the Soviet Union, and at the expense of U.S. security interests in the Basin and elsewhere in the Third World.

Castro's imperial ambitions are the heart of Cuba's interventionist imperative—now codified in the 1976 Constitution—so that he has repeatedly sacrificed prospects for improved relations with the United States in favor of "internationalism." Thus, when Washington broke off secret negotiations with Havana in 1975 because of the latter's military

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adventurism in Angola, Castro declared that, "there never will be relations with the United States" if Cuba had to pay the "price" of abandoning its "solidarity" with anti-imperialist movements in the Third World.[2] Two years later, and only three months after the establishment of Interests Sections in Washington and Havana, Cuba's dispatch of a new expeditionary force to Ethiopia again halted the movement towards normal bilateral relations initiated by the Carter administration.

Soviet backing for Cuba's international offensive was manifested most dramatically in Africa where 36,000 Cuban combat troops were sent to Angola in 1975-76, with another 12,000 troops dispatched to Ethiopia in 1977-78.[3] Both these expeditions advanced Soviet interests in southern Africa and the Horn, and both were facilitated by Soviet logistical support, with Soviet Lieutenant General Vasily Petrov and his military staff commanding the Ethiopian expedition. Despite widespread perception that he had become a surrogate, Castro promoted his maximalist aspirations through his African campaigns. Thus, the Angolan intervention in particular strengthened Havana's ties with African regimes; advanced Castro's ambitions as leader of the more radical states in the Third World and Nonaligned Movement; and transformed Cuba into a privileged client-state, commanding ever higher levels of Soviet economic and military aid.[4] In economic terms alone, in fact, Soviet aid to Cuba shot up exponentially in the eight years after Angola.

New Opportunities in the Caribbean Basin

In the meantime, Castro's maximalist goals were also advanced by developments in the Caribbean Basin, a theater of critical security importance to Cuba. In March 1979, the New Jewel Movement (NJM) under the leadership of Maurice Bishop seized power in Grenada and, with Cuban and Soviet bloc assistance, began to install a Marxist-Leninist regime. The triumph of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua the following July, after a prolonged bloody civil war, was even more significant for Castro's maximalist posture:

- For the first time since the Cuban Revolution, armed struggle had toppled a regime closely allied with the United States, thereby opening the way for emergence of a new Marxist-Leninist regime with strong ties to Havana.

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[2] Radio Havana, December 22, 1975.

[3] The Cuban troop figures were disclosed by Castro in his then "secret speech" of December 27, 1979, before the National Assembly of People's Power.

[4] See Edward Gonzalez, "Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Africa," in David Albright, ed., *Communism in Africa,* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 145-67; Merrit E. Robbins, "The Soviet-Cuban Relationship," in Roger E. Kanet, ed., *Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s,* (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 144-70; and Aaron Segal, "Cuba and Africa: Military and Technical Assistance," in Levine, *The New Cuban Presence,* pp. 123-48; and Pastor, "Cuba and the Soviet Union," pp. 191-210.

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TABLE 1
SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO CUBA, 1961-1983

1961-1970:	$3.568 billion	
1971:	$ .570 billion	
1972:	$ .614 billion	
1973:	$ .611 billion	
1974:	$ .338 billion	
1975:	$1.064 billion	
(1961-1975 subtotal		$ 6.765 billion)
1976:	$1.569 billion	
1977:	$2.270 billion	
1978:	$2.946 billion	
1979:	$3.178 billion	
1980:	$3.463 billion	
1981:	$4.438 billion	
1982:	$4.561 billion	
1983 (est.):	$4.100 billion	
(1976-1983 subtotal		$26.525 billion)

SOURCES: 1961-1970 figures are taken from *Cuba Faces the Economic Realities of the 1980s, A Study Prepared for the Joint Economic Committee,* Congress of the United States, 1982, p. 16. The 1976-1983 figures are drawn from Directorate of Intelligence, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review,* A Reference Aid, Washington, D.C., ALA 84-10052, June 1984, p. 40. Soviet economic assistance includes developmental aid and trade subsidies for sugar, petroleum, and nickel. The U.S. government calculations are based on official Soviet and Cuban sources.

- The Sandinistas' guerrilla victory portended a "revolution without borders" in Central America as the armed insurgency in El Salvador in particular gained new momentum beginning in 1980.
- The Nicaraguan Revolution affected Soviet perceptions with respect to the viability of armed struggle by Communist and more radical Marxist-oriented groups, and to the new revolutionary vulnerabilities in the U.S. "strategic rear."

In truth, by 1980, revolutionary preconditions were present in Central America to a degree unmatched in the 1960s. Virtually all the agrarian-based and non-oil exporting economies of the region, for example, remained severely depressed because of low commodity prices on the world market, high costs of energy and manufactured goods, imports, and increased international indebtedness. Save for Costa Rica, income and land holdings remained concentrated in a fraction of the population, while existing social, economic, and political institutions were too rigid or weak to promote needed structural reform. The Central American countries also faced serious demographic problems; in El Salvador, population density was reaching Asia-like proportions (from 91 inhabitants per square kilometer in 1950 to 240 by 1983). Even where population densities were not intense, the social and economic systems of the Central American republics remained burdened by an under-

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fourteen age group accounting for 45 percent or more of their total population.

Meanwhile, the worsening socioeconomic and political reality of Central America contributed to significant new political trends. Thus, the Catholic Church was no longer the unified, conservative force of the 1960s. Instead, the Church was often divided, with some radical priests not only committed to Marxism or liberation theology, but also to revolutionary violence as the only tool to effect structural change. Prevented by entrenched civil-military elites from carrying out such change through electoral means, and threatened with government repression, moderate as well as more radical elements of the Christian Social Democratic parties also became convinced that violent revolution was necessary. They thus grew willing to align themselves with Marxist guerrillas, first in the anti-Somoza struggle in Nicaragua and later in El Salvador.

For both Havana and Moscow, the participation of radicalized clergy and the non-Marxist opposition in the insurgencies of Nicaragua and El Salvador was a major strategic breakthrough. Neither the earlier Cuban *foco* strategy of guerrilla struggle in the 1960s, which rested on the rural guerrillas band's becoming the focal point of insurgency, nor the nonviolent political strategy of the Moscow-oriented Communist parties during the 1970s, had been able to attract broad-based civilian support. For the first time since the Cuban Revolution, guerrilla movements under Marxist or Marxist-Leninist leadership were creating popular front-type alliances with civilian sectors, cutting across class, ideological, generational and urban-rural lines.

From Castro's perspective, the 1980s confirmed changes in the international correlation of forces that could accelerate revolutionary trends present in Central America and elsewhere in the Basin. In contrast to the 1960s, a rough strategic parity now existed between the two superpowers, as the Soviets possessed naval and air capabilities for conventional power projection on a global scale. Western Europe was becoming involved in Basin affairs, and such Basin countries as Venezuela, Mexico, and Panama had asserted independent policies. For its part, the United States appeared constrained by the legacies of Vietnam and Watergate — less able to impose its power and will abroad as evidenced by revolutionary upheavals in Iran and Nicaragua in 1979. Even within the Basin there were signs of U.S. disengagement. By 1980-81, the U.S. military presence in the region had reached its lowest level in over two decades.[5]

[5] Total U.S. military personnel in the Basin, including military advisory groups and attaché personnel, numbered 22,073 in 1960, and then peaked at 25,121 in 1968. By 1981-82, total U.S. military personnel stationed in the region had dropped to 15,668 owing to personnel reductions in facilities in Puerto Rico, Panama Canal Zone, and Guantanamo, and to the closure or downgrading of

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The existence of regional and international conditions favoring revolutionary advance was the underlying theme at an international conference on revolutionary strategy hosted by Havana in the spring of 1982. At that conference, Manuel Pineiro Losada, head of the Americas Department of the Communist Party of Cuba, emphasized, among other things, the internal policy contradictions besetting the United States, the unity of progressive and revolutionary forces in Central America and elsewhere, and the imperative of waging armed struggle in Latin America and the Caribbean.[6]

For its part, Havana has claimed the right to render active support to guerrilla movements, and thus to intervene in the domestic affairs of Latin American countries, on the basis of three rationales:

- *Fighting social inequities.* In 1982, the Cuban government informed a British parliamentary delegation that it was entitled to intervene in those countries where social injustice prevails.[7]
- *Rendering solidarity.* In 1984, Castro reaffirmed Cuba's interventionist imperative in an interview with Tad Szulc by claiming that, "As revolutionaries . . . we feel we have the right to support politically, to support morally the revolutionaries, those who wish social change."[8]
- *Retaliating against hostile regimes.* In the same interview, Castro further added that ". . . we are disposed to fulfill our international norms and obligations [regarding nonintervention] in relation to all the countries that adjust themselves to the same principle in relation to us," thereby implying that Cuban revolutionary subversion would stop only if Central American and Caribbean states ceased their hostility towards Cuba.[9]

Thus, Havana has given itself virtual *carte blanche* to intervene for reasons of social injustice, co-religiosity, and Qaddafi-like extortion against its alleged enemies. Yet, Latin American societies have no assurance that Castro will honor his own criteria. Non-hostile reformist or moderate governments have been the target of Cuban subversion in recent as well as past years (e.g., Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia), while, for obvious reasons of state, Havana has ignored widespread social injustice in such friendly countries as Mexico.

Cuban interventionism in the Caribbean Basin is not new, however. What is new is that "at the present time the Soviets have come

other base facilities. (Joseph H. Stodder, Kevin F. McCarthy, *Profiles of the Caribbean Basin in 1960/1980: Changing Geopolitical and Geostrategic Dimensions,* The Rand Corporation, N-2058-AF, December 1983, pp. 61-70.)

[6] See Manuel Pineiro Losada, "La crisis actual del imperialismo y los procesos revolutionarios en America Latina y el Caribe," *Cuba Socialista* (September-November 1982), pp. 15-33.

[7] See *House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1981-1982,* October 21, 1982, Sections 203 and 204.

[8] *Los Angeles Times,* April 22, 1984.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Although minimizing their significance, a useful description of Cuba's subversive efforts in Latin America is contained in Carla Anne Robbins, *The Cuban Threat* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983).

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to accept almost completely the Cuban theory of revolution over which Moscow and Havana exchanged bitter polemics in the 1960s."[11] In fact, for the first time since the Cuban Revolution, Moscow acted in concert with Havana in endorsing armed struggle and supporting the emergence of the new socialist-oriented regimes that appeared in Grenada and Nicaragua after 1979.

Soviet Perceptions and Interests

Changes in Soviet Assessments

If Soviet academic writings on Latin America are at all indicative of official Soviet interest in the region, then post-1979 developments in Central America and the Caribbean gave the region new importance on the Soviet Union's international agenda.[12] Prior to 1979, Soviet writers had consigned most of the region to the "reactionary and pro-imperialistic" bloc within the hemisphere. As a consequence, only about sixty-eight articles and four books were published on Central America between 1970-75. Following the triumph of the Nicaraguan Revolution, however, Soviet output jumped to 267 articles and seven books in the 1979-1981 period. Central America was now seen as the "weak link" in the chain of U.S. imperialism, owing to its potential for revolutionary upheaval.[13]

The Sandinista victory, and the subsequent consolidation of power in Nicaragua, brought Soviet revolutionary doctrine into basic agreement with the Cuban position on three points that had sharply divided Moscow and Havana throughout the 1960s:

- The validity of armed struggle as the strategy to be followed not only by radical insurgent groups but also by Communist parties in such Central American countries as El Salvador and Guatemala.
- The necessity of forging a broad but increasingly united military-political front based on an alliance between the guerrilla organization(s) and the civilian

[11] Mark N. Katz, "The Soviet-Cuban Connection," in *International Security* (Summer 1983), p. 93.

[12] It is arguable, of course, whether Soviet academicians writing in *Latinskaya America*, *International Affairs*, and other Soviet publications influence the policies of the CPSU, KGB, or other organs of the Soviet government. In his *The Giant's Rival* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), Cole Blasier concludes that in *Latinskaya America* writers "... tend to avoid explicit discussion of Soviet policy, but their interpretations of 'realities' have policy implications" (p. 189). However, judging by the time-lag between Basin events and analyses by Soviet academics, the doctrinaire and often misinformed nature of most Soviet writings on the region, and the dearth of Soviet specialists with any field experience in the Basin, Soviet policy might well be ill-served were it to rely on most academic assessments. Still, such authoritative commentators as Sergo Mikoyan, editor of *Latinskaya America*, presumably carry weight with Soviet policy makers, and their public pronouncements thus form part of the evidence that outside analysts must sift and weigh in analyzing Soviet policy.

[13] Edme Dominguez Reyes, "Soviet Policy Toward Central America, the Caribbean, and Members of the Contadora Group," a paper presented at the Conference on Soviet Foreign Policy Behavior in an Uncertain World, Bellagio, Italy, November 12-26, 1984.

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political opposition that includes Christian and Social Democratic as well as Marxist groups.

- The imperative of building a political infrastructure—the armed forces, security police, mass organizations, and a select vanguard party—that ensures the monopolization of the key organs of state power, and thus the irreversibility of the revolutionary process, even if it means slowing the advance towards socialism.[14]

The change in Soviet perceptions and doctrine regarding the Basin was signalled by S. A. Mikoyan, editor of *Latinskaya Amerika,* who declared in the March 1980 issue that "up to now only the armed path has led to revolutionary victory in Latin America."[15] In addition to *Latinskaya Amerika* (also published in Spanish), other internationally influential journals such as *Kommunist* and *World Marxist Review* (also published in Spanish) echoed the new line.[16]

The appreciation of Central America's revolutionary potential was not confined to Soviet academicians, however. In the November 1980 issue of *Kommunist,* Boris Ponomarev, head of the International Department of the CPSU, and thus the most authoritative Soviet spokesman on the Third World, hailed the Nicaraguan Revolution as an event comparable to developments in Angola and Ethiopia. Also, among the captured Grenadan documents, a March 10, 1983, memorandum reported that the then Soviet army Chief of General Staff, Marshall Nikolai V. Ogarkov, had told his Grenadan guest that whereas only Cuba had existed two decades ago, "today there are Nicaragua, Grenada, and a serious battle is going in El Salvador."

Cascading events in the Basin may well have been perceived by Soviet policy analysts as a further continuation of global trends in the 1970s that had enabled the USSR to extend its power and presence elsewhere in the Third World.[17] Civil wars and internal power struggles, often accompanied by military intervention by the Soviet Union or its client states, had led to the emergence of six new Marxist-oriented or Marxist-Leninist regimes closely tied to the USSR or its allies (South Yemen, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan). In other

[14] The renewed emphasis on securing political power—including by proxy forces—had already become part of Soviet revolutionary doctrine with respect to other Third World areas owing to earlier disappointments in the 1960s and 1970s, including Chile. See Alexander R. Alexiev, *The New Soviet Strategy in the Third World,* The Rand Corporation, N-1995-AF, June 1983.

[15] Quoted in Pedro Ramet and Fernando Lopez-Alves, "Moscow and the Revolutionary Left in Latin America," *ORBIS* (Summer 1984), p. 352.

[16] On Soviet writings, see ibid; Dominguez Reyes, "Soviet Policy"; Katz, "Soviet-Cuban Connection," pp. 88-12; Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Policy and the Crisis in the Caribbean," in H. Michael Erisman and John D. Martz, eds., *Colossus Challenged: The Struggle for Caribbean Influence,* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 47-82; and Morris Rothenberg, "Latin America in Soviet Eyes," *Problems of Communism* (September-October 1983), pp. 1-19.

[17] On the expansion of Soviet influence see Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World Conflicts,* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983).

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instances, radical non-Marxist states had aligned themselves with Moscow as clients in order to enhance their military capabilities (Syria, Libya). By the beginning of the 1980s, therefore, the Soviets had a direct military presence (including basing facilities) in four Third World countries (Cuba, Angola, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia), while also securing military basing, port, or refueling facilities in six other Third World countries (Algeria, Libya, Mozambique, South Yemen, Syria, and Vietnam).[18]

In the Caribbean Basin, Soviet policy appears to have been initially reactive. According to Fidel Castro's speech of December 11, 1982, the Soviets had had virtually no contact with the Sandinista insurgent leadership prior to 1979. But soon afterwards, the Nicaraguan Revolution was perceived as a watershed, offering potential political and geostrategic gains in a region where the only Soviet political advance had occurred in Cuba starting two decades earlier. Encouraged by the prospects of revolutionary upheavals in the U.S. "strategic rear," the CPSU thus signalled the Communist parties of Central America in 1980 to abandon their strategy of nonviolent political action and to engage in armed struggle with other radical groups.

Still, to a much greater degree than in Angola, Ethiopia, or Mozambique, the Soviets themselves studiously avoided making commitments to the fledgling regime in Managua. During Daniel Ortega's visit to Moscow in March 1980, the Soviets implicitly recognized that the Sandinista Front of National Liberation (FSLN) constitutes the revolutionary vanguard party within Nicaragua; but they have yet to acknowledge that Nicaragua's revolutionary process is moving the country into the stage of building socialism—an affirmation that could tie Moscow to Managua. Even as it supplies the FSLN government with large-scale military and security assistance, the USSR has pursued a low-risk, low-profile approach:

> The Soviets have demonstrated a clear preference for using intermediaries in the delivery of arms (at least until now): indeed, not only such trusted allies as Bulgaria, East Germany, and Cuba, but seemingly more neutral shippers, like Algeria, have been utilized when possible. Although there is a large Cuban advisory presence in Managua, the Soviets themselves have some 200 military and civilian advisers—a far cry from the numbers of advisers in Angola or Mozambique, for example.[19]

In their various public pronouncements regarding Nicaragua, in turn, the Soviets have taken care to indicate that the Sandinistas themselves must assume responsibility for their own survival.[20]

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[18] Frank Fukuyama, *The Military Dimension of Soviet Policy in the Third World,* The Rand Corporation, P-6965, February 1984, p. 28.

[19] Peter Clement, "Moscow and Nicaragua: Two Sides of Soviet Policy," *Comparative Strategy,* Volume 5, Number 1, 1985, p. 82.

[20] See ibid., pp. 78-80.

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In Pursuit of Geostrategic Goals

While minimizing its commitments to revolutionary actors in the Basin, the USSR may have sought three geostrategic objectives as it joined with Havana after 1979 to exploit adverse trends and new targets of opportunity in the region. Ranging from minimum to maximum, these objectives could be pursued simultaneously by Moscow, with their realization contingent upon the outcome of local developments and U.S. policy responses:

(1) *Weaken U.S. hegemony.* At a minimum, the consolidation of socialist-oriented regimes in (pre-1983) Grenada and Nicaragua, and the further triumph of new Marxist-Leninist led insurgencies in Central America, would demonstrate the inevitability of revolution and the impotence of the United States in the Basin. As a consequence, key governmental and nongovernmental actors in the region might seek to distance themselves from the United States in order to ensure their security vis-à-vis Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other radicalized states. In the meantime, internal policy divisions and public controversy within the United States could further sap U.S. power, as had occurred during the Vietnam War.

(2) *Divert U.S. resources.* Higher up the scale, increased Basin turmoil, and the presence of new Marxist-Leninist regimes militarily aligned with Cuba and the USSR, could force the United States to divert both greater attention and resources — including military assets — to the Basin and away from other contested areas of greater importance to Soviet security concerns. As had occurred with Cuba during the 1960s and 1970s, the military buildup of Nicaragua and (pre-1983) Grenada could proceed incrementally and ambiguously. For example, the arms increase might be achieved through the importation of "defensive" heavy weapons, thereby making it difficult for the United States to prevent the arms buildup. In time, Cuba, Nicaragua, (pre-1983) Grenada, and other Marxist-led countries could form a militarized axis linked to the USSR that would sit astride critical sea-lanes of communications (SLOCS) in the region. To ensure the Basin's security, therefore, Washington would need to allocate more of its political, economic, and military resources there, to the detriment of other global theaters.

(3) *Project Soviet power.* At a maximum, and over the longer term, consolidated Marxist-Leninist regimes in Grenada, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, could eventually provide the USSR with new basing facilities for further power projection in the Basin, South America, and the South Atlantic. As with the second objective, a new and direct Soviet military presence in these countries could be achieved incrementally and under

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ambiguous circumstances — initially, for example, by means of port calls by Soviet naval ships and refueling of unarmed Soviet military aircraft — in order to minimize the possibility of confrontation with the United States. Again, Soviet military activities in Cuba since 1969 provide the model. Over time, an increased Soviet military presence in the Basin, together with the militarization of Cuban-Soviet allies in the region, could present the United States with the prospect of strategic denial through the interdiction of SLOCS and raw material flows from within and outside the Basin. Hence, U.S. defense planners would need to draw down on U.S. military assets in other theaters, thereby abandoning their traditional "economy of force" principle whereby Basin security had been maintained with minimal force allocations. Even with a greater U.S. presence, the Soviets could still retain new forward basing facilities — as has been the case with Cuba since 1969 — that would enable them to project military power directly into the region.[21]

Congruence and Divergence in Soviet-Cuban Interests

In the post-1979 period, therefore, Soviet and Cuban interests had become highly convergent and mutually reinforcing. Nonetheless, as suggested by Moscow's circumspect policy towards Nicaragua, their respective interests also differed in the Basin:

- Although acclaiming its new revolutionary potential, the Basin remains peripheral to the Soviet Union's vital interests. Moscow moved to exploit openings in the distant, strategic rear of the United States primarily to gain geostrategic advantage in the East-West struggle.
- For Cuba, as in the past, the Basin is of vital importance to the Castro regime's security and political interests. Also, in contrast to the Soviets, Havana pursued maximalist goals that would transform the region by eroding U.S. power, extending Cuba's power and presence, and creating a new core of revolutionary states aligned with Cuba.

For Castro, the changes in the global correlation of forces and in the Basin now made his imperial ambitions far more possible than at any time since 1959. As these were realized, moreover, Cuba's value to the Soviet Union would be further enhanced, thereby ensuring continued high levels of Soviet economic and military support. The respective interests at stake in the Basin were thus considerably more critical and intense for Havana.

In turn, the potential for policy conflict between Havana and Moscow was further sharpened because, unlike the USSR, the very survival of Castro's Cuba could be at stake as the "point man" in attempting

[21] On the strategic implications of further Soviet and Cuban inroads in the Basin, see R. Bruce McColm, "Central America and the Caribbean: The Larger Scenario," *Strategic Review* (Summer 1983), pp. 28-42.

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to exploit Basin turmoil. The Castro regime also would be the most likely to suffer the most serious consequences from any major policy reversal in the Basin. Hence, the continued congruence of Cuban and Soviet interests would depend not only upon the course of Basin developments. It also would be contingent on Cuba's effectiveness as a revolutionary actor, and especially on the Soviet Union's readiness to stand behind Cuba and to commit its power and presence to the region. The initial test in this respect would occur over Grenada in the fall of 1983. In the meantime, the power and presence of the USSR and especially Cuba had grown significantly in the region.

Cuban and Soviet Capabilities for Power Projection

The United States remained the paramount political, economic, and military power in the Basin at the outset of the 1980s. But major transformations had also occurred since the late 1960s as the U.S. military (and economic) presence in the region had declined steadily, while that of Cuba and the Soviet Union had experienced a sharp increase.[22] Specifically, Cuban and Soviet power projecting capabilities had grown substantially in the ability to support revolutionary movements and regimes, and in the buildup of conventional military forces.

Aid to Revolutionary Movements and Regimes

Initially, the capacity of the Castro regime to influence events in the Caribbean, and in Central and South America, stemmed mainly from the appeal that the Cuban Revolution possessed for radical leftists in the region, and from the regime's own efforts actively to promote revolutionary movements and armed struggle in Latin America. When Havana normalized its relations with much of Latin America during most of the 1970s, Cuba still remained a Mecca for true-believers. In the meantime, the regime's capacity for power projection through revolutionary subversion grew substantially before and after the triumph of the Nicaraguan Revolution, as it gained new or improved instruments for promoting armed struggle. In turn, Havana was able to play a key strategic role in uniting, guiding, and supporting guerrilla movements in the region, first in Nicaragua, and then in El Salvador and Guatemala:

(1) *A more effective revolutionary strategy.* The triumph of the Sandinistas over Somoza demonstrated not only the viability of the

[22] See Joseph H. Stodder, Kevin F. McCarthy, *Profiles of the Caribbean Basin in 1960/1980: Changing Geopolitical and Geostrategic Dimensions,* The Rand Corporation, N-2058-AF, December 1983.

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path of armed struggle, but also the effectiveness of a new revolutionary strategy. In the 1960s, Guevara's *foco* theory of armed struggle was to be implemented by a guerrilla band operating in the countryside. The new strategy, in contrast, called for the formation of a combined guerrilla military front and a broad political front that included noncommunist as well as Marxist-Leninist opposition groups; the unity and coordination of the revolutionary forces; the waging of political as well as military warfare in the urban centers and countryside; and the orchestration of international solidarity and support. With Havana's active backing, the new strategy was implemented with considerable success in El Salvador following the formation of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front-Democratic Revolutionary Front (FMLN-FDR) in late 1980, and it also proved effective in constraining U.S. support for the Salvadoran regime.

The strategy devised a new formula for the consolidation of power by the Sandinista leadership in that the radical Cuban model need not be replicated in Nicaragua. Instead, the Nicaraguan model would seemingly allow for "political pluralism" in terms of opposition political parties, elections, and formal representative institutions, while private enterprise would be permitted within a mixed, but state-directed, economy. What would not be permitted, however, is the relinquishment of political power and control over the state to the opposition. This was made clear by Castro himself during the presidential inauguration of Daniel Ortega in Managua in January 1985: "There can be capitalists in the economy. What there undoubtedly will not be, and this is the essential point, is a government to serve the capitalists."[23] The Nicaraguan model thus has several advantages: it enables the Sandinistas to monopolize power, defuse internal opposition, engage the private sector, deflect U.S. charges of communist totalitarianism, and enlist the needed economic support of Western countries.

(2) *Greater institutional capabilities.* With the founding in 1974 of the Americas Department of the Communist Party of Cuba, the regime strengthened its organizational infrastructure for collecting intelligence, carrying out covert operations, training guerrillas, and disseminating propaganda in support of guerrilla insurgencies. Headed by Manuel Pineiro Losada, a Castro confidant and former intelligence chief, the Americas Department directs and coordinates Cuban revolutionary activities on the island and abroad, and works closely with the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) and other Ministry of Interior agencies. A network of guerrilla camps and indoctrination centers on the island, including the party's Nico Lopez Training School, provides instruction in guerrilla warfare, weapons use, and propaganda and agitation to aspiring revolution-

[23] *Los Angeles Times,* January 15, 1985.

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aries. Havana's extensive organizational network enables it to maintain close ties with guerrilla forces, thereby buttressing institutionally the personal influence of Castro and other Cuban leaders in their dealings with guerrilla leaders.[24]

The professionalization and modernization of the Cuban armed forces (FAR) and the Ministry of Interior (MININT) further strengthened the regime's power projection capabilities. Both the FAR and MININT can extend technical assistance and training to new revolutionary regimes seeking to consolidate their power. Thus, according to U.S. estimates, upwards of 3,000 military and security advisers have been assigned to the Nicaraguan armed forces and security and intelligence organizations.[25] Division General Arnaldo Ochoa, Cuba's top combat commander and a veteran of the Angolan and Ethiopian campaigns, was dispatched in June 1983 on the first of several visits to assist the Sandinista regime. The Special Troop Battalion of the MININT, an elite force that was airlifted to Angola in 1975, conceivably could again be deployed by Castro to affect the outcome, for example, of an internal power struggle or to assist a friendly regime in the event of a regional conflict.[26]

(3) *Greater manpower and technical resources.* Starting in the mid-1970s, the age profile of the Cuban population changed dramatically as the number of fifteen- to ninteen-year-olds increased by over 339,000 between 1974 and 1980, thereby reaching 1,116,340 in the latter year.[27] With a growing surplus of young men and women, many with technical skills that could not be absorbed by the island's stagnant economy, Cuba could thus export not only combat troops to Africa, but also tens of thousands of civilian skilled workers and technicians. While most were sent to Africa, the Castro government also dispatched Cuban military and civilian personnel to assist friendly regimes within the Basin.[28] Besides some 3,000 military and security personnel, for example, 6,000 civilians

[24] According to a Nicaraguan defector, as early as July 1979, Cuba had already trained more than 200 Salvadoran guerrillas of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), one of the main guerrilla organizations within the FMLN. This was nearly twelve months before the Salvadoran insurgents began to wage large-scale guerrilla attacks. Ferman Cienfuegos, of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FARN), also was said to be in close contact with Cuban intelligence operatives. (Department of State and Department of Defense, *Background Paper: Nicaragua's Military Build-up and Support for Central American Subversion,* July 18, 1984, p. 15.)

[25] Ibid, p. 11.

[26] The Special Troop Battalion was not sent to Grenada either to aid Maurice Bishop in his struggle with Bernard Coard, or to shore-up the island's defenses before the U.S. military operation of October 25, 1983. On October 24, however, Castro did dispatch Colonel Pedro Tortolo Comas and a contingent of officers to assume command of the Cuban construction workers on the island, who had already been augmented by some 150 to 200 recently arrived Cuban soldiers.

[27] Sergio Diaz Briquets and Lisandro Perez, *Cuba: The Demography of Revolution,* Washington, D.C., Population Reference Bureau, Inc., Vol. 26, No. 1, April 1981, p. 22.

[28] As of 1983, there were approximately 47,000 troops and military technicians, plus an additional 25,000 civilian personnel, serving in Third World countries, including Nicaragua. With some 36,000 troops in Angola and Ethiopia alone in 1983, Africa accounted for the greatest number of Cuban military and civilian personnel abroad.

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are today helping the Nicaraguan revolutionary process as school teachers, public health officials, economic technicians, and administrative and political advisers. In Grenada, nearly 800 Cuban construction workers were on the island before the Marxist-Leninist regime was ousted by U.S. forces, while another 100 or so Cuban technicians were in Suriname before being expelled in October 1983.

(4) *Greater logistical capabilities.* Cuba's ability to aid revolutionary movements and regimes has been strengthened by increases in its airlift capacity. Since 1975, Cubana de Aviación has acquired long-range and medium-range jet transport planes which can be used to transport civilian personnel to Nicaragua and elsewhere in the Basin. Although for use in civil aviation, these aircraft can also airlift upwards of 200 combat troops each (in the Angolan operation), as well as deliver war materiel and other supplies to friendly Basin regimes. Additionally, the FAR has approximately 100 military transport planes that extend Cuba's logistical reach within the Basin. These include the AN-26, a short-range transport with a radius of 600 nautical miles when carrying forty fully equipped paratroopers, or roughly 900 nautical miles when ferrying supplies.

(5) *Greater Soviet collaboration and backing.* With changes in Soviet perceptions of Central America and the Caribbean have come increased Soviet collaboration with Havana and greater levels of Soviet bloc support for revolutionary movements and regimes. Thus, together with its counterparts in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, the CPSU established party-to-party relations with the Sandinistas in March 1980, following the arrival of the first high-level Nicaraguan delegation to the USSR. Along with Cuban personnel, East German advisers assist the Sandinista government on security and intelligence matters, augmented by some 200 Soviet military and civilian advisers.[29]

Initially, the USSR and other bloc countries extended meager economic assistance to Nicaragua, with Western Europe in particular becoming the largest source of credit and loans. Soviet aid levels have begun to increase, however. According to one recent report, the Soviets now supply Nicaragua with nearly two-thirds of its petroleum imports followng cut-backs by Venezuela and Mexico, while Soviet bloc subsidies are said to run at over $300 million per annum.[30]

The Soviet bloc has been more forthcoming in supplying military hardware and training to help new Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Basin consolidate their power and strengthen their military capabilities.

[29] Clement, "Moscow and Nicaragua."
[30] *The Economist,* February 2, 1985, p. 27.

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Thus, the five secret international agreements between Grenada and the Soviet Union, Cuba, and North Korea, disclosed in the captured Grenadan documents, revealed that some $40 million worth of military assistance (assorted munitions, military equipment, uniforms, and military training), was being delivered to the Bishop government before its downfall.[31]

Soviet arms transfers to Nicaragua have been considerably larger. According to a high-ranking U.S. Department of Defense official, the Nicaraguan weapons inventory by the end of 1984 included about 150 T-54/T-55 medium tanks and PT-76 amphibious tanks, 200 other armed vehicles, more than 700 SAM-7 missiles, about twenty-four BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, and approximately five MI-24 Hind attack helicopters.[32] Although MiG-21s have not been deployed to Nicaragua, Nicaraguan pilots were sent to Bulgaria for MiG flight training starting in 1980 and are now reportedly in Cuba.

(6) *Access to other global resources.* The Nicaraguan Revolution was an internationalized conflict: not only were Cuba, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Panama actively backing the Sandinista forces in the struggle against Somoza, but the PLO and other radical organizations had "volunteers" in the guerrilla ranks. Since then, Havana and Managua have been able to obtain external support for Nicaragua from outside the Soviet bloc. Thus, Libya has extended economic assistance and supplied Managua with military equipment; and the PLO has provided pilots and mechanics for the Nicaraguan air force.[33] Until 1984, Nicaragua was also able to offset the low level of Soviet economic assistance by obtaining loans and credits from West European governments. Additional political support came from the Socialist International.

(7) *A Central American staging area.* With the installation of the Sandinista regime in Managua, Cuba gained a revolutionary ally that became invaluable in prosecuting the armed struggle in El Salvador and elsewhere in Central America. Starting in 1980, Nicaragua became a transshipment point for arms supplies to the Salvadoran guerrillas, a guerrilla training center, a sanctuary for the FDR political leadership, and a command-and-control center for directing guerrilla activities in El Salvador. Similar activities are also carried out from Nicaragua against Honduras. In turn, Nicaragua provides the Castro regime with a beachhead

[31] See Nestor D. Sanchez, "What Was Uncovered in Grenada," *Caribbean Review,* Vol. XII, No. 4, pp. 21-23, 59.

[32] Remarks of Nestor D. Sanchez, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs, "The Situation in Central America and U.S. Policy Toward the Region," Council on Foreign Relations, New York, January 7, 1984, p. 4.

[33] Ibid., pp. 10-11.

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from which it directly oversees and coordinates guerrilla activities in the region.[34]

Conventional Capabilities for Power Projection

Beginning in 1969, the Soviets gradually increased their capabilities for direct force projection in the Basin. With its development of a blue-water navy, the USSR has deployed twenty-three flotillas to the Caribbean since 1969, with virtually all the Soviet ships paying call at Cuban ports.[35] For years, the Soviets have routinely flown their long-range TU-95D Bear reconnaissance aircraft to San Antonio de los Banos in Cuba, while two armed TU-144F antisubmarine planes were deployed to the island for the first time in March 1983. Soviet pilots flew Cuban MiGs on the island to enable Cuban pilots to acquire combat experience during the Ethiopian campaign.

Meanwhile, in addition to some 2,800 military advisers, a 3,000-man brigade — evidently a remnant of the Soviet forces that left after the 1962 missile crisis — remains on the island.[36] A Soviet electronic monitoring complex at Torrens, west of Havana, is the largest such facility outside the USSR and enables the Soviets to monitor sensitive communications and missile tests on the U.S. mainland. Thus, though still small in size, the Soviet armed forces have increased their presence and activities in the Basin by incremental means over the last decade and a half.

On the other hand, the Cuban armed forces greatly increased their force projection capabilities, starting in the early 1970s. Numbering 109,000 personnel in 1970, the FAR more than doubled in the intervening decade, the most rapid increase occurring in the years of the African campaigns — that is, prior to the new round of U.S.-Cuban hostility that began in 1979. By 1982, the FAR had reached its present level of approximately 230,000 personnel. Buttressed by some 950 tanks, 700 artillery pieces, and a large fleet of combat aircraft, the FAR has thus become the largest and most formidable military force in the Basin save for mainland U.S. forces. Additionally, a Territorial Troop Militia, incorporating one million civilians, now serves as a home guard in the event of military hostilities with the United States.

The FAR has also been extensively modernized. By 1984, according to U.S. government sources, the Cuban air force had 270 Soviet-supplied MiGs in its inventory, including the more advanced MiG-

[34] For a comprehensive and extensively documented analysis of Nicaragua's role in promoting insurgency, see ibid, pp. 15-35.

[35] U.S. Department of State, *Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military Presence,* Special Report 103, August 1982, p. 5.

[36] These figures are taken from Sanchez, "The Situation in Central America," p. 8.

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21F and -MF models, and MiG-23E and -F attack fighters. These were supported by an extensive air defense system made up of over 200 surface to air missile launchers (SA-2s, -3s, -6s and -7s), and radar facilities. Additionally, the Cuban navy acquired two Koni-class frigates and three attack submarines to supplement its more than fifty torpedo and missile attack boats.[37] In sum, Cuba has become the Basin's most potent second-order power by possessing, in addition to its defensive might, a growing capability for offensive operations. Cuba is thus in a position to intimidate its neighbors, a capability first demonstrated in May 1980, when Cuban MiGs sank the Bahamian patrol craft, *Flamingo,* and then harassed subsequent U.S. as well as Bahamian rescue efforts.

Paradoxically, Cuba's increased military prowess heightens the risks to the Castro regime's security. Because of its growing capabilities and close ties with the USSR, Cuba now presents the United States with a credible conventional military threat in the event of an international crisis situation involving the United States and the Soviet Union or even Nicaragua: were either of these situations to come to pass, Cuba's military capabilities probably would have to be neutralized through U.S. air and naval strikes because of Cuba's capacity to interdict such critical sea lanes as the Florida Straits, the Mono Passage, and the Yucatan Channel.[38]

The still modest military presence of the USSR in Cuba and the Caribbean in itself suggests that Moscow is not prepared to challenge the United States directly in the Basin. As a consequence, Cuba remains the most exposed salient of the Soviet Union's "extended empire" precisely when both U.S. military power and concern over the Basin are growing. Without membership in the Warsaw Pact or a Soviet security commitment, Cuba is left in a potentially precarious position: as was shown by the Grenadan development, the Castro regime most likely would be on its own in the event of a military confrontation with the United States.

Grenada and its Long-Term Implications

The October 1983 events in Grenada may well have long-term repercussions for the Basin, and for Cuban and Soviet policy in the region. Grenada demonstrated the priority of Soviet over Cuban interests, and the limitations of Cuban and Soviet power in the Basin. Thus, the

[37] Sanchez, "The Situation in Central America."

[38] On how Cuban as well as Soviet military capabilities could affect the security of the Basin, and U.S. defense calculations, see Edward Gonzalez, *A Strategy for Dealing with Cuba in the 1980s,* The Rand Corporation, R-2954-DOS/AF, September 1982, pp. 6-12, and 19-25. See also P. Edward Haley, "Cuba and United States Strategy," *Air University Review* (November-December 1983), pp. 82-93.

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ouster and murder of Maurice Bishop, and the subsequent U.S. and East Caribbean invasion, were major setbacks for Moscow and especially Havana in the Basin. These events also revealed the potential for sharp divergence between Cuban and Soviet interests in the region.

Maurice Bishop was a virtual protégé of Castro, and his ouster and murder by the faction headed by Bernard Coard was in itself a setback for the Cuban leader. Worse still, there are indications that the Soviets were working at cross-purposes with Havana in supporting their own client in the power struggle that enveloped the New Jewel Movement in September and October. Based on their extensive analysis of the captured Grenadan documents as well as on interviews, two authors have recently written that:

> what evidence we have suggests that Soviet officials knew about the Bishop-Coard rivalry and, unlike the Cubans, very likely sought to aid the anti-Bishop conspirators in their efforts to demote him. At any rate, they made no move to help the embattled Bishop.[39]

Indeed, Coard and others in the anti-Bishop faction had established close ties with the Soviets to strengthen their position within the New Jewel Movement, thereby perhaps providing Moscow with a "back channel" to the Coard faction. In any event, the Soviets did not react adversely to the Coard coup:

> When the coup took place, the Soviets, unlike the Cubans, did not eulogize Bishop and his supporters. Later . . . *Kommunist* talked vaguely about a "tragic turn of events" caused by "the differences within the party." Not only did the Soviets fail to admonish Coard; they still have not admitted that Bishop's death was the result of a conspiracy, attributing it rather to "an armed clash in one of the districts of St. George's."[40]

In contrast, Castro sought to shore-up Bishop's position prior to the coup by receiving him warmly in Havana in September following the Grenadan leader's cool reception in Moscow. After the coup, in a letter to the New Jewel Movement's Central Committee, he sought to have Bishop's life spared. And, although Cuba did not dispatch large-scale military reinforcements to Grenada prior to or during the U.S. invasion, it had sent upwards of 200 soldiers to strengthen the Cuban construction workers already on the island. In short, within his limited means, and without jeopardizing his relationship with the Soviets, Castro sought to protect his political stake in Grenada.

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[39] The authors further state that, "The Soviets were undoubtedly suspicious of Bishop's independence, suggested by his belated attempts (apparently not coordinated with Moscow) at rapprochement with the United States, and of his poor Leninist credentials, suggested by his unwillingness to abide by the NJM Central Committee decision to impose collective leadership. Surely the Soviets would have felt more at ease with the ideologically more compatible *apparatchik,* Bernard Coard." (Jiri and Virginia Valenta, "Leninism in Grenada," *Problems of Communism* [July- August 1984], p. 20.)

[40] Ibid, pp. 21-22.

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Most critically, the Grenadan affair revealed the unwillingness of Cuba and especially the USSR to risk a direct military confrontation with the United States in order to save a client regime in the Basin. Castro made this clear in a message he sent to Cuban representatives on the tiny island on October 22, three days before the U.S.–East Caribbean invasion. Because "a large-scale Yankee aggression against us" was imminent, he declared that, "It is not the new Grenadan Government we must think of now, but of Cuba . . .," and that accordingly, ". . . sending reinforcements is impossible and unthinkable." Instead, ". . . Cuba will do its best to promote, together with all progressive countries, a strong campaign to counter the U.S. threats against Grenada."[41] Still, the nearly 800 Cuban construction workers on the island, many of whom had previously seen combat duty in Africa, fought the U.S. forces when the invasion commenced. In contrast, Soviet behavior was conspicuous by both its prudence in not aiding Cuba's embattled contingents, and by its abandonment of a client regime.

Grenada may well be unique in terms of the events that allowed the U.S. and East Caribbean forces to intervene, and in terms of the relative ease with which the military operation was carried out. Still, it demonstrates the precariousness of Cuba's position — and that of its Nicaraguan ally — in working with the USSR to undermine U.S. and Basin security, when Moscow cannot or will not commit Soviet power to ensure the survival of its clients if the United States moves militarily against them.

As the Grenadan affair indicates, however, any policy differences with Moscow must necessarily be self-limiting because Castro needs to adhere to the Soviet position if his maximalist goals are to be realized, including obtaining optimal levels of Soviet economic and military assistance. Thus far, Cuba did succeed in securing a new long-term Soviet-Cuban agreement on economic, technological, and scientific cooperation at the conclusion of the 39th Meeting of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance that was held in Havana in October 1984, but details have been sketchy and neither the Cuban press nor Castro have been effusive in referring to the agreement.[42] In the meantime, the island's lagging economy, its growing export obligations to the USSR, and its increased economic integration into the Soviet bloc — 85 percent of Cuba's imports

[41] "Statement by the Cuban Party and Government on the Imperialist Intervention in Grenada," October 25, 1983, *Granma Weekly Review* [Havana], October 30, 1983, p. 1.

[42] For the Cuban reaction, see ibid, November 11, 1984, pp. 3-5. According to unconfirmed Western reports, Moscow agreed to refinance Cuba's debt to the USSR by postponing repayments scheduled to begin in 1986, in order to enable Cuba to repay its Western creditors who are owed $3.6 billion. The Soviets have postponed Cuba's debt repayments in the past, however, so that such a concession may be less significant than were Moscow to increase its level of economic assistance to the island.

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now come from the socialist countries, principally the USSR — leave Castro little leverage in his dealings with Moscow.[43]

Thus, Cuba's *líder maximo* confronts a strategic dilemma in his policy towards the Basin: To advance his imperial ambitions in the region, and to ensure that Cuba's status as a most privileged Soviet client does not diminish, he needs to pursue highly activist if not interventionist policies in order to revalidate his role as an international paladin advancing Soviet global interests. But such policies are likely to place Cuba on a collision course with the United States at a time when the so-called international correlation of forces is shifting in favor of the West and thereby further increasing the prospects that the Soviets will not jeopardize their own security to defend Cuba. Thus, the more successful Castro's policies become in exploiting revolutionary situations in the Basin, the greater the risks to Cuba.[44]

As a consequence, the Cuban-Soviet relationship is likely to be characterized in the future by latent strains that arise in part from differences over the degree to which Moscow should commit itself — economically, politically, and militarily — to supporting Havana, Managua, and other revolutionary actors in the Basin. In time, these strains could manifest themselves more openly, particularly if the new Soviet leadership assigns a lower priority to the Third World. Meanwhile, Castro's recent flurry of U.S. press and television interviews, together with his absence from Moscow in March on the occasion of Konstantin U. Chernenko's burial, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev's accession to power, all attest to the Cuban leader's growing frustration with his Soviet patron and his own policy predicament.

[43] On Cuba's dependency and need to conduct an "economic war" to revitalize the economy, see Castro's lengthy speech to the National Assembly of People's Power, December 28, 1984, reprinted in a special supplement in ibid, January 13, 1985, pp. 2-15.

[44] For a further elaboration of this argument, see Edward Gonzalez, "Cuba: Confrontation or Finlandization," *Washington Quarterly* (Fall 1984), pp. 28-39.

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POST-ATTACK STRATEGIC COMMAND AND CONTROL SURVIVAL: OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE*

by Alan J. Vick

Over the last twenty years, defense professionals have focused on command and control survival as the most profound problem among the operational necessities of nuclear war. During this period, the United States spent over $40 billion to ensure that no surprise attack could prevent retaliation by disruption of presidential control over the nuclear forces. While problems remain, these efforts have been largely successful.[1]

Current U.S. nuclear policy, however, requires that the United States be capable of much more than a spasmodic retaliation. The Reagan administration adopted the proposition in National Security Decision Directive 13 that the best deterrent to a Soviet attack would be the ability to prevail in any conflict, limited or total, short or prolonged.[2] This strategy requires that United States strategic nuclear forces and their associated Command-Control-Communications-Intelligence (C^3I) system survive an initial attack, reconstitute, and prosecute the war in pursuit of specific political and military goals over a prolonged period, lasting possibly weeks or months. Secretary of Defense Weinberger stressed C^3I survivability in the FY 1983 *Annual Report* to the Congress, arguing that C^3I systems "must be able to operate reliably over an extended period after an attack should that prove necessary."[3]

* The views and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and should not be interpreted as representing those of the Rand Corporation or any of the agencies sponsoring its research. The author wishes to thank Thomas Brown, Benjamin Lambeth, and Rein Taagepera for their helpful comments and suggestions.

[1] An interesting discussion of this problem is found in John Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation," *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1981/82), pp. 16-28. For an analysis of future options for command and control modernization, see Congressional Budget Office, *Strategic Command, Control, and Communications: Alternative Approaches for Modernization* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, 1981); and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Strategic Command and Control Vulnerabilities: Dangers and Remedies," *ORBIS* (Winter 1983), pp. 941-63.

[2] Leon Sloss and Marc Dean Millot, "U.S. Nuclear Strategy in Evolution," *Strategic Review* (Winter 1984), pp. 19-28; and Jeffrey Richelson, "PD-59, NSDD-13 and the Reagan Strategic Modernization Program," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (June 1983), pp. 125-46.

[3] Caspar W. Weinberger, *Department of Defense Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1983* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1982), p. 66.

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This followed President Carter's codification of a "countervailing" nuclear strategy in Presidential Directive 59 and his stress on national leadership and C³I survival found in Presidential Directives 53, 57, and 58.[4] President Carter's strategy was, in turn, a logical development from the Limited Nuclear Options developed under President Nixon and formally established in National Security Decision Memorandum 242.[5]

The demands placed upon the C³I system during a prolonged nuclear war would be infinitely greater than those placed on a system that simply sends a "go code" to launch a total retaliation.[6] Without satellites, radar warning systems, communications systems, and command bunkers capable of surviving sustained attack, prolonged nuclear war is impossible.

Fixed command sites, early warning radars, and satellite control facilities are not designed to survive during the trans- and post-attack periods and may be lost early in a nuclear war. Mobile command posts might bear the entire command and control burden. Yet, the current Post-Attack Command and Control System (PACCS), while useful during the trans- and early post-attack periods, may have difficulty remaining mobile and undetected in any war lasting more than a few days. During the 1980s, assuring mobility and crew survival are likely to be paramount problems. By the 1990s or turn of the century, however, strategic reconnaissance sensors, signal processing and interpretation capabilities may be sufficiently advanced to threaten even mobile systems.

Arguing a serious gap between current policy and the C³I assets deployed to support that policy, this paper discusses the physical vulnerability of the present command and control system and presents three options that might address this problem. Finally, it investigates the interactive nature of C³I vulnerability and the associated incentives to destroy the opponent's system during a prolonged war.

System Overview

Communications

The U.S. C³I system is a network of command posts, communication and satellite control centers, data processing facilities, and

[4] See Thomas Powers, "Choosing A Strategy for World War III," *The Atlantic,* November 1982, pp. 82-110; Walter Slocombe, "The Countervailing Strategy," *International Security* (Spring 1981), pp. 18-27; and Colin S. Gray, "Presidential Directive 59: Flawed But Useful," *Parameters* (March 1981), pp. 29-37.

[5] See Lynn E. Davis, *Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New American Doctrine, Adelphi Paper 121* (London: IISS, 1976); and Desmond Ball, *Déja Vû: The Return to Counterforce in the Nixon Administration* (Santa Monica, Calif.: California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 1974).

[6] The most comprehensive study of prolonged nuclear war available in the public literature is Christopher I. Branch, *Fighting A Long Nuclear War: A Strategy, Force, Policy Mismatch* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984).

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intelligence collection and interpretation facilities tied together by the World-Wide Military Command and Communication System (WWMCCS). Formally established in 1962, it is designed for routine peacetime communications between American installations around the world and the Pentagon. WWMCCS is not, however, a hardened, survivable system. Most of its facilities are vulnerable to nuclear effects, conventional attack, or sabotage. Radio traffic between most units can be easily intercepted and jammed. Most radio traffic would be significantly disrupted by Transient Radiation Effects on Electronics (TREE) from nuclear detonations.[7]

The Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN) is composed of the survivable components of the American C^3I system. These are protected by physical hardening, mobility, redundancy, anti-jamming techniques, communications security, and shielding from Electromagnetic Pulse Effects (EMP).[8] They are designed to detect nuclear attack; provide warning to the National Command Authorities (the president, secretary of defense, etc.); and send out the Emergency Action Message (EAM), ordering one of the many Standard Integrated Operational Plans (SIOP) or sub-SIOP options launched against the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, although these options are subtle and flexible, the current communications system was predicated upon the belief that nuclear war would consist of one exceptionally destructive attack and one equally total retaliation. The demands placed upon a system that only has to function once, then crawl in a corner and die, are quite straightforward. Current strategy, however, demands a more robust system: one capable of surviving and operating under nuclear conditions for weeks.[9]

Early Warning

The first warning of a nuclear attack might be political, as tensions increased over some serious confrontation (see table 1). Strategic warning might also be provided as the Soviets prepared for a nuclear strike. An increase in training flights, missile tests, troop movements and maneuvers followed by a stand-down or forward-deployment of the strategic bomber force and submarine fleet are all possible indicators. Whether, in fact, such activities would be interpreted as unambiguous

[7] For detailed discussions of the effects of nuclear detonations on communications, see Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, *MX Missile Basing* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1981); and Samuel Glasstone and Phillip Dolan, eds.; *The Effects of Nuclear Weapons* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1977).

[8] Thomas Reed, "A Better Horse for Paul Revere?" *Strategic Review* (Summer 1976), pp. 25-32.

[9] Brewer and Bracken identify ten discrete C^3I functions, each highly complex and often manpower, data, and analysis intensive. See Garry Brewer and Paul Bracken, "Some Missing Pieces of the C^3I Puzzle," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (September 1984), p. 461.

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TABLE 1

TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC WARNING LADDERS

Tactical Warning	
t	IMPACT
t-1	BMEWS/DEW Line/PAVE PAWS
t-2	Early Warning Satellites
t-3	Changes in volume and type of radio transmissions
t-4	Detection of Soviet submarines off American coasts
t-5	Backfire/tanker movement to Arctic staging areas
t-6	Unusual aircraft, troop, ship movements
Strategic Warning	
t-7	Deployment of SSBNs
t-8	Stand-down of SSBNs, aircraft, or any military forces
t-9	Recall of ambassadors
t-10	Stockpiling
t-11	Massive reduction in exports (particularly fuel and strategic minerals)
t-12	Unusual training

indicators of imminent attack is another matter.[10] The historical record is not encouraging.[11]

Immediate tactical warning of attack might be provided by U.S. interception of Soviet ICBM launch orders and bomber scramble orders. The volume of communications alone might indicate a forthcoming attack. Early warning satellites might give twenty-five to thirty minutes warning of ICBM attack and ten to twenty minutes warning of Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) attack. Approximately ten minutes later, the U.S. Air Force Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radars at Flyingdales Moor, England; Thule, Greenland; and Clear, Alaska, would confirm that the United States was under attack. The nature and magnitude of the attack would be established at this time.[12] Precise points of impact would also be determined, allowing ten to twenty minutes to decide on the appropriate response and perhaps launch, prior to the detonation of Soviet re-entry vehicles.[13]

Additionally, the Enhanced Perimeter Acquisition Radar Characterization System (EPARCS) at Grand Forks, North Dakota, and COBRA

[10] For a discussion of ambiguities associated with strategic force operations, see Alan J. Vick and James A. Thomson, *The Military Significance of Restrictions on Strategic Nuclear Force Operations* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1984).

[11] See Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982); and Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962).

[12] Congressional Budget Office, *Strategic Command*, p. 8.

[13] John Steinbruner's work suggests that such a strategy would be neither practical nor wise. See John Steinbruner, "Launch Under Attack," *Scientific American* (January 1984), pp. 37-47.

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DANE, the phased-array radar on Shemya Island in the Aleutians, would identify and track individual re-entry vehicles and predict impact points. COBRA JUDY, a shipborne, phased-array radar based on the USN *Observation Island,* offers a mobile, less capable but more survivable warning system. It has no early warning responsibilities but, during a nuclear war, it might be mobilized to provide limited early warning.[14]

For SLBM attack from the east and west, PAVE PAWS, the phased array warning radars at Otis AFB, Massachusetts, and Beale AFB, California, provide attack characterization.[15] Two additional sites, under construction in Georgia and Texas, will provide similar coverage for southern attacks. Currently, older radars at the Alternate Space Defense Center at Eglin AFB, Florida, warn of SLBM launches from the Gulf of Mexico, southern Atlantic, and southern Pacific. These radars also warn of attack over the South Pole by Fractional Orbiting Bombardment System (FOBS) warheads. This center is linked to other surveillance systems through NORAD.[16]

Defending North American air space is the responsibility of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a joint U.S.-Canadian command. NORAD radars include the Distant Early Warning (DEW) system positioned along the seventieth parallel (north) from Point Lay, Alaska, through Canada and Greenland to Iceland and the Pinetree Line in mid-Canada. Finally, FAA/U.S. Air Force radars in the United States and U.S. Air Force AWACS aircraft provide surveillance and interceptor C^3I for the lower forty-eight states.

The AWACS aircraft will patrol in random patterns along the periphery of the United States, providing all-altitude warning of attack in their sectors. Alerted in time, they could dramatically enhance NORAD's ability to detect, intercept, and destroy Soviet bombers. Deployment of the U.S. Air Force Over-the-Horizon radar system (two sites in Maine are completed and one is planned for Washington state), and modification of the DEW line will make surreptitious penetration of North American airspace more difficult. Approximately 300 interceptors (F-106s, F-4s, F-15s, CF-106s, and CF-18s) are deployed throughout the continent.[17]

Mobile Command Posts

Upon warning of attack, the president, secretary of defense, and other key members of the National Command Authority (NCA) would fly by helicopter to a designated airfield where they would board the

[14] "COBRA JUDY Radar Turret Presents Distinctive Profile," *Aviation and Space Technology,* March 8, 1982, p. 231.

[15] Congressional Budget Office, *Strategic Command,* p. 10.

[16] *The Military Balance 1982-1983* (London: IISS, 1983), p. 5.

[17] *The Military Balance,* p. 5.

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National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP). Since evacuation helicopters are not kept on ground alert at the White House, Pentagon or State Department, a "bolt out of the blue" attack by SLBMs or SLCMs launched off the eastern coast would destroy Washington, D.C., before the helicopters could fly to the White House, let alone escape. As is the case with many elements of the U.S. C^3I system, evacuation procedures are based on the premise that several days or weeks of increasing tensions will warn of nuclear war, allowing alert rates to be increased.

NEACP can communicate with American military forces on radio frequencies ranging from very low frequency (VLF) to super high frequency (SHF). It can communicate with the strategic submarine fleet and with fleet satellite communications (FLTSATCOM), Air Force Satellite Communications System (AFSATCOM), and other military satellites. Refuelable in flight, NEACP can stay aloft for seventy-two hours, because of a special oil replenishment system. After three days, however, it must land for maintenance and new oil.[18]

If the president chose to react to strategic warning of an attack (e.g., evacuation of Soviet cities), he could order the evacuation of select members of the federal government to the federal relocation centers in Virginia and Maryland.[19] If the president ordered total evacuation of Washington, D.C., he might then board NEACP and randomly move about the country. Certainly, under these conditions some members of the NCA would man NEACP.

The Post-Attack Command and Communications System (PACCS) aircraft have several missions. The first is the commander-in-chief of the strategic air command's (SAC) *Looking Glass* mission. The *Looking Glass* mission requires that one EC-135 (to be replaced by E-4B aircraft) be airborne at all times and commanded by a general officer. This officer has the codes and, perhaps, authority to launch a retaliation against the Soviet Union in the event the president is killed or isolated.[20] *Looking Glass* has direct ties to SAC's primary alert system, the SAC underground command center at Offut AFB, NORAD, the National Military Command Center and its alternate.[21]

Looking Glass can be refueled in flight, remaining aloft for twenty-four hours. This aircraft can communicate on all radio frequencies from VLF to VHF. PACCS aircraft on the *Looking Glass* mission patrol in

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[18] Desmond Ball, *Can Nuclear War be Controlled? Adelphi Paper 169* (London: IISS, 1981), p. 16.

[19] Ball, *Nuclear War*, p. 39.

[20] John Steinbruner presents an illuminating evaluation of the delicate political and organizational issue of nuclear delegation of authority in "National Security and the Concept of Strategic Stability," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (September 1978), pp. 411-28. See especially pp. 419-20.

[21] Congressional Budget Office, *Strategic Command*, p. 14; and Ball, *Nuclear War*, p. 16.

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a random fashion over the United States. Currently, this mobility makes *Looking Glass* highly survivable. Deployment of space-based sensors may, however, enable the Soviets to track aircraft. By the 1990s, improvements in Soviet computer technology may enable them to transmit this information to SSBN or ICBM Launch Control Centers, retargeting their SLBMs and ICBMs to detonate along *Looking Glass*'s flight path. Thus, *Looking Glass* may become vulnerable to nuclear attack in the future.

Other PACCS aircraft are on ground-alert at various air force bases. Three such aircraft are designated as the Airborne Launch and Control System (ALCS). These aircraft can program and launch Minuteman ICBMs. Two auxiliary command-post aircraft and two radio/relay aircraft provide an air-to-air ultrahigh frequency (UHF) link between NEACP, *Looking Glass,* and ALCS. Thus, even if all communication satellites and land-lines were destroyed, the president would still be able to communicate with the ICBM and bomber forces.[22]

The U.S. Navy maintains two of its TACAMO (take action, charge, and move out) aircraft on airborne alert, providing continuous VLF communications with the ballistic missile submarines. TACAMO aircraft are linked by UHF to AFSATCOM and FLTSATCOM satellites. They can remain aloft for ten hours. Their primary role is to relay a launch order from the president in NEACP to the submarines.[23]

Fixed Command Posts

There are five major strategic command posts in the United States. The first, the National Military Command Center (NMCC) is located in the Pentagon, and has outstanding communication and data processing equipment.[24] It is not hardened against nuclear effects. During a nuclear war, it would be abandoned in favor of the ANMCC.

The Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC) is an underground base which offers some blast and fall-out protection. It is tied into all of the NMCC's communication links, ready to replace the NMCC with little notice. The ANMCC has complete food stocks, medical care, quarters, and other necessities for its personnel. It, along with a second ANMCC, is designed to ensure the survival of key members of the federal government and to ease recovery from a nuclear war.

The underground command post at Strategic Air Command headquarters at Offut Air Force Base in Nebraska provides limited blast and fallout protection. It is linked to the NMCC, NORAD, NEACP, *Looking*

[22] Ball, *Nuclear War,* pp. 16, 41; and Office of Technology Assessment, *MX Missile Basing,* p. 286.

[23] Ball, *Nuclear War,* pp. 17, 41.

[24] Congressional Budget Office, *Strategic Command,* p. 12.

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Glass, the numbered air forces within SAC, and SAC bases, controlling all U.S. land-based ICBMs and bombers. During an actual conflict, CINCSAC may direct operations from here or choose to go airborne in one of the PACCS aircraft.

Finally, NORAD is buried under approximately 1,500 feet of granite within Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado. Probably the most survivable of the American command posts, NORAD's primary mission is strategic surveillance and warning. It collates and interprets attack data and alerts the president and U.S. nuclear forces. The NORAD commander-in-chief's authority and ability to direct U.S. nuclear forces is unclear. It seems reasonable, given the surveillance, data processing, communication, and personnel assets of NORAD, that CINCNORAD could direct U.S. nuclear forces, if need be.

The U.S. commanders of European, Atlantic and Pacific forces (CINCEUR, CINCLANT, and CINCPAC respectively) also have airborne command posts at their disposal.[25]

Vulnerability of the American Command System to Nuclear Attack

All these facilities are vulnerable to attack and could be destroyed or isolated by any major Soviet attack on C^3I assets. For example, the Soviets have deployed twenty-megaton warheads on SS-18 ICBMs. One such warhead, detonated at ground level would produce a crater 2,376 feet in diameter and 528 feet deep. [26] Even NORAD headquarters in Cheyenne Mountain could not survive more than a few such attacks. At the least, radio antenna towers and microwave towers would be destroyed or disabled, and buried communication lines cannot survive ground bursts in their vicinity. Thus, it appears that, if attacked, the most survivable hardened command center in the United States, NORAD, would lose contact with other U.S. forces. Perhaps, superhardened deep underground command posts can eventually be built, but current command posts are vulnerable.

The airborne command posts appear safe because of the protection their mobility provides. In the future, however, satellite-based radar or infrared sensors may allow such aircraft to be tracked and destroyed. Even if such an attack fails because of U.S. destruction of

[25] Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1981* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1980), p. 140.

[26] Calculations for dry soft rock. Crater dimensions in dry hard rock would be smaller. Calculated on the Nuclear Bomb Effects Computer developed by Lovelace Biomedical and Environmental Research Institute.

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reconnaissance satellites, the NEACP, PACCS, and TACAMO aircraft must land after seventy-two, twenty-four, and ten hours, respectively.

There are over 200 civil and military airfields in the United States 10,000 feet or longer and over 400 airfields greater than 8,000 feet in length.[27] With proper ground support,[28] NEACP, PACCS, and TACAMO aircraft can all operate from the former airfields and all can make emergency landings at the latter; details vary as a function of aircraft takeoff weight, density altitude, and pilot ability.

The Soviets possess enough weapons to destroy all these airfields. A one-megaton weapon need only land within 2,000 feet of a runway either to destroy the runway or to cover it with debris. During the earliest exchanges, many such facilities might be deserted. Even a trivial amount of damage — antenna towers, cables, or destroyed aircraft covering the runways — would be devastating to a NEACP crew low on fuel and counting on landing at such an airport. Destroyed or unmanned control towers would prevent the NEACP crew from requesting that such debris be removed.

As long as the war remained limited, this probably would not be a problem. If the Soviets wished to deny the airborne command post fleet operating bases by systematically destroying every potential airfield, the blast and fallout resulting from hundreds of ground bursts, many in metropolitan areas, would cause millions of casualties. One could hardly destroy Los Angeles, O'Hare, John F. Kennedy, Dulles and similar airports without killing millions of civilians outright. It seems reasonable that at some point during such a massive attack, the threshold for total retaliation would have been crossed. Little of political meaning could result from such wholesale slaughter. Even if a less destructive attack were possible, a sophisticated dispersal program combined with airfield upgrades would make such an attack unprofitable from a Soviet perspective.

More critical in a prolonged and limited nuclear war would be Soviet tracking of the NEACP, PACCS, and TACAMO fleets. Soviet ability to accomplish this would be a function of the number and quality of their surviving reconnaissance satellites and their own ability to maintain a functioning command structure. The more successful a U.S. attack

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[27] *FAA Statistical Handbook of Aviation for 1982,* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1982), p. 32.

[28] This is not a trivial concern. Without substantial numbers of highly trained technicians equipped with delicate electronic test and calibration equipment, tools and spare parts, these aircraft will neither fly nor function for more than a short period. Indeed, various environmental hazards (blast-induced dust damaging jet turbine blades and so on) are likely to increase substantially the maintenance requirements. This army of technicians will need to be fed, sheltered, and provided medical care. Such services can only be provided by a functioning command and support system. Spare parts may be a critical problem. As Branch points out, while the centralization of the U.S. military logistics system may be efficient, it makes the system highly vulnerable to attack and catastrophic failure. See Branch, *Fighting a Long Nuclear War.*

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against Soviet C³I, the less likely that the Soviets would have the intelligence data and centralized control necessary to chase NEACP from airfield to airfield. Mutual destruction of fixed installations and satellites might occur in the opening salvo, leaving mobile command posts essentially invulnerable for a significant period afterward. Alternatively, even if the Soviet C³I system were intact, if NEACP, PACCS, and TACAMO aircraft moved within the Soviet intelligence/attack cycle, they could survive.

Eventually, lack of fuel and equipment failures might force NEACP to become a land-based command post. If the United States could control space, destroying any new Soviet reconnaissance satellites, or if it had destroyed Soviet satellite ground control stations and intelligence processing facilities, it might be possible to hide and defend a ground-based NEACP from Soviet bombers. Perhaps, NEACP could simply be parked in an airport hangar. Perhaps, a creative crew would land on an interstate highway, acquire some basic construction equipment and camouflage or partially bury NEACP, providing some protection from fallout and casual observation. Antenna towers for MF and HF communication may be carried onboard the aircraft. A VLF antenna could be built using field expedient methods. Parabolic dishes for UHF, VHF, and EHF communications via satellites could be placed on towers. A bunker complex of storage and living quarters might even be built around the camouflaged NEACP. Such a facility might not be found by Soviet reconnaissance aircraft or bombers for weeks, if ever. The flight crew, battle staff, members of the National Command Authority, and the president might, however, suffer the effects of overexposure to radiation during these operations. The aircraft provides little protection from fallout, and digging bunkers through contaminated soil would take its toll. It is not clear how well or how long such an ad hoc command post would function. Radiation sickness and depression of the crew, severe winter weather, bizarre biological effects, and damage to equipment are all uncertainties which might lessen the effectiveness of this command post.

Counter-C³I Targeting and Escalation

The current U.S. C³I system was designed to ensure that the Emergency Action message, ordering nuclear retaliation, would be broadcast and received. It appears that it can accomplish this goal. Even if communications broke down in the midst of the attack, individual commanders would probably take charge. The Soviet Union might escape a comprehensive retaliation, but even an uncoordinated response would produce massive damage.

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In contrast, during a prolonged nuclear war the U.S. system must continue to collect, interpret, and disseminate information about a variety of political, military, and economic events around the world. The Soviet system must offer similar information to the Politburo and General Staff. Prolonged nuclear war is, by definition, limited, controlled, and guided by political goals. It is hard to imagine an uncontrolled, unlimited nuclear war lasting for more than a few hours or days. Such a controlled and selective war requires a much more robust C^3I system than that needed for one massive attack. Information about the progress of the war must be relayed to the nuclear forces for retargeting. The collection and analysis of targeting information requires that American satellites, receiving stations, command posts, and weapons systems survive the initial days of nuclear war. If satellites in orbit were disabled, replacements would have to be launched, requiring stockpiles of satellites and survivable launch facilities. Two-way communications with unit commanders and staffs are necessary for damage assessment, resupply, attack planning and the rebuilding of a command structure. If the nuclear war is the product of conventional conflict at the theater level and theater objectives continue to be pursued by both sides, reliable communications between integrated commands and the NCA will be critical. Furthermore, communications between allied forces will further complicate the already immense challenge of command and control.

U.S. early warning and nuclear burst detection satellites are reasonably safe from current generation Soviet anti-satellite weapons. Other U.S. reconnaissance satellites would provide post-attack assessment and information about Soviet troop and population movements, but the lower orbits of these satellites would make them more vulnerable to attack. Destruction of military satellites would make the limitation of a nuclear war problematic. Early warning, nuclear-burst detection, reconnaissance, meteorological and navigation satellites are essential if nuclear war is to remain limited.

For this reason, each side has some incentive to refrain from attacks against the other's C^3I system or, perhaps, to attack enemy command assets in ways that allow the opponent some control over his forces. Total surprise destruction of the enemy C^3I system by a massive first-strike might dramatically reduce the destructiveness of a retaliatory attack. While an extraordinarily risky choice, it could produce a quick victory through decapitation of the enemy command structure. Once the war was underway, the opposite might be true. The theater and specified commanders could very well be restraining subordinates wishing to launch everything. The more vulnerable the individual weapons systems, the greater the temptation to launch these weapons before they are destroyed.

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Even commanders would feel this pressure if they doubted the ability of their airborne command posts to survive once they had landed. The isolated theater or SAC commander might persuade himself to order massive attacks while airborne, fearing that once on the ground he would lose all contact with his forces. During a limited nuclear war, preservation of both nations' centralized control through mutual restraint would be in everyone's interest. If either system were destroyed, there would be no central means to restrain individual commanders. In the heat of battle, after tens or hundreds of weapons had already been used, the psychological inhibitions against ordering nuclear strikes would be gone. Commanders who might have hesitated to use nuclear weapons in the first minutes or hours of the war would be much more likely to conduct independent operations several days or weeks into a war.

C^3I vulnerability does not encourage such restraint. Since the American ability to destroy the Soviet C^3I system on a given day is a function of surviving reconnaissance satellites, aircraft, command posts, communication and data processing systems, and, of course, weapons systems, the Soviets would feel severe pressure to destroy the American C^3I system, *before it was used to destroy theirs.* Command system vulnerability is remarkably similar to ICBM vulnerability. Just as one side might feel compelled to launch its ICBMs on warning of attack or launch a pre-emptive attack on the enemy's ICBMs, lest their own ICBMs be destroyed, so might each side feel compelled to destroy the other's command system. In both cases vulnerability is destabilizing.

Given the incentives and, at least, the implied intention of both the United States and Soviet Union to target the other's governmental infrastructure in a nuclear war, it is unlikely that command assets can be protected through mutual restraint. It appears that unilateral protection of C^3I assets will be necessary to prevent a limited nuclear war from becoming total.

In the case of satellites, even mutual restraint is not sufficient. They must eventually be replaced. Some U.S. photographic and electronic intelligence satellites are reported to function for only fifty to eighty days; others have operated for one or two years.[29] The U.S. would need hardened launch facilities and spare satellites to launch during a nuclear war. Current launch facilities are unlikely to survive the opening salvos. Thus, even if the satellites remain invulnerable, the major facilities for directing their operations can be easily destroyed. Whether these control facilities can be made mobile is an interesting question and deserves study.

Surveillance radars and data processing facilities are also essential. Given current missile accuracies, the Soviets could easily destroy

[29] Ball, *Nuclear War,* p. 21.

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all three BMEWS installations. EPARCS, COBRA DANE, and PAVE PAWS radars are more resistant to blast, but all are such large targets that they could be destroyed with little effort. COBRA JUDY, the shipborne phased-array radar, might provide some limited ICBM and SLBM warning and attack assessment. Unfortunately, the thirty-five foot high COBRA JUDY radar turret and two thirty-two-foot diameter geodesic radomes (housing passive radar) give the *Observation Island* a unique (and large) radar cross-section. A dedicated search by surviving elements of the Soviet navy would probably discover it in short order.[30] On the other hand, previous strategic nuclear strikes and U.S. Navy operations may have rendered the Soviet navy moot. Within a few years, however, satellites may be able to track individual ships. Thus, the survival of COBRA JUDY would be a function of the American ability to destroy Soviet reconaissance satellites or their associated ground control stations. If the post-attack survival of ships were deemed reasonable, a fleet of COBRA JUDYs might be deployed as a post-attack warning and assessment system. It appears unlikely that highly capable phased-array radars and their associated computer facilities could be made land-mobile, but perhaps a fleet of less capable radars deployed on trucks could provide some attack warning and assessment. Satellite-based radars may ultimately offer greater promise.

As far as the current system is concerned, one has to conclude that if the Soviets wish to, they can destroy the command centers such as the NMCC; the airfields from which NEACP, PACCS and AWACS must operate; the satellites that would link American forces; the ground stations that direct U.S. satellites; satellite launch facilities; intelligence interpretation and analysis centers, and all fixed early warning assets. The United States has a similar ability to disrupt terribly the Soviet C^3I system.

Addressing C^3I Vulnerability

The previous sections have shown that the elements of the C^3I system are few, large, and inherently vulnerable to nuclear effects. Dispersion, proliferation and hardening, all reasonable approaches to solving weapons systems vulnerability, are increasingly inappropriate for command posts. Dispersion and proliferation are problematic because a nuclear command post is an intrinsically large, complex, and expensive data processing and communications system. Current command posts are sufficiently separated to meet the basic dispersion criterion: that no one weapon can destroy more than one command post. Early warning assets

[30] "COBRA JUDY Radar Turret Presents Distinctive Profile," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, March 8, 1982, p. 231.

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are naturally dispersed to cover different approaches. Proliferation is unrealistic because of the extreme cost of building, manning, and maintaining command posts and radar early-warning facilities. Such facilities will always be grossly outnumbered by enemy warheads. One can never build enough command posts, early-warning facilities, or decoys (facsimiles thereof) to exhaust the supply of Soviet warheads.

Proliferation of command posts increases the number of officials with potential control over U.S. nuclear forces, making the system less centralized. This decentralization, if carried too far, might lead to accidental or unauthorized nuclear war.[31] Moreover, during a nuclear war multiple command centers might give conflicting directions, creating confusion over the chain of command. Decentralization is, however, a double-edged sword. While it can be dangerous, it makes decapitation of the system more difficult. This, in turn, guarantees that some, albeit uncoordinated, retaliation is likely even if the NCA were lost. Consequently, some decentralization can enhance deterrence.

The accuracy of currently deployed U.S. and Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) is measured by the warhead's Circular Error Probable (CEP), the radius of a circle within which 50 percent of the warheads aimed at a single target will fall. The CEPs of the Soviet SS-18 and U.S. Minuteman III warheads have both been reported to be as low as 600 to 700 feet.[32] The Peacekeeper ICBM and Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) are expected to achieve significantly greater accuracies. Some scientists believe that zero CEP can be achieved within two decades. Were such accuracies to be realized, no fixed facility could survive an attack, unless it were buried thousands of feet underground. Such a facility could easily be isolated by the destruction of all its communication cables and radio antennae, which must be near or on the surface.

Mobility offers better protection. Since Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered the conversion of several KC-135 tanker aircraft to airborne command posts in the early 1960s, the United States has relied on the mobility of airborne command posts to ensure that someone capable of ordering retaliation would survive a surprise attack.

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[31] Paul Bracken's superb book presents a sobering picture of scenarios that might lead to such a breakdown and explains how the structure of the command and control system might facilitate this collapse. Bracken is careful, however, to point out that this problem would be difficult to prevent in such a complex and large organization. See Paul Bracken, *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983); and Charles Perrow, "Normal Accident at Three Mile Island," *Society* (July/August 1981), pp. 17-26.

[32] Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, and Milton M. Hoenig, *Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I, U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishers, 1984), p. 118; and Ray Bonds, ed., *Russian Military Power* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 226.

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Increasingly sophisticated space-based reconnaissance capabilities,[33] however, are making even these systems vulnerable to attack. And mobile systems have other weaknesses. They provide little blast and fallout protection for the battle staff and crew. They cannot carry the fuel, food, medicine, repair parts, and maintenance facilities which can be contained within an underground command post.

While no single method can solve this vulnerability problem, a combination of these approaches may be worth considering. A 1981 Office of Technology Assessment study notes that:

> no single communications link can be made absolutely survivable, but disruption can be made difficult, time-consuming, provocative, and costly of Soviet resources. Multiple links can also be made for reconstituting some link if the primary system is destroyed.[34]

Furthermore, no command post basing option guarantees that a nuclear war can remain limited or be controlled in a manner consistent with national military or political goals. Electromagnetic pulse effects producing permanent damage to electrical components, transient disruption of radio and radar, destruction of the ozone layer, and the potential for severe meteorological changes are additional uncertainties which may render impossible political control of all but the most selective nuclear war. Perhaps the greatest uncertainty is whether the standard operating procedures, command relationships, and other organizational characteristics of the nuclear system are robust enough to function under the unprecedented demands of prolonged conflict. Paul Bracken's work raises serious questions on this score.[35]

Command and control survival is a demanding problem and may necessitate novel solutions, perhaps land-mobile, sea-mobile, and space-mobile command centers. These options are not designed to replace the current fixed and mobile command centers, but to supplement them. Survivable centers tend to be less capable than the more vulnerable modes, and would only be preferable if, in fact, the current facilities were destroyed.

Land-Mobile Command Centers

Recognizing the limitations of airborne command posts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Weinberger requested fund-

[33] For an overview of space-based assets, see Thomas Karas, *The New High Ground: Systems and Weapons of Space Age War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983); and Kenneth Gatland, *Space Technology* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1981).

[34] Office of Technology Assessment, *MX Missile Basing*, p. 277.

[35] See Bracken, *Command and Control*, especially chapter 4.

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ing for a land-mobile command center in the Fiscal Year 1983 defense budget. The army is reported to be developing this system under its Joint Crisis Management Capability program.[36]

A land-mobile system might consist of several vehicles the size of interstate buses or eighteen-wheel trucks to carry a *Looking Glass*-equivalent battle staff. Power generation, communications and construction equipment, food, water, fuel, protective clothing, weapons, Geiger counters, medical facilities, and some security forces would be necessary. Perhaps increasingly capable microcomputers will lessen the size of the land-mobile command center data processing and communications equipment. Improved software may reduce the number of communications and data processing personnel, although it is hard to imagine this number decreasing to the point where one or two vehicles could contain all necessary personnel and equipment. Therefore, the three options discussed here are similar to the more modest *Looking Glass* mission capabilities profile, and each could duplicate the *Looking Glass* continuous patrol function. During a crisis, the president would probably choose the airborne NEACP, rather than one of these less mobile modes.

A land-mobile system could be designed for on-road or off-road use. An on-road command center would use the more than 123,500 miles of four-lane U.S. highways and hundreds of thousands of smaller roads for concealment.[37] A land-mobile command post would be able to function autonomously for a longer period than *Looking Glass*. This period would vary as a function of the distance covered by the command center vehicles. If only occasional movement were deemed necessary and fuel trucks were organic to the command center organization, such a system might operate for several months. If, however, constant movement were necessary and fuel were used for other purposes (such as heating), the command center might remain mobile for only a few days or weeks. If a critical vehicle were severely disabled, the entire command center might become prematurely fixed.

While exact hardness data are not available for trucks, there is some agreement that a slab-sided vehicle, like a bus, cannot be hardened to withstand greater than 15 psi, with 5 to 10 psi a more achievable goal. Unless stabilized and lashed down, these vehicles could be overturned by the blast wave from a nuclear detonation occurring some distance away. For example, a vehicle hardened to 10 psi would be damaged or destroyed by a one megaton blast occurring three or less miles away.[38]

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[36] Congressional Budget Office, *Strategic Command*, pp. 34-35.
[37] Office of Technology Assessment, *MX Missile Basing*, p. 262.
[38] Ibid.

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While this provides some protection from accidental destruction, it offers little comfort to a crew facing a dedicated attack directed by a functioning Soviet command and intelligence system. Flash-blinding of the drivers might also occur. Radiation sickness would likely be suffered by the crew since weight limitations would prohibit significant fallout protection in the vehicle walls.[39] While some protection could be provided, the crews would quickly receive dangerously high cumulative doses of radiation.

The land-mobile command center could use low-profile, tracked, and heavily armored vehicles equivalent to the command post models of current armored personnel carriers. These vehicles could offer significant blast and fallout protection and could take advantage of rugged terrain. While their range would be limited by high fuel consumption and low speed, they could hide in mountains, fields, and forests — all far from roads. The price paid in gas mileage and payload would be high. Such vehicles are notoriously fuel inefficient, requiring an enormous logistical tail. They are temperamental, difficult to maintain, and extremely cramped. Perhaps ten or twenty such vehicles would be required to carry the same equipment, and the number of personnel would dramatically increase. Maintenance facilities and personnel would be necessary to keep such a fleet mobile, increasing the number of vehicles even further. Moving this mass of vehicles would be a nightmare, an unacceptable distraction for planners already carrying the weight of nuclear war on their shoulders. Therefore, the probability that such a fleet could remain mobile is small. If Soviet reconnaissance satellites were still functioning, the infrared signature, tracks, and size of the convoy would all make such a fleet more readily detectable than the smaller number of buses. The problems associated with off-road vehicles might, therefore, outweigh the blast resistance and ability to hide away from roads.

To ensure survival, several land-mobile command centers might patrol on alert on federal land twenty-four hours a day, their mission similar to that of *Looking Glass*. Alternatively, they could be maintained on alert at various military facilities, randomly moving by air (if the vehicles were small enough) around the country. During a crisis, the centers could then take to the road, avoiding likely targets such as major military installations.

A land-mobile system should be more difficult to detect than an air-mobile command post (assuming deployment of satellite radar or

[39] Protection from radiation produced by fallout is related to the thickness of the protecting walls and the quality of ventilation systems. An airtight vehicle with suitable air filtration and four-inch steel walls could reduce radiation by a factor of ten, but would be prohibitively heavy. See Office of Technology Assessment, *MX Missile Basing*, p. 50.

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infrared sensor systems), and should possess greater durability, without requiring any exotic technology.

Sea-Mobile Command Centers

A nuclear-powered submarine equipped as a command post (a naval equivalent of *Looking Glass*) would offer several advantages not found in airborne, land-mobile, space-mobile or fixed installations: it would offer durability equivalent to a fixed installation and superior to airborne and land-mobile systems, comparable data processing facilities, and unsurpassed survivability.

Unlike air- and land-mobile systems, a submarine command post would provide total blast and fallout protection for its crew. It could easily carry all necessary food, water, and medical equipment. In addition, the horrors of nuclear war would be less than vivid for members of the crew and battle staff. There would be no radiation sickness and little of the associated depression. Their ability to function as a military unit would, thus, be unhampered. Nuclear submarines can function autonomously for ninety days, providing 100 percent of their own power needs. A submarine command post would be the only easily deployed system — using "off-the-shelf" technology — capable of such independent operation, with three or four necessary to support a continuous patrol.

A submarine command post would have one major disadvantage: it would not be capable of continuous communications on all radio frequencies as are the other basing modes. Only low frequency (LF), VLF, and extra-low frequency (ELF) can penetrate water. Thus, unless the submarine were close enough to the surface to expose an antenna (periscope depth), it would be dependent on low frequencies. Unfortunately, these frequencies require large antennae such as the long copper wires towed behind NEACP while in flight. These frequencies are also incapable of transmitting data at a rapid rate, although some scientists maintain that high data transmission rates are possible through improved coding. Continuous all-frequency communications would be possible if the submarine cruised on the surface or at periscope depth. This would, however, significantly increase the probability of detection by Soviet submarines, surface ships, aircraft, or satellite-based sensors. Successful destruction of Soviet communications facilities, data processing facilities (particularly those dedicated to anti-submarine warfare), reconnaissance satellites and the Soviet navy would be prerequisite to the survival of this basing mode. Once again, one sees the pressures on the United States to go after the Soviet command system so that U.S. command assets can survive and function.

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Space-Mobile Command Centers

The final command center option, space-mobile, is obviously exotic. Like directed energy weapons, it sounds uncomfortably similar to science fiction literature. The Soviets, however, have demonstrated the feasibility of a long-term manned orbital station, manning a station for several years. The United States is currently demonstrating the potential of the space shuttle as a supply vehicle for such facilities. The space shuttle fleet should make the construction and expansion of an orbital station possible. Manning a space station, however, is hardly equivalent to putting NEACP in orbit. While certain members of the opposition party might like to put the president in orbit, a space-based command center would not require placing the president and many advisers in orbit. While this may be politically and technically possible in fifty years, it is not an issue of current concern.

Rather, the issue is whether a spartan version of *Looking Glass,* complete with a general officer, is possible. The station would be manned by a general officer and a small staff (fewer than ten officers) equipped with appropriate data processing and communications equipment, codes, and targeting data. In the event of a decapitating terrestrial first-strike, they could send the EAM through a system of relay satellites. During a prolonged nuclear war, their space-based command center might offer the most survivable, continuously accessible C^3I asset available.

The vulnerability of orbital vehicles to nuclear effects is, however, controversial. It may turn out that such systems cannot be sufficiently hardened against nuclear effects. Such a center would also require pushing the frontiers of computer miniaturization. A small planning staff could only hope to offer guidance to U.S. forces if it were supported by extremely high-speed, large-memory microcomputers. Still, it could hardly compete with the ANMCC, NORAD, NEACP or *Looking Glass* in control potential. Indeed, even a submarine-based or land-mobile command center would have a significantly larger data processing facility and planning staff. As space technology improves, a space station might offer competitive planning facilities.

Eventually, a large space station might house a battle staff and crew as large as NEACP, and might include satellite repair and monitoring facilities. While initially deployed in a lower orbit (under 1,000 kilometers), advanced shuttle vehicles may allow deployment of such a facility at the more survivable geostationary altitude of 35,880 kilometers.

NASA and the air force are seeking funding for a small, modular facility to establish a permanent civil and military manned presence in

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space.[40] Whatever the future potential of these systems, however, this exotic technology does not offer a short-term solution to C^3I vulnerability.

Vulnerability, Survivability, and Action

Whether the Soviets see victory through a short or through a prolonged war, it is highly probable that they would attempt to destroy U.S. command assets during the earliest attacks. American strategy might also require destruction of Soviet command assets. According to Desmond Ball, C^3I assets have been targeted for years;[41] Harold Brown has discussed attacking "a Soviet political leadership that is being shuttled among hardened command posts";[42] and Colin Gray has advocated that the Soviet state, generally conceived, be dismantled through the selective destruction of its communication system, command assets, security facilities, military forces and recovery assets.[43]

If a counter-C^3I strategy were followed by the Soviet Union, the United States command system might not survive. The options discussed above may address these weaknesses, although there is no guarantee that a nuclear war can remain limited, be prolonged or that a post-nuclear world would resemble the current political and ecological system.

Both Soviet and American C^3I facilities appear sufficiently robust to deter a decapitating first-strike. Planned hardening and proliferation of the American command system will make a decapitation attack less likely to succeed. Even an exceptionally successful attack would have little hope of avoiding detection. For example, U.S. forces would receive warning of a possible attack, preparing them for a forthcoming launch order. Eventually some commanders might choose to launch on their own as scattered reports of the decapitation filtered in. More realistically, the general officer aboard *Looking Glass* might order the retaliation if the president were killed or isolated.

The very uncertainties associated with a first-strike discourage attack.[44] The Soviet leader must recognize that the decision to attack may

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[40] Craig Covault, "Consensus Nearing on Orbital Facilities," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, February 15, 1982, p. 119.

[41] Desmond Ball, *Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1980), p. 190; and Desmond Ball "U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would They Be Used?" *International Security* (Winter 1982/83), p. 37.

[42] Harold Brown, *Thinking About National Security* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), p. 75.

[43] Colin Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: A Case For A Theory of Victory," *International Security* (Summer 1979), pp. 54-87.

[44] Thomas Schelling was perhaps the first to identify and explore the positive contribution that uncertainty can make to deterrence. See Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966); and Stanley Sienkiewicz, "Observations on the Impact of Uncertainty in Strategic Analysis," *World Politics* (October 1979), pp. 90-101.

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set in motion a train of events beyond the control of any one leader.[45] Obviously, a decapitation attack is based upon the premise that intra-war negotiations are not as important as removing the sources of information and direction. Random, uncoordinated retaliatory attacks might occur, but the Soviet leader choosing this course of action would have concluded that damage would be "minor." The current C^3I system is sufficiently survivable to deter an all-out attack.

One problem with making American C^3I assets survivable is that during a war some military planners could argue that the U.S. should destroy Soviet command assets. After all, they might argue, U.S. assets are surviving not because of Soviet restraint, but because of unilateral action by the American military. Why should the United States allow the Soviets to attack American targets when the United States could severely disrupt such attacks? During a war, failing to take advantage of such opportunities might cost the United States victory. If the United States did destroy the Soviet command system, the surviving Soviet leadership would have no way to keep the conflict limited. They might surrender. Alternatively, a posthumous spasm might launch an attack. Individual commanders might have orders to launch *everything* if total communications were lost for more than a certain grace period. In the latter case, a war which had been limited to tens of weapons detonated might quickly become total.

C^3I vulnerability is a highly interactive problem. If symmetric destruction of reconnaissance satellites and fixed command posts occurred early in a war, de facto restraint might occur. Quick symmetric destruction of fixed command posts, satellite control centers, intelligence collection devices, and processing facilities would prevent coordinated tracking of the enemy's mobile command posts. Without centralized information collection and analysis, these mobile command posts would be highly survivable. They might control their forces for several months. Ironically, quick symmetric destruction of most fixed C^3I assets might offer the best opportunity for avoiding escalation to total war. Each side might possess enough mobile command facilities to keep the war limited, but not enough to get in the last blow against the opponent's command system. This odd balance would not, however, be particularly stable. Each side would fear that its surviving mobile command assets might be discovered by an enemy bomber or new satellite. Consequently, continued attacks against the enemy C^3I system would be necessary. Eventually the threshold might be crossed, beyond which the opponent would lose

[45] For a particularly lucid discussion of uncertainty in Soviet military planning see Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Uncertainties for the Soviet War Planner," *International Security* (Winter 1982/83), pp. 139-66.

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control. This might produce victory. On the other hand, there would be a nontrivial probability that this would lead to unlimited nuclear war. Thus, a temporary "balance" through mutual destruction of command assets (achieved through blind luck) would not be sufficiently stable.[46]

Simultaneous deployment of truly survivable command assets would offer the most stable balance, but cannot be counted on. Rather, unilateral action offers the best insurance both against a first-strike and against attacks during the war.

Whatever the escalatory dangers of American C^3I superiority, it is much safer for both sides than the current state of mutual vulnerability. The current situation would push each side toward intra-war pre-emptive strikes to protect their own command assets from tracking and destruction. Survivable American assets provide no incentive for Soviet attack (if they believe that they cannot destroy U.S. command facilities) and no fear-induced incentive for an American attack against Soviet command facilities. As discussed above, the United States might go after Soviet command facilities in a bold stroke designed to achieve victory, but such an argument is much less compelling than the defensive pre-emptive attack. The first is a "want," the second a "need." National leaders are more likely to be convinced of the necessity of a pre-emptive attack, lest our facilities be destroyed, than an attack based on "it would be nice if we could" logic.

Most constituent elements of the C^3I are sufficiently survivable during the pre- and trans-attack periods. To survive into and during the post-attack period appears to argue for mobile systems. Whatever the merits of mobility, and they are many, we may be quickly approaching the practical limit of such efforts. Making the entire C^3I system mobile presents an amusing image of military gypsies and their associated command posts, communications relay, satellite control and launch, intelligence interpretation and analysis, and radar warning caravans wandering the countryside. Whether mobility is the appropriate response for every element of the system is a question beyond the scope of this paper. What is critical for our purposes, however, is the recognition that making some elements of the C^3I system survivable (e.g., command posts) while leaving other equally critical facilities (e.g., intelligence interpretation and analysis centers) above ground and soft is a shortsighted approach to enhancing the survival of a tightly interconnected system. The loss of critical nodes, such as intelligence, would have the most serious consequences during a prolonged war. Thus, the problem is really how to deploy an enduring,

[46] John Steinbruner raised the problem of C^3I stability well before it received much attention in the public literature. See Steinbruner, "Launch Under Attack."

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highly robust *system* not just how to protect a few marginally more critical nodes.

Improving the durability of American command and control assets is necessary to close the current gap between U.S. nuclear strategy and strategic capabilities. While not a panacea, increased reliance on mobility, particularly on land and sea, appears to offer a reasonable near-term solution to the problem of command and control vulnerability during prolonged war.

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DETERRENCE, CHEMICAL WARFARE, AND ARMS CONTROL

by Manfred R. Hamm

Throughout its history, NATO has endured countless debates on nuclear and conventional weapons policy that brought military professionals into often acrimonious conflict with their elected superiors. These disputes centered typically on the proper mix of conventional and nuclear forces to support the twin goals of NATO security policy: deterrence and sufficient capabilities to mount a viable defense in the event of an attack. By contrast, chemical warfare policy received only scant attention.

The limited and esoteric debate was dominated until a few years ago by the search for a global ban on chemical arms. There were high aspirations to perfect the existing international legal regime governing the possession of chemical weapons and their use so as to rid the world of them. NATO councils were thus drafted to provide analytical support to arms control experts, but they devoted little thought to determining NATO chemical warfare needs in the dynamic threat environment of central Europe.

It should not have been surprising that governments and military leaders joined in a "cult of denial." Politicians eagerly skirted the vexing issues surrounding chemical warfare preparedness. Psycho-cultural aversions to these hideous weapons are firmly entrenched in Western societies and derive from the horrifying memories of World War I when chemical weapons use was widespread. These aversions continue to shape public and military perceptions, even though the development of nuclear weapons has added a more destructive dimension to modern warfare.

The military contributed its share to this utter neglect of NATO's chemical warfare posture, because chemical arms have never been favored by professional soldiers. Their indiscriminate area effects inherently contradict the military traditions of man-to-man combat and notional virtues like chivalry. The armed forces are also ambivalent about their actual combat utility and instead stress their operational shortcomings and their adverse effect on combat performance. Moreover, the first use of chemical arms is outlawed and stockpiles are maintained solely for the

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purpose of deterring their use by an adversary. The military prefers to allocate its limited resources for more glamorous weapons whose use is not restricted by international legal norms.

For these reasons, chemical warfare has always been a poor cousin of conventional and nuclear weapons. Funding for chemical warfare assets has been sporadic and minimal. Indeed, until recently NATO never even pretended to integrate chemical warfare into its operational doctrine. Planning for chemical warfare was limited to pronouncements of declaratory policy in the context of flexible response, but specific requirements for preparedness were never spelled out, let alone implemented. Consequently, NATO has never had, nor does it possess today, either a comprehensive tactical chemical warfare doctrine or adequate offensive and defensive capabilities to conduct sustained operations in a chemical warfare environment.

Over the last few years, military views of the chemical warfare threat to NATO have slowly been changing. Beginning in the late 1970s, NATO started to overhaul its defensive posture for chemical warfare in response to evidence, based on equipment captured during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, indicating a high degree of Soviet preparedness for chemical warfare operations.[1] The U.S. military also intensified its calls for the modernization of its deteriorating chemical munitions stockpile, but NATO commanders did not support these demands and were silent about the inadequacy of NATO's offensive weapons stockpile. NATO relied in practice largely on the combination of minimal defensive measures, a small stockpile of chemical weapons stored in West Germany, and the threat of a nuclear response to deter Soviet chemical warfare.

General Bernard W. Rogers, NATO's senior commander, thus startled his audience and violated an unwritten rule when he called for the production of binary chemical weapons, at the end of the British Lionheart exercises in Hildesheim, West Germany, in September 1984. These were the first large-scale maneuvers in which NATO forces conducted almost all operations under simulated chemical conditions wearing full protective gear.[2] His call was echoed by Lt. Gen. Martin Farndale, the commander of the First British Corps who told the press that "as a soldier . . . [he] would like to have a retaliatory capability," in blunt reference to the obsolete stockpile of U.S. munitions and secret studies in the United Kingdom of the need to resume production of chemical

[1] Amoretta M. Hoeber and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. "The Neglected Threat of Chemical Warfare," *International Security,* Vol. 3, (Summer 1978), pp. 55-82; John Erickson, "The Soviet Union's Growing Arsenal of Chemical Warfare," *Strategic Review,* Vol. 7, (Fall 1979), pp. 63-71; Sen. John Tower, "The Politics of Chemical Deterrence," *Washington Quarterly,* Vol. 5, (Spring 1982), pp. 25-37.

[2] Peter Almond, "Defensive Chemical Weapons Touchy Subject for NATO," *Washington Times,* September 25, 1984; "Red Alert For Lionheart," *Yorkshire Post* (England), September 20, 1984.

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weapons.[3] The Lionheart exercises represented a radical departure from past practices, and indicate that NATO is in the process of rethinking its chemical warfare posture.

Coming right on the heels of the divisive controversy over the deployment of Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), General Rogers's public appeal for chemical weapons production indicates that NATO is alarmed about the deficiencies of its chemical deterrent in the face of a mounting Soviet chemical threat. This alarm is fueled by expanded Soviet chemical and conventional capabilities, and enormous changes in the strategic environment, which have undermined the viability of flexible response. The United States lost strategic nuclear superiority during the 1970s, Moscow acquired a nuclear edge in the European theater, and the conventional force balance worsened as a result of qualitative improvements of Warsaw Pact forces. Therefore, NATO military leaders have pressed for some time for conventional force modernization, a demand spurred further by growing opposition among the European public to the deployment of new nuclear forces.

These changes in the calculus of deterrence have magnified the shortcomings of NATO's chemical warfare posture, which have to be mitigated if other elements of force posture improvements are to yield their intended benefits. NATO will not succeed in reducing its heavy reliance on nuclear weapons by boosting conventional defenses alone. Indeed, this may be counterproductive. Increasing NATO resistance at the conventional level of hostilities might tempt Moscow to employ chemical weapons, instead of going nuclear, to break the conventional logjam and maintain the offensive momentum of its forces.[4] In view of its inadequate assets, NATO is unable to deter Soviet chemical warfare or to fight effectively and efficiently in a chemical environment and, thus, might be forced prematurely to resort to nuclear weapons in order to halt the advance of Warsaw Pact forces. If NATO is intent on raising the nuclear threshold, it will thus have to supplement conventional force improvements with improvements of its chemical force posture. It seems that

[3] Michael Getler, "Top NATO General Seeks New Chemical Arms," *Washigton Post,* September 22, 1984; Drew Middleton, "Chemical Warfare: A Weak Area for NATO," *New York Times,* October 6, 1984.

[4] Soviet strategy calls for the penetration of enemy defenses as quickly as possible, utilizing speed, maneuver, surprise, and overwhelming firepower. Since offensive missions will use all types of weapons required to attain the mission objective, chemical weapons would probably be used to overcome conventional resistance by NATO forces before Moscow resorted to nuclear weapons. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., *Soviet Military Strategy in Europe,* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), p. 170; Christopher Donnelly, "The Development of the Soviet Concept of Echeloning," *NATO Review,* Vol. 32 (December 1984), pp. 9-17; C. J. Dick, "Soviet Doctrine, Equipment Design and Organization-An Integrated Approach to War," *International Defense Review,* Vol. 16 (December 1983), pp. 1715-22; John G. Hines and Phillip A. Peterson, "The Warsaw Pact Strategic Offensive-The OMG Context," *International Defense Review,* Vol. 16, (October 1983), pp. 1391-95.

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NATO has begun to realize that the chemical warfare gap undercuts its strenuous efforts to lessen reliance on nuclear weapons.

NATO military commanders and governments have been notorious for their attempts to rationalize and justify new force requirements in terms of the quantitative buildup and qualitative improvement of Soviet forces. This has thereby helped to popularize the "action-reaction" model of the arms race and has given rise to public demands to break this vicious cycle by freezing our current force posture. The latest example of such an attempt was the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) deployment decision, where NATO chose to link stationing of INF to Soviet SS-20 deployment instead of emphasizing the strategic rationale provided by past arms agreements.

But in this instance, the need to enhance NATO's chemical warfare posture is conditioned only indirectly by higher levels of Soviet chemical warfare preparedness. It derives instead from the recognition that changes in the strategic environment have progressively eroded NATO's capacity to cope with the Soviet chemical warfare threat. Therefore, NATO can no longer afford to prevaricate and must correct the shortcomings of its chemical posture. NATO military leaders must dispel public perceptions that they are simply trying to match Soviet capabilities if they are to win public acceptance of chemical rearmament. This requires placing chemical warfare preparedness in the broader context of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons.

Military concerns over the tactical and strategic implications of the chemical warfare imbalance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO have caused a breakdown of the old consensus on chemical warfare policy between political and military leaders. Demands for binary munitions have already set off a storm of public protest resembling the debate over deployment of the neutron bomb in the late 1970s. For almost a decade, the U.S. Congress has refused to grant the military permission to resume production of chemical weapons for fear that doing so might undercut efforts by the U.S. and other countries to reach a global ban on chemical weapons. This attitude is shared by European governments in dismissing military pleas for an upgrading of the chemical warfare deterrent as premature and counterproductive. Despite years of inconclusive negotiations within the framework of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament as well as intermittent bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, Europe remains staunchly committed to seeking a universal ban on chemical weapons.

Chemical weapons modernization is thus held hostage to arms control in much the same way as other NATO force improvement programs have been hamstrung by the irrepressible inclination to view arms

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control as a substitute for prudent military planning. This tendency was epitomized by NATO's dual-track decision in 1979, making the deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs conditional upon its failure to achieve an arms control solution by the end of 1983.[5] While no such explicit conditionality has been established in regard to chemical weapons, annual congressional refusals to authorize the production of binary munitions have had the same effect. Even worse, the absence of a firm "make-it-or-break-it" deadline for reaching an agreement has absolved proponents of arms control from confronting its palpable limits. Their open-ended commitment to exercise restraint for as long as negotiations continue also provides Moscow, the principal roadblock to a verifiable agreement, with little incentive to accede to Western demands for full and effective verification procedures and has weakened the hands of U.S. negotiators.

It is ironic that this unshakable faith in the ability of arms control to do away with chemical weapons has grown stronger in the face of mounting signs that even existing restraints on the use of chemical weapons are eroding. In recent years, convincing evidence has been uncovered documenting the use of chemical and toxin weapons by the Soviet Union and Vietnam in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia.[6] The outbreak of pulmonary anthrax near a Soviet chemical factory under military control outside the Siberian city of Sverdlovsk had already raised suspicions of Soviet violations of the Biological Warfare Convention in 1979.[7] There are also credible reports that Moscow is trying to exploit advances in biochemistry, microbiology and molecular biology as well as genetic engineering for military purposes.[8] Consequently, fears are growing that

[5] Manfred R. Hamm, "Missiles in Europe: The Case for Deployment," *Backgrounder,* No. 300, October 27, 1983, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.; Jeffrey Record, *NATO's Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Program: The Real Issues,* Special Report, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. Boston, November 1981; *Second Interim Report on Nuclear Weapons in Europe,* prepared by the North Atlantic Assembly's Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe, A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, January 1983.

[6] U.S. Department of State, "Chemical Weapons Use in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan," *Current Policy,* No. 553, February 21, 1984, contains the U.S. submission to the U.N. Secretary General and lists all previous reports issued by the U.S.; Mark C. Storella, *Poisoning Arms Control: The Soviet Union and Chemical/Biological Warfare,* Special Report, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., Boston, June 1984, provides a comprehensive evaluation of the factual evidence of chemical and toxin use in Indochina and Afghanistan. In February 1985, Thailand again charged Vietnam with using chemical weapons in squashing Cambodian resistance strongholds along the Thai border (William Branigin, "Thailand Says Vietnam Used Toxic Chemicals," *Washington Post,* February 20, 1985).

[7] *The Sverdlovsk Incident: Soviet Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention?* Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, May 29, 1980 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1980); Leslie H. Gelb, "Keeping An Eye on Russia," *New York Times* Magazine, November 29, 1981.

[8] William Kucewicz, "Beyond 'Yellow Rain,' " seven-part series on biochemical warfare, *Wall Street Journal,* April 25-May 18, 1984; for a critique see Leonard A. Cole, "Yellow Rain or Yellow Journalism," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (August-September 1984), pp. 36-38; "Biological Warfare: Advances Breed New Dangers," *Defense Science 2002+,* Vol. 3 (August 1984), pp. 59-60; Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and H. Richard Lukens, "The Expanding Arena of Chemical-Biological Warfare," *Strategic Review,* Vol. 7 (Fall 1984), pp. 71-80; Jonathan B. Tucker, "Gene Wars," *Foreign Policy,* Vol. 57 (Winter 1984/85), pp. 58-79.

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NATO's protective equipment may soon become ineffective against a whole array of exotic agents some of which may have already entered the Soviet arsenal, prompting requests by the U.S. Army to step up defensive research in biological and toxin weapons.[9] At present, NATO is investing heavily to improve defensive chemical warfare capabilities against the standard agents in the Soviet chemical arsenal, but these efforts will be of only limited value unless they are accompanied by development of defensive equipment to counter the emerging generation of supertoxic agents.[10]

Chemical weapons are also proliferating in the Third World. In its war with Iran, Iraq has repeatedly used chemical weapons to halt the advance of an Iranian offensive, most recently in March 1985.[11] A recent U.S. intelligence report credited fourteen nations with having chemical weapons that could become the poor man's equivalent of the "nuclear weapon," and there are worrisome indications that a "gray market" in chemical arms and technology is evolving in response to growing demand from Third World countries.[12]

While the spread of chemical arms to countries in the Third World poses no direct threat to NATO, it complicates reaching a global ban on these weapons. It also erodes the viability of existing international conventions by demonstrating, as in the case of Iraq, that the international community is impotent or disinterested when called upon to punish employment of outlawed weapons. Chemical weapons in the hands of countries in crisis-prone regions of the world impose new requirements on NATO forces in out-of-area contingencies. These weapons may render military interventions by outside powers in regional conflicts more costly in terms of human life, and their outcome less predictable.

Enforcing Compliance with No-First-Use Through Deterrence

World War I saw the widespread use of more than forty types of chemical weapons, ranging from cyanide gas, first used by German

[9] Wayne Biddle, "Just What Germs Would The Army Grow in Utah?" *New York Times,* December 16, 1984; David Warsh, "New Germ Weapons in Cards?" *Boston Globe,* December 16, 1984.

[10] Philip M. Boffey, "Biotechnology May Be Used Against U.S., Official Says," *New York Times,* May 28, 1984; Jack Anderson, "Soviets Push Biological Weapons Work," *Washington Post,* December 4, 1984; David Wood, "Army Tests Drugs for Chemical Warfare Survival-Experimental Vaccines Stockpiled for Treating the Frontline Forces," *Newark Star-Ledger,* December 2, 1984.

[11] *Foreign Report,* March 8, 1984; Seymour M. Hersh, "U.S. Aides Say Iraqis Made Use of a Nerve Gas-Assert Lab Gear Came from West Germans," *New York Times,* March 30, 1984; Brad Roberts, "Chemical Proliferation and Policy," *Washington Quarterly,* Vol. 8 (Winter 1985), pp. 155-165; Richard Halloran, "U.S. Finds 14 Nations Now Have Chemical Arms," *New York Times,* May 20, 1984; Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Aides Say Iraq is Using Gas; Shultz Meets the Foreign Minister," *New York Times,* March 26, 1985; David B. Ottaway, "U.S. Says Iraq Used Gas Again in War With Iran," *Washington Post,*" March 21, 1985.

[12] John Tagliabue, "Europeans Agree To Chemical Curb," *New York Times,* April 11, 1984; Karen DeYoung, "Britain Bans Export of Poison-Gas Chemicals to Iran and Iraq," *Washington Post,* April 13, 1984.

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troops in April 1915, to mustard gas.[13] But victims of chemical attacks accounted for only a small fraction of casualties and fatalities suffered during the war. In fact, once respirators and protective overgarments became available, the tactical utility of chemical operations diminished as did the count of victims. Nonetheless, the unprecedented suffering inflicted by the "silent killer" evoked a public outrage that worked to outlaw the use of chemical weapons. They culminated in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, a treaty prohibiting the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases," or "analogous liquids, materials or devices," or "bacteriological methods of warfare."[14]

But the Protocol did not prohibit the possession of chemical weapons, nor did it institute procedures to enforce compliance with its provisions. Many states therefore reserved the right when signing the treaty to retaliate against a transgressor. Moreover, some countries, like the Soviet Union, limited their obligations only to parties to the treaty. Despite these limitations, the Geneva Protocol is usually credited with confining the use of chemical weapons to isolated instances.

Admittedly, the Protocol gave legal standing to universal moral condemnation of chemical warfare and thereby reinforced presumptions against its use. But it did not prevent countries from employing chemical weapons when doing so was deemed to further their military objectives. Whenever chemical warfare has been waged in violation of the Geneva Protocol, its victims were unable to protect themselves or to retaliate in kind. In stark contrast, chemical weapons were not used in any of the major wars involving countries with significant chemical capabilities. This suggests that not the Geneva Protocol but the threat of retaliation has deterred more frequent use of chemical weapons.

The best, most often cited illustration of the deterrent value of chemical warfare preparedness is World War II where Nazi Germany refrained from employing chemical weapons even as a last resort when confronting defeat. The Soviets reported occasional use of chemical weapons by German forces on the Eastern Front in 1943, and indeed, their employment was seriously considered when the Soviet counteroffensive gathered momentum after the battle of Stalingrad. But Soviet charges have never been substantiated and were probably meant to prod the Allies into supplying chemical warfare equipment to Soviet forces. According to Albert Speer, the Nazi minister of armaments, Hitler ordered suicide attacks with chemical weapons in a last ditch effort to halt the advance

[13] Frederick J. Brown, *Chemical Warfare: A Study in Restraints*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968) claims that casualties of the first uses of chemicals during the battle of Ypres were much exaggerated.

[14] R. R. Baxter and Thomas Buergenthal, "Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925," in *The Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1971), pp. 1-36; U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Text and Histories of Negotiations*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO-ACDA, 1982).

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of allied troops on Berlin, but his directives were evidently ignored by the German High Command.[15]

Germany was equipped with advanced nerve gas agents which had been developed by its scientists during the 1930s and are still the mainstay of the chemical arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union.[16] Its forces also maintained a large supply of less efficient agents of World War I vintage. Defensive equipment was well developed, although it was not initially deployed with all units due to supply shortages.

Despite their high state of chemical warfare preparedness, German commanders were deterred from employing chemical weapons for a number of interrelated reasons. German intelligence estimates exaggerated allied chemical warfare capabilities. The United States was thought to be ahead in the development and production of nerve gases because it led the world in the production of pesticides. The fascination with the utility of strategic air power pervaded military planning throughout the interwar years and had caused a serious mismatch between offensive weapons and defensive capabilities in Germany. Most chemical agents had been filled into bombs for use against unprotected enemy cities at the expense of chemical munitions for tactical employment on the battlefield. German soldiers were trained and equipped for chemical warfare, but the civilian population was left utterly unprotected against allied retaliation. Once the Luftwaffe lost control over German airspace, fear of chemical retaliation for battlefield use of chemical weapons by German forces acted as a formidable deterrent.[17] Historical evidence thus supports the case of deterrence through possession of balanced chemical defense and retaliatory capabilities. It also demonstrates that chemical defense alone is insufficient as a deterrent. In all instances of imbalance, obligations of the Geneva Protocol or the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 have acted as inadequate restraints on the better-equipped combatant. Recent use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iran and the use of chemical and toxin weapons by the Soviet Union against the Afghan resistance serve as forceful reminders that lack of preparedness can spell disaster, when confronting a ruthless opponent.

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[15] Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970).

[16] Tabun had been discovered in 1936, and both soman and sarin were discovered during World War II. A. F. Gravely, "Defense or Deterrence? The Case for Chemical Weapons," *RUSI Journal,* Vol. 126 (December 1981), pp. 13-20; for a succinct discussion of the constraints on German chemical weapons use in World War II see John M. Weinstein and Henry G. Gole, *Chemical Weapons Rearmament and the Security of Europe: Can Support Be Mustered?* Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1983, pp. 8-10.

[17] Frederick J. Brown, *Chemical Warfare;* John Ellis von Courtland Moon, "Chemical Weapons and Deterrence, The World War II Experience," *International Security,* Vol. 8 (Spring, 1984), pp. 3-35; Speer, *Inside the Third Reich,* relates that all sensible German army people turned down gas warfare as utterly insane in view of America's superiority in the air. In fact, Churchill instructed his Chief of Staff to explore drenching German cities with chemical agents in retaliation for German V-1 and V-2 buzzbomb attacks on British cities.

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Nuclear Deterrence and the Chemical Threat

Consistent with the national obligations under the Geneva Protocol, all NATO members have renounced the first-use of chemical weapons and rely on limited U.S. capabilities exclusively for the purpose of deterring Soviet chemical warfare. Many proponents of chemical disarmament reject NATO's need of a chemical warfare deterrent because they deem the threat of nuclear escalation sufficient to deter Moscow from initiating chemical warfare. They contend that NATO can abandon its retaliatory stockpile without the risk of undermining deterrence, and they urge NATO to disarm unilaterally to further the cause of arms control by setting an example. Some even accuse NATO of insisting on procedures for full and effective verification to conceal its unwillingness to relinquish chemical weapons.

In view of its inadequate preparations for chemical contingencies and nominal retaliatory capabilities, NATO has long relied in practice on the threat of nuclear escalation to deter Moscow from initiating chemical combat. But a nuclear response has always lacked credibility for a number of reasons. First, it is disproportional to the act it is designed to deter. Damage associated with using nuclear weapons is far greater than that inflicted by chemical weapons. While chemical attacks would wreak havoc and cause massive casualties among unprotected civilians, nuclear weapons would devastate urban centers in densely populated Western Europe.

NATO forces are no better prepared to conduct combat operations under conditions of chemical than radiological contamination. Both disrupt NATO's defense organization and force soldiers to wear performance-degrading protective equipment to avoid exposure to the lethal environment. In terms of the secondary effects of nuclear explosions and damage to equipment and defense infrastructure, recovery from chemical attacks is much faster. From a commander's perspective, combat conditions brought about by chemical weapons are thus preferable to those attending the use of tactical nuclear arms and are lesser impediments to defensive operations by NATO units. As a result, nuclear escalation is inherently undesirable and does not offset existing shortcomings of NATO's chemical retaliatory assets.

Automatic nuclear retaliation for the use of chemical weapons will require NATO to deploy tactical nuclear weapons with all frontline units. Furthermore, chemical attacks need not be confined to the forward edge of the battle area but can be aimed at NATO targets such as staging areas or infrastructure assets in the rear. Nuclear retaliation might thus require NATO to launch nuclear attacks against follow-on forces with the

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attendant risk of blurring the notional boundary between strictly tactical and theaterwide use of nuclear weapons.

Consequently, threatening automatic nuclear escalation contradicts NATO's policy of seeking to end a military conflict at an early stage, with the least possible devastation of NATO territory. A posture involving automatic nuclear escalation will eliminate carefully defined firebreaks between conventional and nuclear warfare that form an integral part of NATO's doctrine of flexible response. Whether NATO will be willing to tamper with its official doctrine is open to question.

To be credible, NATO governments would also have to relinquish political control over nuclear escalation and transfer nuclear release authority to military commanders. Under current rules, extensive consultations among allied political leaders must precede any formal decision to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. According to its doctrine, NATO contemplates using nuclear weapons in the face of a crushing breakthrough of Warsaw Pact forces that causes the collapse of its defenses. But there are serious doubts that NATO councils would overcome political indecision and authorize employment of nuclear weapons in a timely fashion. It can be all but ruled out that NATO's political leaders would muster the courage to permit the use of nuclear weapons to retaliate against chemical attacks or to transfer this decision to their military commanders in order to make the nuclear response automatic.

NATO's nuclear first-use posture suffers from serious credibility problems and cannot tolerate further strain from the demand to deter chemical warfare. In the past, credibility derived from NATO's great lead in theater nuclear assets and U.S. strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, which enabled NATO to deter Moscow by clearly dominating the escalatory process. It is widely acknowledged that NATO has lost its edge in both of these critical weapons categories. This not only spurred demands to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons but underpinned the decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe, to prevent its decoupling from the strategic nuclear deterrent of the United States.

NATO dependence on nuclear deterrence of chemical warfare will impede its attempts to lessen the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy by bolstering its conventional forces. Unless it is accompanied by a simultaneous buildup of chemical warfare capabilities, strengthening NATO's conventional posture may be, in fact, a mixed blessing. Stronger resistance by NATO conventional forces could tempt Moscow to attain its operational objectives by using chemical weapons before the momentum of its offensive falters. Only if one presumes that the Soviet Union is unwilling to risk nuclear conflict in Europe — highly doubtful in view of its theater and strategic nuclear buildup — will NATO be able to count

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on deterring Soviet chemical warfare without fixing the chink in its chemical armor.

Most opponents of NATO chemical rearmament, who propose that NATO rely on nuclear weapons to deter Soviet chemical warfare, are also pressing NATO to adopt a nuclear no-first-use posture and agree to a nuclear-free zone in central Europe.[18] This is no coincidence: their resistance to restocking NATO's chemical arsenal is symptomatic of their rejection of virtually every attempt by NATO to shore up its deteriorating deterrence posture and operationally meaningful defense capabilities. When NATO was about to field Pershing IIs and GLCMs, they urged improvement of conventional forces and cancelling of deployment plans for these weapons as a signal that NATO is serious about lessening dependence on nuclear weapons. With deployment proceeding, they have turned against NATO efforts to strengthen conventional forces on the pretext that employment tactics for many of these new weapons are unduly provocative to the Warsaw Pact.[19]

In view of its deteriorating nuclear deterrence posture, NATO cannot expect to depend on the de facto threat of nuclear escalation to compensate indefinitely for the inadequacy of its chemical warfare posture. This threat has never been convincing because NATO commanders do not possess the advance release authority that would initiate an automatic response. Furthermore, efforts by NATO to raise the nuclear threshold will fail as long as it does not close the chemical warfare gap. Such a gap might either neutralize NATO's conventional force improvements or precipitate a nuclear response in a strategic environment in which NATO will have lost what was only a theoretical ability to prevail by virtue of a superior nuclear capability.

Soviet Interest in Chemical Warfare

German restraint during World War II demonstrates the power of deterrence in regard to chemical weapons. In the face of incontro-

[18] For discussion of nuclear no-first-use see: John D. Steinbrunner and Leon V. Sigal, eds., *Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First Use Question,* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983); Robert S. McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 62 (Fall 1983), pp. 59-80; McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robet S. McNamara, Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 60, pp. 753-786; Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes, Franz Josef Schulze, "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A German Response," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 60 (Summer 1982), pp. 1157-1170.

[19] The NATO Defense Planning Committee approved SACEUR's Long-Term Planning Guideline for Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) on November 9, 1984. Its objective is to develop NATO capabilities to attack Warsaw Pact forces with conventional weapons long before they reach the battle area. As a strategic subconcept FOFA does not represent a departure from NATO's forward defense posture, as has been alleged by its political critics, but rather reflects NATO efforts to raise the nuclear threshold by optimizing advanced technologies and force planning for early interdiction of enemy targets. Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, "Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA): Myths and Realities," *NATO Review,* Vol. 32 (December 1984), pp. 1-9.

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vertible evidence that Moscow does not honor existing legal restraints on the use of chemical weapons, the high state of chemical warfare preparedness of its forces cannot be explained by reference to Soviet obsession with security. Because few other weapons are so dependent for their decisiveness on the opponent's defensive posture and possession of countervailing assets, it is prudent to assume that Moscow will seize the operational advantages offered by chemical weapons whenever their use is indicated.

The Soviet chemical threat to NATO is a direct function of a number of closely interrelated conditions: the nature of Soviet military objectives; the principles of Soviet operational planning; the utility of chemical weapons in enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of both offensive and defensive operations of Soviet forces; the availability of a highly diverse arsenal of chemical agents to complement and augment other elements of the Soviet force structure; the lack of adequate defensive and chemical retaliatory capabilities of NATO; the limited and eroding credibility of NATO's threat to retaliate with nuclear weapons, either immediately or once its small inventory of chemical munitions has been depleted; the minimal risk and resulting minimal constraints on Soviet decisions to initiate chemical operations; and, finally, the utter vulnerability of NATO populations to the effects of chemical weapons.

Experts agree that the Red Army maintains the world's most elaborate and comprehensive chemical warfare posture. It consists of a balanced mix of offensive and defensive forces, a military doctrine that integrates chemical warfare operations with the use of conventional and nuclear weapons and maximizes their utility, units specializing in chemical warfare missions, and technically competent and psychologically conditioned manpower to conduct combat operations on a chemical and radiological battlefield.[20] It is all too fashionable to attribute Moscow's excessive force posture to its obsession with security and attendant tendency to overinvest in its military establishment. But the scope of its chemical warfare preparedness far exceeds what might reasonably be considered an exaggerated defense emphasis. In light of the poor condition of NATO forces, Moscow has acquired a chemical first strike posture,

[20] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power,* April 2, 1985, pp. 71-72; id., *Continuing Development of Chemical Weapons Capabilities in the USSR,* Washington, D.C., October 1983; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, *CBR Protection of the Soviet Ground Forces,* DDB-1600-5-80, June 1980; Association of the U.S. Army, AUSA, Special Report, *A Chink in our Armour: The Urgent Need for Chemical Weapons,* Arlington, Va.; Christopher N. Donnelly, "Winning the NBC War: Soviet Army Theory and Practice," *International Defense Review,* Vol. 14, pp. 989-96; Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., "Chemical Weapons: An Imbalance of Terror," *Strategic Review,* Vol. 10 (Summer 1982), pp. 36-47; J. Kenneth Crelling, *Chemical Warfare Capabilities: The Warsaw Pact Countries,* Charlottesville, Va.: U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, October 31, 1979; Erickson, "Soviet Union's Growing Arsenal"; C. J. Dick, "Soviet Chemical Warfare Capabilities," *International Defense Review,* Vol. 14 (January 1981), pp. 31-38.

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and one must assume that Soviet forces will employ chemical arms whenever the course of battle calls for their use.

Soviet interest in chemical weapons dates to World War I, when the Imperial Russian Army suffered catastrophic losses from chemical weapons use by German forces. It incurred twice as many fatalities and five times as many casualties as any of the other belligerents. The Soviets attributed these horrendous losses to inadequate preparedness in munitions and delivery systems, chemical defense equipment, and training.[21]

The new Soviet regime set out right away to correct these apparent deficiencies by incorporating chemical warfare into its military planning, and launching a comprehensive procurement and training program. The Red Army was established in 1918 and newly created specialized chemical troops were made an integral element of its original organization.[22] During the Civil War, chemical weapons were reportedly employed by both sides and, perhaps not unrelated to this, the Higher Military Chemical School was established in 1920 to provide advanced training for officers of the specialized forces. Chemical troops became an independent service in 1924, reporting directly to the Military Chemical Army Administration which has supervised research and development of chemical agents.[23]

After the Treaty of Versailles banned chemical weapons from the arsenal of the Reichswehr, Germany collaborated clandestinely with the Red Army on a broad range of chemical warfare problems. It underwrote half the cost of the Sikhany Chemical Proving Ground, a joint test facility set up in 1928 where new chemical agents and munitions were developed, and upgraded defensive gear was tested. According to Western wartime intelligence, the center remained an active test facility after Germany withdrew technical and financial support in 1933.[24]

During the interwar years, Red Army units received new generation protection, detection, and decontamination equipment; and universal training for combat in a chemical environment was made an organic element of all Soviet forces. By 1937, the Red Army was well equipped and psychologically prepared for chemical warfare. During World War II, each Soviet rifle division featured specialized chemical defense com-

[21] Erickson "Soviet Union's Growing Arsenal"; Amoretta M. Hoeber, *The Chemistry of Defeat: Asymmetries in U.S. and Soviet Chemical Warfare Postures,* Special Report (Boston: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. December 1981), pp. 36-37.

[22] Erickson, "Soviet Union's Growing Arsenal," p. 64; Julian P. Robinson, *The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. 1: The Rise of CB Weapons,* (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksall for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1971), pp. 284-85.

[23] Hoeber, *The Chemistry of Defeat,* pp. 36-38.

[24] U.S. Department of Defense, *Continuing Development of Chemical Weapons Capabilities in the USSR;* Erickson, "Soviet Union's Growing Arsenal."

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panies, consisting of chemical reconnaissance platoons and units charged with decontamination, sabotage behind enemy lines, and medical services. Soviet leaders credited their high state of chemical warfare readiness with successfully deterring Nazi Germany from initiating large-scale chemical operations.[25]

After the war, Soviet forces seized two German chemical weapons factories on occupied territory, which had produced highly toxic nerve agents discovered by German scientists before and during the war. These factories were dismantled and transferred to the Soviet Union where they were re-erected and operated by captured German scientists who also played an active role in the development of new agents. The two factories became the backbone of Soviet nerve gas production during the 1950s, producing most of the older chemical agents in the Soviet arsenal.[26]

Moscow has shown an enduring interest in developing new agents, like thickened soman, and has established a farflung network of chemical factories and test facilities for chemical weapons. Evidently, Moscow has launched a major effort to develop so-called mask busting agents that can penetrate existing respirators. There have also been frightening reports that Moscow is looking beyond the family of neuroparalytic agents and is experimenting with living pathogenic agents. These disease- or death-causing organisms, like viruses and bacteria, infest and then spawn in host organisms that are killed or disabled once they reach a certain level of accumulation. Most pathogenic agents occur in nature and produce anthrax, the plague, and other fatal diseases. Several thousand people were killed in 1979 by an outbreak of pulmonary anthrax after a biological plant exploded in the heavily guarded Military Compound 19 outside the Siberian city of Sverdlovsk.[27] A number of mysterious assassinations using microscopic flechettes in Paris, London, and elsewhere have been linked to the KGB and its East European affiliates using unknown supertoxic substances to kill high-risk defectors.[28]

In the past, biological agents were not considered useful for military applications due to their volatility and long incubation periods.

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[25] Hoeber and Douglass "Neglected Threat of Chemical Warfare"; Julian P. Robinson, "Chemical Warfare Capabilities of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations: An Overview from Open Sources," in SIPRI, *Chemical Weapons* (New York: Crane Russak, 1980); Walter Hirsch, "Soviet BW and CW Preparations and Capabilities — 1935-45," declassified June 1974 (Charlottesville: U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, 1974).

[26] Robinson, "Chemical Warfare Capabilities of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization"; Douglass, "Chemical Weapons: An Imbalance of Terror."

[27] *The Sverdlovsk Incident; Soviet Biological Warfare Activities,* A Report of the Subcommittee on Oversight, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, (Washington, D.C., GPO June 1980).

[28] Neil C. Livingstone and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., *CBW: The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb,* National Security Paper: 1, (Boston: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., February 1984); Jack Anderson, "Soviets Plotting Biotech War, President Told," *Washington Post,* February 21, 1984; *Anti-personnel Weapons,* (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1978), p. 105.

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But this may be changing due to advances in the field of genetic engineering, in which the pathogenic properties of a potentially unlimited number of micro-organisms can be transferred through genetic recombination within stable vectors.[29] Desirable toxic features of one biological agent can thus be spliced into other agents with different properties, producing an essentially infinite number of combinations against which defense is virtually impossible. According to the Board of Army Science and Technology of the National Research Council, "a large number of biological agents could be useful for military purposes based on their microbiological and epidemiological characteristics," and U.S. government officials have already expressed serious concerns about the threat of microbiology to U.S. security.[30]

Moscow also seems to be experimenting in Afghanistan, with a variety of mycotoxins and other highly lethal toxin weapons that are being combined with other unknown toxic substances. Until reports of their use there and in Indochina, toxins were not considered militarily useful due to their instability and short life span. They are now being re-examined for their military utility. Toxins are best described as a subclass of chemical weapons consisting of a large number of biologically derived substances some of which can also be produced synthetically. Toxins can also be obtained from micro-organisms, plants, and animals by using simple laboratory techniques. Ricin toxin, for example, is about five orders of magnitude more toxic than the most advanced neuropathological agents and can be extracted from castor beans.[31]

According to reports of Soviet emigré scientists, the open scientific literature, intelligence reports, and Soviet military writings, Moscow values the potentially vast military uses of biological and toxin weapons and conducts research and testing at a number of supersecret facilities, in flagrant violation of the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972. By comparison, research in the West is carried out exclusively in the private sector for strictly commercial application. Efforts by the U.S. armed forces to research defensive technologies against already known biochemical threats have not received congressional approval and funding.[32] Conse-

[29] Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., "Biochem Warfare: A Warning," *Defense Science 2002+*, Vol. 3 (October 1984), pp. 66-69; *Assessment of Chemical and Biological Sensor Technologies*, A report prepared by the Committee on Chemical and Biological Sensor Technologies, Board on Army Science and Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1984, p. 6; Joshua Lederberg, "Biological Warfare: A Global Threat," *American Scientist*, Vol. 59 (March-April 1971), pp. 195-97.

[30] *Assessment of Chemical and Biological Sensor Technologies;* Boffey, "Biotechnology May Be Used Against U.S., Official Says."

[31] Livingstone and Douglass, *CBW: The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb*, p. 9.

[32] Wayne Biddle, "Army Requests Funds to Test Lethal Sprays," *Norfolk Virginian-Pilot*, November 2, 1984; Associated Press, "Army Defends Proposal to Test Biowar Defenses," *San Diego Union*, December 1, 1984.

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quently, our knowledge about the real scope of this emerging threat is sketchy and speculative, and the armed forces of the West remain largely defenseless, providing Moscow with an irresistible incentive to capitalize on its growing lead in this frontier of warfare.

Soviet Military Doctrine and Chemical Warfare

Soviet military leaders have always emphasized the important role that chemical warfare will play in any future war. Marshal Zhukov stated this publicly at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956, and Soviet military literature is replete with references to the integral role of biochemical warfare in Soviet contingency planning. Indeed, the tactical and strategic utility of chemical weapons in executing Moscow's essentially offensive military doctrine can hardly be overestimated.[33]

Soviet military doctrine stresses the elements of surprise, high speed of advance and maneuver as well as massive firepower as the cardinal and immutable principles of its military strategy. Moscow has adopted a Blitzkrieg-type strategy to compensate for the weaknesses of its industrial base. Swift and decisive victory is also required to avoid political fissures at home and in the East European satellite countries, which might be engendered by a protracted war of attrition.

Consequently, Soviet strategy for mechanized warfare calls for massive thrusts through NATO frontline defenses, effecting deep penetration of NATO's strategic depth to smash NATO's ability to resist before organization of a well-coordinated defense. NATO nuclear depots, troop concentrations, C^3I installations, logistic nodal points, airfields and port facilities rank high on Soviet target lists for the opening phase of a conflict. The principal task of all Soviet forces operating against rear area targets is to destroy with conventional means NATO's nuclear assets, before their use can be authorized to halt Moscow's offensive.

Moscow does not share the notion of firebreaks underlying all Western military planning and views all military capabilities as organically related. Its military leaders seem determined to employ whatever weapons are best suited to attain certain tactical objectives. Until the mid-1960s, Moscow viewed war as global conflict in which nuclear

[33] Hoeber and Douglass, "The Neglected Threat of Chemical Warfare"; John Erickson, *Soviet Military Power* (Washington, D.C.: United States Strategic Studies Institute, 1973); Charles H. Bay, "Chemical Warfare and the Military Balance," *Parameters,* Vol. 7, 1977, pp. 39-53; for an analysis of Soviet warfighting doctrine, see Peter H. Vigor, *Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory* (Hong Kong: MacMillan, 1983), and id., *The Soviet View of War, Peace, and Neutrality,* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975); V. D. Sokolovsky, *Soviet Military Strategy.* trans. Harriett Fast Scott et al., (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1975); William F. Scott," Soviet Declaratory Views on Chemical and Biological Warfare," prepared for JAYCOR on the basis of open Soviet sources, April 1984.

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weapons would be used from the outset, and where conventional forces had only the ancillary role of exploiting the effects of nuclear strikes. Conventional forces were de-emphasized, restructured, equipped, and trained to fight in a nuclear environment.[34]

Soviet doctrine and force structure largely reflected NATO's tripwire strategy, and as long as flexible response was understood to involve the use of nuclear weapons at a very early stage, they remained essentially valid and unchanged.[35] During the 1970s, however, it became apparent that NATO might hesitate to authorize the use of nuclear weapons, and there has thus been a notable shift toward a more balanced view of nuclear and conventional weapons. The primacy of nuclear weapons is no longer being asserted. There is a growing interest in avoiding nuclear escalation altogether, and in achieving victory before NATO goes nuclear.

The tremendous buildup of conventional and nuclear forces mirrors Moscow's interest in keeping the conflict from escalating to the nuclear arena. Moscow has sought nuclear superiority in the European theater for both political and military purposes: to increase its leverage during peacetime and to deter NATO from employing nuclear weapons once military conflict has begun. Its vastly improved conventional forces are designed to exploit what may only be a short nuclear stand-off by breaking through NATO's zone of defense and turning isolated tactical success across the entire front into full operational success.

Chemical weapons are tailor-made to support this new Soviet emphasis. But even if nuclear weapons were used, it could prove helpful to disable some targets with chemical attacks instead of destroying them with nuclear weapons. Amoretta M. Hoeber and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., observed that "for the major Soviet concerns or targets in the event of either a conventional or a nuclear war in Europe . . . chemical weapons offer important advantages that complement rather than duplicate the effectiveness of both conventional and nuclear weapons, and recommend their use in both contexts." [36] Viewed from Moscow, use of chemical weapons can facilitate victory before the war goes nuclear, and, should

[34] Donnelly, "Winning the NBC War: Soviet Army Theory and Practice," p. 989; James H. Hansen, "Countering NATO's New Weapons, Soviet Concepts for War in Europe," *International Defense Review,* Vol. 17, pp. 1617-1624; Douglass, *Soviet Military Strategy in Europe;* David C. Isby, *Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army,"* (London: Jane's, 1981), Christopher N. Donnelly, "The Soviet Helicopter on the Battlefield," *International Defense Review,* Vol. 17, pp. 559-66.

[35] Donnelly, "The Development of the Soviet Concept of Echeloning"; Hines and Peterson, "The Warsaw Pact Strategic Offensive — The OMG Context"; John M. Collins, *American and Soviet Military Trends Since the Cuban Missile Crisis,* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1978), pp. 321-72; Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces, Part I: Development of Doctrine and Objectives," *Adelphi Papers,* No. 187 (London: IISS, 1984) pp. 21-23.

[36] Hoeber and Douglass, "The Neglected Threat of Chemical Warfare," p. 62.

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this fail, allows Soviet forces to employ tactical nuclear weapons discriminately.

Soviet Chemical Warfare Preparedness

The chemical warfare capabilities of Soviet forces and the Warsaw Pact mirror the importance that Soviet military doctrine assigns to the utility of chemical weapons. Moscow possesses an extensive and highly diverse stockpile of chemical munitions, and its forces field a wide range of chemical protection equipment, chemical detection devices, and decontamination gear. Warsaw Pact forces also field a large number of combat vehicles for chemical warfare missions. Moreover, Soviet and East European troops are fully trained for combat in a contaminated environment, and Moscow alone maintains more than 80,000 troops for specialized chemical warfare missions.[37]

None of the East European countries deploys a stockpile of chemical munitions under national control, but they will probably be issued Soviet weapons in a military conflict. Based on the size and configuration of the Soviet stockpile, Warsaw Pact forces are capable of employing chemical weapons throughout NATO's entire theater of operations in Europe. All mortar or artillery pieces with a caliber of more than 100mm can fire chemical munitions, such as the M-43 120mm mortar and the D-20/M-74 and M-73 howitzers. Moscow will probably produce chemical shells for its new generation of howitzers and mortars, like the 203mm and the 240mm, once initial conventional munitions requirements have been filled. The BM-21 120mm MLR has a range of up to 20km and the new M-77 MLR can deliver chemical payloads to a distance of 30km. Close tactical chemical combat support is also provided by a fleet of more than 700 helicopter gunships like the M-8/Hip E and Mi-24 attack helicopters that have been fitted for short-range chemical rockets and aerial bombs.[38]

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[37] Erickson, "The Soviet Union's Growing Arsenal of Chemical Warfare"; *Strategic Implications of Chemical and Biological Warfare,* Hearings before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Asia and Pacific Affairs, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, April 24, 1980. Estimates of specialized forces range as high as 110,000. It should be emphasized, however, that these troops also have radiological warfare responsibilities and that equipment and training for chemical/biological/radiological warfare (CBR) are somewhat similar.

[38] Donnelly, "The Soviet Helicopter on the Battlefield"; Hoeber, *The Chemistry of Defeat;* and Harold Brown, *DOD Annual Report,* FY 1981: "Their nuclear-chemical-conventional launchers consist of the FROG series, the SCUD B, the SS-12 Scaleboard, and three follow-on missiles" p. 92. These follow-on missiles, the SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 have since become operational, and SS-21 and SS-23 were deployed to Czechoslovakia and East Germany beginning in November 1983 as part of the Soviet measures to counter NATO INF deployment. When a Soviet air-launched cruise missile went astray over Finland in late 1984, Moscow denied it was carrying either a chemical or nuclear warhead. Christopher Bellamy, "Firepower Superiority," *Jane's Defence Weekly,* January 12, 1985, pp. 59-67.

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For long-range strikes against NATO assets, the Warsaw Pact relies on surface-to-surface missiles and air-launched cruise missiles carrying chemical warheads. The old Scud, Frog and Scaleboard tactical missiles are currently being replaced by the advanced SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 missiles that have a longer range and greater accuracy than their predecessors. All Soviet frontline aviation can also deliver chemical payloads against NATO targets with pinpoint accuracy.[39]

According to NATO intelligence, the Soviet chemical arsenal consists of the highly lethal nerve gases tabun, soman, and thickened soman (VR-55), various types of mustard agents as well as various types of blood agents. The exact aggregate size of the Soviet chemical stockpile is unknown; estimates range from a low of 20,000 tons to a high of 700,000 tons, depending on the source and methodology used.[40] Some experts estimate that chemical munitions account for as much as half of the entire munitions stockpile for some weapons systems.[41]

Warsaw Pact forces field a wide range of standardized chemical defense equipment, and collective protection features have been integrated in all armored vehicles. While their equipment is not as advanced as NATO's, it has been issued to all frontline forces. Chemical and radiological detection devices are deployed with all units, and some have been mounted on specially fitted reconnaissance vehicles and can be handled remotely from within the vehicles. These vehicles are being operated by the Chemical Troops well ahead of the combat units, and findings are radioed to command posts for evaluation and warning. In addition, small groups of soldiers are carrying the PKhR series detection devices which must be manually activated and are capable of detecting the most common chemical agents.[42]

The Soviets claim to have the best protective mask in the world, although its small diameter eyepiece restricts the visual field and

[39] For instance, the MiG-27 Flogger-D/J and Su-24 Fencers have a combat radius sufficient to strike targets throughout NATO's operational area and can deliver their 3,000 KG and 2,500 KG payloads with great accuracy. The variety of deep-strike chemical delivery means gives Soviet forces a flexibility that is unmatched by NATO.

[40] Sen. John Tower, "The Politics of Chemical Deterrence," pp. 27-28; Christopher N. Donnelly, "Winning the NBC War: Soviet Army Theory and Practice," pp. 989-96. There are a number of reasons for the great variance in the estimates: (1) The Soviets have a much broader definition of chemical weapons than the U.S. and include, for instance, smoke and incendiary agents; (2) It is often unclear whether the estimates refer to total munitions weight or only agent tons.

[41] Again, estimates vary from as low as 5 percent to as high as 50 percent, a figure used by John Erickson, "The Soviet Union's Growing Arsenal of Chemical Weapons," p. 65, for missiles and bombs. Based on offensive combat need calculations, a ratio of 4:1 would probably suffice for a prolonged combined conventional-chemical offensive.

[42] Julian Perry Robinson, *The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. 2: CB Weapons Today* (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1971); U.S. Department of Defense, *Continuing Development of Chemical Weapons Capabilities in the U.S.S.R.;* Defense Intelligence Agency, *CBR Protection of the Soviet Ground Forces;* U.S. General Accounting Office, *Chemical Warfare: Many Unanswered Questions,* April 29, 1983, pp. 44; Isby, *Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army,* pp. 209-219.

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it lacks fittings for corrective lenses. Moreover, it is uncomfortable to wear and does not have a built-in voicemitter for communication. Protective clothing offers good protection against all types of chemical agents and is made of rubberized material. It must be worn with chemically treated undergarments for full protection. The Soviets have developed different kinds of protective overgarments to optimize protection while keeping force degradation to a minimum. Overall, Soviet suits provide good protection, but they cannot be worn for longer than a few hours in moderate temperatures due to excessive heat stress. Soviet planners must regard this limitation as tolerable; perhaps because they expect to traverse contaminated terrain as quickly as possible. This conclusion is supported by the fact that crews of armored vehicles do not wear protective clothing or respirators at all and can only dismount them after clearing contaminated areas. Collective protection is thus optimized for effective combat, but not for survival of crews that will be trapped in their vehicles for lack of individual protective gear.

Warsaw Pact forces also maintain extensive specialized decontamination equipment, ranging from individual cleansing kits carried by soldiers to trucks and trailers for decontamination of tracked vehicles and other heavy equipment. A chemical warfare battalion with over sixty multipurpose decontamination trucks is attached to every Soviet tank or motorized rifle division. In addition to their individual decontamination kits, soldiers carry small medical kits containing antidotes to chemical agents. Among them are antidotes for soman and cyanide gas, which are not part of NATO's arsenal but form the backbone of the Soviet arsenal.[43]

Training in chemical warfare skills is universal and begins long before a conscript enters military service. Chemical drills are regular elements of firing exercises, and tactical training for specialized warfare operations is included in every maneuver where chemical attacks are carried out under realistic conditions involving the use of diluted chemical agents. Although cheating is widespread as commanders try to boost the competitive ratings of their units, and such drills are often only perfunctory, Warsaw Pact troops are vastly better prepared than NATO forces where, until recently, chemical warfare training was notorious for its absence.

The backbone of every Soviet combat unit is the Military Chemical Troops (BKHV), which is an independent component of the Soviet force structure and numbers in excess of 80,000 troops. Members of the Military Chemical Troops undergo rigorous training and are organized into military defense units that are attached to all Soviet military services. The Military Chemical Troops provide specialized chemical war-

[43] Hoeber, *The Chemistry of Defeat*, p. 39; K. G. Benz, "NBC Defense — An Overview, Part 1: Protection Equipment," *International Defense Review*, Vol. 16 (December 1983), p. 1786.

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fare support, reconnoiter chemical contamination, operate decontamination equipment. They also deliver chemical munitions and supervise their employment. These specialized forces are unparalleled and round out the impressive chemical capabilities of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. Harold Brown, President Carter's secretary of defense, offered the following sobering assessment in his FY 1979 Report to Congress: "it is likely that the Soviets would consider using a combination of chemical and conventional weapons, as well as a combination of chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons — and they have the capability to do either — if they believe a tactical advantage could be gained." [44] His warning deserves to be heeded.

The Tactical Utility of Chemical Weapons

As a generic class, chemical weapons cause effects that cannot be replicated easily by either conventional or nuclear weapons. Chemical weapons do not cause any collateral damage but their area effects resemble those of nuclear weapons. Therefore, they can serve as substitutes for tactical nuclear munitions, if the preservation of physical structures in the target area is deemed desirable or the risks of nuclear attack are excessive. In the pre-nuclear phase of a conflict, airfields, C^3I installations, and port facilities are prime targets for chemical attacks. Even after the nuclear threshold has been crossed, chemical weapons can substitute for nuclear charges and, thus, curtail overall requirements for nuclear strikes.

The use of chemical weapons is difficult to detect. Unlike nuclear explosions, there is no visible evidence, especially if the chemical weapons are mixed with conventional explosives. Troops in the target zone have little or no warning, and some casualties are certain to result from a chemical attack. Chemical agents kill or incapacitate faster than nuclear radiation that can take hours or days fully to disable soldiers outside the immediate blast and firestorm zones of nuclear detonations.

Chemical weapons are essentially area munitions, attacking anybody who is in a given area at the time of a strike, or who enters it before the agents have lost their toxicity. The extent and duration of contamination and the kind of protective equipment required to shield against its harmful effects vary according to the agents employed, the amounts delivered, and local conditions — weather, vegetation, and terrain — in the target area. Usually, chemical weapons "blanket" a target with large amounts of agents that can be delivered with virtually all types of delivery vehicles fielded by Soviet forces.

[44] Harold Brown, *DOD Annual Report, FY 1979,* February 1978, p. 157.

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But chemical weapons can also be used clandestinely before the outbreak of hostilities to create confusion and panic. Civilian and military leaders are the targets of choice of assassination squads, and Soviet involvement in their mysterious deaths would probably go unrecognized. These attacks can be effected by the more than 15,000 Soviet and East European agents operating in Western Europe, but the United States is equally vulnerable, and its counterintelligence resources are seriously inadequate to cope with this threat.

Once hostilities have begun, special operations forces could be introduced into NATO Europe to engage in chemical sabotage on a larger scale. The Warsaw Pact maintains more than 30,000 of these so-called *spetsnaz* forces, trained to operate behind enemy lines to destroy critical infrastructure targets — power lines, bridges, pipelines, military installations, and political command centers. These units can also inject chemical agents into the water supply or food chain and use other methods to impede NATO mobilization and forward deployment of troops.[45]

At the forward edge of the battle, chemical weapons can be employed to inflict heavy casualties on the defending forces and dislodge them from their fortified positions. Chemical assaults are useful to isolate individual units from their field command, deny them tactical intelligence, and, thus, effectively disrupt organized defenses. Soviet forces can apply massive amounts of chemical agents with the BM-21 .multiple rocket launcher. Each motorized rifle division is equipped with eighteen of these forty-barrel launchers which can deliver 720 rounds in a single salvo for maximum surprise and effect.[46]

For offensive breakthroughs, the use of fast acting and short-lived agents with strong penetration capability is most effective. Hydrogen cyanide gas, for instance, loses its lethalness in seven to ten minutes. After a tactical assault with this or other short-lived agents, infantry can swiftly overrun the area without chemical protective equipment so as to exploit their debilitating effects on the defense.[47]

Nonpersistent chemical weapons are also useful to prepare drop zones for surprise airborne attacks behind enemy lines or to establish coastal bridgeheads by seaborne assault. Troops can be injected shortly after the attack without protective gear to suppress and eliminate re-

[45] Viktor Surorov, "Spetsnaz, The Soviet Union's Special Forces," *International Defense Review*, Vol. 16 (September 1983), 1208-1216; Douglass and Lukens, "Expanding Arena of Chemical-Biological Warfare," p. 72.

[46] MRLs are best suited to deliver chemical munitions because of their rapid-fire ability which allows quick application of massive amounts of agents. NATO is presently fielding its own multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), but there are no plans yet to acquire chemical munitions for this system.

[47] Julian P. Robinson, "Chemical Weapons and Europe," *Survival*, Vol. 24 (January-February 1982), pp. 9-18; id., "Chemical Weapons for NATO? A Framework for Considering Policy Options," in Matthew Meselson, ed., *Chemical Weapons and Arms Control* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1978); Charles H. Bay, "Chemical Warfare and the Military Balance," *Parameters*, Vol. 7 (1977), pp. 39-53.

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maining enemy resistance and to secure the area for reinforcements. Depending on the intensity of enemy air defenses in the area, chemical agents can be applied either by aircraft using aerial bombs, or spraytanks, or surface-to-surface missiles.

Chemical weapons are also useful to destroy pockets of enemy resistance or units that have been bypassed or cut off by Warsaw Pact forces. Blanketing these troop concentrations with chemical munitions is very effective to wear them down in preparation for mop-up operations. Chemical attacks also economically neutralize outflanked enemy troop concentrations as few chemical rounds are required. They can be delivered without diverting firepower from the main thrust of the assault.

Persistent chemical agents can be employed to secure the flanks of advancing forces without draining resources from the primary mission of attacking forces. Denial of terrain also restricts maneuver warfare by NATO forces, hampering their ability to stage counterattacks on Warsaw Pact forces, and forcing NATO to concentrate its troops in uncontaminated areas and difficult terrain where they will be vulnerable to air strikes. Effective area denial also tends to reduce Warsaw Pact tactical reconnaissance requirements and can create dangerous tactical discontinuities by separating NATO forces from their logistical support.

Finally, chemical strikes against NATO airfields, C^3I assets, port facilities and major staging arenas for a second line of defense can exercise a decisive impact on the course of the battle for Europe. Combined Soviet chemical and conventional attacks against NATO airfields can render them inoperable and slow their sortie rate far longer than would be possible using only conventional runway cratering bombs. Such attacks could have a decisive impact on NATO's ability to maintain air superiority and provide tactical ground support on the forward edge of the front.

In sum, employment of chemical weapons can enhance the effectiveness of conventional and nuclear offensive operations. Since Soviet commanders can determine the timing, scope, and type of chemical agents, they can fully capitalize on their tactical utility without risk, as long as NATO remains incapable of retaliating in an effective and sustained manner. The very danger of Soviet chemical strikes impedes NATO's defense efforts, forcing its troops to maintain at least a minimal protective posture. This magnifies the existing force structure disparities and may give the Warsaw Pact the critical edge against NATO in a future war.

The Unmaking of NATO's Retaliatory Deterrent

With the exception of France, which acknowledges possession of a retaliatory chemical munitions stockpile estimated at roughly 2,000 tons, the United States is the only NATO member that maintains an

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offensive chemical weapons capability. The United Kingdom destroyed its stocks of chemical munitions as a matter of unilateral decision during the 1950s and has no official plans to resume their production. West Germany renounced its right to produce or possess chemical weapons under the provisions of Protocol III to the treaty establishing the West European Union, the so-called Brussels Treaty. Italy is subject to similar restriction and to feelings of guilt about its violation of the Geneva Protocol when invading Ethiopia in the 1930s. Guilt tends to reinforce the legal restraint and explains the country's allergy to chemical weapons. None of the smaller NATO members has ever expressed interest in acquiring a chemical retaliatory capability of its own.

During the 1950s, interest in chemical weapons was strong in the United States, and some chemical agents, mostly GB and VX, were produced at three factories.[48] For a short time, the army experimented with military applications for incapacitating hallucinogens like BZ and LSD, but early enthusiasm about these "harmless" weapons was dispelled when their limited military utility was determined.

Only a small amount of the agents produced at the three factories were actually filled into munitions. During the Vietnam War, the demand for conventional munitions diverted artillery and mortar shell casings away from chemical munitions plants. Most chemical agents were stored in essentially useless bulk form at various military bases throughout the United States and Johnston Island. The VX plant at Newport was shut down in 1967. Since that date, the United States has not produced any new chemical agents, and there are no functioning facilities where agents stored in bulk form could be filled into munitions. As in so many other areas of the U.S. force posture, the Vietnam War also left its mark on the chemical warfare deterrent. In terms of its chemical weapons stockpile, the United States remains locked into a pre-Vietnam War munitions design that is widely regarded as obsolete.[49]

Vietnam bestowed another legacy: the debate over the harmful health effects of exposure to Agent Orange, a defoliant widely used by U.S. forces during the war. In the late 1960s, there were also growing concerns about the environmental safety of chemical munitions. These concerns were fanned by a number of accidents attributed to the testing of chemical munitions, and prompted Congress to prohibit open-air testing

[48] Richard L. Wagner and Theodore S. Gold, "Why We Can't Avoid Developing Chemical Weapons," *Defense* (July 1982), pp. 1-11; according to testimony by Theodore S. Gold, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical Matters, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 7, 1983, the U.S. presently maintains no operational facility for chemical weapons production or the weaponization of chemical agents stored in bulk, and revitalizing mothballed facilities could take years of construction and extensive investment.

[49] Robinson, "Chemical Warfare Capabilities of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations," p. 37-38.

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of chemical weapons and to impose various environmental safeguards on their transportation and disposition.[50]

To allay public fears about the chemical weapons activities of the armed forces, the Pentagon with the army as the lead service launched a search for a "safe" chemical weapon. Before President Nixon proclaimed the unilateral U.S. moratorium on chemical weapons production on November 25, 1969, the army already had decided to bow to public pressure and terminate production of unitary chemical munitions. Engineering development of binary munitions had progressed enough to warrant confidence in their feasibility, and the army expected to start production in the early 1970s.[51]

Since then, however, repeated efforts to secure funding for two types of new binary munitions, the 155mm artillery shell and the Bigeye aerial bomb have failed. During the fifteen-year-long moratorium, the quality of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile has seriously deteriorated and, as a result, NATO's ability to deter Soviet chemical warfare in Europe has been weakened.

In order to assess properly the desolate state of the U.S. retaliatory deterrent, it must be recalled that the munitions in the existing arsenal were designed originally for a twenty-year shelf-life. But some munitions, like the 115mm GB rocket, were found leaking after only ten years storage, and there have been reports that VX munitions at the Tooele Army Depot show signs of "accelerating deterioration." In fact, fully 75 percent of all chemical munitions have now reached the end of their shelf-life. Amoretta Hoeber, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition, testified on March 13, 1985, before the House Armed Services Committee that only 10 percent of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile is useful, another 18 percent is of only limited utility, and that neither category consists of weapons optimal for modern tactics and delivery systems.[52] The army has placed

[50] The most prominent accident attributed to chemical warfare operations of the U.S. Army occurred at the Dugway Proving Ground, 85 miles southwest of Salt Lake City on March 14, 1968; see Douglass, "Chemical Warfare: An Imbalance of Terror," p. 41. Among chemical weapons-relevant laws are: P.L.-91-441, prohibiting open-air testing; P.L. 92-532, prohibiting disposal of chemical munitions by ocean dumping. P.L. 91-121 of 1970 as amended by P.L. 91-441 in 1971 carefully defines conditions under which chemical weapons can be transported and destroyed, and P.L. 91-190, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires environmental impact statements for all chemical weapons-related activities.

[51] Consequently, the army never intended its moratorium to last more than a few years until production of binary munitions would commence. It therefore did not devote additional resources to stockpile management and munitions upgrading programs. It can reasonably be assumed that preventive rather than remedial stockpile servicing could have slowed the deterioration of the existing inventory without, however, removing the need for eventual modernization.

[52] Hearings on the *Disposal of Chemical Munitions,* House Armed Services Committee, Investigations Subcommittee, prepared testimony, March 13, 1985, including the report by the Nuclear and Chemical Directorate on the *Chemical Demilitarization Program,* March 6, 1985; Associated Press, "Nerve Gas Weapons Aging-Disposal Called 'National Problem,' " *Washington Post,* March 14, 1985.

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more emphasis on servicing its existing munitions stockpile to slow deterioration and increase the usable share to 12 percent, but this can be no more than a stop-gap salvage operation. Even if the electrical components of the munitions were replaced, the agent fill continues to deteriorate, making the weapons unreliable. In 1982 alone, the entire stockpile of M55 rockets filled with VX and GB was declared obsolete and slated for destruction.[53]

In 1969 about half of the chemical stockpile consisted of agents stored in bulk form according to testimony by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result of demilitarization of hazardous and unrepairable munitions, the share of bulk agents has risen to fully 61 percent. It will continue to grow as more munitions become unserviceable and are slated for destruction in the current multibillion dollar disposal program. In the early 1970s, the U.S. chemical stockpile was put at about 40,000 agent tons of which only 10 percent, or 4,000 tons, is still of military utility. According to an army estimate, "current U.S. stockpiles amount to only 25 percent of the needed deterrent and . . . by 1990 . . . the U.S. will no longer have a military usable stockpile of chemical munitions and groundbased delivery systems."[54]

Of greater importance for the purpose of assessing NATO chemical retaliatory capabilities is the U.S. stockpile deployed in Europe. Reliable sources estimate that approximately 5 percent of the U.S. stockpile is stored in West Germany, the only European country housing U.S. chemical munitions. Using 20,000 agent tons filled in chemical munitions by 1969 as a basis for computing the size of that stockpile, and assuming that all forward-deployed munitions can be fired with existing delivery systems, no more than 1,000 agent tons or no more than a few thousand shells and bombs are readily available for retaliatory use by NATO forces. This is clearly inadequate to constitute a viable deterrent.

The condition of NATO's chemical deterrent is even worse when examined in terms of the growing mismatch between available munitions and delivery systems. As noted above, U.S. chemical munitions were configured for delivery with weapons in use with U.S. and NATO forces during the 1960s. Most of these systems have been withdrawn already or are being retired. For instance, the old 105mm gun, formerly the backbone of NATO, is being phased out, and the old 155mm gun is being replaced with a new extended-range howitzer. While the old

[53] The army stores a total of 476,895 M-55 rockets at five sites in the CONUS and the Johnston Atoll, and their demilitarization will cost about $500 million dollars. For FY 1987, DOD requested $104.6 million to begin disposal at three sites.

[54] Quoted in Deborah M. Kyle, "Chemical Warfare," *Armed Forces Journal International,* November 1981, p. 57; similar warnings can be found in virtually all testimony by Pentagon officials before Congress.

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155mm GB projectiles can be fired from the new gun, they cannot be fired to maximum range. Unless the United States procures the extended-range 155mm binary shell, it will not be able to capitalize fully on the tactical flexibility provided by the new gun. The army is also replacing the 8-inch gun and the 4.2-inch mortar and will soon certify chemical munitions for these weapons as unusable.

While the Warsaw Pact possesses a balanced mix of chemical munitions for short- and long-range delivery of up to 500 km, U.S. chemical weapons have a range of approximately 20 km. The Air Force has retained a limited number of TM-28/B nonreusable spray tanks which contain 1,301 pounds of persistent VX nerve agent and were initially developed for F-100 aircraft. They were adapted to the F-105 and F-4C, and recently modified for the F-4E but will not fit the F-16, the replacement for the F-4. According to recent testimony by General Charles A. Donnelly, Jr., Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe, the "aircraft must fly at 300 knots below 500 feet for optimal delivery. By flying this required low and slow 'crop duster' profile over today's heavily defended Soviet targets, we may well run out of aircraft before we use half of our spray tanks."[55] The only chemical bomb in the U.S. inventory is the MC-1, a standard 750-pound bomb modified to carry 220.5 pounds, which detonates on impact and is filled with nonpersistent GB that dissipates within an hour and does not pose a serious danger to troops a few hundred feet away from impact. Given the limitation of these two delivery systems, NATO does not presently possess a deep-strike capability that would enable it to retaliate effectively against Warsaw Pact deep strikes and inflict a comparable degree of degradation. Chemical attacks can cut airfield sortie rates by 50 percent. Unless NATO is able to degrade Warsaw Pact airfield operations, it will be unable to provide NATO ground forces the air cover and ground support on which they heavily depend. The air force has been insisting for years that its deep-strike capabilities urgently need modernization to meet the growing threat of Soviet air power in the European theater.

Despite overwhelming evidence of shrinking retaliatory capabilities, the U.S. Congress has rejected production of new binary chemical weapons that would rectify, at least in part, the growing imbalance in the aggregate size and operational utility of Warsaw Pact and NATO chemical capabilities. NATO allies have been equally loath to address the need for chemical weapons modernization. Indeed, opponents of

[55] General Charles L. Donnelly, Jr., Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe, Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe, prepared joint statement with General Robert W. Sennewald, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command, before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems, Chemical Warfare, March 21, 1985, p. 7.

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binary weapons in the United States constantly invoke European rejection of new chemical weapons to defeat funding requests of the U.S. military. The debate over procurement of binary chemical weapons classically illustrates how obsessive preoccupation with arms control can lead to unilateral disarmament by NATO in a critical class of weapons — at the very time that Moscow's interest in limiting a European conflict to the conventional level raises the danger of chemical weapons use.

NATO Chemical Doctrine and Defense Readiness: The Missing Link

Efforts to improve NATO's chemical defense posture have been underway since the late 1970s when NATO established chemical defense enhancement as one priority of its long-term modernization program. Because of budgetary problems, few NATO countries met the spending targets necessary to implement the goals of the program. In years past, chemical defense would have born the brunt of the cuts due to its low visibility and general lack of popularity. It is astonishing, therefore, that most national chemical defense enhancement programs survived budget reviews virtually unscathed. This should be interpreted as an indication of the degree of concern about the shortcomings of NATO's chemical defense posture.

The level of attention now given to chemical defense reverses a pattern of intentional disregard and neglect. In many ways, NATO's attitude resembled its view of nuclear weapons. The goal was deterrence and, as a result, few efforts were made to examine the requirements needed to fight a chemical conflict. Accordingly, possession of more than minimal chemical response assets was considered detrimental to nuclear deterrence as this could be interpreted by Moscow as a signal of NATO's willingness to endure chemical attacks without early recourse to nuclear weapons. The United States countenanced fierce European insistence on this deterrence-only posture by not trying to develop a chemical war-fighting capacity. As the only member of NATO's integrated military command structure which fields a chemical retaliatory capability, it naturally fell upon the United States — with respect to nuclear weapons — to ensure the continuing adequacy of the offensive deterrent, to develop a tactical doctrine, and to prod the allies to round out NATO's deterrence posture by providing sufficient chemical defense assets.

To be viable, a chemical defense posture must entail a balanced and redundant configuration of chemical detection, protection, and decontamination gear. Furthermore, the military must assimilate chemical warfare conditions into military doctrine and contingency plans. There must be rules and procedures to ensure maximum protection and optimum

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combat efficiency. All troops must be thoroughly trained to handle chemical defense equipment and to perform their combat missions effectively given the constraints of a chemical environment. They also must be conditioned psychologically to withstand the severe stress attending use of chemical weapons.

U.S. chemical defense assets have never been impressive but they atrophied during the Vietnam War. Funds for research and development (R&D) in chemical defense were shifted to conventional weapons procurement and acquisition of chemical defense gear was severely curtailed, except for respirators needed for use in Vietnam. After the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, funds for chemical defense were not restored because defense budgets were slashed repeatedly throughout the 1970s, and requests by the U.S. Army to redress the growing disparity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact were cut either by consecutive administrations or were denied by Congress. As a result of this misguided austerity, the size of the Chemical Corps was cut to a low of 1,600 men in the mid-1970s, and the corps was almost disbanded after its chemical warfare school at Fort McClellan, Alabama, was closed.[56]

The most serious shortcoming of NATO's chemical defense posture is that chemical warfare has not been assimilated into NATO operational planning and military doctrine. While flexible response vaguely stipulates allied force posture objectives and conditions that might lead to nuclear escalation by NATO, it is notably silent on response to Warsaw Pact use of chemical weapons. As a matter of policy, NATO insists that it needs an adequate retaliatory capacility to deter the use of chemical weapons, but it equivocates when it comes to spelling out what will prompt a response and what scope it will take.

According to Theodore S. Gold, "use [by NATO] would be considered only if they were used first against the United States or its allies and then only in a proportionate manner for the sole purpose of discouraging further use."[57] Chemical retaliation is, thus, far from automatic, its scope ambiguous, and may indeed be very limited. The ambiguities of NATO's position on chemical warfare reflect the long-standing view that "chemical warfare would occur only as part of nuclear warfare, whether that nuclear warfare initiated a conflict or occurred at some later point."[58] This perception of the chemical warfare threat may have been

[56] For instance, army funding for chemical warfare declined from $145 million in 1972 to $79 million in 1976. Since then, it slowly increased for a total services budget of about $1 billion beginning in the 1980s. But only about 15 percent of this funding has been earmarked for offensive stockpile modernization. For the decline of the Army Chemical Corps, see Douglas C. Guiler, Jr., "Chemical Corps: A Branch in Search of Identity," *Army*, November 1977.

[57] Theodore S. Gold, "Land Warfare #3: Chemical Warfare," *Journal of Defense and Diplomacy* (September 1984), p. 44.

[58] Hoeber, *The Chemistry of Defeat*, p. 45.

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accurate as long as NATO relied on a nuclear tripwire strategy that deemed actual warfighting capabilities unnecessary and undesirable for fear of weakening nuclear deterrence.

Under conditions of flexible response, however, the nature of the Soviet chemical warfare threat changed dramatically, and NATO should have adjusted its threat assessments accordingly. In fact, NATO did not change its force posture requirements, nor did it attempt to integrate chemical warfare into its battlefield doctrines. The emerging new quality of the chemical threat in a conventional warfare environment either went unrecognized — which is hard to imagine — or was ignored deliberately for political reasons. It was probably their interest in avoiding public disquiet over the growing specter of chemical warfare and their preoccupation with strengthening conventional capabilities that led military leaders to connive with their governments to suppress even internal debate over larger resource allocations for chemical warfare needs. For these reasons, NATO today possesses neither a credible chemical defense nor a sufficient retaliatory stockpile and "even if retaliation in kind were deemed necessary, the United States has no tactical doctrine for the employment of chemical weapons on the battlefield."[59]

In the absence of a well-articulated, comprehensive chemical warfare doctrine, it has been difficult to state essential chemical retaliatory requirements. Lack of a battlefield doctrine also has contributed to poor standards for training in chemical warfare tactics throughout NATO. Some countries, like the Federal Republic of Germany, even took pride in their policy of not training their troops in the skills required to employ chemical weapons. Different training levels for chemical weapons use precluded NATO's developing uniform standards of chemical preparedness and proficiency. In terms of chemical deterrence, this led to tactical discontinuities along the Central Front, which designated for Soviet planners chemical free-fire-zones based on NATO assignments of primary national defense responsibilities. Only in areas defended by U.S. forces do Warsaw Pact forces run the theoretical risk of triggering a chemical response when using chemical weapons. These national policies of NATO countries not only contradict NATO's official policy of having a chemical weapons capability throughout the treaty area, but they undermine the deterrent effect of the limited retaliatory assets deployed by the United States in the European theater.[60]

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[59] Ibid., p. 14; Frederick J. Brown, *Chemical Warfare — A Study in Restraints*, pp. 293-96, discusses the lack of doctrinal assimilation of chemical warfare by the U.S. armed forces.

[60] Bundesminister der Verteidigung, *Weissbuch 1983, Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Bonn, October 20, 1983, pp. 285-88. The previous White Paper of 1979 referred to chemical warfare only in the context of arms control and the White Paper of 1970 stated categorically: "The Federal Republic neither possesses nor does she store any . . . chemical weapons; she does not seek possession of, or control over, weapons of that kind, she has made no preparation for using them, does not train military personnel for that purpose, and will abstain from doing so in the future." See also Uwe

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Although NATO formally incorporated chemical warfare drills in its maneuver plans until 1979, these tactical discontinuities have not been alleviated. Chemical weapons under U.S. control have not been deployed with all units on the Central Front. Only U.S. troops have been trained to employ them, and there are no plans to attach U.S. chemical warfare personnel to units of other NATO countries to make up for the inexperience of European forces. The belated emphasis on chemical defense has also impeded thorough evaluation of the impact of chemical warfare on the existing force structure and operational plans. Consequently, NATO also trails the Warsaw Pact with respect to optimizing weapons systems for chemical combat missions, and confidence in the effectiveness and proper handling of specialized equipment remains low. Moreover, NATO devotes far less time to chemical drills, and its training standards are much less rigorous than those of the Warsaw Pact. Thus, NATO forces are not well prepared to endure the physiological and psychological stress that accompanies the use of chemicals on the battlefield.

Upon coming to office in 1981, the Reagan administration set out to correct the critical deficiencies of the U.S. chemical defense posture. It launched a major equipment procurement and upgrading program and established manpower targets for specialized chemical personnel to 15,400 men by FY 1986 and established chemical defense companies at the divisional level. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) companies have already been assigned to all divisions stationed in or slated for deployment to NATO Europe. Even if the administration is successful in meeting these ambitious targets, Soviet Chemical Troops would still outnumber U.S. forces by six-to-one. The Chemical School at Fort McClellan has been reopened and the training center at Aberdeen, Maryland, is being enlarged to handle a higher annual trainee throughput.[61]

Defense Against Tactical Use of Chemical Weapons

The current chemical warfare improvement program is based on the 1980 recommendations of the U.S. Defense Science Board Study pursuant to which the Department of Defense designated the army as the lead service in this area. Following its mandate, it has initiated a major research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) program for advanced defensive equipment. Medical R&D has also been accelerated,

Nerlich, "Chemical Warfare Policy Alternatives," in: David S. Yost, ed., *NATO's Strategic Options* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), pp. 203-14.

[61] Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to Congress for FY 1983* February 1982, III-147. See also: North Atlantic Assembly, "Chemical Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," Annex 1 to Y MC(81) (6), *General Report on Alliance Security in the 1980s*, October 1981; ibid., Michael Forrestall, General Rapporteur, AB 194, MC(84) 8, November 1984, pp. 15-16.

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concentrating on the development of new drugs and treatment methods for chemical victims and antidotes for immediate battlefield use. These efforts are also responsive to mounting concerns about Soviet development of "one-breath anesthesia" agents and so-called mask-busting agents.[62] Although the precise composition of these weapons is unknown, army researchers are investigating defense technologies against generically different chemical agents.

Soviet-made combat vehicles captured by the Israelis during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 revealed the extent to which collective crew protection systems had been integrated in Soviet equipment. But it took a statutory directive from Congress to sway a dithering army in 1978 to begin development of analogous overpressure and filtration systems for its own armored vehicles. Collective protection had long been adopted by most NATO allies,[63] and the U.S. had been trailing in this area because of its desire to preserve full tactical flexibility of its armored forces. The army remains skeptical of complete reliance on collective protection and, therefore, continues to emphasize the need for individual protection for infantry-fighting vehicles. Early production models of the Abrams M-1 tank were equipped with a hybrid crew protection system but will be retrofitted. The army expects to equip all its new armored combat vehicles with some form of collective crew protection by the late 1980s.

U.S. and NATO individual protection ensembles are relatively superior to Soviet models in service throughout the Warsaw Pact, but are far from perfect. While they have now been issued to all units, war reserve stocks remain in short supply.[64] Development of a replacement for the standard issue M17A1 respirator has been underway for more than six years but remains saddled with problems. While it provides only marginally improved protection, it is less restrictive on the wearer and is more comfortable. Designated the XM-30, this new mask will have a wider field of vision, a voicemitter, two fittings for side-mounted filters, and will allow the wearer to ingest fluids through a special tube. While the air force has decided to procure a sizable batch of the XM-30 mask to take advantage of its superior feature, though not all its problems have been resolved, the army decided to defer procurement and await development of the new MC/MR (minimum change/minimum risk) mask, first tested in 1983 and expected to become available in the mid-1980s.[65]

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[62] Douglass and Lukens, "The Expanding Arena of Chemical-Biological Warfare," p. 73/74; William Kucewicz, "Beyond Yellow Rain."

[63] K. G. Benz, "NBC Defense — An Overview, Part 1: Protection Equipment," *International Defense Review,* Vol. 16 (December 1983), pp. 1783-1800;

[64] Helmut Stelzmueller, "NBC Defense—NATO Needs New Devices," *Military Technology,* Vol. 7 (February 1983), pp. 24-35; Steven R. Bowman, "U.S. Chemical Warfare Preparedness Program," Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., February 21, 1985.

[65] K. G. Benz, "NBC Defense — An Overview, Part 1: Protection Equipment."

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NATO overgarments are superior to their Warsaw Pact counterparts. They are made of lightweight, permeable material and can, therefore, be worn for days without heat stress or fatigue. They are not reusable, however, because, after several hours, their charcoal lining is depleted by exposure to contamination. Britain has been the leader in protective overgarments, and its most advanced model affords protection for up to twenty-four hours in contaminated surroundings as compared to only six hours for the standard U.S. overalls. The United States is developing a new suit that will be reusable after laundering in decontaminants, flame resistant, and substantially lighter. Although the French armed forces already field a comparable suit, the U.S. Army decided against adopting the French model.

The critical weakness of NATO personnel protection resides in the shortage of hardened shelters for decontamination of personnel and issuing of new protective gear. Many creative designs are available, such as the containerized mobile field station offered by the Alfred Kaercher GmbH of West Germany. However, too many national programs are pursued simultaneously, resulting in exorbitantly high unit costs, squandering of limited resources, and lack of standardization. It is doubtful that all NATO units will ever receive a redundant, attrition-capable personnel decontamination capability.

Until a few years ago, NATO relied on manual decontamination of equipment which posed serious sustainability problems since intermittent use of chemical weapons requires rapid and repeated decontamination. But new equipment is coming on line, such as the U.S. Jet Exhaust Decontamination Apparatus, a virtual replica of the Soviet TMS-65, which will enter production in 1986. By that time, all U.S. units will also field portable spraytank decontamination devices for smaller decontamination tasks. Due to limited funding, vehicle decontamination devices have been issued on a priority basis only to frontline units. This leaves NATO follow-on and reserve forces critically vulnerable to crippling Soviet chemical attacks.

Despite improvements, the decontamination kits carried by all troops remain rather rudimentary, containing little more than a few pads of Fuller's earth and a bottle of powder for small arms decontamination. The British kit is most elaborate largely because the British armed forces consider operational equipment decontamination in conjunction with personal decontamination superior to and more economical than full equipment decontamination. Most personal kits also contain the most common antidotes against nerve gas and blister agents.

The weakest link in NATO's chemical defense posture is detection, identification, and warning of chemical attacks. Even the most

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advanced protective gear is of only limited value if chemical attacks are either detected too late, or the employed chemical substances cannot be identified quickly and accurately. Most modern chemical agents cannot be detected by body senses. Development of faster-acting chemicals, toxin and biological agents, and long-range delivery systems to maximize surprise place a premium on early detection and warning of chemical attacks. But efforts to upgrade sensing devices are being seriously impeded by the prohibition of realistic testing with live chemical agents and restrictions on experiments to determine the military utility and define the threat spectrum of new poisonous substances. In 1984, an assessment of chemical and biological sensor technologies by a panel of eminent scientists concluded that "sensors currently in use are inadequate to detect all chemical and biological agents today" because "the technology used in fielded point sensors is obsolete [and] there are no remote sensors in the field." [66] While many promising technologies are being pursued, until they become available NATO will remain critically vulnerable to Soviet chemical warfare at the very moment when the balance of restraints and incentives is shifting decisively in favor of using chemical weapons.

Defense Against Strategic Chemical Warfare: Air and Naval Forces

For conventional forward defense, NATO depends heavily on ground support and reconnaissance by the air force which, in large measure, is predicated on its ability to maintain air superiority through the European theater. In the past, NATO relied on its superior aircraft to offset the numerical edge in combat aircraft of the Warsaw Pact. In recent years, however, NATO's qualitative edge has narrowed as Moscow modernized its frontal aviation and deployed advanced high-performance aircraft to Eastern Europe. The range and lethal capability of Soviet frontal aviation has vastly improved, eroding confidence in NATO's ability to provide timely and sufficient air support upon which its ground forces count to repel Warsaw Pact tank forces.

Moreover, by placing NATO air bases within range of Soviet fighter bombers, the modernization of Soviet frontal aviation has magnified the vulnerability of NATO air bases to Soviet chemical attacks. Present interceptor aircraft and ground-based air defense assets are seriously inadequate to cope with the threat posed by Soviet theater air power to NATO airfields. Any Soviet attack on Western Europe will likely start with massive pre-emptive raids against NATO airfields to cripple NATO's air

[66] National Research Council, *Assessment of Chemical and Biological Sensor Technologies*, p. 60; K. G. Benz, "NBC Defense — An Overview, Part 2: Detection and Decontamination," *International Defense Review*, Vol. 17 (February 1984), pp. 159-72.

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force on the ground, disrupt its flight operations and quickly seize air superiority in the theater.

The U.S.-West German agreement to deploy the intergrated Patriot-Roland air defense system closes some holes in NATO's air defense on the Central Front, but does not remove the need to harden airbases against chemical attacks. Combined conventional/chemical attacks will disable airbases for much longer than conventional bombing could accomplish, as repairs to runways have to be made while wearing cumbersome protective gear. Even chemical attacks alone slow the sortie rate of aircraft by 50 percent, which is tantamount to cutting NATO airpower in half.[67]

According to testimony by Dr. Theodore S. Gold, as late as 1977 the U.S. Air Force (USAF) "could not launch a single combat aircraft under chemical attack conditions," and the same could be said about the air forces of other NATO countries.[68] In the late 1970s, the USAF pioneered the "dirty cockpit" concept that combines pilot protection with partial decontamination. It permits aircraft to return to their bases even after they suffered from chemical attacks and shortens aircraft turn-around times by reducing decontamination requirements. Similar techniques have been adopted by other NATO countries but are not fully effective because stocks of consumable equipment, like pilot suits, remain below required levels.

There are no uniform standards for chemical warfare operations among NATO's national air forces. The RAF and the USAF emphasize operational decontamination and pilot protection, whereas the Luftwaffe concentrates, in addition, on full decontamination of aircraft and equipment. The RAF has achieved the highest proficiency of all NATO forces and is able to turn-around aircraft under chemical conditions in about fifteen minutes. But the different chemical defense procedures of allied air forces and resulting discrepancies in ground support equipment are a barrier to the creation of a fully integrated network of allied airfields in Western Europe.

Ground personnel on airfields are also receiving chemical task qualification training, although there is a shortage of chemical defense specialists and decontamination equipment. In order to sustain flight operations, airfields must be equipped with hardened aircraft service facilities. Conventionally hardened facilities must be fitted with collective chemical protection systems, and NATO has stepped up efforts to upgrade existing installations and incorporate chemical protection features in new

[67] General Charles L. Donnelly, Jr., see note 55.

[68] Theodore S. Gold, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Chemical Matters), prepared testimony before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, April 16, 1984, p. 14.

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construction under the NATO infrastructure support program and pursuant to host nation support agreements for co-located bases. While these measures will attenuate the degrading impact of chemical attacks on NATO air bases, they will remain vulnerable to enemy air strikes and attacks with chemically armed surface-to-surface missiles. Only if NATO acquires a countervailing chemical deep-strike capability will it be able to deter Warsaw Pact use of chemical weapons against its vital airfields.

In a short war scenario, NATO cannot count on reinforcements from the United States reaching Europe in time to prevent its collapse. But in a protracted war, resupply from the United States will be essential to NATO's ability to sustain combat operations. NATO port and resupply facilities would then rank high on the Soviet target list, and their vulnerability to chemical attacks makes them prone to being disabled by Warsaw Pact chemical strikes. While their effect on port operations is similar to that on air bases, NATO port facilities have not been equipped with chemical defense gear that would allow them to operate under chemical attack conditions. Their civilian workers, upon whom NATO would have to rely, are unfamiliar with the procedures required for performing in a chemical environment. Chemical vulnerability of port facilities could thus prove to be an Achilles' heel in a future war. A high-ranking U.S. Navy (USN) officer warned the House Armed Services Committee in March 1985 that "chemical agents employed against such vulnerable targets can render them instantaneously useless . . . and could quickly and cheaply offset our intense efforts to defend the vital sea lines of communications [SLOCs] by denying us the use of vital ports and harbors." [69]

But vulnerability of NATO resupply extends also to the SLOCs in the Northern Atlantic. Because chemical warfare has been traditionally associated with war ashore, the NATO navies have devoted precious little attention to chemical attacks at sea. With the exception of submerged submarines, the ability of all ships to continue combat operations would be severely degraded by chemical agents, and their capacity to ensure the safety of the SLOCs against Soviet interdiction would be inhibited.

The Soviet chemical threat is now being addressed by allied naval forces, and the USN, in addition, is concerned about the growing global threat of chemical warfare which "is an option increasingly available to both countries and organizations whose conventional capabilities are limited by their industrial and economic base." [70] The cardinal objective of the chemical warfare programs of all NATO navies is to improve their "survivability" but the USN intends to supplement its defensive

[69] Vice Admiral Lee Bagget, Jr., Director of Naval Warfare, prepared statement before the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Chemical Warfare Modernization, March 21, 1985, p. 6-7.

[70] Ibid., p. 2.

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measures with a carrier-based retaliatory capability to inflict the same combat-degrading conditions on enemy vessels as it suffers from chemical attack.

The Soviet navy has made considerable investments in chemical warfare capabilities. It has equipped its surface ships with extensive collective protection systems and, reportedly, most weapons aboard are chemical capable. Seaborne chemical armed precision-guided munitions and surface-to-surface missiles can deliver large agent payloads with great accuracy and virtually no warning against allied fleets. Soviet naval air forces stationed on the Kola Peninsula and in the Pacific also carry air-to-surface missiles that can be delivered against U.S. and allied naval forces operating in the region. Diminishing U.S. retaliatory assets and lack of readiness for chemical warfare at sea may prompt Moscow to view conventional/chemical attacks on NATO fleets patrolling the sea lanes in the North Atlantic by Soviet shore-based aviation and naval vessels as highly efficient and economical ways to delay and disrupt logistics and seaborne reinforcement of the Central Front.

Carrier air operations, mine countermeasures, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and amphibious assault are among the naval missions most vulnerable to chemical warfare attacks. NATO depends precisely on this kind of naval support, if it is to prevail in Central Europe and its Northern Flank to which the 50,000 man-strong Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) will deploy during wartime.[71] It would probably be accompanied by at least one carrier battle group that would have to sail into the Norwegian Sea to provide aircover for amphibious landing and operations ashore. USMC amphibious vessels will operate in a hostile environment, and their complements will be highly exposed to Soviet chemical attacks. If carrier air support were also degraded by chemical contamination, it could spell disaster for amphibious deployment ashore.

Along the perimeter of the GIUK gap, NATO operates a string of highly sensitive surveillance facilities that are susceptible to chemical attack with naval airpower, chemical-armed cruise missiles launched from all types of platforms, and naval bombardment. These installations, like the SOSUS (sound surveillance system) line, are critical to ASW missions against the armada of Soviet attack submarines that will have to pass through these narrows in order to engage NATO convoys sailing further south. Loss of these assets or their disruption by Soviet forces jeopardizes NATO's reinforcement efforts and could be a decisive factor contributing to NATO's defeat in Central Europe.

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[71] Manfred R. Hamm, "Ten Steps To Counter Moscow's Threat to Northern Europe," *Backgrounder*, No. 356, Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, May 30, 1984.

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The strategic chemical warfare threat to NATO has been widely neglected as concern concentrated on the tactical utility of using chemical weapons. This may have been justified as long as the Soviet threat to NATO was conceptualized as a large-scale overland attack by Warsaw Pact forces. But the growth of Warsaw Pact air power and deep-strike capabilities in Europe, as well as the transformation of the Red Fleet from a coastal defense force into a Blue Water Navy, have given chemical warfare a strategic dimension. Strategic use of chemical weapons can complement the tactical frontline use of chemical agents by disabling in a selective way critical fixed installations of NATO, and by severing its strategic umbilical cord spanning the Atlantic. It is not inconceivable that, given the limited sustainability of its naval forces, Moscow will elect to use chemical instead of nuclear weapons at sea — if it has no plans to employ tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe and wants to avoid the risk of nuclear escalation by NATO. Since the strategic use of chemical weapons does not degrade the combat performance of ground forces and NATO long-range chemical assets are even more limited than those for tactical use, Moscow might consider waging strategic chemical warfare without employing chemical weapons in its offensive operations on the ground. NATO is currently ill-prepared to deter strategic chemical warfare, while being seriously vulnerable to its effects. Given the enormous military advantages of strategic chemical warfare, Moscow will probably be tempted to exploit this yawning gap in NATO's deterrent posture.

Chemical Rearmament Versus Arms Control: NATO's Enduring Dilemma

The deterioration of the U.S. chemical retaliatory capability and chemical weapons arms control have been inextricably linked since the United States decided to terminate production of chemical weapons in 1969. The competing demands of aspiring to a global ban on these weapons and of needing a chemical deterrent until a ban has been negotiated have been central to the debate on whether the United States should procure binary chemical munitions to reverse its unilateral disarmament of the past fifteen years. Indeed, President Nixon's decision during his first year in office to halt production of chemical weapons and renounce the use and possession of biological and toxin weapons was inspired by his desire to further agreement on a ban of these weapons. The issue of chemical weapons also illustrates how Moscow has manip-

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ulated Western goodwill to expand its own chemical/biological superiority, while confounding global efforts to reach a viable arms accord.[72]

The review of U.S. chemical warfare capabilities ordered by President Nixon upon coming to office was based, in part, on an incorrect assessment of Soviet capabilities and intentions. According to reports published in the late 1970s, Soviet disinformation led the White House to conclude that Moscow trailed the United States in chemical and biological warfare capabilities and that Brezhnev was eager to negotiate an arms agreement to deflect military demands for a massive chemical and biological arms program. The White House review concluded that biological weapons were of limited military utility and that the United States would, thus, relinquish no meaningful capability for the sake of giving impetus to arms control negotiations, newly begun at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Since biological and chemical weapons were not treated separately, the Nixon White House considered a less far-reaching moratorium on chemical arms production as an essentially complementary step. In another attempt to boost the prospects of the talks, President Nixon resubmitted the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent.[73]

In March 1971, the Soviet Union agreed to separate biological from chemical weapons for the purpose of concluding a comprehensive ban on biological weapons. The United States and Britain made this proposal to prevent a deadlock over Moscow's insistence on an essentially unverifiable treaty. Believing in the disutility of biological weapons, they were willing to accept the risk of clandestine evasion and dropped their demands for adequate verification procedures. Talks at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament progressed rapidly and the Biological Warfare Convention was signed in 1972. In view of demonstrable Soviet violations, however, it is plain that the Convention has merely allowed Moscow to take advantage of Western compliance and gain a significant advantage in biological and toxin warfare capabilities. It should, therefore, serve as a lasting reminder to proponents of arms control that flawed treaties not only jeopardize national security but discredit confidence in arms control as a viable means by which to enhance security.

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[72] Mark C. Storella, *Poisoning Arms Control,* p. 9; John Ellis van Courtland Moon, "Chemical Weapons and Deterrence, The World War II Experience," p. 7; David F. Emery, Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, prepared testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems, March 21, 1985, p.3.

[73] Edward J. Epstein, "Incorporating Analysis of Foreign Governments' Deception into U.S. Analytical Systems," in Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Analysis and Estimates,* (Washington, D.C.: The National Strategy Information Center, 1980); "Trickery on Chemical War," *Washington Star,* June 5, 1978.

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In 1974, when the U.S. military began to request binary munitions, Moscow immediately signalled interest in resuming talks on a chemical weapons ban and at their summit meeting in July 1974, President Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev pledged to develop a joint draft proposal for an effective prohibition of chemical weapons. In 1974, President Ford launched a new drive to obtain Senate ratification of the Geneva Protocol together with the Biological Warfare Convention, and both passed by unanimous vote on December 16, 1974. President Ford ratified both on January 22, 1975.[74] Between 1977 and 1980, the delegations of both countries held twelve rounds of bilateral talks that were conducted parallel to the deliberations of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. They were not interrupted by either the Sverdlovsk incident or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which set off a stream of sanctions against Moscow. Such was the commitment of the Carter administration to reach a ban on chemical weapons. These bilateral talks stalemated in 1980 due to Soviet intransigence on the critical issues of verification and compliance and were not resumed in January 1981. But barely one month after the U.S. Senate voted in May 1982 to resume production of chemical weapons, Moscow tried to foster hopes for a breakthrough on the verification issue.[75]

Speaking before the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament on June 15, 1982, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko presented a draft paper that referred to the possibility of "systematic on-site inspections" carried out under the auspices of an international authority on the basis of an agreed quota. This statement had its intended effect in the U.S. Congress which at the time was deliberating the FY 1983 administration request of $54 million for the production of binary weapons. Shortly after the House of Representatives voted to deny the funds, Soviet interest in on-site verification of chemical stockpile destruction vanished.[76]

In February 1983, the Reagan administration tried to revive the deadlocked negotiations at Geneva by presenting its "Detailed Views" paper denoting ways in which the elimination of stockpiles could be verified and future compliance monitored effectively. But Moscow was loath to consider these U.S. ideas and the United States even failed to get Soviet representatives to clarify the precise meaning and scope of Mr.

[74] U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, Texts and Histories of Negotiations,* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1982), pp. 12-13.

[75] In 1981, the Reagan administration won a $20 million supplemental appropriation for the acquisition of binary plant equipment. But this action stopped short of actual production of binary nerve gas which would have required presidential certification of an existing national security need pursuant to earlier legislation. The president submitted this certification on February 8, 1982, in conjunction with the FY 1983 budget request of $105 million for the binary munitions program of which $54 million was for the procurement of 155mm GB2 nerve gas artillery projectiles.

[76] Thomas J. Welch, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy and Chemical Matters), prepared statement before the House Armed Services Committee, March 21, 1985, p. 10.

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Gromyko's statement at the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament the previous year. Instead, Moscow denounced the "Detailed Views" paper as evidence of U.S. desires to obstruct progress at the Geneva talks.[77]

But the Soviets again signalled flexibility in the wake of a vote by the U.S. Senate authorizing the production of binary weapons in FY 1984. In August 1983, they indicated acceptance in principle of international on-site inspection, but held out until February 21, 1984, before conceding that such inspections had to be on a continuous basis. Moscow did not respond to a U.S. invitation to participate in a November 1983 workshop on verification of stockpile destruction at the Tooele Army Depot in Utah to which twenty-nine countries, including Rumania as the only Soviet bloc member, sent participants.

On the eve of the start of the opening session of the Stockholm conference in January 1984,[78] at which Secretary of State George Shultz announced that the United States would soon present a comprehensive draft treaty on a global ban of chemical weapons, the Soviets called on European NATO members to agree to negotiations of a regional ban on chemical weapons limited to Europe. Moscow's motivations were complex, but this move was certainly designed as much to regain the offensive in the arms control arena, after having walked away from the Geneva INF talks in November 1983, as it was meant to divide the U.S. from its NATO allies on the issue of chemical disarmament. The Soviets probably hoped as well to influence the upcoming debate on Defense Department (DOD) binary weapons production requests for FY 1985 which again were denied after the House of Representatives voted 247 to 179 in May 1984 to delete $95 million intended to procure production equipment and long leadtime items for binary munitions.

On April 18, Vice President Bush presented the U.S. draft treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons (CD/500) to the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. It built on the "Detailed Views" paper of 1983 and incorporated ideas presented by other countries at the conference or in bilateral consultations. The draft convention prohibits the production, possession, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. It also stipulates rigorous verification measures including "a system of international on-site inspection" to monitor and confirm destruction, and to monitor permitted activities such as commercial production of specified

[77] Submitted as CD/343 and CD/387 to the Geneva Conference; Theodore S. Gold, testimony, p. 10; Edward M. Spiers, "Bargaining With Binaries," *NATO Review*, Vol. 32 (October 1984), pp. 20-25.

[78] The Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe convened in January 1984 pursuant to the mandate of the Helsinki Accord review conference at Madrid to discuss specific security-enhancing measures. This conference was first proposed by the French at Madrid to serve as an adjunct to the Vienna MBFR talks that have been stalemated for more than a decade.

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chemicals which pose a particular risk. A special mechanism, "involving challenge on-site inspection anytime, anywhere," is the key instrument to "deal with suspected violations." [79]

The U.S. draft convention was denounced by Moscow even before it had been submitted to the Conference on Disarmament but was welcomed by most governments.[80] In great detail it spells out verification measures the United States considers essential for an effective ban on chemical weapons. Because of its intrusiveness, the U.S. draft convention has been roundly condemned as nonnegotiable by the liberal arms control establishment for whom the negotiability of a treaty is often more important than its effectiveness in furthering verifiable arms reductions.[81]

Even though Moscow has scorned the U.S. draft convention, the U.S. State Department announced on June 29, 1984, that the Soviets have agreed to hold bilateral closed technical consultation on the issue of verification. While it has been emphasized that these talks are not negotiations, that Moscow resumed bilateral meetings on the issue reflects its concern about growing frustration in the West on lack of progress in these negotiations. In the past, Moscow has exhibited great skill in manipulating the process of negotiations so as to paralyze Western resolve to take whatever steps are required to ensure U.S. and allied security. Only by demonstrating to Moscow that it cannot abuse arms control for unilateral advantage will the West be able to force the Soviet Union to accept meaningful agreements.

The on-again, off-again pattern of Soviet interest in chemical disarmament correlates with the voting schedule of the U.S. Congress on the defense budget, thus confirming a direct link between reaching a treaty and U.S. production of chemical weapons. During the Carter administration, no funding for binary weapons had been requested, and it fell upon Congress to insert $3.15 million in the DOD appropriation to begin to establish a production capability for binary weapons. In 1977 and 1978, President Carter had ordered two full reviews of the U.S. chemical warfare policy and posture. On the basis of both reviews, the White House deleted army funding requests for binary munitions, in FY 1978 against strong protests by Defense Secretary Harold Brown. The annual Defense Guidance merely directed the army to continue plans for a production facility, conforming with President Carter's 1977 directive to

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[79] U.S. Department of State, Vice President Bush, *U.S. Proposes Banning Chemical Weapons*, Current Policy No. 566, April 18, 1984; Gerald F. Seib, "U.S. Proposal to Ban Chemical Weapons Unlikely to Get Approval of Soviets," *Wall Street Journal*, April 19, 1984.

[80] Robert Gillette, "TASS Assails Proposal To Ban Chemical Arms," *Washington Post*, April 6, 1984; David Hoffman and Walter Pincus, "Bush to Take Chemical-Arms Plan to Geneva," *Washington Post*, April 17, 1984.

[81] Nicholas A. Sims, *Chemical Weapons — Control or Chaos* (London: Faraday Discussion Paper No. 1, The Council for Arms Control, July 1984), pp. 7-12.

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take no actions to improve the chemical stockpile with binary munitions. This policy was slated for review in the FY 1980 budget cycle in view of progress made in the arms control talks.

Confidence in the ability of arms agreements to eliminate the U.S. need to upgrade its retaliatory stockpile and to "give the talks just another year" has been equally pervasive in the Congress. By contrast to the 1970s, when complacency on the part of successive administrations gave Moscow no incentive to make concessions on the crucial issue of verification, the Reagan administration requests for chemical weapons funding have spurred Moscow to accept the Western position on verification at least in principle. Though Congress has yet to fund production of binary weapons, the annual ritual of congressional defense budget making has forced the problem of U.S. unilateral chemical disarmament into the public limelight. But the two-pronged U.S. chemical weapons policy of simultaneously pursuing a global ban on chemical arms and production of new binary munitions offers Moscow the opportunity to derive maximum political leverage from its limited concessions by capitalizing on the open deliberative parliamentary process of defense policy making in the United States.

The poor record of Soviet compliance with existing arms accords underscores the critical importance of ensuring full verification of future arms control agreements. The challenges involved in verifying a complete ban on any weapons system are compounded by the inherent properties of chemical arms production, storage, and use that make verification of a ban on chemical weapons a gargantuan task. Consequently, it is not surprising that the intricate problems involved in devising measures for full and effective verification have been the principal roadblock to an agreement.

Attention has, therefore, shifted toward seeking regional accords only to ban deployment of chemical weapons. Proponents of regional approaches to chemical weapons arms control contend that a ban limited to deployment would be easier to verify, will lessen fears of surprise attack with chemical weapons, will reduce the role of chemical weapons in military planning and deterrence, and will further attainment of a global ban on chemical weapons. While these claims are highly dubious, the widespread frustration over the failure to reach a global ban accounts for the growing appeal in Europe of a regional ban on chemical weapons deployment. Unlike the debate over INF deployment, NATO governments are in tune with public opinion and oppose the deployment in their countries of new U.S. chemical weapons.

The Palme Commission endorsed a regional ban on chemical weapons deployment, and the Soviet Union has placed such ban on the

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agenda of the Stockholm conference as a confidence-building measure. In West Germany, the only NATO country hosting U.S. chemical weapons, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) embraced a regional ban in 1978 and, since leaving office in October 1982, has set up a joint Working Group with East Germany to prepare a proposal for a chemical arms exclusion zone covering both German states and Czechoslovakia. These discussions are reportedly in an advanced stage and the imminent official release of a joint proposal will pose a serious challenge to the NATO consensus on chemical weapons arms control policy, providing Moscow with another vehicle by which to drive a wedge between the United States and the European allies, especially between the United States and West Germany.

The impending public controversy over a regional ban on chemical arms in Europe is bound to throw into stark relief once again the different strategic goals pursued by the United States and the Europeans under the mantle of flexible response. It will highlight the tenuous balance between deterrence and defense embodied in NATO strategy and will, therefore, have a major impact on the direction of ongoing strategy debate within NATO. Moreover, it is likely to slow NATO investment in chemical defense capabilities and undermine efforts to redress the growing imbalance in retaliatory deterrent assets by strengthening the hands of opponents of chemical rearmament in the U.S. Congress. Finally, it will divert attention from the Geneva negotiations and, thereby, lessen pressure on Moscow to accept verification procedures that could serve as a solid foundation for a global ban on chemical weapons.

Toward Decision and Action

NATO chemical warfare policy is at a crossroads. The ability of the Alliance to deter Soviet chemical warfare has been virtually eliminated by years of intentional neglect, unilateral disarmament by the United States, and the paralyzing impact of its commitment to arms control. Moreover, changes in the strategic environment have magnified U.S. failure to formulate a credible chemical deterrence strategy and to create a viable force posture to cope with the growing threat of Soviet chemical warfare.

As a result, the tactical and strategic employment of chemical weapons has assumed a significant role in Soviet planning of offensive operations against NATO. That is not to say that Moscow is preparing for the military conquest of Western Europe, but only to suggest that NATO's diminishing ability to deny Moscow the military benefits of chemical weapons deployment may exercise an irresistible temptation to exploit

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NATO's chemical warfare vulnerabilities once conflict has erupted. Moreover, by impacting on the overall theater balance in Europe, it may become a decisive element in Moscow's risk calculus for attack on Western Europe.

NATO must redress the chemical warfare imbalance in Europe if it wishes to lessen overreliance on nuclear weapons. Conventional force improvements alone may boost the utility of chemical warfare in the eyes of Soviet planners and, by accelerating the speed of Warsaw Pact penetration of NATO territory, may neutralize the effect of expensive conventional force enhancement programs. Indeed, it may actually raise NATO's dependence on tactical nuclear weapons for defense rather than deterrence which will diminish the usefulness of nuclear escalation and firebreaks for intra-war deterrence, upon which NATO presently counts to bring about an early termination of a European conflict.

The experience of the past fifteen years demonstrates that U.S. and NATO restraint in the field of chemical warfare has not been matched by Moscow. It has not furthered achievement of a global chemical ban largely because NATO unilateral disarmament did not impel Moscow to seek an agreement while simultaneously broadening the range of chemical warfare options. Accordingly, Moscow may today derive more advantages from employing chemical weapons in a strategic rather than tactical mode against NATO.

Although isolated military fixes of NATO's chemical warfare dilemma may be feasible, they will be insufficient to rectify the problem. Therefore, a comprehensive program to augment NATO's chemical warfare deterrent must be embedded in a broader political strategy to strengthen public support for higher NATO military readiness. Arms control policy will have to be an integral element of such a strategy lest it be unacceptable to Western publics. But arms control must be based on the realization that, in order to enhance security, it must not be considered a substitute for military programs. The best way to convince Moscow of the need to bargain seriously is for NATO to back a comprehensive chemical warfare preparedness program and for the U.S. Congress to fund production of binary weapons.

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OF LEOPARDS AND CHEETAHS: WEST GERMANY'S ROLE AS A MID-SIZED ARMS SUPPLIER*

by Frederic S. Pearson

Most recent headlines, both media and scholarly, about the international arms traffic have dealt with jousting by the superpowers for top supplier position, and the emergence of a new breed of "Third World" arms producers, such as Israel, Argentina, and Brazil. The long-standing and still active role of mid-sized suppliers — mainly of the European Community — has been less closely watched. Yet these states face a unique blend of incentives and pressures that bear careful scrutiny, since as a group in 1980 they accounted for approximately 23 percent of total world arms supplies (the U.S. had 25 percent and the USSR 34 percent),[1] and they mount extremely active sales promotions. In regions such as Africa, mid-sized suppliers dominate segments of the market and make use of political ties left over from colonial days. They also offer the readiest alternative source of sophisticated military equipment for customers worried about over-dependence on the superpowers. Clearly then these suppliers can affect the outbreak and outcome of wars in areas as diverse as the Persian Gulf, the Straits of Molucca, and the Beagle Channel.

Before going further to account for the unique political and market environment faced by mid-sized suppliers, it is necessary to define that category more carefully. Basically, "mid-sized supplier" will refer to industrially developed states producing heavy and highly advanced weapons, seriously seeking to sell these weapons abroad, but not able to sustain production in all types of military equipment with a purely domestic

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[1] U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1971-80* (Washington: March 1983), p. 30.

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market. Currently the U.S. and USSR are the only states able to sustain across-the-board military production through domestic defense procurement given the soaring costs of research, development, and production; and it is becoming increasingly difficult even for them to do so. The pressure on mid-sized arms producing states is even more intense, given their smaller domestic armed force procurement, and continuing desire to stay in as many aspects of the weapons business as possible. The basic assumption is that economies of scale in weapons production occur with at least somewhat extended production runs, and that production design teams are a valuable national asset which must be kept together and functioning through contract awards.

In order of export of major weapons systems to the Third World, today's mid-sized suppliers include France, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and Sweden.[2] Smaller producers (those not producing heavy and/or technologically advanced systems for export) which could develop to join this group include among others, China, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland, Czechoslovakia, Brazil, Argentina, Israel, Japan, South Africa, Australia, Taiwan, and Belgium.

Mid-sized suppliers promote arms exports for many of the same reasons as the superpowers, but for other reasons as well. Like the superpowers, many of them seek influence over recipient states, or in key regions such as the Persian Gulf. While numerous studies have concluded that such influence can be fleeting at best,[3] the bolstering of friendly regimes and fostering of friendly relations with client states remains a notable British, French, and German interest. Mid-sized suppliers also share with their larger competitors economic and security interests in keeping design teams busy and generating longer production runs to ease military procurement cost and supply problems. However, arms exports may be overrated as a cost-reduction device, since marginal cost savings can often be achieved through pooled alliance procurement (as in NATO) rather than through Third World exports. Research also has shown that rather than facilitating military procurement by the exporting state, arms exports frequently *substitute* for domestic orders when budget problems limit procurement.[4]

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[2] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *World Armament and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1982* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1982), p. 177.

[3] See for example, Andrew J. Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 14-24.

[4] Mary Kaldor, "Defense Industries — National and International Implications," Sussex, U.K., 1972; and A. J. Alexander, W. P. Butz, and M. D. Mihalka, *Modeling the Production and International Trade of Arms: An Economic Framework for Analyzing Policy Alternatives* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, March 1981).

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Domestic concerns ranging from economic to moral controversies also affect both large and mid-sized powers' arms sales policies. Domestic employment is one overriding interest, although the number of jobs created through arms exports has been remarkably low — an estimated 80,000 jobs in Britain and 45,000 jobs in West Germany for example in the early 1980s.[5] The regional impact of job losses, as in northern German or British shipyards, can be devastating and politically explosive at least in the short-run. While all suppliers seek a return to the treasury and improved balance of payments through weapons exports, the degree of benefit achieved has varied depending upon the country's competitive position in the market. Britain has seen little direct return to the exchecquer, for example, since government levies (designed to recoup research and development [R & D] expenditures) are allowed to vary to make exported arms competitive.[6] Concerns about the wisdom and ethics of extensive weapons exports also affect domestic politics to varying degrees in different periods, including controversies about U.N. embargoes, unauthorized third-party weapon retransfers, violation of purchase contract terms, bribery, supplies to repressive regimes, and arms to fuel foreign wars.

Partly to avoid both domestic and foreign policy embarrassments and conflicts, arms exporting states, no matter their size, also seek to control and regulate sales through licensing procedures. Such procedures provide information about where arms are purportedly going, and afford the opportunity to deny arms sales on a variety of criteria, including the release of sensitive technological information, and worry about use of the weapons against the exporter's interests. Some states also try to shield their exports from parliamentary or public scrutiny.

There are key differences between the perspectives of large and mid-sized arms exporters; some reflect the latter's concerns about keeping up with the pacesetters and ahead of the "up and comers." As noted above the domestic markets of the mid-sized supplier cannot sustain necessary R & D expenses and the high cost of today's sophisticated weapons systems. Therefore, they use arms exports and various forms of foreign collaboration — coproduction arrangements, subcontracting for superpower arms manufacturers, pooled procurement of equipment — to maintain military production capabilities. These states also suffer from market disadvantages vis à vis the superpowers, who offer a wider range of products, at least in the U.S. case, produced by a wide variety of manufacturers. Mid-sized suppliers generally can support only one major

[5] Douglas Hurd, "Overseas Arms Sales," *Financial Times*, June 23, 1980; and John Tagliabue, "Bonn Takes New Look at Arms Export Curbs," *New York Times*, September 3, 1983.

[6] Lawrence Freedman, *Arms Production in the United Kingdom: Problems and Prospects* (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1978), p. 29.

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weapons producer per category of weapon, and have consolidated firms to eliminate unprofitable producers. The goods offered by superpowers are generally more thoroughly battle-tested, backed by more extensive service and training facilities, and cheaper because of economies of scale and credit incentives.

Therefore, the mid-sized group will seek certain niches in the market, usually not competing directly with the superpowers but offering custom tailoring, along the lines of Italy's fast light patrol boats, for instance. They might try to achieve heavy penetration of a limited part of the market, through exclusive relationships with certain clients or with states to which the major powers are reluctant to ship arms. In the end, mid-sized producers more frequently compete with each other in foreign sales than with the superpowers, since they essentially search out the same niches with similar types of weapons systems.

Because some mid-sized exporters seek greater political and military autonomy from the superpowers than do others, the degree of their consultation with the superpowers on arms production and transfers also varies. Britain has maintained relatively close consultation with Washington on Middle Eastern, as opposed to Latin American, sales; France has adopted a decidedly independent approach. Since the primary mid-sized suppliers are U.S. allies, they are also subject to U.S. political and military pressures, especially regarding alliance procurement decisions. In the case of West Germany, dependence on U.S. forces fosters special receptivity to imports of U.S. arms. Allies respond by pushing for "two-way streets" in procurement decisions, i.e., U.S. decisions to purchase European arms in compensation for Europe's purchases of U.S. systems.

Since mid-sized states depend more on outside sources of raw materials than do the superpowers, they will turn to arms marketing to remedy trade imbalances and to facilitate relations, sometimes even "special relations," with Third World raw materials exporters. In recent years the intense pressure to sell arms for these reasons has lessened somewhat, with the opening of alternate energy sources in the North Sea and among non-OPEC producers, and with the advent of nuclear power generation in some European countries.

Mid-sized states pursue somewhat different strategies than do larger or smaller arms producers, while often differing in strategies among themselves as well. Types of responses adopted include

- Specialization — Sweden, for example, has become committed to aircraft design and production (even to the point of filling in with extensive domestic orders if foreign contracts cannot be won);

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- Concerted government-industry export partnerships — as in the complex French agencies designed to promote foreign sales of various types of military equipment;[7]
- Efforts to restrict exports to avoid political embarrassment — as with German and Swedish reluctance to sell to war-torn areas;
- The use of nationalized or semi-nationalized production or marketing concerns to maintain government control of sales and avoid overidentification of government in weapons exports — as in the British case, albeit mixed with desires to dispose of less profitable nationalized firms;
- Coproduction agreements with other mid-sized suppliers, to assure each partner a share of production and marketing, and to promote greater economies of scale; British, French, Italian, and German producers have all collaborated in various combinations, especially in aircraft production and with mixed results in terms of bottlenecks, cost-overruns, and marketing success;
- Cultivation of special clients, often in former colonies (France in Africa; U.K. in the Persian Gulf and with Kenya, Australia, and less successfully, India);
- Cultivation of "special relations" with superpowers, as in the not very well balanced U.K.-U.S. and West German-U.S. two-way purchase and subcontract agreements for aircraft, submarines, training equipment, and parts;
- Utilization of alliance ties to edge out non-allied competitors — as in the stiff competition for the "deal of the century" in re-equipping NATO's air forces among U.S., French, and Swedish competitors.

Nowhere has the complexity and conflict of mid-sized supplier interests been better demonstrated than in the Iran-Iraq war since 1980. A number of suppliers had intimate dealings with the former Iranian government under the Shah, and were initially sent scrambling for substitute arms customers when he fell. As Iraq gravitated from its former heavy dependence on the USSR, France and Britain moved to fill the void. At the outbreak of war, mid-sized suppliers, along with strictly economic interests, had considerable security stakes in the continued supply of oil and the maintenance of friendly client regimes. Therefore, Britain also moved to increase its military supply role with a number of Arab and Gulf states (notably Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, and the UAE), and to bolster its Saudi air force supply contract. With high oil prices, the Federal Republic was tempted to respond to Saudi overtures about purchase of the well-regarded Leopard II tank and other infantry equipment. This, of course, conflicted with existing German export restraints and traditionally difficult relations with Israel. With growing fears of an Iranian victory in the Gulf, the mixture of political and economic concern sparked a new round of military supply arrangements between France and Iraq, controversy about British arms for *both* Iran and Iraq, new Saudi and

[7] Edward A. Kolodziej. "Determinants of French Arms Sales: Security Implications," in *Threats, Weapons, and Foreign Policy,* ed. by Pat McGowan and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980), pp. 137-75; and Jean Klein, "France and the Arms Trade," in *The Gun Merchants: Politics and Policies of the Major Arms Suppliers,* ed. by Cindy Cannizzo, (New York: Pergamon, 1980), pp. 127-66.

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Jordanian requests for arms, and renewed U.S. interest in supplying the area directly.

The Particular Focus of German Policy

Each mid-sized supplier, then, faces similar pressures, but reacts somewhat distinctly because of varying traditional interests and experiences in the arms business. Some suppliers lack expertise in certain production areas (e.g., aircraft engine production or avionics); others have stressed nationalized vs. private ownership of armories; still others remain immune to political and ethical controversies regarding the sale of destructive equipment overseas.

The Federal Republic's responses to the international arms market and domestic arms interests have been especially complicated and subtle. Highly efficient German military production had been short-circuited both economically and politically by World War II, and arms production remains a controversial issue because of domestic opposition and international suspicions. Yet in certain categories of production, particularly land-based infantry equipment, German manufacture continues to excel; and, in collaboration with NATO partners, German industry has again honed high technology capabilities, as in aircraft production.

The Federal Republic re-entered the arms export business only slowly, with belated government involvement. Exports in the 1950s were confined mainly to surplus equipment. Unlike Britain and France, West Germany retained few traditional arms clients after World War II, and recreated its arms production capacity gradually, content to subcontract for, or replicate under license, U.S. production through the early 1960s. As the Bundeswehr grew modestly, arms exports were maintained at modest levels to provide a national security base and to fit U.S. regulations about retransfers of licensed production.[8] Corresponding to a German tendency to non-assertiveness in international affairs and emphasis on economic modernization during those years, Bonn established NATO's most clearly articulated limits on arms exports (neutrals such as Sweden have since articulated similar restraints).

These limits derived from German constitutional provisions, and legislation to implement those provisions and prevent abuses. The Federal Constitution prohibits the manufacture, transport, and marketing of weapons of war except with the permission of the Federal Government, and prohibits all business activity which threatens the peaceful relations of peoples. As the volume of German weapons production increased,

[8] Mike Dillon, "Arms Transfers and the Federal Republic of Germany," in Cannizzo, *The Gun Merchants*, p. 104.

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and embarrassing incidents occurred in the early 1960s — German ships running arms to Algeria during the French-Algerian war — two additional laws were promulgated. One, the War Weapons Control Act (first conceived with rearmament in 1955), involved creation of a munitions list, periodically revised, to specify weapons subject to Federal export control. The other, the Foreign Trade Act, supplemented the list by integrating the NATO-COCOM classifications of strategic goods that could not be released for fear of Eastern bloc acquisition, along with less lethal types. This act created three types of lists (A, B, and C) which distinguish between Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) restrictions, the sale of sensitive war materials (such as ball bearings), the sale of light weapons, munitions, weapon materials, and nuclear goods. Yet West Germany's commitment to free trade principles was also written into the law, so that particular license refusals (which for the Foreign Trade Act were approximately 106 out of 48,500 applications in 1983) could be appealed to an administrative court (none have been). Thus, the Federal Republic went far toward subjecting administration of arms export controls to judicial scrutiny, and the conflict between commerical export interests and arms control advocates began quite early.

Additional restrictions derived from the Federal Republic's membership in the Western European Union (WEU), whose Paris Agreements of 1954 contained German assurances not to produce nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and not to build weapons such as warships above a specified size limit. WEU provisions have not been applied to German arms sales, although they constituted a limit affecting the types of weapons produced and available for export (such as small submarines).[9] These restrictions have now been allowed to lapse.

The Federal Republic was not unique among arms exporters in applying controls and creating restricted weapons lists, nor for that matter in administering the controls through consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and economic ministries. But Bonn has indulged in considerably less overt governmental promotion of arms exports than other Western states. There is as yet no German equivalent of the British Defence Sales Organization, the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program, or the French governmental-business export societies.[10] However, in recent cases, mostly having to do with the hard-pressed shipbuilding industry, banks have offered government-backed credits (through the Hermes agency) for arms (warship) transfer or military construction deals overseas (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Malaysia, Oman, and Argentina).

[9] Ibid., pp. 105-109; Michael Brzoska, unpublished doctoral dissertation, SIPRI, 1983.
[10] Dillon, "Arms Transfers and the Federal Republic," p. 109.

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For a time beginning in 1961, arms transfers were considered important adjuncts to West German foreign policy, especially in promoting the legitimacy of the state vis à vis the GDR. Yet military assistance to African states and Israel paid few political dividends and, along with embarrassing retransfers of arms to warring parties such as India and Pakistan, provoked opposition among states bordering the recipients. Such incidents and policy failures provoked opposition inside Germany as well. The Erhard cabinet decided in 1965 not to allow further arms deliveries to conflict-ridden areas,[11] a policy that, although vague, was picked up by subsequent governments. The Middle East, which had received 39 percent of German arms deliveries before the 1967 war, fell to 18 percent after, and to 3 percent after the October 1973 war (later to pick up again). The policy reduced Germany's overall Third World arms sales by 7 percent between 1965-66, at the moment U.S. and French Third World sales were taking off.

In 1966, the Social Democratic party (SPD) also had begun to draft relatively strict arms export policy proposals, including restrictions on transfers to NATO countries. However, the Bundestag did not include restrictions to NATO when it beefed up commerical export limits in 1968. When the SPD took office in 1969, the government began developing further formulations of the export policy, implemented, though not fully revealed, in 1971.

These policy guidelines were designed to prevent weapons transfers to "areas of tension" (to be defined by the Foreign Ministry), particularly in the Third World, while allowing relatively free flow of arms to NATO countries. By the late 1970s, over 85 percent of reported German arms transfers were going to NATO members, although from 1973-77, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) figures showed 70 percent of German arms going to the Third World with 30 percent to NATO (the breakdown was: Middle East, 46 percent; Africa, 27 percent; Latin America, 21 percent; East Asia, 5.1 percent and South Asia, 1.3 percent).[12] One category on non-NATO countries, presumably those at peace or of key importance to the West, were allowed under the guidelines to receive German arms if the Federal government determined it in the national interest and not in conflict with the law. However, in principle, arms exports outside NATO were to be strongly discouraged, and indeed the Federal Republic generally refrained from designing or tailoring weapons solely for export.

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[11] Joachim Krause, "Die Rustungsexport-Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," *Europa-Archiv,* 12 (1981), p. 365.

[12] Dillon, "Arms Transfers and the Federal Republic," pp. 113, 120-21; and Eckehart Ehrenberg, *Der Deutsche Rustungsexport: Beurteilung und Perspectiven* (Sulzbert, FRG: 1981), pp. 14-20; and Ehrenberg, *Der Deutsche Rustungsexport,* pp.. 19-20.

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The 1970s witnessed increasing pressure, to no small extent due to oil price increases, to modify or drop some of these guidelines. The guidelines themselves were vague and open both to reinterpretation and legalistic distinctions — if certain goods were not expressly restricted, they could be exported. While not as dependent as the United States, Britain, or France on arms exports to support extensive military production, the Federal Republic's weapons exports to the Third World nevertheless increased by 70 percent between 1973-77 (one SPD report, using SIPRI data, claimed by 449 percent), ranking the country fifth among world suppliers (though growth figures used the relatively low 1971-73 base period). Arms exports have increased sharply in importance for German balances of trade, rising from .34 percent of total exports in 1967-69 to .60 percent in 1975-77. Nearly two-thirds of the Deutsche marks (DM) 1.5 billion in government-approved arms deliveries in 1979 were ships, showing the economic concern about north German shipyards. Guidelines dealing with areas of tension were obviously stretched somewhat in arms deliveries to Indonesia, India, Iran, Ghana, Nigeria, Abu Dhabi, Argentina, and Chile, among others, and in sales of co-produced weapons to Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Brazil and others.[13] Latin America evidently came to be seen as a relatively acceptable area for German arms exports, i.e., less subject to regional tensions than the Middle East during the 1970s.[14]

Arms transfer totals for the 1970s generally do not include the considerable "indirect" supply and potential re-export of German weapons and parts under coproduction and overseas licensed production agreements, reportedly involving sixty-seven countries by 1979. In the late 1970s, efforts were made to account for them in more rigorous insistence on "end-use" documentation by recipient states. Still, licenses and blueprints shipped overseas allow considerable military production using German designs to go unreported in German totals. Furthermore, it has been claimed that German parts, engines, and designs — often not subject to weapons list restrictions — have been used extensively, despite U.N. boycotts, in South Africa.

Faced with incentives and requirements to export arms to support a growing industry, Bonn maintains a low profile in its international marketing, yet is involved in extensive production and sales collaboration with other European states, subcontracting for other European manufac-

[13] Krause, "Die Rustungsexport-Politik," pp. 366-67; Dillon, "Arms Transfers and the Federal Republic," pp. 119-20; Hans Otto Eglau, "The Arms Trade: Four Charged over Alleged Illegal Exports," *German Tribune*, September 18, 1983, p. 15; and Gale A. Mattox, "The Limits of FRG International Involvements: The Debate of German Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, March 1982.

[14] Dillon, "Arms Transfers and the Federal Republic," pp. 111-18.

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turers, and multinational assembly and sales arrangements in the Third World, especially in Latin America. By remaining relatively invisible in these collaborative endeavors, Germany was able to increase its share of overseas arms sales, while not overly alarming those worried about German "merchants of death."

As stated in a 1980 government white paper:

> The Federal Government's arms export policy is stamped by the Federal German Republic's membership in the Atlantic Alliance. The Federal Government strives for no autonomy in weapons, it wants no unilateral exclusive arms production. Because of military logic and technical economic reasons, the Federal Republic cannot assert such arms capacity. It must see therefore that its role as a cooperative partner in the Alliance can be played out.[15]

Thus, an ambitious military producer and European political and economic power must, for reasons of lingering political controversy, adopt a public image of full military integration with NATO partners. Arms sales abroad are seen as a way of keeping design teams together and developing German weapons technology (even de facto autonomy in certain weapon areas), but are a potential political embarrassment if opening Germany to charges of wholesale remilitarization.[16]

Despite its best efforts, Bonn has been embarrassed by disclosures of sales to South Africa, Rhodesia, Nigeria, Chile, and Israel in the 1970s. Arms sales are one type of export often assumed to imply political support for the customer, even though exporters may deny such intent.[17] Therefore, the tension of competing German priorities — to sell or not to sell — remains intense, further complicated in the 1980s by such factors as antinuclear and antimilitary protests, NATO decisions regarding procurement of conventional weapons, continued sensitivity to both Arab and Israeli demands, energy price burdens, and the first post-1950s unemployment problems.

Arms and German Politics

The 1980s have seen gradual modifications in policy guidelines by both the Schmidt and Kohl governments. Weapons still account only for roughly 1 percent of German exports (up slightly from .71 percent in 1977). But the estimated $1.5 billion in 1983 arms export revenue (German government figures, up from $1.3 billion in 1982, with approximately

[15] Ehrenberg, *Der Deutsche Rustungsexport,* p. 30.

[16] Ehrenberg, *Der Deutsche Rustungsexport,* p. 30; and Carola Bielfeldt and Peter Schlotter, *Die Militarische Sicherheitspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Einfuhrung und kritik* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1980), pp. 65-69.

[17] Julius Nyerere, quoted in SIPRI, *World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1978* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1978), p. 224 and cited in Dillon, "Arms Transfers and the Federal Republic," p. 102.

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40 percent in "war weapons" and 60 percent in "war material") was important to the Federal Republic's balance of payments in a recession era, and in view of 9 percent unemployment, to the jobs of 15 percent of West Germany's defense industry workforce.[18] Even so, roughly 50 percent of German arms manufacturing capacity reportedly has been unused in recent years, with much of the subcontracting going, and parts acquisition coming from, abroad. Weapons production accounts for roughly 2 percent of West German industrial output; at least 80 percent of the defense budget for research, development, procurement, and maintenance is now spent (for prime contracts) *inside* the country.[19] This indicates a growing interest in German military self-reliance, which means added incentives to promote exports to compete with France and Britain. Since German military production facilities remain largely in private hands, considerable commercial pressure to maintain production capacity is brought upon the government.

Chancellors Schmidt and Kohl increasingly have interpreted arms export restrictions liberally, the latter for example, with after-the-fact reversals of prior export license denials for sales to Malaysia and Egypt.[20] The Schmidt government, confronting the severe oil price crises of the mid-1970s, agonized over a decision not to grant a Saudi request to purchase 300 advanced tanks and a variety of other infantry and air defense equipment. Temptations and pressures continued, however, and in 1982, Schmidt and coalition partner Hans Dietrich Genscher amended the "rubber regulations" to open the way for possible sale of less controversial equipment to Third World customers in areas of tension. Exceptions to the 1971 ban could be allowed if vital German foreign and security policy or consideration of alliance interests could be cited.[21] Weapons sales to Saudi Arabia would, according to some, fit NATO alliance or German political and strategic interests. However, the Schmidt-Genscher government backed off from an actual deal with the Saudis after encountering strong SPD opposition, especially in light of German submarine deliveries to Pinochet's Chile. The SPD had not been informed by the Federal Security Council prior to the sale to Chile.

Among the domestic opponents of liberalized West German arms transfer policies and/or significant transfers to Saudi Arabia are pacifists and opponents of expanded armaments; those who doubt the employment benefits of defense production; those sensitive to Middle Eastern entanglements and worried about fueling crises there; those who

[18] Tagliabue, "New Look at Arms Export Curbs," p. 24.
[19] Krause, "Die Rustungsexport-Politik," p. 378.
[20] Tagliabue, "New Look at Arms Export Curbs," p. 24.
[21] Eberhard Wisdorff, "Move to Change Guidelines Covering Weapons Exports," *German Tribune*, May 8, 1983.

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argue for coordinated Western approaches to such exports — a coordination that does not exist — and who want German foreign policy to blend innocuously with that of other European nations; those who cite slackened OPEC power and Saudi-German trade, together with the continued receipt of petrodollars in Germany even without arms sales. The Ministry of Defense also has had second thoughts about releasing advanced weapons technology outside NATO, and about stationing the requisite number of German military instructors and technicians in regions such as the Middle East.

Among would-be German arms exporters there is recognition that (1) other countries have expanded Third World sales; (2) Saudi Arabia is still Germany's largest non-Western trading partner, although oil imports and total trade are declining; (3) the Saudis supposedly moderate OPEC and Middle Eastern crises and reinvest petrodollars in the German economy while remaining Bonn's foremost external creditor (having lent DM 23 billion from 1980-82); and (4) Saudi Arabia could act as Bonn's inroad into the Third World, especially after the fall of the Shah.[22]

These conflicting pressures and interests were inherited by the Kohl-Genscher government, along with renewed Saudi inquiries about available German weapons, and renewed Israeli opposition to such sales. King Fahd had been very understanding publicly about Chancellor Schmidt's dilemmas concerning the Leopard tank, i.e., Germany's history, Israel's sensitivities, domestic opposition, and the ultimate need for new guidelines — but the German press reported, and Christian Democrats cited, Saudi understandings that Schmidt would sell them weapons.[23] The SPD has denied this, but the Saudis clearly expected that some arms would be forthcoming to cement their newly signed security cooperation agreement with Bonn.

Chancellor Kohl travelled to the Middle East in early 1984 hoping to encourage Israeli acceptance of "defensive" weapons such as the Gepard (Cheetah) antiaircraft tank and the Roland antiaircraft missile (Israel itself, of course, has become one of the world's leading small-sized weapons suppliers, reportedly accounting for up to 26 percent of the Third World's weapons supply).[24] However, the Israelis were decidedly unforgiving, and German critics, especially within an SPD no longer led by Schmidt, echoed their opposition. The transfer of Leopard II tanks had become too politically and militarily risky for both SPD and Christian

[22] Kurt Becker, "Wide Variety of Issues on Agenda for Kohl Visit to Saudi Arabia," *German Tribune*, October 16, 1983; and Heinz Stuwe, "Deficit with the Saudis Heads Towards Surplus," *German Tribune*, October 23, 1983.

[23] Heinz-Joachim Melder, "Kohl Keeps His Balance in the Middle East," *German Tribune*, October 23, 1983.

[24] Elizabeth Pond, "Kohl's Trip to Israel Didn't Fit the Neat Blueprint," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 10, 1984; and Eglau, "The Arms Trade," p. 15.

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Democratic Union (CDU) governments. But Kohl seemed determined to push ahead with some weapons sales, citing Germany's major status in NATO and strong security interest in the Gulf area. In addition Kohl pointed to British, French, American, and even Italian advantages in Third World arms trade compared to West Germany (officially only 37.6 percent of German arms go to the Third World, compared to 81.7 percent for the U.K., 76.5 percent for France, and 76.6 percent for Italy).[25] Kohl quickly learned that Israel, at least, still regards Germany as a special case, not yet entitled to the freedom of action afforded other European states, and that Israel could conceivably bring effective pressure to bear on Washington to oppose German arms exports.

While the Federal Republic is indeed free to pursue weapons transfers to the Middle East, and, as implied in Chancellor Kohl's post-visit policy statement to the Bundestag, will probably do so,[26] these harrowing political experiences show that German leaders still must be uniquely and acutely conscious of the precarious nature of their diplomacy. German arms sales policy merely reflects the slow evolution of full West German sovereignty and assertiveness in world affairs, from the self-effacing 1950s and 1960s, to the anti-East German Third World offensives of the 1960s, to the tentative diplomatic assertions that went along with economic vigor in the *Ostpolitik* period, to the even more vigorous assertiveness of the Schmidt era in OECD, NATO, and world politics. Yet even this latter period, including the Kohl chancellorship, has seen a continuing preference for policies integrated with the European Community; it is still very difficult for Germany to be "out front" on the Middle East and a number of other world issues. Arms transfer guidelines are part of this general foreign policy stance and predicament. The Federal Republic continues to move toward greater assertiveness in world affairs, but remains essentially only at the beginning stages. Federal German preferences for joint European arms ventures reflect this position.

The strict ban on arms sales to areas of tension has been breached, but not entirely broken. Both SPD and CDU governments have been confronted by political, diplomatic, and bureaucratic buffeting over arms transfers, responding with incremental changes in policy guidelines. In particular, the redefinition of the arms transfer guidelines in 1982 stipulated that no permit for export to an area of tension will be issued "when the internal situation of the buyer country" precludes a sale, when

[25] Figures from Erich Hauser, "European MP's Seek Ways of Reducing International Arms Trade," *German Tribune,* May 8, 1983, p. 4; see also Knut Barrey, "Arms Issue Dominates Kohl Visit to Israel," *German Tribune,* February 5, 1984, pp. 1-2.

[26] Helmut Kohl, "A Special Relationship: Policy Statement to the Bundestag on his Visit to Israel," (February 9, 1984), *Statements and Speeches,* 7 (New York: German Information Center, February 10, 1984).

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the sale would "heighten existing tensions," or if "there is danger of an armed conflict."[27] This phrasing was devised particularly to facilitate sales to places like Saudi Arabia, where it is argued the arms would have deterrent rather than "warfighting" effect. They allow for continued bans under U.N. human rights boycotts (only sporadically effective anyway), and offer excuses to refuse arms to countries at war (such as Iran or Iraq, where some German transport equipment and coproduced weapons have turned up anyway). However, if sales to Chile were consummated under the older more stringent interpretations, it is difficult to see how such controversial moves are precluded by the new phrasing.

The "maturity" and growing independence of Germany's foreign policy is indicated by Bonn's evolving arms export policy, which increasingly resembles those of fellow mid-sized and superpower suppliers. Driven by competitive needs to develop and support new, expensive arms technology and joint international ventures, as well as by needs to promote Germany's own interests in places like the Gulf, the government has moved toward a case-by-case review of sales decisions, forsaking the generalized ban of earlier days.[28] This stance affords Bonn the image of "reliable partner" both in potential coproduction agreements, and to arms purchasers; there is greater likelihood of continued supplies of spare parts and of fulfilled contracts.

Technically the new regulations distinguish, as did the two enabling arms sales laws of the 1960s, between "war weapons" and other arms. The former — the heavier lethal varieties, which can also include parts — generally are not to be sold outside NATO and other Western industrial states except in individual cases of "vital" German foreign and security interests. Other arms equipment can be exported (except to Communist states) unless German security or peaceful relations are endangered. Hence larger, higher technology and lethal equipment still probably are reviewed more carefully and stringently than other types of military gear. One grey area left in the new guidelines, which seems to perplex those judging individual cases, is the extent to which economic and trade concerns are to be included as "vital interests." The guidelines, written by Chancellor Schmidt and retained by Chancellor Kohl after extensive intra- and inter-party debate, state that labor policy considerations (unemployment) are not to be regarded as "decisive." The guidelines then leave open the exact extent of allowable consideration.[29]

Combining the German push for a case-by-case approach, new willingness to consider sales to areas of tension, continued copro-

[27] "New Arms Export Guidelines Adopted," *The Week in Germany*, 13 (New York: German Information Center, May 7, 1982), p. 2.

[28] Krause, "Die Rustungsexport-Politik"; and "New Arms Export Guidelines Adopted."

[29] Personal confidential interview with ministry official (Bonn: July, 1984).

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duction and co-marketing of arms, and sensitivities about political embarrassments, the Federal Republic is apt eventually to approach other mid-sized European suppliers about joint guidelines and strategies for weapon exports and joint criteria beyond the current minimal COCOM requirements. Trial balloons about such initiatives, especially toward the Middle East, were floated by a Bonn State Secretary in early 1984, though they came to little at the time. Such approaches would not necessarily involve reviving the Western European Union approach, which was after all uniquely restrictive toward Germany, but rather a community or NATO approach over which Germany would have considerable influence, yet in which German policies could not be easily singled out. Germany's neighbors, successful as they have been in Third World marketing, are by no means certain to go along with such proposals, but the Germans have certain cards that could be played to help persuade them — particularly procurement decisions for the German armed forces, the strength of the Deutsche mark in relation to other investment currencies, and the rapid advance of German arms technology, moving close to Britain in major weapons exports. Such pressure for multilateral approaches might not extend, however, to cases where it is more convenient for the Federal Republic "not to know" of its partners' exports of German coproduced equipment. The German government will have to balance the desire to control competitors' export behavior with the need to work together in joint ventures.[30]

One indication of Bonn's priorities regarding Euro-arms sales coordination is the recent shift in guidelines concerning coproduction. The Federal government has recently defined arms transfers as shipments leaving the Federal Republic. Therefore, German export restrictions will not necessarily apply to goods finally assembled and shipped *from* partner European or NATO states. The precedent for this policy was set in 1972, in a secret agreement with France whereby sales of jointly produced items to controversial or conflict-ridden customers such as Libya would not be questioned. Officially, Bonn could claim to have no control over, and, therefore, no potentially embarrassing responsibility for such sales. Now the way has been cleared for this type of "at arm's length" political stance with all European partner states, although clearly Bonn will have a major say in the ultimate determination of customers.[31]

Apart from international coproduction and sales, the German penchant for overseas licensed arms production is likely to increase as well. Amid concern over rising terrorism in and around the Federal Republic, an article was added to the arms export legislation in 1978 re-

[30] Krause, "Die Rustungsexport-Politik"; and *Die Welt*, February 29, 1984.
[31] Personal confidential interview with defense analyst (Bonn: July, 1984).

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quiring government permission for arms exported to German companies operating outside the FRG and acting as agents for sales of other states' equipment. This was designed at least to afford Bonn information on the far-flung activities of German arms merchants, activities often designed to circumvent the "areas of tension" restrictions.[32] Now that those restrictions have been eased, the pressure for overseas assembly also might ease in the long run, but for the present is likely to mount since the German arms trade remains controversial, as Chancellor Kohl's Middle East excursions showed. German firms will continue to be attracted to Third World states which will increasingly insist on domestically producing significant portions of their weapons. Enforcement of control over such overseas-licensed assembly and marketing of arms is difficult, though a government seriously interested in cutting that trade could punish companies violating principles of German arms sales restrictions.

Bonn Defines Its Role

Mid-sized arms suppliers, as well as their large and small counterparts, adjust to their environment in formulating export policies, and balance advantages against disadvantages. The mid-sized exporter comes under increasing pressure to engage in joint international production and marketing ventures and to use arms transfers to ease pressing energy and security problems in important regions, as well as to build or maintain domestic military capabilities and provide jobs. Major arms transfer decisions are subject to government scrutiny and control so that sensitive technologies are not released indiscriminately. In addition to these general environmental concerns — many impinging on all exporting states — each individual state carries a legacy of historical and political experience which conditions its arms transfer policy.

In West Germany's case such legacies include the Nazi past, the slow evolution of an assertive postwar foreign policy, NATO and European Community connections, constitutional and statutory arms control provisions, and vociferous political protest movements. This results in incremental modifications and loosening of transfer policies, and the likelihood of a more serious arms marketing effort in the Third World. Yet Germany will probably continue to cultivate joint approaches to defuse politically explosive criticism. Bonn also will distinguish among types of equipment exported. Germany's pride in main battle tank production will probably mean greater reluctance to export *panzer* tech-

[32] See Regina Cowen, "West German Arms Transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa: Commercialism versus Foreign Policy," in *Arms for Africa: Military Assistance and Foreign Policy in the Developing World*, ed. by Bruce E. Arlinghaus (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath, 1983), p. 163; and Mattox, "Limits of FRG International Involvements."

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nology than other types of weapon systems. Yet restrictions on tank exports have led, and probably will continue to lead, German tank manufacturers to overseas assembly operations and joint ventures. The press has reported, for example, that a Leopard-like tank for sale to Saudi Arabia will be built with German technology in Spain or Egypt. Thus the impetus for coproduction schemes is further heightened.

Mid-sized arms marketers operate in the shadow of major powers, with smaller competitors nipping at their heels. They operate in specific, rather well-defined and carefully cultivated markets, offering various alternatives to superpower arms supply, as well as subcontracting for superpower production. Yet they compete so intensively with each other, and confront such diverse domestic political environments regarding arms and foreign policy, that it is difficult for them to coordinate their strategies and merge their resources. Germany's moral and political struggle — to sell or not to sell — is not shared by the French; while Britain has an active campaign against the arms trade, it is not combined with constitutional prohibitions and the need to worry about foreign and military policy legitimacy. Given these circumstances, arms export policy is an unusually good microcosm and indication of a mid-sized supplier's general foreign policy orientation, role, and dilemmas.

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

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COPRODUCTION, BARTER, AND COUNTERTRADE: OFFSETS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARMS MARKET*

by Stephanie G. Neuman

Offsets, coproduction, barter, and countertrade are fast becoming common words in the lexicon of the arms trade. As their number and variety have increased, so has the concern of many government agencies, private industries, labor officials, and the press. Their concerns relate to the impact of these trade practices on American jobs, the U.S. balance of payments position, technology transfer policy, as well as the long-term consequences for the world economy and the place of the United States in it. This essay focuses on the main questions now at issue: (1) What are offsets, coproduction, barter, and countertrade? (2) when and why did they begin? (3) how extensive is this form of trade? and (4) what effect does it have on U.S. security interests?

Offsets, Coproduction, and Countertrade

Offsets, coproduction, barter, and countertrade are compensatory trade agreements — agreements that incorporate some method of reducing the amount of foreign exchange needed to buy a military item or some means of creating revenue to help pay for it. However, many other varieties of compensatory trade agreements exist, and each organization and source uses different and conflicting terminology to refer to them. Throughout the literature, offsets, coproduction, barter, and countertrade are used interchangeably with such terms "buy backs," "barter," "counterpurchase," "compensation," or "licensed production." Trying to differentiate between them is a frustrating and thankless task.

The problem has arisen in part because of a traditional division of function within the U.S. government. Different agencies are responsible for overseeing the military and civilian trade sectors, and so different

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language has evolved to describe what is often the same process. Attempting to sort out the relationship between offsets and countertrade illustrates the extent of the confusion. The Treasury Department, for example, considers countertrade as only one form of offset. On the other hand, some civilian trade specialists specifically exclude offsets from the category altogether, and the Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) include them only as a special form of countertrade. The confusion multiplies geometrically with each additional term.

These definitional distinctions which divide the various U.S. government agencies are both confounding and misleading, since they imply a structural distinction between civilian and military forms of trade which does not seem to exist. Based on interviews with officials from the various agencies, and a reading of the literature, the similarities between how goods are traded in both sectors are more striking than their differences.

Table 1 and table 2 outline the various forms of compensatory trade agreements in the two sectors and how they relate to each other. In general, the U.S. International Trade Commission's terminology was used to define countertrade (see table 1), and that established by the Department of the Treasury and the new U.S. government coordinating committee served as a guide for the definition of offsets. However, although these sources provided the vocabulary and much enlightenment, the author also drew from interviews with government and industry officials, and her own understanding of the way the system operates. Table 2 represents her attempt to combine and interrelate concepts used in the civilian and military sectors of the international trade community. The diagrams and definitions contained in this paper, therefore, represent a synthesis drawn from many sources and the author alone is responsible for any errors in interpretation or judgment.[1]

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[1] See, U.S. International Trade Commission, *Analysis of Recent Trends in U.S. Countertrade,* Washington, D.C. 1982; Department of the Treasury, *Offset/Coproduction Requirements in Aerospace and Electronics Trade: Report of a Survey of Industry,* May 24, 1983; and a questionnaire on offsets distributed to industry in February 1985 by a U.S. government coordinating committee. The Department of the Treasury study is based on a survey of the aerospace and electronics industries' trade agreements between 1975-1981. A more recent questionnaire developed by the USITC and distributed on behalf of the government coordinating committee was sent to "companies that have negotiated countertrade agreements or that have offset obligations resulting from military related export sales or that were subcontractors for firms that have such offset obligations." The interagency committee is chaired by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and includes representatives from nine government agencies. James I. Walsh, Senior International Economist with the U.S. International Trade Commission helped me to understand the countertrade process, and Col. William J. Weida, Assistant for Economic Policy and Analysis, Department of Defense, provided invaluable information on offsets. Joel Johnson of the American League for Exports and Security Assistance, Inc., was also helpful.

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TABLE 1

RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: COUNTERTRADE


RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
Offsets
Military Sector
(see table 2)
Countertrade
(Contractual Obligation for Reciprocal Purchases in the civilian sector)
Commercial Countertrade
(minor part of trade in $)
1. Short Duration—1-3 yrs
2. Under $10 million on average
3. Current or Past Production
4. Most Surplus Commodities; Mainly Lt. Manufactures
Industrial Countertrade
(major part of trade in $)
1. Long Term min. 5 yrs.
2. Large: $1-10m
3. Future Production
Counterpurchase
(firm-firm; firm-government)
Bilateral Government Agreements
(firm-government; government-government)
Compensation Arrangements
(firm-firm; firm-government)
Reimbursement with related goods. Include "buy back" and joint venture-equity loans.
Economic Cooperation Agreements
(govt.-to-govt.)
Large, long-term agreements involving heavy industry, heavy construction or advanced technologies.
Barter
(Only goods, not cash exchanged)
Bilateral Trade
(Products specified and $ value)
Framework Agreement
(Products not specified, only $ value)
Goods plus cash exchanged.
Specifies the exchange of selected goods or services of equivalent value without the use of currencies.

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TABLE 2

MILITARY OFFSETS


OFFSETS
Coproduction (Government-Government)
Licensed Production (Firm-Firm or Firm-Government)
Subcontractor Production (Firm-Firm, Firm-Government)
Overseas Investment (Firm-Firm, Firm-Government)
Technology Transfer (Firm-Firm, Firm-Govt., Govt.-Govt)
Countertrade (Firm-Firm, Firm-Government)
Compensation (Firm-Firm, Firm-Government) "Buy-Back" Related Goods and Services
Counterpurchase (Firm-Firm, Firm-Government) Unrelated Goods and Services
Barter (Government-Government) Unrelated Goods and Services
Switch Trading

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Offsets

The term *offset* refers to a range of industrial and commercial compensation practices required as a condition of sale for military-related exports, i.e., either Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or commercial sales of defense articles and defense services as defined by the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic In Arms Regulations.[2] Sales of commercial aircraft are also often included in this category.[3] In this essay, offset is used generically to refer to all compensatory arrangements practiced in the arms trade.

It is customary to divide these practices into two major categories, direct and indirect offsets. *Direct offsets* allow for compensation in related goods, permitting a foreign country to produce in-country certain components or subsystems of a weapon system it is buying from a U.S. supplier as a condition of the sale.[4] An example is Israel's first F-16 purchase that provided for an Israeli firm to produce the aircraft's composite rudder.[5]

Indirect offsets are associated with goods unrelated to the defense item being sold. The supplier agrees to purchase a certain dollar value of the buyer's manufactured products, raw materials, or services as a condition of the sale, usually over an extended, open-ended period. Although these agreements can include penalties for nonperformance on the part of the supplier, generally there is no firm contract commitment for reciprocal purchases. Instead, the supplier agrees to use its "best effort" to achieve the dollar goals stipulated in the contract. For example, McDonnell Douglas agreed to use its best effort to purchase $100 million of Israeli goods over a ten-year period in connection with the sale of its F-15 aircraft to Israel. Although companies sign best effort contracts, they do not always fulfill their commitment.[6] Limited manufacturing capabilities in the buying country, crop failures, and a variety of other circumstances make it difficult, in many cases, to achieve the quotas contained in the contract. Suppliers often complain they are unable to find enough products in sufficient numbers to fulfill their offset commitment to the recipient.

The most common types of compensatory trade agreements can be structured as either a direct or indirect offset, and sometimes as a combination of the two: [7]

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[2] USITC questionnaire.

[3] USITC study, p. 6.

[4] U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *U.S. Assistance to the State of Israel,* Report by the Comptroller General, GAO/ID-83-51, June 24, 1983, p. 54.

[5] GAO, *U.S. Assistance to the State of Israel,* p. 54.

[6] Ibid.

[7] For sources, see note 1 above.

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Coproduction. Agreements between governments that permit a foreign government or producer to acquire the technical information to manufacture all or part of a U.S. origin defense article overseas. It includes government-to-government licensed production. It excludes licensed production based upon direct commercial arrangements by U.S. manufacturers.

Licensed Production. Overseas production of U.S. origin defense articles based upon the transfer of technical information under direct commercial arrangements between a U.S. manufacturer and a foreign government or producer.

Subcontractor Production. Overseas production of a part or component of a U.S. origin defense article. The subcontract does not necessarily involve license of technical information. This type of production is usually a direct commercial arrangement between a U.S. manufacturer and a foreign producer, and often takes the form of a joint venture or subsidiary.

Overseas Investment. Investment arising from the offset agreement, taking the form of capital invested to establish or expand a subsidiary or joint venture in the foreign country.

Technology Transfer. Transfer of technology that occurs as a result of an offset agreement (other than coproduction and licensed production) that may take the form of research and development conducted in the buyer country; technical assistance provided to the subsidiary or joint venture in the foreign country; and other activities under direct commercial arrangement between the U.S. manufacturer and the foreign entity.

Countertrade. The term is used here to describe all agreements involving the reciprocal purchase of civil or defense goods and services from the foreign entity as a condition of sale of military-related exports.[8] The principals in these arrangements usually are a firm in a developed country and a foreign government or company. Countertrade agreements take the same general form in both the civilian and military sectors. However, unlike offset agreements for military items, civilian countertrade contracts always incorporate penalties for nonperformance within a specified time period, whereas some military-related countertrade arrangements are best effort agreements and may have more open-ended time frames.[9] The

[8] As observed above, commercial aircraft are generally included in this category.

[9] For civilian trade specialists, the term countertrade is reserved for those arrangements that involve a counterdelivery of goods or services and a contractual obligation on the part of the seller to purchase them within a specified period of time or suffer a monetary penalty. Offsets are excluded from this category for two reasons: First, some countries locally assemble and produce parts of a military item for their own use as an offset to reduce the amount of hard currency payment required for the purchase. Because this type of agreement does not include counterdeliveries, it is not considered countertrade. Second, some offset agreements have more flexible or open-ended time periods for reciprocal counterpurchases and do not contain penalty clauses for nonperformance on the part of the original exporter. (Interview with James I. Walsh, Department of Commerce.) However, one Department of Defense official believes the latter distinction is not always valid. In his view, "these 'best effort' contracts are as binding

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most common forms of countertrade in the military sector, outlined in table 2, are defined below:

Barter. A one-time transaction only, bound under a single contract that specifies the exchange of selected goods or services of equivalent value without the use of currencies. In other words, barter agreements stipulate the quantity rather than the dollar value of goods to be traded, and only goods, not cash, change hands. When negotiated, "clearing accounts" are established to keep track of the amounts traded. At the end of the period, a tally is made and imbalances are adjusted.

Barter was widely practiced during World War II in the civilian sector when international currencies were in disarray. After the war, the practice spread to the Communist bloc and the less developed countries (LDCs). The United States also operated a barter program from 1950 to 1973, which disposed of surplus agricultural commodities, acquired strategic materials for the National Defense Stockpile, and filled some other government needs overseas. In the last three years the U.S. government has become involved in barter again on a limited basis.[10]

Press reports suggest that barter is now used in the international arms trade as well. Oil-rich countries are said to be trading oil for arms and other products from industrialized countries.[11] However, because the negotiating parties find it difficult to determine and reach agreement on the relative value of traded goods, barter arrangements are not common in either the civilian or military sectors.[12] Most companies prefer other forms of countertrade, and in fact, many so-called barter deals are actually counterpurchases (see below). In these arrangements, money is exchanged, but the seller, under separate contract, agrees either to buy a product directly from or to find appropriate export markets for its customer:

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as any other because they carry with them the implicit threat that should the exporting company not honor its agreement, the buying country will deny it future sales." (Interview with Col. William Weida, Department of Defense, March 1985.) Others believe that many buyers of military equipment are becoming as "sophisticated" as their civilian counterparts, pointing out that more states are now instituting contractual penalties for failure to fulfill offset agreements completely or on time. (Dale W. Church, "Countertrade, technology transfer, and international defense sales," *Defense Management Journal,* second quarter [February 20] 1984.)

[10] Donna U. Vogt, *The Reagan Administration's Response to Barter,* Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, May 23, 1984.

[11] Hesham el-Abd and Michael Kenney O'Sullivan, "Encountering Countertrade," *Journal of Defense and Diplomacy,* July 1984, p. 24."Fierce Competition in the World Arms Business," *Business Week,* October 22, 1984, p. 36-7. Reports of specific agreements have also appeared in the press. For example, the Saudi Arabian and Brazilian governments signed an agreement whereby Brazil would supply military products (Avibras rocket systems and Embraer aircraft) in exchange for oil. Brazil is also exchanging manufactured goods for Mexican oil (see nn. 30 and 53, below). Other states are beginning to experiment with barter, as well. Egypt, for example, is said to be interested in exchanging its military hardware for foodstuffs (rice, sugar, tapioca, and seafood) and raw materials (timber and rubber). (*Aviation Week and Space Technology,* October 22, 1984, p. 17.; *Jane's Defence Weekly,* December 22, 1984, p. 1093.)

[12] Leo G. B. Welt, *Countertrade Business Practices for Today's World Market,* AMA Management Briefing, 1982, p. 15.

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Counterpurchase. An agreement by the initial exporter to buy (or to find a buyer for) a specified value of *unrelated* goods from the original importer during a specified time period. In this form of reciprocal trade, a company sells military equipment or services to another country for cash *plus* products.[13] Counterpurchases are conducted under separate contracts, each of which provides for an exchange of goods for hard currency.[14]

Compensation. An agreement by the original exporter to accept as full or partial repayment goods derived from the original exported product (e.g., a turnkey factory, machinery, or equipment used to produce military articles.) Agreements for repayment in *related* goods, are often referred to as "buy-backs." They are generally included in the original contract as a condition of sale.

Switch. Switch trading occurs when one party to a countertrade agreement (usually the original seller) cannot use or sell goods contracted for. Purchase options on the goods are sold by the original buyer at a discount, to specialists known as switch traders, to dispose of the goods on the international market.

Offsets may involve any one of the above arrangements or may incorporate elements from several of them. They are not mutually exclusive. In the mid-1970s, for example, a consortium of NATO countries agreed to purchase 348 F-16 fighter aircraft from the United States. The $2.8 billion contract included provisions to offset the full cost of the program. Initially, 58 percent will be offset through the manufacture in Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands of parts for 650 aircraft purchased by the U.S. Air Force and the 348 F-16s bought by the consortium. The remaining 42 percent is to be offset by the manufacture of parts by these NATO countries for F-16s sold by the United States to other foreign governments.[15] Thus, this agreement between the United States and European governments incorporates elements of coproduction,

[13] An example dating back to the 1960s, often cited in the literature, is the agreement between McDonnell Douglas and Yugoslavia, whereby McDonnell Douglas sold $43 million of its aircraft and, in return, agreed to market Yugoslavian products worth $9 million, which included hams, beer, wine, textiles, leather goods, and tourist packages (Hesham El-Abd and Michael Kenney O'Sullivan, "Dealing with Countertrade," *Journal of Defense and Diplomacy* [October 1984], p. 39).

[14] Separating the contracts protects the original exporter because payment for his goods cannot be legally withheld if problems arise in implementing the second contract (Leo G. B. Welt, *Countertrade Business Practices for Today's World Market*, p. 16).

[15] U.S. Department of Defense, *International Coproduction/Industrial Participation Agreements*, Report of the Department of Defense Task Group, August 15, 1983, Appendix A. (Hereafter referred to as the Defense Task Group study); Leo G. B. Welt, "Military Offsets," *National Defense* (March 1984), p. 20. It was agreed that the Consortium would produce 10 percent of the value of the USAF aircraft, 40 percent of the value of the consortium aircraft, and 15 percent of the value of foreign purchases, until the $2.8 billion was totally offset. In effect, these foreign companies were serving in a subcontractor relationship with General Dynamics.

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subcontractor production, counterpurchase and compensation countertrade.

Why Offsets?

Offsets are used by different states to serve a variety of functions. In the past, these agreements were used primarily as an alternate means of financing trade. They represented an effort on the part of both buyers and sellers to make the best of unfavorable economic conditions. Today, offset agreements have evolved into a tool of marketing as well as industrialization, and individual buyers are adapting them to suit their specific needs as well. Those factors most often cited by buyers, sellers, and interested observers as the major stimuli for offset demands in the arms trade are the following:

Financing Trade. Countertrade has had a long venerable history in the civilian sector, tracing its roots to the Depression of the 1930s. Extensive exchange restrictions combined with large debts, soft currencies, and low foreign exchange reserves of many governments made it impossible for businesses and governments to pay for imports or finance exports. The situation threatened to bring international trade to a virtual halt during this period and caused governments and firms to look for alternative ways to maintain trade flow.

Similar conditions existed after World War II, and large amounts of U.S. foreign aid were necessary to help Europe regain its economic vitality. Help in rebuilding was also required in the military sector, and to that end the production of U.S. defense items in foreign countries began in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The first major coproduction program was the F-104 aircraft and the HAWK air defense system in Europe.[16] During 1960-1975, the demand for offsets spread and their numbers multiplied. Agreements were negotiated between the United States and other developed countries (NATO, Japan, Australia, Switzerland) and Third World countries (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, India, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Iran, Argentina, and Brazil. Currently, almost all arms producers in the world have negotiated offset agreements in connection with the sale of their military equipment to other countries.[17]

Disturbances in the international economy since 1973 — rising oil prices, high rates of inflation, and slow economic growth and trade in many countries — have produced large trade deficits, particularly among the non-oil producing LDCs. According to the USTIC study, the trade deficits for oil-importing LDCs jumped from $7.3 billion in 1973 to

[16] Defense Task Group study, p. 3.
[17] Ibid., pp. 4, 7.

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an estimated $70 billion in 1980.[18] Because oil-exporting countries rarely accept payment in product — arms are an important exception — most oil-importing countries prefer to use their hard currency reserves for oil, causing planners to seek other means of financing necessary imports.

In addition, there has been a decrease in the demand for developing country exports, and many LDCs have been faced with lower prices for their commodity exports,[19] further reducing their reserves of hard currency. Lacking the foreign exchange necessary to purchase items essential for the production of exports, many LDCs have been unable to increase their manufactured exports. This decline in export earnings has exacerbated their cash flow problems.

Borrowing has been one solution. Purchases of Western goods and services by the LDCs increasingly have been financed through extension of Western credit. As a result their indebtedness to the West reached record levels, rising from $142 billion in 1974 to $416 billion in 1980. With their borrowing capabilities restricted by their large debts, their hard currency earnings paying for oil, many oil-importing countries have sought offsets as a means of financing new purchases. Moreover, Western banks, fearing defaults, have encouraged them to do so as a means of insuring their own repayment.

These economic problems have been exacerbated by the rising cost of weapons. One source cites the sale of 24 F-14A "Tomcats" for $44.3 million apiece, 39 F-15A "Eagles" for $34.2 million each, and 120 F-16A "Fighting Falcons" for $15.9 million each.[20] Furthermore, U.S. subsidies for foreign military procurement have changed. Between 1968-1972, 90 percent of U.S. military assistance was concessional. Between 1978-1982, this percentage fell to less than 25 percent. As a result, many countries have been forced to borrow with the consequent repayment problems already described.[21]

Financing trade, then, is cited by many countries, but particularly the LDCs, as their chief motivation for seeking compensatory trade arrangements. In their view, the latter constitute an important means both of reducing the drain on their scarce hard currency reserves and of financing the purchase of vital imports. However, the demand for offsets

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[18] USITC study, 1982, pp. 11-12.

[19] Non-oil primary commodities prices dropped 15 percent in 1981 and 12 percent in 1982. (Dan Haendel, "International Barter and Countertrade," staff paper #14, National Center for Export-Import Studies, Georgetown University, n.d., p.3.)

[20] Leo G. B. Welt, "Military Offsets," p. 21.

[21] Pompiliu Verzariu, "Do Offsets Help or Hurt U.S. Jobs and Trade?" *Countertrade and Barter International,* Vol. II, no. 2 (Summer 1984), no pp. nos. In response to this situation, the Reagan administration has, since 1981, attempted to increase the concessionality of the FMS program by again permitting 100 percent grant and/or concessional loans for needy countries. In 1985, the first concessional loan was signed, and more are expected in the future. (Interview with Col. William Weida, Department of Defense, March 1985; OMB official, April 1985.)

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as a condition of purchase is not confined to poor countries, nor is financing trade any longer the only declared motive. Industrialized, as well as less industrialized countries, have come to view offsets as mechanisms to stimulate export earnings and industrial growth, and some states are finding them useful for other domestic purposes as well.

Stimulating Exports and Evading Import Constraints. Some states claim that "buy-backs" and counterpurchases are a way of gaining new markets for their products through the distribution network of the supplier country. LDCs largely depend upon Europe and the United States for this service; however, European states make similar demands upon American companies.[22] For both industrializing and industrialized countries, gaining access to the marketing network of an industrialized supplier and increasing their exports has apparently become a major motive for pursuing countertrade. Some LDCs also claim these agreements are a way of penetrating protectionist barriers in the industrialized world.

In addition, according to some sources, countertrade offers the original buyer a way to disguise the discounting of its exports, a means of undercutting prices set by international commodity agreements, and a method of concealing the dumping of surplus goods. As noted above, the terms of sale for a military item and its offset in counterpurchases are generally contained in separate agreements.[23] If, for example, a country buying military equipment agrees to sell a commodity good at world prices as part of an offset agreement, but in a separate contract pays more for the equipment than it would ordinarily have had to pay, in effect it has discounted its commodity export. From the original buyer's point of view, this form of disguised price cutting stimulates sales without upsetting its other customers or incurring the wrath of other commodity exporters, and allows the country to unload surplus goods into the international market without risking the penalties of international anti-dumping measures.[24]

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[22] The Northrop Corporation, for example, contracted with Switzerland for the sale of 72 F-5 fighter aircraft in 1975. It agreed to offset 30 percent of the program by helping the Swiss market their products through Northrop's worldwide marketing facilities. Thomas V. Jones, President of Northrop, is quoted as saying: "Using our international offices we have helped sell Swiss-made shelving for a Saudi-Arabian construction program and Swiss-made hoses to a Mexican oil firm." Under a 38-plane 1980 extension of the original program, Northrop marketed Swiss merchandise equal to 50 percent of the total contract value. In the follow-on agreement, Swiss refrigerators were sold in Saudi Arabia, and different buyers were found for Swiss generators and other products. (Pamela G. Hollie, "Northrop's Product Strategy: Simplify," *New York Times,* February 4, 1980; Roy J. Harris, Jr., "Coproduction Boosts U.S. Arms Sales," *Wall Street Journal,* July 12, 1984.)

[23] See section on counterpurchase above.

[24] Discussions with several government officials and industry representatives. It was suggested that OPEC countries have been offering to use oil in countertrade arrangements in order to circumvent OPEC price and export quota agreements. See also P. N. Agarwala, "Trade Goes Over the Counter," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* p. 53.

Another source adds: "There is already a strong suspicion that complex countertrade arrangements are from time to time leading to sizeable oil flows beyond quota allowances. Tracking countertraded

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Others suspect that some LDCs are turning to countertrade as a means of circumventing International Monetary Fund (IMF) restrictions on their imports. They believe that the IMF is contributing to the rise of various forms of countertrade by forcing the LDCs to cut imports as part of debt refinancing packages.[25]

Economic Growth and Industrialization. Many governments are also using these agreements to encourage economic growth and industrialization. They see offsets as an opportunity (1) to build up their industrial infrastructure and acquire advanced technology in both the military and civilian sectors; (2) to maintain and expand employment; (3) to acquire new technical skills and raise the technological competence of local industry; and (4) to enhance the commercial competitiveness of current and future products. Even though manufacturing an item is often more expensive than buying it off-the-shelf from a supplier, most states consider the associated economic benefits necessary and sufficient compensation. Thus, more states are demanding not hardware but manufacturing know-how and are using offsets to acquire it.[26]

The Turkish-U.S. agreement to coproduce F-16 fighters is a case in point. Turkey signed an agreement in 1983 to procure and coproduce about 160 F-16s over a ten-year period. The project was to cost $3.5 to $5 billion.[27] From the perspective of the Turkish government, the major reason for buying the F-16s was the military requirement to modernize its aging fleet of aircraft. However, Turkey also wanted to find some means of lessening the financial burden on the Turkish economy, and, in addition, a way of creating additional spin-offs. The offset contract as negotiated was designed to serve both needs. It stipulates that all but

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oil flow is complex. Deals are often secretive, and the fact that supplies often end up in the Communist bloc or are sold away from direct producer control on the spot market in Rotterdam makes assessing the overall volume of crude particularly difficult." ("The Barter Game," *The Middle East* [December 1984], p. 17.)

The "barter" deal between Saudi Arabia and the Boeing Corporation offers some insight into how countertrade is conducted and the opportunities it affords for disguised discounting. The agreement involves the exchange of 36 million barrels of oil priced at $27.92 a barrel for 10 wide-bodied 747-300 transport aircraft. The arrangement was concluded through a major financial institution which guarantees the counterdeliveries to the Saudi Arabian government. However, the oil will never be in Boeing's possession since it will be sold "on the open market at the current spot price, which has been estimated at about $27.20 per barrel, or 72 cents less per barrel than Boeing is paying." (*Aviation Week and Space Technology,* August 20, 1984, p. 28.) In this context, a Defense Department official remarked that agreements of this kind, where reciprocal purchases are to be made over an extended period of time, are constructed by the original exporting firm to protect itself from possible negative fluctuations in future prices." (Interview, March 1985)

[25] Dr. Herbert Stepic, managing director of Unico Trading Handelgesellscaft, an Austrian trading company has expressed these views in Patrick Blum, "Third World debt 'forces increase in counter-trading,' " *Financial Times,* September 21, 1984.

[26] See Defense Task Group study, p. 15; "Saudis Employing Offsets to Expand Industrial Base," *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* May 23, 1983, p. 85.

[27] U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Trade Offsets in Military Sales,* Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, (GAO/NSIAD-84-102), April 13, 1984, pp. 3, 7.

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eight of the 160 aircraft purchased are to be assembled in Turkey at a new facility, 51 percent of which will be owned by the Turkish government. The Defense Minister frankly admitted his country's multiple objectives when he stated that Turkey looks upon the new facility as a potential base for establishing a modern aeronautics industry. The offset, he pointed out, not only provides for the joint manufacture of the F-16s and their maintenance and modification, but assures Turkey technology transfer, training, and research and development in the future. In addition, the agreement will broaden Turkey's marketing opportunities, since the seller, General Dynamics, had agreed to find markets for Turkish products to earn foreign exchange to help offset the cost of the procurement.[28] Similar industrial development and marketing arrangements are being negotiated in the civilian sector. From the Turkish point of view, the offset is expected to not only defray the cost of needed aircraft, but to serve as a catalyst for industrial development and economic growth.

Need for Military Equipment. Like Turkey, most states perceive military procurement as vital to their survival. When they cannot afford to buy, or do not have the infrastructure or necessary scale to make weapons, states feel compelled to find other methods of procurement. Even states that have internal military industries do not usually have the resources or the scale to warrant across-the-board defense production. For these countries, too, the import of sophisticated military components and systems and the wherewithal to manufacture them, such as raw materials, licenses, tooling equipment, etc. is required. As one specialist observes: "the existence of military offset programs stems from the inelastic demand for military hardware among governments, the need to purchase equipment abroad, and the high price of these goods." [29]

Political Advantage. Various analysts also believe that foreign governments derive political advantage from offsets. Some use them to build domestic support, publicly pointing to the jobs, industrialization, and other economic benefits which accrue to the state and its citizens. In many countries these agreements also serve to keep the military happy and out of politics. Other governments use offsets as a symbol of national prestige, solidarity

[28] It was also agreed that Turkey would provide $1.8 billion of its own funds towards the $3.5 to $5 billion total cost. The rest was to be financed through bank credit loans and U.S. assistance. (*Aviation Week and Space Technology*, May 14, 1984; *Jane's Defence Weekly*, July 21, 1984, p. 84; GAO, *U.S. Trade Offsets in Military Trade*, p. 7.)

[29] Leo G. B. Welt, "Military Offsets," p. 21.

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with another state, or to increase their regional or international status.[30] In the opinion of David Blakemore, U.S. State Department, "The perceived economic benefits are only illusory. It is rare in today's international economy that offsets can be demonstrated to have purely economic advantages for the customer. More often the real gains are found in the political arena." [31]

Although buyers may be enthusiastic champions of compensatory trade agreements, sellers, by and large, are not. For most exporting companies, offsets are not trade agreements of choice. Rather, they see them as better than no sale at all, especially in cases where offsets are mandated as a condition of sale. The Treasury survey, for example, found that many U.S. companies believe offsets provide a competitive edge in a sale. Perceived competition was given as the major reason such arrangements are granted. Competition from other U.S. firms was cited in 62 percent of the military offset cases, and competition from foreign companies in 54 percent.[32] Thus, from the exporters' point of view, offsets are a way of maintaining their company's share of the market and/or improving sales. In some instances, these agreements also are used by the seller to ensure a reliable supplier of critical raw materials.[33]

How Extensive Is This Form of Trade?

Information about offsets is difficult to obtain and there is little consensus as to their extent. Why are so little data available? Although many factors contribute, perhaps the most important is that no single U.S. agency or department has been charged with keeping track of compen-

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[30] For example, the Brazil-Mexico agreement signed in April 1983, which called for the exchange of Brazil's electronics and electrical goods for Mexican oil, is described "in some quarters as a first step to free Latin America from the yoke of international bankers, from the hegemony of the dollar, and from the need to trade with industrialized countries." Similarly, Malaysia's attempts to barter have been described as an effort to reduce the country's dependence on the London commodity exchange. (Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Countertrade: Its Nature and Scope," Report 821-AR, April 17, 1984, p. 6. [Hereafter referred to as INR study.]; see also, Gary Banks, "The Economics and Politics of Countertrade," *The World Economy,* VI [June 1983], pp. 159-82.)

One DOD official believes that some countries are now using offset agreements to gain access to and influence in the U.S. political system. He claims that when legislation detrimental to the interests of the foreign government is being considered, it is possible for that country to bring pressure to bear on Congress through the commercial companies it has offset agreements with, so close and incestuous do these relationships become. I am also grateful to David Blakemore, Department of State, for his suggestion, during the early stages of this research, that I consider the political motives associated with the demand for offsets.

[31] Interview, April 25, 1985.

[32] Department of the Treasury, *Offset/Coproduction Requirements in Aerospace and Electronics Trade,* Table 8. The percentages add up to more than 100 percent because of multiple responses from companies reporting competition from several sources, domestic and foreign. The foreign competition most often mentioned was French, followed by the U.K., Germany, and Italy (p. 12).

[33] Dan Haendel, "International Barter and Countertrade," p. 7; see n. 54, below, for examples.

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satory foreign trade agreements.[34] Since 1978, the obligation to satisfy offset demands has been passed on to U.S. industries making the sales. The Department of Defense no longer becomes involved in guaranteeing such arrangements.[35] Without a mandated interest on the part of a government agency to monitor these agreements, combined with the industry's inclination to treat their contents as proprietary, there is little motive for any agency to collect data. Therefore, information on offsets and countertrade remains fragmentary.

What is offered here, then, is based on rough estimates derived from various preliminary studies done by U.S. and international agencies [36] and information drawn from personal interviews, the general literature, and press reports. Countertrade is estimated by the U.S. Department of Commerce to account for between 20 and 30 percent of the roughly $2 trillion of world trade in 1983.[37] However, the Department of State (INR) believes the total is closer to 15 percent; [38] the OECD calculates 8 percent of world trade as countertrade; GATT figures reflect about 6 percent and the IMF 1.0 percent.[39]

A similar estimate for the value of worldwide offsets does not exist, and even approximations of the dollar value of U.S. offset transactions are keenly debated. The Treasury, based on its survey of the aerospace and electronics industry, reported that the twenty-six companies responding to its questionnaire had agreed to an average annual $1.5 billion in offsets between 1975 and 1981, which many believe to be a conservative figure.[40] Congressman Vento, extrapolating from this

[34] One U.S. Defense Department official commented that the same is true for other countries. At least in the U.S. two governmental agencies are investigating the extent and implications of offsets. But in other countries there are no similar investigations underway, and there is equally little information available about their consequences.

[35] See pp. 203-204; and n. 57 for a discussion of current U.S. policy.

[36] See USITC, *Analysis of Recent Trends in U.S. Countertrade;* Department of the Treasury, *Offset/Coproduction Requirements in Aerospace and Electronics Trade: Report of a Survey of Industry,* May 24, 1983.

[37] Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary James P. Moore, Jr., Department of Commerce, before the Economic Stabilization Subcommittee, in *The Impact of Countertrade and Offset Agreements on the U.S. Economy,* Hearing before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, May 22, 1984, p. 31.

[38] This estimate is based on a study using 1982 data. It includes .10 percent of East-West trade; 2 percent of LDC trade with industrialized countries; 3 percent intra-LDC barter; 10 percent bilateral payments arrangements (including all trade within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [CEMA]). (INR study, p. 3.)

[39] Testimony by James P. Moore, Jr., Department of Commerce, before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, p. 62. James I. Walsh, Senior International Economist with the Department of Commerce, in an interview with the author, (December 1984) supplied the IMF estimate but expressed confidence in the 30 percent figure, explaining that the IMF estimates do not include many arrangements such as economic cooperation agreements, technology transfers, and other specialized deals containing countertrade clauses.

[40] Department of the Treasury, *Offset/Coproduction Requirements in Aerospace and Electronics Trade,* pp. 3-8. The Treasury study reports on the findings of a survey of the Aerospace Industries Association and the Electronics Industries Association. Twenty-six companies reported a total of 143 contracts involving compensation trade agreements with a face value of $15.2 billion, signed between January 1, 1975, and the summer of 1981. The twenty-six responding firms included most of the largest

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figure, estimates about $5 billion per year for the total industry, which he also believes to be "conservative." [41] If this figure is approximately accurate, it means that of the $14.6 billion in U.S. military sales agreements for 1984,[42] approximately 28 percent is represented by offset agreements.[43]

Most informed observers believe that offset demands are increasing and that they will continue to do so in the future. Interviews with trade specialists, intelligence analysts, Defense Department officials, as well as the growing number of press reports about offset arrangements, all support this conclusion. The GAO found some corroborative evidence contained in the August 1983 Department of Defense Task Group report which estimated that in the next five years, about $30 billion in potential arms sales are expected to involve offsets.[44] This represents a $1 billion annual increase over the current estimated figure of $5 billion per year, and this too may be a "conservative" guesstimate.

As table 3 indicates, demand for offsets has come primarily from industrialized countries as a prerequisite for purchasing major U.S. defense equipment. About 75 percent of all offset requirements reported in the Treasury study were in countries with high and medium R&D expenditures.[45] Canada and Japan received the largest dollar amounts regardless of category, Canada accounting for 47.6 percent and Japan 13 percent of the U.S. military offsets.

This finding is not surprising. Because the more industrialized states procure more advanced and expensive defense systems, the dollar value of their offsets is also higher relative to that of other states. Furthermore, the U.S. supports the concept of rationalization, standardization, and integration (RSI) of weapon systems in NATO, and, therefore, has given greater recognition to foreign production as offsets in those countries. For the most part, the largest agreements with industrialized and NATO states have involved aircraft acquisitions, e.g., the sale of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to NATO; the F-5E sale to Switzerland; F-16 sales to four northern European states (Belgium,

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and most diversified manufacturers in the fields of aerospace and electronics. Of these contracts, 120 (84 percent) valued at $14.2 billion were in the military sector of which offsets totalled $8.94 billion. See also the statement of Robert A. Cornell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, p. 16.

[41] Statement of Congressman Bruce F. Vento before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, p. 7.

[42] Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Fiscal Year Series*, 1984. This figure includes $300 million in construction services.

[43] One Defense Department official believes 28 percent is a very low estimate since the standard rate for offsets is 30 percent, and many run as high as 100 percent or more. (Interview, March 19, 1984).

[44] GAO, *Trade Offsets in Foreign Military Sales*, p. 3.

[45] Department of the Treasury, *Offset/Coproduction Requirements in Aerospace and Electronics Trade*, pp. 3-8.

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TABLE 3

MILITARY OFFSETS

RECIPIENT COUNTRIES BY CATEGORY[1]

OECD High R&D (15.4%)	OECD Medium R&D (59.1%)	OECD Low R&D (2.9%)	Other Countries (3.2%)[2]	Total $8.94b
France-0.29%	Australia-0.75%	Denmark-0.34%	Brazil-0.4%	
West Germany-1.54%	Belgium-2.18%	Finland-0.3%	Greece-0.1%	
Japan-12.78%	Canada-47.64%	Norway-0.57%	Israel-2.93%	
United Kingdom-1.34%	Italy-0.21%	Netherlands and Denmark 0.2%[3]	Pakistan-0.5%	
	Netherlands-2.17%	Portugal-0.73%	Korea-0.06%	
	Sweden-3.55%	Spain-0.36%		
	Switzerland-1.63%			

SOURCE: Derived from Tables 2 and 5 in the Department of the Treasury, *Offset / Coproduction Requirements in Aerospace and Electronics Trade: Report of a Survey of Industry,* May 24, 1984. This report surveyed twenty-six companies which reported a total of 143 civilian and military contracts, with a face value of $15.2 billion, signed between January 1, 1975 and the summer of 1981 involving offset obligations. Of these, military contracts totalled $8.94 billion.

[1] The first three categories are based on a system developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to distinguish between countries by their relative expenditures for research and development (R&D). States reported to have offset agreements with U.S. firms that do not appear in the OECD model are listed under "Other Countries."

[2] Offset agreements with NATO as a whole amounted to 10.9%; unknown=9.3%

[3] When Netherlands and Denmark were mentioned together in a U.S. firm's response, they were grouped in the "Low "R&D" category by the Treasury Department for the purposes of this report.

Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark) and Turkey; the F-18 sales to Australia, Canada, and Spain. The Raytheon Corporation also agreed to a 100 percent offset for its sale to the Netherlands of 160 Patriot surface-to-air missiles valued at $300 million.[46]

As reported by the GAO study, many foreign purchasers now expect to receive offsets as a matter of course, and some have or are instituting policies requiring them on all major military purchases. Examples are Norway (100 percent), Australia (30 percent, considering a rise to 40 percent), Spain, Greece, and Turkey. Some (such as Australia) are also demanding penalties for nonperformance.[47]

The LDCs make up only 3.2 percent of all reported offsets in the Treasury survey, and of these, Israel comprises 85 percent of the total. However, these figures relate only to the period between January 1, 1975, and summer of 1981, and conditions are changing rapidly. More LDCs are requiring offset agreements as a condition of their military purchases. For example, since 1982, the Indonesian government has established a policy whereby a foreign firm awarded a public sector contract of over $750,000 will be paid in cash for the service or goods, but will be obliged under the agreement to buy (or market) Indonesian products equivalent to 100 percent of the value of the sales contract within a certain period of time. Should the firm fail to purchase all or part of the specified Indonesian products, it would be liable to pay a penalty of 50 percent of the contract value.

Israel, in 1983, established a "Central Authority for Reciprocal Purchases" which requires suppliers to the public sector to buy Israeli products for one-quarter the value of the contracts received, or 40 percent local content on large government procurement contracts.[48] And during the same year, the Government of Malaysia issued a directive that created a countertrade unit under the Ministry of Trade and Industry to encourage countertrade, although it is not mandatory.[49] South Korea has begun to require foreign companies from which it buys military equipment to produce parts in-country or to arrange exports of Korean goods.[50]

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[46] "Dutch Seek to Buy 160 Patriot Missiles," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, November 14, 1983, p. 28. Interview with State Department official, March 19, 1985.

[47] GAO, *Trade Offsets in Foreign Military Sales*, pp. 3, 7.

[48] Israel's countertrade is said to run about $25-30 million annually, or 0.3 percent of Israel's $9 billion annual imports. (INR study, p. 7.)

[49] Stephan Pellay, "Trade by Exchange," *Development Forum Business Edition*, October 16, 1983, p. 1; Heshem El-Abd and Michael Kenny O'Sullivan, "Encountering Countertrade," p. 24.

[50] Among the foreign contractors already accommodating countertrade agreements in South Korea is General Dynamics which recently agreed to help offset the cost of the $930 million contract South Korea signed in 1981 for 36 F-16 fighter aircraft. In April 1984, General Dynamics contracted with Daewoo Heavy Industries to manufacture certain fuselage sections. ("South Koreans Toughen Terms in Military Sales," *Wall Street Journal*, April 17, 1984.)

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Egypt, Saudi Arabia,[51] and other U.S. industry customers have also begun to request offsets. This development is not confined to U.S. defense trade, but characterizes LDC agreements with Western Europe and the Warsaw Pact countries as well.[52] Another trend, underresearched, but apparently growing is intra-Third World countertrade. Iran, Brazil, and Mexico, for example, have negotiated offsets involving arms for oil with several Third World countries,[53] while other LDCs are investigating different kinds of countertrade opportunities.[54]

However, although the demand is growing, the number of agreements actually consummated may be less than press reports suggest. Due to the limited industrial and technological bases of many of these states (which inhibit coproduction), the low marketability of many of their products, and the legal complexities involved, finding mutually acceptable and efficient arrangements is often difficult. In fact, a recent study of countertrade questions the success of the LDCs in implementing their mandated offset and countertrade policies. It points out that because of its high compensatory demands, the Indonesians have signed few contracts. Brazil, eager to exchange oil for its civilian and military manufactured goods, has signed several agreements with poor results. Its barter

[51] In 1983, Saudi negotiators requested an "offset floor of 35 percent of technical services and products as a starting point in proposals" in their negotiations with U.S. contractors for the kingdom's $3.8 billion Peace Shield C³I system. (*Aviation Week and Space Technology,* November 21, 1983, p. 13. See also, "Saudis Employing Offsets to Expand Industrial Base," p. 85.)

[52] See "The Barter Game," *Middle East Magazine* (December 1984), pp. 15-19; *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* February 25, 1985, p. 22. The United Arab Emirates, for example, meets armaments payments to the French Dassault Company with crude oil. Bulgaria is also known to be heavily involved in countertrade. Between 1979-1982, according to one report, shipments of arms from Bulgaria rose fourfold, many of which were bartered for oil. During this period, arms became Bulgaria's top export, and oil and petroleum products were second. The latter were re-exported from Libya, Iraq, Iran and the Soviet Union. ("Bulgaria Arms Third World," *Washington Inquirer,* August 31, 1984.) Brazil and West Germany have also reached agreement for offsets. West Germany will build two conventional submarines for Brazil in exchange for iron ore worth about $200 million. One submarine will be built in West Germany, the other in Brazil. ("Brazil to Barter Iron Ore for Submarines," *Jane's Defence Weekly,* March 17, 1984, p. 29.)

[53] Brazil's involvement as a weapons supplier in the Persian Gulf dates back to arms-for-oil exchanges with Iraq before the start of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. Brazil has continued to be an important source of arms for Iraq, with the number of arms deliveries escalating sharply since 1983. Brazil had also been reported to have supplied Iran armored vehicles and equipment via Libya. (Richard House, "Brazilians Find Arms Buyers in Conflict Zones," *Washington Post,* June 9, 1984.) Recently, Brazil and Saudi Arabia signed a five-year military cooperation agreement in October 1984 in which Brazil will supply military products and services in exchange for oil as partial payment. Although the total price of the sale is not known, the Saudis are also expected to help finance the development of a new Brazilian-designed ship-to-ship missile system. Saudi Arabia, in exchange for its military purchases, will be permitted on a case-by-case basis to resell or transfer the weapons it buys from Brazil. The arrangement also provides for technical training of Saudi workers in weapons assembly and manufacturing, and the transfer of technology to expand Saudi Arabia's domestic military production capability. (Richard House, "Saudi Arabians, Brazilians Agree to Manufacture Weapons Jointly," *Washington Post,* October 12, 1984; "Bartering Oil," *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* October 22, 1984, p. 17.)

[54] Egypt is reported to be interested in bartering military hardware to Thailand, mainly in exchange for food and raw materials. (*Jane's Defence Weekly,* December 22, 1984, p. 1093.) Some analysts believe Israel is providing substantial numbers of arms and services to China in exchange for rare metals used in aircraft production such as, vanadium, titanium, and tantalum. (Russell Warren Howe, "Israel's Sales to China Believed to Exceed 41 Billion," *Washington Times,* January 1, 1985.)

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protocol with Mexico, for example, did not prevent a decline in trade between the two countries in recent years because of recession, and trade with Ecuador has been equally disappointing.[55] Similar problems beset trade between the LDCs and industrialized countries.

A major obstacle has been the question of "additionality." Many LDCs have grown wary of offset agreements in which their primary commodities are involved and are demanding some guarantee that additional markets will be created for them. Some LDC governments believe that in countertrade arrangements, their primary products are merely resold in their own traditional markets — a situation which in the long run adversely affects their export position.[56] This issue has further complicated negotiations and arrangements for countertrade.

Types of Offset Agreements

An index to measure the relative weight of different offset arrangements was constructed from the Department of Treasury data. However, because many of the reported contracts call for more than one type of offset, only the incidence of each type rather than the dollar value could be presented. Table 4 shows the relative frequency of the different kinds of compensatory trade agreements employed in the military sector and in both the military and civilian sectors. Note that domestic military production (coproduction, licensed production, subcontracting) is cited about as frequently as countertrade as a form of offset. It is also interesting to note how blurred the distinction between civilian and defense products has become in international trade. Thus in the military sector, the number of counterdelivery agreements for civilian goods is about equal to those set for the locally produced military items.

How do Offsets Affect U.S. Interests?

Until 1978 the Department of Defense negotiated offset arrangements between U.S. defense equipment manufacturers and other countries in connection with foreign military sales.[57] Since then, in accordance with the Department of Defense's May 4, 1978, directive, the

[55] INR study, p.5.

[56] "The Barter Game," p. 16.

[57] The U.S. government withdrew from these arrangements in 1978 because of the following: management complexities and the drain on DOD resources in the negotiation and implementation of these agreements; such agreements created the impression of a U.S. government obligation to purchase systems or components produced in foreign countries, or an interest in requiring U.S. contractors to do so; conviction that offset commitments were business judgments which should not involve DOD; and belief that the responsibility for fulfilling the offset should be the contractor's not DOD's. (GAO, *Trade Offsets in Foreign Military Sales,* p. 1.)

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TABLE 4

INCIDENCE OF OFFSET AGREEMENTS IN THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SECTORS AND IN THE MILITARY SECTOR ONLY

	Military and Civil (345) %	Military Only (317) %
Coproduction and Licensed Production	*20.0*	*21.1*
Subcontract Production	24.9	23.7
Foreign Investment	2.6	2.8
Technology Transfer	6.4	6.9
Countertrade (all types)	46.1	45.4
Defense Buys	21.2	23.0
Civilian Buys	24.9	22.4

SOURCE: Department of the Treasury, *Offset/Coproduction Requirements in Aerospace and Electronics Trade: Report of a Survey of Industry,* May 24, 1984, Table 5, p. 9.

so-called Duncan Memorandum, the U.S. government takes no active role in administering or guaranteeing offsets. Current policy provides that (1) DOD will not become directly involved in offsets either as a participant or a guarantor; and (2) Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits will not be used to directly finance coproduction or licensed production abroad.[58] When compensatory agreements are deemed necessary the following general guidelines will apply: "Agreements involving system specific arrangements should specify that the responsibility for fulfilling any commitment rests with the U.S. firms directly benefiting from the sale." [59]

The term *coproduction,* however, itself implies some sort of government participation in offsets. Government-owned facilities do sell licenses to countries which permit them to manufacture domestically U.S. government-owned military items. These sales are often associated with larger procurements, and are negotiated as a means of reducing the amount of foreign exchange needed by the buyer for the military package. They therefore qualify as government-sponsored offsets.

[58] This element of U.S. policy has been eroded by specific agreements with Greece, Israel, Spain, and Turkey. One reason, according to a U.S. government official, is the size and complexity of many arrangements such as the F-16 and F-18 agreements "which have made it very difficult to separate out FMS credit monies from other monies involved." (Interview with OMB official, April 18, 1985.)

[59] *General Policy on Compensatory Coproduction and Offset Agreements with Other Nations,* May 4, 1978. The directive states that "DOD shall not normally enter into such agreements. An exception may be made only when there is no feasible alternative to ensure the successful completion of transactions considered to be of significant importance to United States national security interests (e.g., rationalization of mutual defense arrangements)."

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The relationship of these agreements to stated policy constitutes what some Department of Defense officials grant is a "gray area." However, they add that coproduction does not violate the intent of the Duncan Memorandum, since the sale of production licenses is neither administered nor guaranteed by the U.S. government, nor are there ever any "buy-backs" involved.

There are other more indirect ways in which the government also becomes involved: restrictions on certain types of technology transfer,[60] third country transfer prohibitions,[61] and various legislative and administrative mandates to oversee the impact on U.S. political, economic, and military interests.

However, the increasing demand for offsets has raised concerns among industries, labor organizations, and in some government agencies that existing policy guidance is inadequate to protect U.S. national interests. As a result, Congress has mandated a study detailing the uses of offsets and their effect on defense preparedness, industrial competitiveness, employment, and U.S. trade abroad.[62] Congressional hearings have been held,[63] and various government agencies are now reviewing their policies.

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[60] These are the principal mechanisms that presently review all requests for the transfer of mulitary technology: (1) The Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) which was developed to assess exports in the East-West trade. It is employed to identify technologies which should be released with caution; (2) The National Disclosure Policy (NDP) requires that all classified information or equipment releases be assessed according to certain specified criteria. Within established classification levels for each country, the authority to release specific technologies rests with the department responsible for the system concerned; and (3) The State Department's International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) governs the export of technical information for production of arms, ammunition, and the implements of war. The Department of State and the Department of Defense review the proposed agreement of the U.S. firm and the foreign recipient to ensure that the extent of the transfer does not negatively affect U.S. interests. Commercial licenses are also reviewed under these regulations by the State Department's Office of Munitions Control.

[61] The Arms Export Control Act (ACEA), 1976 as amended, provides that "the country or international organization shall have agreed not to transfer title of, or possession of, any defense article or related training, or other defense service so furnished to it to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of that country or international organization, and not to use or permit the use of such an article or related training or other defense service for purposes other than those for which furnished unless the consent of the President has first been obtained." It also directs that "the country or international organization shall have agreed that it will maintain the security of such article and will provide substantially the same degree of security protection afforded to such an article by the United States." (Cited in Chapter 2, Section 3, of the Department of Defense, *Security Assistance Manual,* January 2, 1985, pp. 2.2-2.3.)

[62] Congressman Vento wrote the amendment to the Defense Production Act (section 309), April 1984, directing the president to submit a formal report of its findings on these questions. The survey currently being conducted by the coordinating committee is in response to this mandate. An earlier study on offsets requested by the committee appeared as: General Accounting Office, *Trade Offsets in Foreign Military Sales,* Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, April 13, 1984 (GAO/NSIAD-84-102). According to one observer, this report was used by Congressman Vento to persuade Congress to pass his amendment to the Defense Production Act. The Treasury survey of offsets which appeared in 1983, was a voluntary study, the initiative for which came from the Department of the Treasury itself.

[63] *The Impact of Countertrade and Offset Agreements on the U.S. Economy,* Hearing before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, May 22, 1984.

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In general, there is strong feeling within the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Labor that a more explicit national policy is needed, and that some agency should have oversight responsibility. They part company on how such policy should be administered and which agency should have the lead role. The Departments of Defense, State, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), and the OMB have been more reluctant to commit themselves on this issue, and a large turf fight is underway. As the State Department declared in April 1983:

> We believe it is premature to undertake any new multilateral negotiations or to issue any statement condemning offsets since there is clearly no agreement between State, Treasury, DOD, OMB, or Commerce (or industry) on what the facts are, the nature of the problem, and the appropriate remedial steps.[64]

Currently, a survey is being conducted by a coordinating committee, chaired by the Office of Management and Budget, including representatives from the State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, and Labor Departments, as well as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council. A questionnaire designed to measure the extent and consequences of offsets was sent out to U.S. industries in February 1985; the results will be reported to Congress in October 1985.

Industry and labor are as divided on the question of offsets as are the government agencies. Large U.S. corporations have reacted to the increasing demand by establishing special in-house trading organizations to deal with the countertrade commitments of the parent company. As the USITC study observed: "The evolution of these U.S. trading organizations is an indication of the growing importance of countertrade as a competitive tool in international trade." In 1974, for example, fewer than five major multinational firms had in-house trading organizations compared with more than thirty in 1980. According to the USITC these in-house organizations are serving a wide range of activities including market research, market development, importing and exporting, customs documentation, financial arranagements, and distribution.[65] Although data on the military industries alone are not available, personal interviews with executives from several defense companies affirm that this general trend describes developments in the military sector as well. Many large corporations have already or are now developing in-house expertise to handle

[64] Quoted in GAO, "Trade Offsets in Foreign Military Sales," p. 6.
[65] USITC, *Analysis of Recent Trends in U.S. Countertrade*, p. vii.

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offset agreements.[66] In situations that call for marketing experience outside the military sector, some of these in-house departments often call on trading houses for assistance.

Despite the movement in this direction, some defense industries regard the trend toward mandated offsets with reservation and are becoming more vocal in their opposition to them. Organized labor also views offsets with suspicion. It has abandoned its long-standing support for free trade in favor of protectionism. Rising unemployment and increasing foreign imports, perceived to be unfairly subsidized in the country of origin, have served to inflame labor's antagonism to this form of trade.

The issues raised by the various agencies and interest groups set forth a number of fundamental questions that are central to the current debate:

What are the long-term consequences for the international trade and finance system? Given the premise of the free-trade international system as it developed after World War II — "namely the unfettered, profit-oriented flows of goods and capital across national boundaries" — can it exist in the current world economy?[67] Many specialists view countertrade and offsets as coercive, anticompetitive practices that impede free and open trade and restructure the world trade system to negative effect. As James Walsh of the Department of Commerce wrote: "The tendency for governments to implement industrial diversification and expansion programs through mandated industrial countertrade often leads to production capacity expansions not only beyond the needs of the domestic market, but also beyond the needs of the world market."[68]

Furthermore, sellers are forced to buy goods from their customers when cheaper and more efficient producers may exist elsewhere. For indebted countries, the banks are insisting that sellers take delivery of domestic product rather than hard currency so bank loans can be paid off. As Walsh observes: "The debt schedule is now running the market!! And this is only the beginning of the problem. State enterprises in many countries are willing and able to sell below the market price, raising all kinds of problems relating to dumping laws, countervailing duties, escape relief, among other things. There is no remedy for this now and no one is looking at it over the long-term."[69]

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[66] Rockwell International and Northrop have long experience in this area and already engage actively in offset and countertrade. It has been estimated by one Rockwell employee that 10 percent of Rockwell's exported goods are paid for in countertrade and he expects it to double soon. (INR study, p. 10)

[67] Pompiliu Verzariu, "Do Offsets Help or Hurt U.S. Jobs and Trade?"

[68] James I. Walsh, "Countertrade: Past, Present, and Future Trends," paper for the Academy of International Business Meeting, October 18, 1984, unpublished.

[69] Interview with James I. Walsh, Department of Commerce, December 1984.

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Critics complain that other trade distortions are created by offsets, particularly countertrade. They claim these arrangements transfer the cost of marketing a country's surplus or undesirable products to the exporting corporation, which constitutes subsidization of that country's products by the private firm in world markets. The same, they claim, is true for military buy-backs. The overall result is that inefficient producers find markets for their domestic manufactures while more competitive producers disappear. In the long run the cost of international defense procurements increases. Contractors raise their prices in lieu of the marketing and other transaction costs associated with offsets and countertrade,[70] raising unit costs, and expanding defense budgets.[71]

Others note that in the long-term offsets serve a free trade system, since these arrangements stimulate the industrial and social development of U.S. allies and friends. Because offsets increase employment, industrial development, and export capacity in these nations as well as generating hard currency to finance essential imports, they will serve to increase international trade.[72]

However, the debate over this issue has cut across traditional free-trade vs. protectionist lines, and many of one persuasion or the other find themselves united regarding the negative or positive impact of offset agreements on world trade.[73]

What are the long-term consequences for the U.S. economy? A major question being asked is whether short-term profits derived by one industrial sector as a result of sales tied to offsets, might be nullified

[70] The costs of negotiating the appropriate valuation for products to be countertraded, and finding markets for those goods can be very costly. Furthermore, a company that cannot use counterpurchased goods must engage in marketing activities to resell them at considerable expense. If subcontracted to a trading company, commission costs can run as high as 20 to 30 percent of the transaction's value. (INR study, p. 8.)

[71] Testimony of John D. Lange, Jr., U.S. Treasury Department, before the Economic Stabilization Subcommittee, Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, September 24, 1981.

[72] Thomas B. McVey, "Countertrade: Commercial Practices; Legal Issues and Policy Dilemmas," *Law and Policy in International Business,* vol. 16, no. 1, 1984, p. 57. Some observers believe that to America's allies jobs are often the single most important issue in an offset agreement. As one program manager writes: "I don't think we sufficiently realize, in this country, the emphasis our allies put on employment. In this country we tend to emphasize only the product while our allies give equal attention to the number of jobs created. In fact, industry is primarily viewed as a source of employment. The old saying, 'That we adapt our work force to fit the product while others adapt the product to fit the work force,' contains a large element of truth." (Frederick H. Barnes, "F-18 Multinational Coproduction Issues," *The Disam Journal,* vol. 7, no. 2 [Winter, 1984-85]. For a similar view see: "Economics, Politics Portend Shifts," *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* May 21, 1984, p. 51.)

[73] This concern and confusion over foreign trade in general is reflected in the positions taken by the Democratic and Republican parties. Frequent policy shifts attest to the sharp divisions within each of them. The Democrats, a free trade party throughout the nineteenth century and into the 1930s, championed legislation to restrict imports during the presidential election campaign in 1984, and have now reverted to a more free trade position. The Republicans who advocated free trade in 1984 are swinging back toward the protectionism they espoused years ago. (See Clyde H. Farnswoth, "Debate on Trade Affecting Parties," *New York Times,* April 11, 1985.)

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in the long term by structural changes forced on the U.S. economy as a consequence of those trade arrangements?

Some observers are concerned that offsets will have negative impacts on a wide range of industrial sectors. Since mustering the necessary resources to exploit opportunities in foreign markets adds substantial costs to the exporter, they fear the result may be the elimination of smaller companies that do not have the organizational or financial means to administer offsets, in favor of large firms that do. Small firms, they argue, are generally less able to use countertraded products within their organizations and have limited access to worldwide markets.[74]

Others express concern that these arrangements, particularly those allowing for production abroad, generate commercial competition that not only adversely affects the U.S. industrial base at the secondary and tertiary levels of subcontractors and suppliers, and therefore the readiness posture of U.S. industry, but also tax revenues and the U.S. balance of payments. Spain's bid for a new main battle tank to be built in Spain is cited as an example, since Spain wants export rights that would directly compete in the markets of the original supplier.[75]

U.S. labor groups contend that offsets negatively affect their interests also. They believe products imported into the U.S. as a result of compensatory trade arrangements constitute a significant loss of jobs. The Canadian F-18 offset agreement between McDonnell Douglas and Canada is cited as the most egregious example; Canadian subcontractors have been producing items for the McDonnell Douglas production line that previously were made in the United States. Similar questions have been raised by the General Accounting Office regarding licensed production in Israel.[76]

Many companies cited in the Department of Treasury survey, on the other hand, feel they have not been hurt by compensatory trade agreements.[77] They report that offsets have created additional sales and markets for them and have helped expand the firm's influence abroad. Some companies also contend, and the USITC report found that for the most part, U.S. exports exceed the value of imports in countertrade

[74] INR study, p. 10.

[75] "Five companies bid for Spain's MBT," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, August 4, 1984, p. 131.

[76] Israel is producing the F-16's composite rudder as a direct offset arrangement with its FMS program. (GAO, *Trade Offsets in Foreign Military Sales*, p. 7.) In addition, Israel Aircraft Industries, under a contract placed October 1982, is producing a conformal fuel tank set for the F-15. (*Jane's Defence Weekly*, July 21, 1984, p. 63.)

[77] An analysis of corporate annual reports for ten of the largest American military contractors showed that, on average, they realized a 25 percent return on equity in 1984. Among the corporations surveyed are Lockheed which showed a 42 percent profit, General Dynamics 30 percent, and Northrop 29 percent — all three of which are associated with large offset agreements. However, although compensatory trade arrangements in the military sector do not appear to have impacted negatively on industrial profits, it must be remembered that foreign sales constitute only about 30 percent of their total business. (Jeff Gerth, "U.S. Weapons Makers Ring Up Healthy Profits," *New York Times*, April 1985.)

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arrangements since most of the counterdeliveries are shipped to markets other than the United States.[78] In addition, many companies report that rather than substituting U.S. goods for imported products, they substitute imported products for other imported products. They believe that lower prices and the larger quantities of available goods which result from expanded imports reduce inflationary pressures in the U.S. economy.[79] Rockwell International, for example, claims that countertrade permitted it to procure forgings from a new supplier at 40 percent savings.[80]

Addressing the question of lost jobs, the Secretary of Defense in testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 22, 1983, reported that for foreign sales deliveries ranging between $5 billion and $10 billion, between 2,000 and 3,000 jobs are created in the private sector. As the value of defense deliveries increases, so do the number of jobs.[81]

Because little data exist to support either the pro or con position, the controversy on the issue promises to continue and grow more heated as the demand for offsets rises.

How do these arrangements affect U.S. national security interests? Even critics of offset agreements recognize that important national security interests are often involved. Their major concern is that one national security interest will cancel the other.

Technology transfers associated with offsets have been a particularly contentious issue. Concern is expressed that the transfer of sophisticated technologies will increase the possibility that they will fall into Soviet hands. Others note that U.S. trade is lost with adverse effect on the American economy when allies acquire systems they would ordinarily not have, manufacture them with the benefit of government subsidies, and then later compete with U.S. military products in the international market.[82] The authors of a recent article on offsets believe: "The export of high technology defense equipment has traditionally been an area of U.S. dominance and giving up the technological advantage to other countries may hinder future export sales as well as place sensitive U.S. technology outside the domain of U.S. legal controls."[83] In this view, political

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[78] USITC, "Analysis of Recent Trends in U.S. Countertrade," p. vii, and p. 21.

[79] McVey, "Countertrade: Commercial Practices, Legal Issues and Policy Dilemmas," p. 59.

[80] INR study, p. 7.

[81] Statement quoted in GAO, "Trade Offsets in Foreign Military Sales," p. 4.

[82] During the Carter administration, the decision was made to transfer American homing device technology to Britain, France, and Germany for the Vought four nation Multiple Launch Rocket System program. Recently, the U.S. has delayed handing the technology over on the grounds a) that it might leak to the Soviet Union; and b) it might be exploited by the Europeans to the detriment of U.S. commercial interests. (Lisa Rennie, "The Debate over Buy America," *Journal of Defense and Diplomacy* [August 1983], pp. 22-25.

[83] Hesham El-Abd and Michael Kennedy O'Sullivan, "Encountering Countertrade," *Journal of Defense and Diplomacy* (July 1984) p. 27.

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and military power is grounded in a stable, prosperous economy. What threatens the latter, directly or indirectly, threatens the former. Others fear the U.S. industrial base and military preparedness will be adversely affected. They warn that coproduction and licensed production abroad can lead to increased American dependence on foreign subcontractors and suppliers, threatening both the defense industrial base and U.S. military preparedness.[84]

Some observers believe that offsets promote rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) among allies, and reduce each country's procurement costs. They argue that without offsets, America's allies might choose not to modernize their forces, or they might turn to other suppliers to fill their military needs, either of which would negatively affect the Alliance's capability and increase the U.S. defense burden. Moreover, they maintain that permitting allies and friends to produce U.S. military items not only builds their military capabilities, but their economies as well, both of which are in the broad U.S. national interest. In addition, they note that these sales have had important benefits for the U.S. defense posture. Standardized equipment and U.S. exports reduce unit costs for the U.S. services and foster ties between the U.S. and its allies.[85] Moreover, they argue, standardized equipment also contributes to U.S. global strategy by making maintenance and spare parts available throughout the world. The F-16 program which has coproduction facilities in Pakistan, South Korea, Egypt, Israel, Norway, and several other countries is offered as one example.[86] The whole question of substitute suppliers, although rarely discussed in this connection, applies here as well.

Addressing the issue of technology transfers, some analysts observe that for the past thirty years NATO's trade balance in military

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[84] A yearlong study by sixty aerospace company officials warned that offsets negatively affect U.S. surge capability. Shortfalls in the U.S. aerospace industry hamper airframe and engine manufacturers' ability to surge production to meet emergency requirements, which compromises U.S. military preparedness and capabilities. The industry officials called on the government to discontinue mandated foreign offsets. ("Study by Industry Identifies Surge Capability Shortfall," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, June 18, 1984, pp. 95-6.)

[85] The whole question of a two-way street in military procurement has been a continuing irritant in U.S.-European relations. The British, for example, were particularly upset over the decision to install a U.S.-built ejection seat into the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 combat aircraft after the British Martin Baker firm had already won the competition for the contract. The British felt that they were in the process of buying Trident SLBMs, Boeing Vertol CH-47 helicopters and McDonnell Douglas F-4 fighters, and were considering several other systems under a British-American Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on defense purchases. In their view, the ejection seat served as an important partial offset for them. Congress also cancelled an MOU when it decided not to buy a large number of German-built vehicles for the U.S. military — an agreement which although informal was seen as part of the two-way street and compensation for its large purchases of U.S. equipment. Germany was as displeased as the British, further straining an already fractured alliance. (Lisa Rennie, "The Debate Over Buy America," p. 24.)

[86] El-Abd and Sullivan, "Encountering Countertrade," p. 27; interview with State Department official, March 19, 1985.

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equipment has been about six to one in favor of the U.S., and offsets have not eroded this advantage. Furthermore, they believe that third party transfer restrictions, which prohibit the retransfer of any U.S. government manufacturing equipment or any major U.S. military component or system without approval, have served to limit the commercial opportunities afforded foreign producers of U.S. military items. And because U.S. state-of-the-art and sensitive technologies have not to-date been produced abroad, the opportunities for their leakage to the Soviet Union are not related to offsets. As one government official remarked: "It is in the exporting company's self-interest *not* to transfer its most sophisticated technologies. In spite of all the rhetoric about RSI, the U.S. has protected itself very well. Offsets give the seller a great deal of flexibility. He decides what he wants to buy and what he wants to give. For the most part, the decision has been to release rather low level technology."[87] In this view, offsets do not create unacceptable commercial competition for the U.S., nor do they constitute a dangerous conduit for "sensitive" technology transfers to the Soviet Union.

The Relationship Between Public and Private Sectors in the Arms Trade

These issues raise important questions about the relationship between the public and private sectors of the U.S. economy and the extent to which the government should and can intervene to regulate commercial military and civilian trade. Because offsets, as a matter of policy, are delegated to private industry, in the eyes of some, controlling them would be a form of unacceptable state interference. Even those companies most negatively disposed to offsets are unsure there is a positive role for government, and they express concern that any kind of government interference will compromise the independence and the confidentiality of their business transactions.[88] On the other hand, some interest groups argue that offsets represent a threat to basic U.S. national economic interests that take first priority.

Policy Options and Industry Response

Various policy options have been discussed from time to time by government and industry with little agreement. Some agencies and

[87] Interview with an official at the Office of Management and Budget, March 19, 1985.
[88] Discussion with an official at the Office of Management and Budget, March 19, 1985.

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companies advocate unilateral U.S. action to limit compensatory trade practices. This would include (1) legislation prohibiting U.S. firms to respond to offset demands; (2) the establishment of import laws to prevent the importation of countertraded goods into the United States; and (3) restrictions on the use of funds from export financing institutions in sales involving offsets or countertrade. Others have recommended a reorganization of the U.S. bureaucracy to give it a more active, integrated role in international defense programs and oversight over offsets.[89]

Some government agencies and industries believe that offsets should be curtailed, but that the problem demands a multilateral response. In their view, a unilateral action would not reduce the practice, but merely render U.S. firms uncompetitive in the international market. Instead, they advocate that the U.S. government negotiate multilateral or bilateral agreements to "clearly define" or "limit" offset practices to assure competition and guard against restraint of trade.[90]

Many corporations, and some government agencies, however, are skeptical about the positive benefits of legislative intervention and the extent of U.S. power abroad. They believe that even if such a multilateral response could improve trading conditions, reaching such an agreement would be difficult if not impossible to achieve, and even if feasible would take years to implement. Most remember the abortive Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks during the Carter administration and are going about business as usual. To these pragmatists it is clear that as long as negative economic conditions persist, foreign governments will continue to request some form of compensation as a condition for purchasing military equipment.

But even the pragmatists are divided over the prospects for the future. Most assume that today's economic conditions are temporary aberrations which will be corrected eventually. Then, as the world econ-

[89] Defense Task Group study, Recommendation V.B.3. This report suggests that coproduction agreements could be better managed and coordinated through the establishment of an International Arms Collaboration Council. It concludes that a more consistent policy reflecting U.S. government interest and greater speed and efficiency in reaching decisions would be the result of such a bureaucratic change. Industry, fearing that yet another bureaucratic layer would only further delay what is often a slow process, has not supported the idea.

[90] GAO, "Trade Offsets in Foreign Military Sales," p. 10. According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, a precedent for such negotiations already exists. Referring to an agreement reached during the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the 1970s, Charles Blum cites Article V.14(h) which although nonbinding requests that entities normally refrain from awarding contracts for civil aircraft "on condition that the supplier provide offset procurement opportunities or similar conditions." In testimony before Congress, Mr. Blum expressed the belief that because it is an internally agreed statement of policy it "represents a first step towards establishing controls over demands for offsets." (Statement of Charles H. Blum, before the Economic Stabilization Subcommittee, Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, May 22, 1984, p. 45-6. A report about "impending" U.S. attempts to reach informal agreement with Britain, France, and West Germany to limit offsets demanded by third countries as a condition of arms purchases appeared in the press March 1984. (*Aviation Week and Space Technology,* March 26, 1984, p. 15.) However, to the author's knowledge there has been no further mention of either the occurrence or outcome of such negotiations.

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omy reverts to its former state, compensatory trade arrangements will fade from the scene as unnecessary and undesirable appendages to it.

Others are less sure. They note the growing interdependence of the international economy, the blurring of sectors within it, and question whether foreign trading practices can ever revert to what the world has come to consider "normal." They suspect the international monetary system may no longer be able to support the world's productive capabilities and that fundamental economic change is underway. Offsets, they fear, may already have become an endemic part of the arms trade. The fact that industrialized as well as industrializing countries have come to view offsets as a means to many ends, suggests to these observers that the demand for them will persist. In their view, it is therefore unlikely that compensatory trading practices will fade from the international trade arena in the near future.

As the demand for offsets grows, so will the debate over them. But the pragmatists are probably right. Judging from the complexities of the issues, the lack of hard data, the limitations inherent in the survey techniques now being used to gather information, and the powerful interests involved, enlightenment will be slow in coming. Until then, it is unlikely the United States government, or any other government, will act to restrict offsets. If not for the long term, then surely for the foreseeable future, offsets will remain an integral part of the international arms trade.

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WORLD POLITICS

Survival Is Not Enough: Soviet Realities and America's Future. By Richard Pipes. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. 302 pp. $16.95. Erudite and incisive, this volume by the former Director of East European and Soviet Affairs at the National Security Council provides an in-depth survey of what the author does not shrink from calling Soviet Grand Strategy in all its political, economic, and military dimensions. Pipes assesses the systemic crisis afflicting the Soviet economy and explores the broader political crisis which, if not ameliorated by Western policies of accommodation, the author believes could lead Moscow to abandon militarism and expansionism. This is the most comprehensive individual effort since George Kennan's writings on containment almost forty years ago to link Soviet behavior abroad to internal conditions in the Soviet Union and both of these to Western policies, a subject to which the last chapter is devoted. In one of many telling observations, Pipes writes: "It seems improbable that a regime that habitually violates law, especially at home, where it can act with impunity, and readily resorts to force to settle disputes in its favor, will show scrupulous respect for arms-control treaties and rely on peaceful procedures to resolve its differences with other nations." One institutional reform in U.S. policy making toward the Soviet Union that Pipes recommends: creation in the U.S. State Department of a counterpart to the CPSU's International Department. This office would be charged with monitoring East-West relations, the international Communist movement, and Soviet strategy in all fields and would advise the secretary on an American counter-strategy. Readers may agree or disagree with the author's analysis and conclusions, but this is a triumph of historically based policy analysis that is destined to be a classic statement of one view on the subject.

Reluctant Rebels: Comparative Studies of Revolution and Underdevelopment. By John Walton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984. 230 pp. $27.50 ($10.00, paper). The theme of this study is the relationship between revolutions and underdevelopment in the Third

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World. Relying on three case studies — the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, the Violencia in Colombia, and the Mau Mau in Kenya — the author analyzes the historical origins, the societal conditions, and the international political economy of the time. His synthesis resembles a variant of a *dependencia* model in its attention to the effect of foreign economic interests on the shifting coalitions among the country's modernizing elites.

DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY HISTORY

Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars. Edited by Ernest R. May. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. 546 pp. $29.50. This volume — the product of a conference held during the summer of 1981 at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard — is a collection of superb essays on how the great powers derived their intelligence assessments of one another in the periods before the two world wars. Unlike most books that grow out of conference proceedings, there is not a single weak essay in this collection: each contributor has attained the highest standards of historical scholarship, providing sharp analytical insights, sober judgments, and a wealth of information about the countries examined. This otherwise excellent volume suffers, however, from two sins of omission. First, the volume neglects to provide an examination of the intelligence assessments made in the United States and their impact on foreign and defense policies in the era of the First World War. This is somewhat surprising, since the United States possessed the organizational structure to make quite accurate assessments of the threats posed by foreign powers to American security. The Office of Naval Intelligence, for example, provided naval policy makers with intelligence on the building programs, weapons characteristics, and operational plans of foreign naval powers. Indeed, United States naval officers drew a very accurate picture of German operational plans in this period. Secondly, there was little attempt in this volume to relate the various case studies examined by the contributors to the rapidly growing theoretical literature in the field of strategic studies on the problems of intelligence assessment. More of an attempt might have been made to produce an interdisciplinary approach to this topic.

German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler. By Henry Ashby Turner, Jr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 525 pp. $25.00. In an

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important new book, Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., Professor of History at Yale University, examines the role played by German big business in Hitler's rise to power. The collapse of the Weimar Republic and the Nazi seizure of power — like the war-guilt question about the origins of the First World War — is a subject that provokes fiercely emotional and partisan debate. That German big business played a decisive role in bringing Hitler to power is an article of faith to many historians, political theorists, and left-wing ideologues. In his richly detailed and lucidly written account, Professor Turner challenges this belief by describing the connections between the business community and the National Socialists. Hitler was certainly not the puppet of major German industrialists that he is frequently caricatured as by vulgar Marxists. The final section of Turner's book, entitled "Myths, Preconceptions, and the Misuse of History," is a stinging indictment of those scholars who have distorted the historical record to fit their ideological preconceptions. Turner concludes: "As always when the writing of history is made subservient to some other goal, the result has been poor history." *German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler* must henceforth be considered the authoritative study on this subject, and, in exposing past abuses by scholars, Professor Turner has alerted us to the ways the writing of history can be distorted by bias and slovenliness.

The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904-1914. By Keith M. Wilson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 207 pp. $34.50. In this fascinating collection of essays, Keith M. Wilson offers a reassessment of Britain's foreign policy in the ten-year period between 1904 and the outbreak of war in 1914. The strength of these essays is Wilson's skill in weaving together the various European and imperial strands in British foreign policy, and then placing this network of relationships within the larger setting of the relative decline of Britain's power in world politics. Instead of focusing on the increasing Anglo-German antagonism, Wilson maintains that not enough weight has been given in accounts about British foreign policy in this period to the threat posed to Britain's empire by Russia's expansion in Asia. This threat loomed before British policy makers as a potentially insurmountable strategic problem, taxing Britain's resources and challenging its standing in world politics. Wilson carries this argument further by asserting that British policy makers "regarded themselves on the whole as being less threatened by Germany than by Russia; that the achievement and maintenance of good relations with Russia as an end in itself was the main objective of British policy throughout these years." In addition, Wilson argues that, contrary to the general interpretation of Britain's

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foreign policy under the Liberal Government, domestic politics played an important role in shaping the actions of British decision makers. While Wilson's conclusions will appear overstated to many historians, his book will serve the valuable purpose of stimulating debate on Britain's foreign policy and the origins of the First World War.

A Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945. By John Terraine. New York: Macmillan, 1985. 848 pp. $29.95. It has been estimated that Britain devoted 50 to 60 percent of its war production during the Second World War to the Royal Air Force. What strategic return did Britain derive from this heavy investment? In particular, what contribution did Bomber Command make to the defeat of Germany? And, did the heavy losses suffered by Bomber Command — 47,268 officers, non-commissioned officers, and airmen were killed or wounded during the war — outweigh the strategic gains? These questions are at the center of John Terraine's first-rate study of the men and machines that fought the air war over Europe. Terraine is no stranger to controversy: in earlier works he has sought to defend what many consider to be indefensible — British generalship on the Western Front during the First World War. Terraine now turns his attention and skills to the operations of the Royal Air Force in the European theater. Tracing the development of the Royal Air Force during the interwar period, Terraine describes how the pre-war planning, doctrine, and equipment fared when confronted by the shock of war, and how prewar strategic and operational dogmas persisted or adapted to the conditions of fighting. Terraine is particularly adept in describing the technological competition between Britain and Germany in air warfare. In this technological leapfrogging, an advantage attained by one side over the other would only be short-lived, and the goal of operations became the exploitation of a position of technical superiority for as long as it lasted to deliver a knock-out blow to the adversary's forces or economy. Terraine's book is highly recommended to those interested in the dynamics of this technological competition and in the history of the Second World War.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland, and the Politics of Industry. By Peter J. Katzenstein. Ithaca and London: Cornell University

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Press, 1984. 331 pp. $35.00. In an important contribution to the literature on comparative and international political economy, Peter Katzenstein argues that democratic corporatism strongly influences the ways that Switzerland and Austria react to changing international markets. Corporatism provides the consensus necessary for both countries to react flexibly, but, because it assumes different forms in Switzerland and Austria, their general and specific policies also differ. Liberal corporatism in Switzerland dictates a policy of "global adaptation and private compensation"; social corporatism in Austria dictates one of "national adaptation and public compensation." Acutely sensitive to the historical determinants of patterns of politics, Katzenstein presents a compelling case for the importance of domestic structures in understanding state responses to constraints or opportunities presented by the international system.

Import Competition and Response. By Jagdish N. Bhagwati. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1982. 410 pps. No price given. Most of the thirteen essays in this book are intended to develop a theoretical framework to aid in the understanding and empirical analysis of issues raised by import competition. Of particular interest to political scientists are the five papers addressed to the issue of "Responses to Import Competition: Lobbying et al." Among these is an essay by the editor that distinguishes possible responses according to type of industry affected; an explanation by Paul Krugman of why liberalized trade has in the postwar period "chiefly benefited trade in manufactured goods between developed countries. . . ."; and a review and analysis by Robert E. Baldwin of various explanations for differences in protection awarded to different industries or income classes. Several essays address empirical issues in import competition. J. David Richardson examines the operation of the trade adjustment provisions of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, comparing workers who received trade adjustment assistance to those receiving standard unemployment assistance; Ronald P. Dore details the adjustment of a Lancashire textile town; and Eric Verreydt and Jean Waelbroeck consider the European Community's reaction to manufactured imports from less developed countries. The book should be extremely useful to those interested in either or both theoretical and policy issues posed by import competition.

Managing Trade Relations in the 1980s: Issues Involved in the GATT Ministerial Meeting — 1982. Edited by Seymour J. Rubin and Thomas R. Graham. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984. 266 pps. $48.50. In late 1982, the Cabinet Ministers of GATT member nations met to discuss urgent issues in international trade. This book is a product of

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discussions organized by the American Society of International Law to assist U.S. representatives in preparing for that meeting. Nine essays by experts who frequently have had direct government experience in trade issues cover a variety of issues addressed by the 1982 meeting. Barriers to liberalized trade in services are analyzed, for example, and it becomes clear that opposition to such trade arises not only outside of but also within the United States. Recent congressional efforts to deal with reciprocity are examined and harshly criticized as unresponsive to actual problems and potentially self-defeating. GATT as an institution is also examined, in part in an effort to explain its past successes and present difficulties. This is a comprehensive and informative volume for students of international trade.

International Political Risk Management: New Dimensions. Edited by Fariborz Ghadar and Theodore H. Moran. Washington, D.C.: Ghadar and Associates, 1984. 220 pp. No. price given. Published under the auspices of Georgetown University and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the volume includes conference papers weighing investment opportunities in the developing world. Addresses political risks, including those facing lenders and equity investors.

Multinationals in a Changing Environment. By Adeoye A. Adkinsanya. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. 336 pp. $34.95. An attempt to thoroughly explore business-government relations in the Third World, particularly in relation to multinational corporations (MNC). In this study, Akinsanya addresses such issues as the role of multinationals in a changing environment; the role of multinationals in the development or underdevelopment of the Third World; and Third World responses to the multinational challenge. From the analysis the author concludes with several generalizations. First, MNCs are vehicles through which capital resources are transferred from capital-poor countries to capital-rich countries. Second, MNCs in fact destroy jobs in developing countries. Third, MNCs usually transfer inappropriate, obsolete, and over-priced technology to developing countries. Fourth, MNCs encourage inappropriate consumption patterns in host states. Fifth, MNCs contribute to the widening of the elite-mass gap and polarization of social forces in the host countries. Sixth, MNC operations in the Third World create a state of technological dependence that in turn impedes and stifles local development. On balance, this is a book well designed for classroom use; nevertheless, the reader should be warned that it reveals some biases and prejudices.

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WESTERN EUROPE

Too Secret Too Long. By Chapman Pincher. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 638 pp. $19.95. British investigative reporter Chapman Pincher is an angry man. In his latest book about the world of espionage, Pincher's anger focuses on the incompetence displayed by Britain's intelligence services in preventing the penetration of their organizations and the other branches of the British government by Soviet agents. Most of this book is devoted to substantiating Pincher's charge that Sir Roger Hollis, a former head of MI-5, was a Soviet agent. Pincher relies heavily on information supplied by disgruntled British intelligence officers who believe that Hollis was indeed working for the Soviet Union. Since Hollis is no longer living and refused to confess to charges that he was a Soviet agent during interrogations conducted after his retirement, there is no way of conclusively proving this sensational charge of treason. Pincher is forced to base his case on circumstantial evidence. Whether the charge is true or not, it nonetheless provoked a statement by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the House of Commons — printed as an appendix in *Too Secret Too Long* — asserting that Hollis was not a Soviet spy. In addition to the Hollis case, Pincher provides more information about the Cambridge ring of Soviet agents — Burgess, Maclean, Philby, and Blunt. While this book might have profited from better editing, it is entertaining and provides a great deal of information about the workings of British intelligence organizations.

France Today, Fifth edition, Introductory Studies. Edited by J. E. Flower. London and New York: Methuen, 1983. 259 pp. $9.95 (paper). A collection of articles on contemporary French life. The chapters, most written by British university scholars, cover aspects of French culture beginning with a comprehensive look at social structures and ending with chapters on the press and broadcast media. The chapter on foreign policy by Alan Clark is a thorough capsulization of French foreign policy from the sixties to the present. Other chapters examine political parties, trade unions, the problem of resident immigrants, education, and the Church. Missing is a chapter contrasting the various governments' domestic policies. In all, however, the collection is useful reading for an introductory course in contemporary French civilization.

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THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

Soviet Political Scientists and American Politics. By Neil Malcolm. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 225 pages. $25.00. This study briefly examines what Soviet Americanists have written about U.S. politics, society, and economic trends, and speculates on their effect on evolving Soviet perceptions and assessments of the United States. The author believes that Soviet Americanists "enjoy a dispensation" to study the United States in a way long denied their colleagues who write about the Soviet Union.

Rethinking the Soviet Experience. Politics and History Since 1917. By Stephen F. Cohen. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 222 pp. $17.95. Composed of chapters all but one of which have appeared elsewhere in an earlier form, this slim but provocative volume, often critical of the author's colleagues in the field of Soviet studies, re-examines contemporary Soviet politics in light of "new historical understandings." An entirely new chapter on the "political-intellectual history of Sovietology" deplores the cold-war "consensus political history" of post-1917 Russia that culminated in the totalitarian model. Cohen's urging that a respectful hearing be given all schools of thought, including the totalitarian one, is laudable but seems to conflict with his summary dismissal of more orthodox views. Professor of Soviet Politics and History at Princeton and a brilliant biographer of Bukharin, Cohen is also critical of some of the scholarship of Jerry Hough and E. H. Carr for their "overreaction to the revelatory zeal of cold-war Sovietology."

Lexicon of Soviet Political Terms. By Ilya Zemtsov. Fairfax, Va.: HERO Books, 1984. 279 pp. No price given. A guide to Soviet "officialese" that has degraded the Russian language, this collection of about 180 entries from "absenteeism" to "write-ups" provides even the Russian-reading specialist with new insight into Soviet semantic corruptions. The author, a responsible party worker before his emigration to Israel where he is Director of the Israeli Research Institute of Contemporary Society, notes in an informative introduction that the pervasiveness of Sovietisms means that the liberation of the individual from the illusions of Soviet Communism must begin with "linguistic dissent, i.e., liberation from the Soviet language."

Breaking With Moscow. By Arkady N. Shevchenko. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. 378 pp. $18.95. A major publishing event, the volume

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is the autobiography of the former U.N. Undersecretary General from his boyhood years in the Crimea to his defection in 1978. From his U.N. post, the author served for two years as a spy for the CIA and FBI before he was found out and sought asylum. Sentenced in Moscow to death in absentia, he has relied on his visibility to deter execution of the sentence. Drawing on his service as Andrei Gromyko's personal assistant from 1970 to 1973, Shevchenko has written a rich account of decision making at the highest level of the party and state apparatus. Gromyko, bored by the Third World and recurrent threats of instability in Eastern Europe, is portrayed as committed to détente with the United States as the best means of extending Soviet global power at American expense. By contrast, Boris Ponomarev, party secretary in charge of the Central Committee's International Department, is shown to disdain Gromyko's *realpolitik,* preferring to use Marxist "liberation" movements to achieve the same long-term objective. As this thumbnail sketch suggests, Western analysis of "hawks" and "doves" in the Kremlin oversimplifies the political dynamics of the Soviet system. A spy story in addition to sophisticated Kremlinology, the book is perhaps most gripping — and disturbing — in its portrayal of KGB operators using New York City as a playground, Central Park as Gorky Park.

The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938. By Jiri Hochman. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984. 253 pages. $29.95. Though much has already been written on the Soviet Union's participation in the West European efforts in the mid-1930s to foster collective security against the rising threat from Nazi Germany, this thoughtful, well-researched, and cogently argued study demonstrates that Moscow was never seriously committed to cooperation with the West. Stalin's aims were to renew a close relationship with Germany and complete his internal revolution. This sober, subtle analysis has contemporary, as well as historical, interest.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

Ethiopia: Politics, Economics and Society. By Peter Schwab. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1985. 134 pages. $18.50 ($10.00, paper). First in a series that will examine Marxist regimes, this volume focuses on the politics and ideology of Ethiopia under the rule of Mengistu

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Haile Mariam. The five chapters deal with history, political traditions and social structure; the political system; the economy; the regime's domestic and foreign policies; and concluding observations. For the most part, the data are known to those who follow developments in Ethiopia. The author's sympathies are with the regime, as evident from the following: "The country is more unified and more at peace with itself than it has been for decades. The Eritrean problem has been largely resolved, the Ogaden is slowly being reintegrated, and internal opponents are impotent. Politically, Ethiopia is truely at a take-off stage where it can move quickly to solidify socialism and socialist values" (p. 113). This optimistic reading of events in Ethiopia is rendered unbelievable by newspaper accounts of starvation, internecine warfare, and bloody repression.

The Soviet Impact in Africa. Edited by R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1984. 275 pages. $27.50. The various threads of Soviet policy in black Africa are traced and assessed in this collection of informative, balanced, and perceptive essays. Colin Legum and R. Craig Nation provide historical-political overviews; Christopher Coker, Seth Singleton, and Keith Somerville examine Soviet policy in southern Africa; Bernard von Plate analyzes the role of East Germany; Joachim Krause, Richard Remnek, Marina Ottaway, and Mark Kauppi write on arms transfers, Soviet military interests, the superpower rivalry in the Horn, and the dynamics and dilemmas of involvement, respectively.

Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background. Edited by B. R. Pridham. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 276 pp. $29.95. The result of a symposium on contemporary Yemen held in 1983 by Exeter University's Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, the seventeen essays cover seldom-trod ground, and in the process bring to light a great deal of solid and difficult to obtain information. Among the contemporary themes discussed, the following merit attention: nationbuilding and political development by John Peterson; the role of education in the nationbuilding process by Saeed Abdul Khair Al-Noban; tribal relations in Upper Yemen by Paul Dresch; Saudi-Yemeni relations by M. S. El Azhary; and Yemeni unity by Sultan Nagi.

Documents on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 1967-1983. Edited by Yehuda Lukacs. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 247 pp. $29.95. The present compendium of key documents and position statements of the key actors in the Israeli-Palestinian drama begins with U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, and ends with the joint Jordanian-PLO statement of April 10, 1983, which rejected

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Jordanian participation in the process proposed by President Reagan in September 1982. This is a useful addition to the growing number of documentary collections on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Pride and the Fall: Iran 1974-1979. By Anthony Parsons. London: Jonathan Cape; distributed in the United States by Merrimack Publishers' Circle, 1984. 160 pp. $15.95. As Britain's Ambassador to Iran, Anthony Parsons witnessed the demise of the Pahlavi dynasty. In a series of brief perceptive chapters, he provides fresh insights into the reasons for the Shah's collapse, the extent to which Western observers understood what was happening, and the options actually available to the West to try to forestall the fall of the Shah. This thoughtful book reveals how those close to the events are victims of their own illusions, bureaucratic inertia, and lack of will to impose direction.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan. Edited by Richard Tapper. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 463 pp. $35.00. Altogether sixteen essays, written by highly qualified anthropologists and historians, appear in this fascinating volume, whose production was triggered by the 1978 and 1979 revolutions in Afghanistan and Iran. The underlying theme is the reassessment of tribalism in the struggle for political and cultural self-determination, which today assumes the form of resistance to the Soviet-backed Marxist regime in Afghanistan, or the fundamentalist Islamic order of Iran. All contributions display great richness of material in their diversity of insights, showing tribalism in conflict with the organized power of the state. The range covered is vast, between 1800-1980, exemplified in the survival, until the twentieth century, of the two major tribal dynasties, the Durranis and the Qajars. After acknowledging the collective inability to produce a substantive definition of what the term *tribe* means, Tapper, who teaches anthropology at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, offers his own plea for the preservation of tribalism in the modern world: "Tribalism has its faults and limitations, but its provision of social security and its long-term survival value should recommend it as no anachronism in the last decades of the twentieth century."

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Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan, Anthropological Perspectives. Edited by M. Nazif Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield. Institute of International Studies. Berkeley: University of California, 1984. 394 pp. $14.95 (paper). In this extremely interesting volume, resulting from an anthropological symposium held in 1980, thirteen contributors, all having spent considerable time researching in the country, have tried to explain the roots of continuing upheaval in Afghanistan from the regional level of tribal and religious groups and associations, rather than to assess its international implications. The volume is divided into six parts. The first contains two introductory essays: while Louis Dupree chronicles the last twenty years of internal political developments, Nazif Shahrani offers his perceptive reflections on the relationship between the imported "Marxist Revolution" and Islamic resistance, showing, among others, that far from fulfilling the revolutionary aim of social justice, the "Marxist Revolution" has been in the first instance "a transfer of power, wealth, and privileges from the old elite to the new" (p. 23). The following three parts focus on specific regions, such as Nuristan, the province in which the first uprising against Kabul took place in 1978; on northern and northeastern Afghanistan; and on social conditions in the central and northwestern regions. Part V concentrates on the Pashtun tribes in the western and southeast corners of the country. The final section deals with the impact of revolutionary legislation on women in Afghanistan.

Siberia and the Soviet Far East: Resources for the Future. By Stuart Kirby. London: The Economist Intelligence Unit. Special Report No. 117, October 1984. 52pp. £60 or $120. Despite its astronomic price, this is a much needed report, filled with precious information for individuals or companies involved in energy and mineral commodity trade, as well as infrastructure equipment supplies. It is most timely, as the energy and mineral exploitation of Siberia and the Soviet Far East (SIBFE) has increased in the last few years to a fantastic proportion, more spectacular probably than that of Saudi Arabia or Brazil. This recent development is even more remarkable if one considers the vastness and inhospitability of SIBFE, which constitutes the largest land mass on earth. Although it accounts for some 57 percent of the total territory of the USSR, its population is a mere twenty-nine million (military personnel excluded), 86 percent Russian speaking. Its climate is severe, and communications poor. However, it is probably the most resource-rich region in the world, with the promise of even greater unexplored potential, since barely 10 percent of its surface has been surveyed until now. At present it accounts for 10 percent of the oil, 20 percent of the natural gas, and 40 percent of the coal reserves on our planet; with substantial other mineral (notably gold

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and diamonds) and forestry reserves, making the Soviet Union almost entirely self-sufficient, and leaving a substantial portion for export (over 60 percent of total Soviet exports). Moreover, SIBFE's strategic importance, since it lies on the main axis of Russia's historic eastward expansion and in the neighborhood of the dynamic nations of East Asia, can hardly be overestimated. It is, however, handicapped by its inadequate transport, poor housing and living conditions in a very harsh climate. All this, plus the painful shortcomings of Soviet bureaucracy, do not encourage permanent settlements in the new development zones in the area of permafrost. Professor Stuart Kirby, who has already produced several special reports for the EIU series, knows the USSR and East Asia extremely well. His report is divided into five parts dealing with the human element, the operational framework (labor, planning and transport), fuel and energy resources, minerals and forest products, and, finally, SIBFE's resources in relation to the outside world and its prospects for the future. He is skeptical about any dramatic change in the modest foreign capital participation during this decade, not only in view of the recent deterioration in East-West relations, but mainly due to the prohibitive cost-effectiveness and, above all, the Communist system. Kirby predicts, however, that any future U.S. sanctions may have relatively little effect and could be in fact counterproductive; Western Europe and Japan, as they do largely today in any case, will continue to supply equipment for the Siberian gas pipelines. A new U.S. boycott, as Kirby demonstrates in a number of examples, would only act as a catalyst on the USSR's efforts to spur its internal technological and engineering development. The report has sixteen very useful tables and two maps.

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

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

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